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A
HISTORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY

BY

THE HON. J. W. FORTESCUE, LL.D. EDIN.

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A History of The British Army

BY

THE HON. J. W. FORTESCUE, LL.D. EDIN.

HONORARY FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

VOL. IX

1813-1814

Quae caret ora cruore nostro?

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PREFACE TO VOLUMES IX. AND X.

THESE two volumes were finished at the end of the year 1915, when, owing to the war, it was impossible to find a competent cartographer to complete the maps. Publication was, therefore, perforce deferred; and meanwhile in February 1916 I reluctantly and after two refusals accepted the task of writing the official history of the war that ended in 1918. I was thus divorced from the work of my life for nearly four years.

After the conclusion of the armistice the maps were again taken in hand; and in the course of the year 1919 the two volumes were sent to the printer. The labour of putting even one volume of this work through the press is, in the most favourable circumstances, very great; and in the case of these two volumes it was incredibly arduous. For one thing, the Pyrenees have never been surveyed, except in the most superficial fashion, on the Spanish side of the frontier, and are not too well mapped even on the French side. I had visited the battlefields and made copious notes respecting the ground in 1903; but there were many doubtful points, complicated by the uncertainty of Basque nomenclature, which I had intended to clear up by a second visit in the autumn

of 1914. The war, however, made any such thing impossible.

Next, it was not easy, after following for three years the operations of our army in every sphere of action from the Western front to East Africa, to recall readily the details of the extremely intricate manœuvres of 1813-1814 in the Pyrenees. I do not say that the time spent over the war with Germany was wholly unprofitable to me, for I could assure myself at least of two things, that all the old mistakes of former wars were repeated in high quarters between 1914 and 1918, and that the prowess of the British soldier was worthily maintained. But it was very trying to turn abruptly from the Ypres salient to the battle of Sorauren and from Anzac Cove to the passage of the Adour ; and I am afraid that some mistakes may have been left unamended in consequence.

Lastly, the distractions of a second heavy task while correcting the proof-sheets of these volumes may, I fear, have prevented me from giving due attention to the correct spelling of place-names. The material from which the narrative of these campaigns is compiled is written mainly in six languages—English, German, French, Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian. There is sometimes considerable variation in the spelling of names in these tongues ; and I am apprehensive lest occasionally I may have used, say, the French form of a name in one passage and the Spanish in another. If I have been guilty of such slips, I must ask for lenient judgment from my readers.

Having of my own motion resigned the official

history early in 1919 and taken absolute leave of it from the end of that year, I am now at liberty to complete this present history, to the year 1870, as I had originally designed. But whether I can permit myself such a luxury is another question. I should have done better for myself, financially, if, instead of devoting over twenty years of intense labour to this book, I had served for the same period as a private of the infantry of the line, without any of the increases of emolument granted to the soldier since 1895, without any such additions as good conduct pay or marksman's pay, and without prospect of promotion or pension. So great was the strain during the first ten years that I must have abandoned the work in 1905, had not King Edward taken me into his household as his Librarian, and His present Majesty continued me in the same capacity ; both giving me all possible sympathy in the prosecution of my historical work during such hours as I could spare from their service. Their gracious encouragement tided me over another eleven years ; and I cannot feel sufficiently grateful for it.

Now, however, a new crisis has arisen for me. Taxation and enhanced prices reduce the incomes of professional men, practically, by two-thirds. The wages of paper-makers, ink-makers and printers range, I am told, from £3 to £10 a week. Those of the historian, whose brain alone gives the printed page its value, remain at their old level of something under fourteen shillings a week. Let it not be thought that I complain. Better men than I have done far greater things for smaller reward ; and I have at least had the

joy of my work. Moreover, there is something in the situation which appeals strongly to my sense of the ridiculous. Sixty or seventy years ago, in the earlier and, as many consider, the benighted years of Queen Victoria's reign, the historian was counted worthy of his hire. In these enlightened days, after fifty years of free education (or something that is called by that name), he is reckoned so no longer. So much the worse for the historian. Henceforward Clio's doors are barred to men, myself among them, who have not considerable private means. Putting myself out of the way as of no importance, I fear that I must still add, So much the worse for history.

If, therefore, this history should end with the Tenth Volume, I hope that the incident will not be ascribed to backwardness on my part, but to the simple fact that I can no longer afford myself the pleasure of writing it. But I shall do my utmost to complete it for several reasons.

In the first place, I heard—indirectly—some two years ago that the General Staff considers my history invaluable. I do not set great store by this. The General Staff has, as a rule, to pay heavily for all that it obtains, and is not always favoured by the Treasury ; consequently its judgment may have been biassed by the ease with which it acquired the fruits of over twenty years of labour and research, giving absolutely nothing in return. But, if the book be useful to the General Staff and so to the country, I should be glad to increase its usefulness.

Next, I firmly believe that the great traditions of

the Army, which it is my effort to record, are the true secret of its strength. It was the memory of past achievements that carried the glorious band, which we fondly term "The Old Contemptibles," through the supreme trials in France and Flanders in 1914, that strengthened the 29th Division in April 1915 to snatch from the Turks the southern end of the Gallipoli Peninsula—one of the grandest feats of arms ever accomplished by any troops,—and that drove other Turks from the Delta of the Euphrates in the spring of the same year. It was the old Army that set the standard for the new Armies, and without that standard the new Armies would for long have been naught.

Next, I owe much to those officers, distinguished and undistinguished, who from time to time have written to me from all parts of the world, asking for a new volume. Many of these will write no more letters and read no more books; yet not the less, but rather the more, shall I strive to give them what was their desire. It is for them that I have laboured gratefully for the best part of a quarter of a century; and for them, if it be possible, I should wish to labour still.

Last, but not least, there is one very near to me who vows that the History of the British Army must and shall be completed by me to the year 1870, and is toiling strenuously to enable that vow to be fulfilled. Whether the end be worth the sacrifice I cannot tell; but to her the credit will be due if my life's work be carried to its appointed close.

J. W. F.

5th February 1920.

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BOOK XV

CHAPTER I

WHILE the war in Spain was proceeding, as has been 1812. narrated, Napoleon had begun, continued and ended his Russian campaign. By gigantic exertions he had not only assembled nearly five hundred thousand men on the eastern border of Poland, but had accumulated also vast magazines and huge masses of transport for their subsistence. It is true that the organisation of this transport, being new, was faulty; that many carriages and waggons lagged far behind the army, and indeed never joined it; and that the men and officers appointed to this particular department showed lack both of zeal and of intelligence. Nevertheless it may be said that whatever forethought could provide for this vast expedition was provided by Napoleon, and that there was one detail only in which his preparations were defective. That detail was the supply of forage; and it may be admitted that, until the invention of the steam-engine, dearth of forage was an almost insuperable difficulty in the conduct of a campaign; for, if animals are to carry or draw their own food, it is plain that they can have little strength left to endure any further burden. Cavalry-horses, having already a man and his victuals on their backs, can bear but little forage in addition; artillery and baggage-horses, having already a heavy load behind them, can drag but little more. In Russia itself, a country of wood and marshes, there was little for the animals but green rye, an unwholesome food; while on the Polish border the accumulation of a hundred thousand animals soon swept away every

1812. scrap of fodder. Hence many of the horses entered upon the campaign weak and in bad condition ; and a heavy thunderstorm, following suddenly upon sultry heat, destroyed ten thousand of them on the first day of the passage of the Niemen. So staggering a loss naturally crippled all branches of the army ; and the transport-service seems to have broken down from the very first.

In a few days great numbers of the soldiers were starving ; and Napoleon, though he fulminated orders against marauding, was obliged to connive at it. The best of his generals, by reducing the practice to system and order, contrived in great measure both to prevent waste and to preserve subordination ; but others allowed their men to maraud as individuals, for their own profit only ; and among the troops commanded by these last discipline soon became very seriously impaired. The weakly men died by hundreds ; the stronger straggled all over the country, plundering every house and even the transport-waggons of the army. Mortier declared that the track of the host resembled rather that of a routed than of an invading army. Moreover, though Napoleon exerted his utmost skill, he for long could not bring his enemies to a general action. He had reckoned, as usual, upon disconcerting them by rapidity of movement, crushing them with a single blow, and receiving immediate overtures for peace. On the contrary, though he traversed the country with great speed, considering all the circumstances, he could never overtake the Russians, and, after several partial engagements, he was obliged when he reached Vitepsk on the July 28. 28th of July to make a prolonged halt. By that time between killed, wounded, sick, and stragglers, his ranks had been depleted by a hundred thousand men.

For a time he thought of ending the campaign of 1812 at that point ; but he was roused by an offensive Aug. 8. advance of the Russians, who on the 8th of August gained a slight success over his advanced guard. There-upon on the 13th he resumed his march eastward ; but

after inflicting upon him a bloody repulse before ^{1812.} Smolensk on the 18th, the Russians again fell back ; ^{Aug. 18.} and, having sustained with the utmost gallantry a furious attack upon their rear-guard on the following day, they made good their retreat, setting fire to every town and village as they passed. At Borodino by the river Moskowa they turned and stood at bay with a force of one hundred and thirty thousand men ; and on the 7th of September the Emperor attacked them there ^{Sept. 7.} with about the same number of troops—all that were left of some three hundred thousand under his immediate command that had crossed the Niemen. On the night of the 6th Napoleon had received the news of Marmont's defeat at Salamanca, which made a great victory more than ever vital to him, but he could accomplish no more than a second Eylau. Fifty thousand men fell on each side ; and it was only possible for the French to claim success because the Russians on the morrow made ^{Sept. 8.} for a short distance an orderly retreat towards Moscow.

Their commanders, however, decided not to defend the city ; and the French, when they entered it on the 14th of September, found it deserted. The rest of the ^{Sept. 14.} story is well known. In the early hours of the 15th a ^{Sept. 15.} great fire was kindled in Moscow which, in spite of all the efforts of the French to quench it, continued for the next five days, and only ceased when four-fifths of the houses had been laid in ashes. Meanwhile the troops of all ranks gave themselves up to indiscriminate pillage, taking leave of all discipline, in order to indemnify themselves for the hardships of their long march. The peasants from the neighbouring villages began to bring in food, but being pillaged by marauders soon ceased to do so. Certain descriptions of supplies, notably liquor, were found in abundance in the cellars of the houses, but forage was almost unobtainable ; and the relaxation of discipline forbade any systematic collection and distribution of victuals for the common advantage. Whether among soldiers or civilians there is nothing so wasteful as anarchy.

1812. Meanwhile the Russians under Kutusoff made a circuitous march round the south of the city, and occupied an entrenched camp midway between Kaluga and Moscow, where, with abundance of victuals and a steady influx of recruits, their spirits and strength were restored. The conclusion of peace by Russia with Turkey and with Sweden also enabled two corps of about fifty thousand men each to march from south and north simultaneously upon the French communications. But pending the execution, necessarily spread over weeks, of this huge combined movement, swarms of Cossacks practically surrounded the French army in Moscow, cutting off all foraging parties, and sweeping in prisoners by scores and even hundreds. Napoleon early became anxious as to his situation ; but staggered by the extreme difficulty of escaping from it with honour, and hoping always that the Tsar would make or accept overtures for peace, remained inactive.

- To lull him the more surely into false security the autumn of 1812 was in Russia singularly mild. Not until the 13th of October did the first shower of snow warn him to make more serious preparations for
- Oct. 18. retreat. A few days later, on the 18th of October, Kutusoff taking the offensive surprised the French advanced guard under Murat, which had neglected all military precautions, and captured fifteen hundred prisoners and over thirty guns. Thereupon Napoleon
- Oct. 19. set his whole army in motion on the 19th, and marched upon Kaluga with rather over one hundred thousand men and six hundred guns, followed by some forty thousand followers with an endless train of vehicles of every description, bearing the plunder of the Grand Army. The advanced corps of both armies met at
- Oct. 24. Malo-jaroslavitz on the 24th, where a desperate combat ensued, the French fighting to ensure their retreat by a new route with abundance of supplies, the Russians struggling doggedly to delay them until Kutusoff should come up with the main body. By nightfall the French had gained the upper hand on the spot ; but

the Russians had made time for Kutusoff to mass one hundred thousand men on some heights a mile or two to the rear, astride of the road to Kaluga. On the 25th Napoleon, after a narrow escape from capture by a party of Cossacks, reconnoitred Kutusoff's position and recognised it as unassailable. That night he gave the order for regaining the route of his advance, and for retreat upon Smolensk. By a strange fatality Kutusoff, apparently losing his nerve, at this same moment issued directions for his army also to retire upon Kaluga; but Napoleon knew nothing of this, and at daybreak of the 26th the two hosts turned their backs upon each other, and marched the one to the southward and to plenty, the other northward to death and destruction. 1812.
Oct. 25.

For the first week the march of the French was little troubled by the enemy, and the weather, though cold at night, was dry and clear; but none the less the army had already degenerated in great measure into a rabble. The men were above all intent upon bringing their booty into France, and, as the draught-animals dropped down by hundreds daily from want of forage, and the soldiers were occupied rather with the security of their possessions than with obedience to military command, the line of march was a scene of incurable disorder. On the 2nd of November Kutusoff's advanced troops, having followed the French by a parallel route on the south, cut in upon Davoust's corps which formed the rear-guard, and handled it so roughly that it was obliged to yield the post of danger to Ney's corps for the rest of the retreat. On the 6th of November the winter began in earnest; the exhausted horses perished by thousands on the slippery roads, and the starving men fought for the miserable carcases that formed their only food. Nov. 2.
Nov. 6.

At length between the 9th and the 13th the survivors drifted into Smolensk rather as a mob of stragglers than as an army, and made a rush for the magazines accumulated there by Napoleon. They had fondly hoped that

1812. arrival at this town signified the end of their sufferings, and Napoleon himself had trusted that it would be so. But the magazines, though gigantic, had been depleted by the constant passage of reinforcements and retiring soldiers. There was flour, but neither bread, biscuit nor meat; and the unhappy men discovered that Smolensk was no better than any other bivouac. Moreover, Napoleon learned here that the Russian armies from Moldavia and Finland had closed, the one from the south and the other from the north, upon the Prussian and Austrian corps that protected his flanks, had forced both of them back, and were converging upon his line of communications.
- Nov. 14. He therefore continued the retreat on the 14th with an army, including detachments picked up at Smolensk and elsewhere, of seventy thousand men, about forty thousand of whom could still be reckoned as soldiers. Kutusoff, marching parallel with him, attacked different sections of this force on the 15th, 16th and 17th, and, though he failed to overwhelm it completely, killed or wounded ten thousand of the French, and captured twenty-six thousand prisoners besides over one hundred guns. The Grand Army was thus reduced to about ten thousand soldiers and four times as many stragglers; but now Kutusoff, whose troops had suffered greatly, relinquished the pursuit and left the final destruction of the French to the armies of Moldavia and Finland.
- Nov. 23. On the 23rd Napoleon was joined by Victor's corps of reserve, which raised his strength to about thirty thousand fighting men; but the passage of the river Beresina cost him about twelve thousand dead and sixteen thousand prisoners; and this action, though eternally honourable to the French Army and to its great leader, reduced Victor's corps to the level of the helpless crowd which had marched from Moscow. The survivors from thenceforward floundered to westward as a mere mob of forty thousand broken men.
- Nov. 26-28. The worst was still to come. On the 30th of November the cold, which had ceased for a few days,

returned with terrible severity. The horses of the 1812. reserve died as rapidly as those of the Grand Army; and Ney, who had conducted the rear-guard with unfailing courage and skill, could hardly scrape together three thousand soldiers to keep the pursuing Cossacks at bay. On the 5th of December Napoleon started for Dec. 5. Paris with three companies to look to the creation of a new army, and the withdrawal of his authority gave the finishing touch to the disorganisation of his troops. The cold grew more and more intense until it became absolutely arctic; and the reinforcements, amounting to at least thirty thousand men, which met the wreck of the great host that had marched to Moscow, melted away in a few days. Barely forty thousand men reached Vilna on the 9th of December, and not ten thousand of Dec. 9. these bore any resemblance to soldiers. In this town there was abundance of food; but, before the starving fugitives could enjoy twenty-four hours' rest, there was a cry that the Cossacks were upon them, and every man who could move took to flight. Fourteen thousand men and over two hundred officers, so utterly exhausted that not even a panic could persuade them to forsake food and shelter, were taken in the town, and the vast magazines were plundered impartially by Russians and French. Ney, the indomitable, alone had strength and courage to collect a few soldiers together and to form some kind of a rear-guard.

So the retreat continued, the Cossacks gathering in prisoners by thousands, and on the 13th about twenty Dec. 13. thousand men, and of whom perhaps three thousand had marched the whole distance from Moscow, filed over the bridge of the Niemen to Kowno. Ney, who was the last man to leave Russian territory, collected seven hundred men and twenty-four guns from the garrison of Kowno to hold the bridge for a time against the enemy; and the twenty thousand drifted on westward to Königsberg, Dantzig, and Posen. Even then many died of the sudden transition from cold, hardship and starvation to comfort and plenty. The total loss of

1812. the French is set down at from four to five hundred thousand men, over one half of them killed in action or dead through wounds and starvation, and nearly two hundred thousand prisoners. But for the prolonged heroism of Ney it is possible that not a soul, except the two flanking corps to north and south, would have recrossed the Niemen.

Throughout the campaign the British Ministers received early information of its progress from their commissioners with the Russian army, and as a natural consequence passed through many phases of hope and despair. Liverpool, whose judgment was remarkably clear and calm, perceived from the first that, if the Russians persevered in a defensive system, the most sanguine expectations might be realised; and, on receiving the news of the battle of Borodino, he realised at once that Napoleon's situation had never in the course of his career been more critical. The intelligence of the capture of Moscow came ominously late, and there was a short spasm of alarm lest reluctance to reveal this truth should portend a resolution in the Tsar to make peace; but, when once it was known that Russia was determined to continue her resistance at all costs, the spirits of the British Cabinet rose high. Before the end of the year detailed accounts of large captures of prisoners and guns showed that their exultation was justified, and that the great enemy was in serious difficulties at last.¹

Ministers had need of some encouragement, for their troubles had been many and great, and their proceedings during the year 1812 were not only severely criticised at the time, but are still held up to them as a reproach. It was of course a bitter disappointment to the nation at large that Wellington's campaign, which had begun so brilliantly, should have ended in a retreat; and the echo of that disappointment, loudly repeated by Napier, still governs the tone of all comments upon the operations. The gist of the charges against Ministers was

¹ *Wellington Supp. Desp.* vii. 401, 403, 412, 446, 462.

that they had failed to strengthen Wellington either ^{1812.} with troops or with money, as they could and should have done; and that, in consequence of their delinquency, the plans of their General had been upset and the fruits of his victories sacrificed. Fifteen thousand additional men sent out to the Peninsula early in the year would (so it was contended) have enabled Wellington to hold the ground that he had won. The troops at home were so numerous that such a number could easily have been spared; and the difficulty of paying for them, and indeed of meeting the expenses of the war at large, could have been overcome if Government had been content to purchase dollars in South America, or to employ private agents instead of the Bank of England to make good its requirements in specie.

Since the question of money underlay all the other troubles, it will be best to deal with it first, though much of the subject is extremely obscure. Lord Wellesley, who certainly had had an opportunity of ascertaining the facts, declared in the House of Lords that dollars in abundance could have been purchased from South America if the Government had been content to pay the market-price on the spot instead of waiting until the specie had reached the Peninsula. He also asserted, and with undeniable truth, that the British Commissaries in the Mediterranean and the Peninsula had bid against each other for such supplies of specie as were in the market, and that Bentinck had deprived Wellington of two million dollars by paying sixpence apiece more for them than Wellington had been empowered to offer.¹ As Bathurst's answer to Wellesley is very imperfectly reported, whereas Wellesley's speech was evidently supplied to the printers in full, it is impossible to say what the Government's defence against these accusations may have been. But it must be remarked that, even if the charges were just, they reflect blame as much upon the administration of Castlereagh and Pitt as upon

¹ Six shillings and twopence against five shillings and eightpence.

1812. that of Liverpool and Bathurst, or of Perceval and of his incompetent successor at the Exchequer, Vansittart.

The dearth of specie was no new thing ; and I find it impossible to believe that, if dollars had been so easily obtainable as Wellesley represented, Castlereagh would not have found some means of getting hold of them. Wellesley's financial criticisms are evidently based upon the letters of the British Consul at Cadiz, which show that private individuals obtained the lion's share of the specie landed at that port from South America ; but whether his strictures are sound or not is another question. His own financial measures, as he had proved in India, were of the heroic kind, which take more careful account of the object to be immediately purchased than of the liability to be ultimately incurred. His method, too, was not that favoured by his brother Arthur who, noticing that specie came to Lisbon in every packet, would have had the Government employ private agents to buy it in England in competition with private speculators.¹ Which of the two illustrious brothers was in the right I will not take upon me to determine ; but, considering that Great Britain was in alliance with Spain and that the Spanish colonies were in revolt against her, it is easy to understand that any direct dealings with the colonies, which might tend to enrich or relieve them at the expense of the mother country, might lead to very serious complications.

In truth the difficulties arising from the dearth of specie reached their climax in 1812. Owing to the huge demand for coin in Russia the price of silver rose so high that the worth of British silver tokens exceeded their face-value, while the depreciation of paper and the unfavourable exchange in the same country promised a profit of thirty per cent to any speculator who should purchase British silver or gold, even at its advanced price, and send it to a Russian port. Hitherto Ministers had frequently empowered agents to buy gold and silver in

¹ In his despatch he speaks of bullion, but evidently in the sense of coined gold and silver. *Supp. Desp.* vii. 439.

large quantities wherever they could do so without 1812. competing with the Bank of England ; but now they found that everything was seized for Russia before they could even make an offer. The Bank itself had exhausted its store of foreign gold and of bar-gold, and had nothing left but guineas, which it was illegal either to export or to exchange for more than their nominal value. At his wits' end to meet the urgent demands of Wellington, Bathurst, by straining the letter of the law, contrived to remit £400,000 in guineas to Wellington under a clause which authorised the Privy Council to demand gold for the payment of troops. But he deliberately violated the law, and took all responsibility for the act, by instructing Wellington to expend the money as he might think best, whether for payment of the soldiers or for the discharge of other debts. He knew very well the danger to which he exposed himself if military affairs in the Peninsula should go wrong, or if a new panic should arise in England owing to the scarcity of specie. The governing body of the Bank itself, grudging the withdrawal of so large a quantity of gold, had protested privately against it by a formal resolution ; and there was sufficient political animus among its members to ensure that, in case of mishap, the transaction would be revealed in an odious light to Parliament. There a Whig Opposition, whose leaders disdained not for mere party advantage to condone a breach of trust in a disloyal member of Wellington's staff, was not likely to spare a Minister who for purely patriotic motives had committed himself to an illegality. Bathurst's unselfish conduct furnishes a sufficient comment upon the reckless abuse which has been heaped upon Lord Liverpool's administration for neglecting to support Wellington in the Peninsula.¹

¹ *Wellington MSS.* Bathurst to Wellington, 22nd Sept., 23rd Oct., 1812. It is difficult to say why these letters should not have been printed in *Supplementary Despatches*, particularly as there is an allusion to the business in vol. vii. p. 499. Napier's summary of the position is characteristic : "Real money had indeed nearly disappeared from England, and a base paper had usurped its place ;

1812. So much for the question of specie, which lay at the root of all the Government's difficulties at this period, for it was very obviously futile to despatch additional troops to the Peninsula, unless coin could be supplied to pay the cost of their wages and of the transport necessary for feeding them in the field. Since, however, the stinting of reinforcements has been cast into the teeth of Ministers apart from all other considerations, it is worth while to go more deeply into that question. In the first place it must be stated that Ministers expected Bentinck to send a much larger reinforcement to Alicante and to send it much earlier than he did. They had given him instructions which, so far as was possible in the circumstances, bound him to make the east coast of Spain his principal object, and they were much annoyed and disappointed when he deliberately set them at nought.¹ Bentinck's stupidity and conceit must also be held accountable for his outbidding of Wellington in the purchase of two million dollars, the want of which greatly crippled the latter during his summer campaign, and accounted in some measure for the indiscipline shown by the army on the retreat from Burgos. But setting this aside, we must proceed to examine the general question whether the Government might not have reinforced Wellington more efficiently during the campaign of 1812; and in doing so we must bear in mind that the General had applied in particular for an increase of cavalry.

The establishment of the Army at home for 1812 was set down at fifty-three thousand men, exclusive of foreign, veteran and garrison regiments, and also of

but gold had not disappeared from the world, and an able Ministry would have found it." No one could infer from this that England had been dependent upon a paper currency since the beginning of 1797, and that the Ministry did actually find gold for Wellington.

¹ Liverpool to Wellington, 19th Aug. 1812. *Supp. Desp.* vii. 401. Napier's assertion that "the Ministry permitted Lord William Bentinck to engage in the scheme of invading Italy" is false, as any man may see who reads the instructions sent to Bentinck under date 14th March 1812.

artillery. It is, however, improbable that the establish- 1812.
ment was fully maintained, and large deductions must
be made for boys and for raw recruits unfit for service ;
so that it will not be safe to reckon the regular soldiers
in the British Isles at more than forty-five thousand.
Three regiments of cavalry¹ had joined Wellington in
winter quarters after the campaign of 1811, and may
therefore be accounted reinforcements of 1812. After
their departure sixteen mounted regiments of all
descriptions still remained in England, of which the
three household regiments and three more of Hussars
sailed for the Peninsula late in the year, and must be
considered as reinforcements of 1813. At the begin-
ning of 1812 there were likewise forty-five battalions of
British infantry at home, many of them mere skeletons,
but others of a fair strength. Seven of these battalions
were added to Wellington's army in the course of 1812,
but three² only arrived in time to take any serious part
in the campaign ; and the remaining four³ must there-
fore be treated as reinforcements of 1813. In addition
to these new corps nearly ten thousand drafts were sent
out to the Peninsula in the course of the year ; but it
was reckoned that, after the 1st of January 1812, not
more than seven thousand men of all descriptions joined
the army before the battle of Salamanca, and not above
three thousand more before the close of the operations
in November. The opponents of the Government
declared that at least fifteen thousand men might have
been spared as easily before as after the battle of Sala-
manca, and that, if such a number had been despatched
to the Peninsula, they would have enabled Wellington
to make the campaign decisive.

Dismissing this last contention as ridiculous, let us
see how far the Government was justified in keeping so
large a force, especially of cavalry, at home when rein-
forcements were so urgently needed in Spain. It is

¹ 5th D.G., 1st and 2nd D., K.G.L. ² 38th, 42nd, 82nd.

³ 1/1st Guards, 6th, 20th, 91st. The Guards, it will be
remembered, joined the army during the retreat from Burgos.

1812. certain that Torrens at the Horse Guards had long been anxious to send out more mounted troops to Wellington,¹ and it now appears that Ministers were of the same mind, but were overborne by the Prince Regent, who was full of ideas of operations in the North. Indeed, it was only with infinite difficulty that the Prince was persuaded to send a brigade of hussars to Spain.

Further, it must be remembered that at that time there were no police either in England or in Ireland, and that dragoons were of the utmost importance not only for the preservation of order but for the preventive service of the revenue. Ireland was as usual in a state of disturbance and could not be left without a large garrison, a fact which the Opposition endeavoured to get over by the argument, since proved to be absurd, that the concession of the Catholic claims would by magic have restored immediate content. But it so chanced that England was also full of unrest during the greater part of 1812. The price of food was high everywhere; and in Lancashire and Yorkshire the introduction of new machinery had raised up the dangerous rioters known as Luddites, who went from factory to factory destroying the new plant, murdering individuals, burning houses and seizing arms, the whole being directed by a secret organisation so perfect that their movements could not be foreseen nor could evidence be gathered as to the actual perpetrators of outrage. Furious combats were maintained by these men against the troops, who were frequently compelled to fire; and on one occasion, at Middleton, five and twenty rioters were killed before order could be restored. Five regiments of cavalry were required permanently to maintain order in the disturbed districts of Yorkshire and Lancashire and Cheshire alone; and, since the tumults over the dearth of food extended as far south as Truro, it is not

¹ E.g. *Wellington MSS.* Torrens to Wellington, 28th June 1811. "I wish you had still more cavalry. The Hussar brigade was reviewed at Hounslow a few days ago, and I could not help wishing it had been with you." Sydenham to Wellington, 8th Dec. 1812 (passage omitted from the letter printed in *S.D.* vii. 295).

surprising that the Government felt unwilling to weaken 1812. the British garrison much further. An additional justification for this reluctance lay in the number of French prisoners confined in the British Isles, and in the very disgraceful readiness of French officers to violate their parole. Since 1809 nearly seven hundred French merchant-captains and military officers had thus dishonoured themselves—brave men such as Brenier and Philippon among them—and four hundred and fifty had actually effected their escape. Finally it must be observed that Wellington had particularly requested that soldiers should not be sent to him except early in the year, because, if they arrived at the opening of the unhealthy season—the summer—they simply served to fill the hospitals, and were something worse than unprofitable.¹

But in addition to troubles at home there was trouble abroad. First and foremost there was the American war; and, although Ministers with great moral courage had announced that they could send no reinforcements to Canada, a British possession, but must keep every man for Spain, a foreign country, it was too much to expect that they should not reserve a few battalions for North America in case of need. The West Indies too, though outwardly quiet, might at any time demand three or four thousand men; for the foreign levies which formed the garrison of the islands were not to be trusted. Yet the critics of the British Government appeared to think that there was no demand for British troops except in the Peninsula. What, they asked, was the use of keeping soldiers idle at home, when there was abundance of work for them abroad, and the bulk of Napoleon's armies were employed in Russia? Very much of this censure was founded on wisdom after the event. If Ministers could have foreseen that Napoleon's superb army would be annihilated by the Russian snows, no doubt they would have sent to Spain every troop and company that they could have scraped together;

¹ Wellington to Liverpool, 10th April 1812. *Supp. Desp.* vii. 313.

1812. but for weeks after the fall of Moscow they dreaded lest the Emperor should return to Paris victorious.

Moreover, it is idle to say that the soldiers at home might just as well have been in the Peninsula; for in Spain they cost exactly twenty-five per cent more than at home. It is equally idle to contend that large sums expended in barracks, clothing for Spanish soldiers, and so forth, had better have been devoted to the pay and transport of Wellington's army; for the former could be paid for in paper, and the latter only in specie, obtained at a ruinous cost. Liverpool had wisely and rightly abjured Pitt's system of great spasmodic effort, followed by helpless collapse, in favour of a policy of steady, even and sustained endeavour. When the right moment should arrive, Ministers were ready to concentrate the whole of England's military resources for the striking of one supreme blow. But had that moment come in 1812? Castlereagh thought that it had come in 1809, and had sent his great expedition to Walcheren because he could not afford the specie to send it to Spain, and because Wellington had told him that he could not have fed the men even if they had been sent to him. If Wellington had had thirty thousand more men directly after Salamanca, it is extremely doubtful whether he could have fed them in the first place;¹ and whether, if he had managed to feed them, he could have driven the French across the Pyrenees. Moreover, if Napoleon had returned victorious from Russia in the winter, the Allies would certainly have been forced back to Portugal in 1813. Ministers therefore judged that the time for the supreme effort had not yet come in 1812.

¹ Napier slurs over this difficulty by the remark that there were provisions for 100,000 men for nine months in Wellington's magazines. Napoleon had a vastly greater supply than this in his magazines in Russia and Poland, yet his army was annihilated by starvation. Any fool can fill a magazine; but it needs a great organiser to carry the food from the magazines to an army in the field. There are times when Napier's political bias makes him positively childish.

There can be no doubt that they were right. A very 1813. few days after his arrival at Moscow Napoleon had required from France one hundred and fifty thousand, and from Italy a second batch of thirty thousand conscripts ; and on his arrival in Paris after the great disaster he set himself with transcendent energy to create, train and equip a new army. He called up another hundred thousand men from the conscriptions of former years, and yet another hundred thousand from the National Guard. His ingenuity and shamelessness when raising men were marvellous. It was absolutely illegal to require the National Guard to serve beyond the French frontier, so he gave out that they had volunteered to do so. After the same manner he exacted thousands of men and horses, and indeed of fully equipped cavalry, from various districts of France, pretending that they had been presented to the State as a patriotic gift by the inhabitants. Finally in January 1813 he summoned one hundred and fifty thousand men of the conscription of 1814, making a total of between five and six hundred thousand men summoned to the colours within three months. The levy, however, was not raised without infinite difficulty, the more so inasmuch as great numbers of gendarmes had already been withdrawn from France for service in Spain. Self-mutilation increased alarmingly among the conscripts ; and tens of thousands of them, particularly in Belgium and Italy, fled to the mountains and forests, or deserted before they could be brought to the barrack-yard. It was reckoned that in May 1813 there were over one hundred and fifty thousand refractory conscripts at large in France alone. Napoleon met the difficulty only by demanding scores of thousands more, and pressing into the service even those who had paid large sums—from £400 to £500 sterling—for substitutes. Good faith and the observation of the law counted for nothing with him in the hour of need.

Hardly had the numbers of his levies been fixed before his busy brain was occupied with their organisa-

1813. tion. His armies in Spain were skimmed, as we shall see, of some of their cream in order to furnish the nuclei of new battalions and squadrons and of a new National Guard ; and then, amid a thousand difficulties, the means for supplying these with arms, clothing, equipment and horses were devised, with more or less success. Before Napoleon had been in Paris a month he was already distributing the new levies into "corps of observation" of the Elbe, of the Rhine, and of Italy, which in a few months' time were to become armies. And, amazing though it may seem, in spite of refractory conscripts, the work went forward on the whole with smoothness, although there was deep inward discontent. Among the better educated classes there was a general opinion that it was time for the Emperor to be gone ; but the mass of the population, which trusted him to preserve for them the fruits of the Revolution, was still on his side ; and, while this feeling endured, he could count upon young officers and young soldiers. If therefore he could still retain Austria and Prussia as his allies, he might yet hope to save the greater part of his Empire. If, on the other hand, one or the other should turn against him, he might expect to beat them in isolation, before Russia, whose armies had suffered from the pursuit almost as much as his own from the retreat, could bring forward any great force to join in combating him.

On his way from Russia to Paris Napoleon on the 14th of December had sent emissaries to Austria and Prussia, calling upon them to increase their contingents with the French army to sixty thousand and thirty thousand men respectively. Frederick William answered with protestations of friendship, but added that the limitation of his troops by treaty made compliance very difficult, though it would be facilitated by the withdrawal of the French garrisons from the Prussian fortresses. His caution was justifiable, for Augereau had twelve thousand troops in Berlin, and Macdonald's corps, of which the Prussian contingent formed a part,

was absolutely intact ; and the King decided that at all costs he must preserve an appearance of friendly relations with France, until he could ascertain whether Austria would throw in her lot with Prussia against Napoleon. The policy was difficult of execution, for the German national movement under the powerful impulse of Stein was running high, and the people were strongly inclined to look on Frederick William as a traitor, and to go their own way. But the question was presently decided by the action of a Prussian subordinate. Upon the disastrous retreat of Napoleon's centre from Russia, his left flank guard, Macdonald's corps, was obliged to fall back likewise from Mittau to Tilsit, entrusting the protection of his rear to General York and the Prussian contingent. True to the secret understanding between the two countries, the Russian pursuers gave York little annoyance ; but on the 24th of December they cut him off from the main body, and their commander, Diebitsch, in an interview told him that he was empowered to conclude a treaty of neutrality. York sent to Berlin to ask instructions, but received only an evasive reply and naturally hesitated to commit his country to any decision. On the same day, however, a messenger came from the Russian head-quarters to say that, unless he made up his mind within thirty-six hours, he should be treated as an enemy. Thereupon on the 30th he signed the Convention of Tauroggen, by which he bound his corps to neutrality pending further orders from Berlin, and engaged himself that, in any case, it should not fight against Russia for three months. This signified only the conditional defection of a few thousand men from the cause of France ; but its moral effect was enormous, and it became practically the starting point of a new coalition.

Russia meanwhile was exultant over her success, and Alexander might well look forward to the title of Liberator of Europe. But his difficulties were many, and he did not allow himself to be so much dazzled by his victory as to forget them. Having driven the

1813. French from his own territory, he had now to decide how far he should follow them up; and upon this decision it depended whether he should continue the work alone or summon Austria and Prussia to his aid. Following the counsel of Nesselrode, he determined that France must be reduced once more within her natural boundaries, the Scheldt, the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees; but this he was unable to effect without assistance. By granting Poland a constitution and accepting the sovereignty for himself, he might expect to rally the Poles as a body to his standard; but he did not love constitutions and was unwilling to revive the Polish question, which had been the salvation of revolutionary France, at such a moment. Stein, again, was ready and eager to rouse the Germans at large to his aid, and to make this the starting point of a free, united and liberal Germany, purged of the incompetent rulers who had dragged her into degradation. But Alexander had no idea of throwing the Emperor Francis, the King of Prussia and the princes of the lesser German states into the arms of Napoleon by any such imprudence; and, while encouraging Stein to stimulate the Germans towards working out their own deliverance, he declined to commit himself to any definite engagement. In fact he saw clearly that, unless he could make sure of Austria, he could effect little in the coming campaign; and he perceived that the safest way of winning over Austria was to gain Prussia first, and so to force Austria into a new coalition.

But Austria under the guidance of Metternich was acting with extreme circumspection. That astute Minister designed that his country should stand outside the contest until her intervention could be decisive, and then step in to determine it in her own interest. His position was a delicate one, for, though he wished to overthrow Napoleon, he had no idea of setting up Alexander or Frederick William in his place; and, while a French victory might place Austria at Napoleon's mercy, a victory of Napoleon's enemies might encourage

Prussia to claim the predominance in Germany, and Alexander to extend his dominions in Poland and the East. Metternich was hampered moreover by the limitation of the Austrian army to one hundred and fifty thousand men under the treaty of 1809, and by the fact that thirty thousand of these were under Napoleon's command. He wished for freedom to increase the number of his troops and to employ them as he thought best ; and, as a means to that end, he sent in December 1812 a special envoy, General Bubna, to Paris, to sound Napoleon as to his willingness to accept Austrian mediation. The Emperor received the overture not ungraciously, but insisted that his alliance with Austria of 1812 should remain intact, and that she should double the numbers of her contingent with the French army. This was not at all what Metternich wanted ; and he resolved to force France to better terms by encouraging Prussia to take up arms against her. Accordingly he advised Frederick William to mass fifty thousand men on the Oder at Breslau, nominally to resist the Russians, but in reality to join them at the right time.

Meanwhile Alexander entered West Prussia, and issued a proclamation offering help to all peoples which had been forced into hostility with Russia against their will. The Prussians took fire at once. York placed himself at the head of the movement ; and Stein, arriving on the spot on the 23rd of January 1813, was installed by Alexander with full powers as his commissioner, or, in other words, as dictator. In vain the superior officials at Berlin sent counter-orders, and their subordinates tried to enforce them. Stein with the people at his back was not to be stopped ; and in a few days the Continental blockade was suspended, a loan had been negotiated, and the military organisation of the male inhabitants was in full progress. Frederick William was terrified, and would have deferred a decision until later, but he was carried away by the enthusiasm of his people. Austria encouraged him in

1813. his defection from France ; Alexander, partly by blandishments, partly by sharp language, drew him
- Feb. 28. steadily on ; and on the 28th of February Frederick William signed the treaty of Kalisch. Thereby Prussia and Russia agreed to an offensive alliance with the object of reconstructing Prussia, on the understanding that the armies of both Powers should at once co-operate in the field, that no peace or truce should be concluded with the common enemy except by joint consent, and that Austria should be invited to join the
- Mar. 16. Alliance. The act was crowned upon the 16th of March by Prussia's declaration of war upon France. Thus Alexander secured not only the Prussian army but the whole of insurgent Germany, and became the acknowledged chief of the Coalition.

Austria meanwhile pursued her way tortuously, though on the whole steadily, towards the same course as Prussia. On the 30th of January the Emperor Francis joyfully agreed to a suspension of hostilities with Russia for three months ; and Metternich, since Napoleon had conditionally accepted Austrian mediation, made that acceptance his excuse for pushing forward warlike preparations. He sent an envoy also to the headquarters of the Tsar, who ascertained that, for the present, Alexander was quite content that Austria should reoccupy her former possessions without declaring war upon France. Three weeks later, however, Austria took a step which practically made her a party to the Coalition. The remains of the Polish corps of Napoleon's army had taken refuge at Cracow, where their position was embarrassing alike to Austria and to Russia. It was agreed therefore by a convention of the 29th of March that the two powers should denounce the armistice, and that Austria, warning the Poles of her inability longer to protect them, should recommend them to disband themselves or to march to such districts of Germany as they might prefer. The Poles having been thus got rid of, the armistice was renewed ; the Russians established themselves comfortably in the

Duchy of Warsaw ; and the Austrians recalled the 1813. contingent, which they had furnished to France, from the Vistula to Bohemia. It was only a question of time until the Emperor Francis should declare open hostility against Napoleon.

Throughout all these transactions Castlereagh watched, biding his time, for he knew that without the money of England the powers of Europe were helpless. At the beginning of 1813 his chief efforts were turned towards persuading Sweden, in the person of Bernadotte, to take an active part against France, and towards detaching Denmark from the French Alliance. The task was not an easy one. By a secret treaty signed in March 1812, Russia had bribed Bernadotte to assist her against Napoleon by favouring the cession of Norway to Sweden, in compensation for the loss of Finland ; but on the other hand Denmark refused to hear of a moment of yielding up Norway. Castlereagh tried to satisfy Bernadotte by offering him Guadeloupe or one province of Norway ; but Denmark declined to give up one acre of the country ; and, perceiving her resolution to be fixed, Bernadotte stood out for his original claim. On the 3rd of March, therefore, Castlereagh acceded to the Russo-Swedish treaty mentioned above, engaging further to make over Guadeloupe to Sweden, and to pay a subsidy of a million sterling in return for the services of thirty thousand Swedish troops on the Continent. The North of Europe, as Castlereagh said, was England's principal concern.

Thus it was that when, at the end of March 1813, Count Wessenberg arrived from Vienna as envoy to propose the mediation of Austria, he received the coldest of cold receptions from the Court of St. James's. Wessenberg predicted that England's selfishness would assuredly involve her in great disasters. Castlereagh declared that, but for the Prince Regent's personal regard for the Emperor Francis, Wessenberg's mission would not have been received at all. He had no idea of betraying England's allies in the Peninsula and elsewhere

1813. to oblige Metternich. On the other hand, an emissary from Prussia, Baron Jacobi, who arrived in London soon after Wessenberg, was favoured with greater encouragement, for he brought the Treaty of Kalisch in his hand. It was quite impossible for the Prussians to take the field unless supplied with British arms and money ; and the possession of the purse practically made England mistress of the situation. Castlereagh therefore decided to send his brother Charles and Lord Cathcart as *attachés* to the head-quarters of the Russian and Prussian armies, pending the negotiation of some more definite engagement.

In Italy there was as yet no certain sign. Murat at the close of the retreat from Moscow had declared in Davoust's presence that he would make his peace with England, applauding the conduct of Bernadotte ; and, upon his return to Naples on the 4th of February, one of his first acts had been to send a secret emissary to Vienna, offering to place his troops at the disposal of Austria if she would guarantee him the throne of Naples, without Sicily. Matters had advanced no further than this in the spring of 1813 ; and though Italy, even as Germany, had been thoroughly stirred by the French disasters in Russia, no definite proposals had come from that quarter beyond a renewal of the incorrigible Bentinck's proposals to land a force as a nucleus for an Italian insurrection. At the end of August 1812 the Russian Admiral Tchitchagoff, commanding the troops on the Danube and the fleet in the Black Sea, had sent to him a wild proposal for a concerted attack upon the French possessions in Dalmatia, to be followed by an invasion of Italy. The Admiral offered to employ forty thousand men in this service and asked Bentinck to provide half as many more British, Sicilians and Sardinian troops ; but upon enquiry it appeared that the entire expense of paying, feeding and equipping the Russians was to fall upon Great Britain. Bentinck, though to the last degree eager to partake in this enterprise, could not pledge himself

to so large an expenditure without authority from 1813. England, and could therefore give only a conditional assent; but, before matters could go further, the project was extinguished for ever by the recall of Tchitchagoff and all his troops to combat Napoleon in Russia.¹

Throughout this time the reiterated instructions of the Secretary of State gave Bentinck clearly to understand that the east coast of Spain was the point to which any military force that he could spare must be directed; and, accordingly, in November and December he embarked two more detachments of nearly nine thousand men for Alicante,² sending at the same time Major-general Campbell to command them. So far, therefore, it seemed as if Bentinck had loyally accepted the decision of the Government that every man whom he could spare should be employed in the Peninsula.³ Nevertheless no sooner did he hear of the French retreat from Moscow than he urged the withdrawal of the detachment in order to make a diversion in Italy. The Tsar, according to Bentinck's correspondent, Admiral Greig of the Russian service, could easily spare eleven

¹ *W.O. Mediterranean.* Bentinck to Sec. of State, 30th Aug., 1st Sept. Sec. of State to Bentinck, 13th Oct. 1812.

² *First Detachment.* Embarked 14th Nov. 1812.

20th L.D.	.	.	13		
Guides	.	.	14	2nd Italian Regt.	1193
R.A. and drivers	.	.	135	Sicilian artillery and	
Grenadier batt.	.	.	957	drivers	155
L.I. batt.	.	.	592	Sicilian grenadiers	605
1/27th	.	.	853		

Total—4517 of all ranks, 211 horses.

Second Detachment. Embarked 5th Dec. 1812.

Sicilian Guards, 1st Sicilian Regt., Calabrian Free Corps, and detachments of 20th L.D., R.A., Sicilian Cavalry, and 2nd Italians.

Total—2466 of all ranks.

Third Detachment. Embarked about 10th Dec. 1812.

2/27th, 800; 1st Italian Regt., 1000; rank and file.

Total—About 2000 of all ranks.

³ Bentinck to Sec. of State, 21st Nov. 1812.

1813. thousand men and the Black Sea fleet for the purpose ; and these, added to the troops at disposal in Sicily, would make a total force of thirty thousand men, fed, paid and equipped by Great Britain, and therefore entirely under her control in the Mediterranean. Two
- Feb. 18. months later Bentinck sent a small expedition to capture the island of Ponza in the Gulf of Gaeta, the object being to furnish the British men-of-war with a naval station from which to harry the enemy's coasting trade, introduce British colonial produce, and establish the means of more immediate communication with Naples and with Italy at large. Murat, according to Bentinck's information, had laid up his naval force for the sake of economy, and was marching northward with every man that could be spared, to give assistance to Napoleon ; wherefore any diversion that could tie those troops to Naples would be of advantage.

Meanwhile the general aspect of affairs in Sicily was, in Bentinck's belief, improving. The Sicilian army was better equipped and better disposed. The party hostile to the British was reduced both in numbers and in power. The constitution, the blessed constitution framed on the model of the British, was "beginning to take effect," and the contrast between British liberty and French tyranny could not fail to impress itself upon the Sicilians. The entire force of Sicily, British and native, could therefore safely be spared for the great work of overthrowing Napoleon, so long as Southern Italy were selected for the point of attack ; and what point could be more desirable ? With Naples once recovered, a national army would be ready to join the British standard immediately, and it would be possible to march north with from thirty to forty thousand men, daily increasing in numbers. What a contrast to the position of the Mediterranean detachment on the east coast of Spain ! There the British could only be auxiliaries ; they could not take the field owing to their inferiority in cavalry ; the Spanish armies were worthless ; Wellington was too far

distant ; in fact the detachment could do little service ^{1813.} at Alicante. But in Italy the British and Allies could act as principals ; they would be equal to the enemy from the first, and could fight him with advantage. Spain was so much exhausted and her Government so unmanageable that but for "the wonderful abilities and influence of Wellington," one would despair of her deliverance. But a diversion in Italy would be conclusive. Napoleon would be obliged to abandon Spain in order to save Italy, and there would be little safety for him if the passage of the Pyrenees were thrown open to Wellington.¹

So reasoned this sanguine but not very wise man, honestly unconscious that what he desired above all things was the independent command of an army in the field, and that army if possible an "army of liberation." Wellington had preached sound sense to him repeatedly from Spain, but to no purpose. Ponza was duly taken by a detachment of the Tenth Foot without the ^{Feb. 26.} loss of a man, and its garrison of nearly two hundred soldiers became prisoners. A few days earlier two ^{Feb. 15.} divisions of the military flotilla, with five companies of the Seventy-fifth on board, attacked a convoy of hostile vessels which had been assembled under protection of an earthwork on the coast of Calabria, and captured or destroyed fifty vessels ; the Seventy-fifth having landed and driven off a superior force of the enemy with the loss of over three hundred of them killed, wounded and prisoners. All this was very satisfactory, but did not make good three sad miscalculations on the part of Bentinck. In the first place the Russian Government, upon being questioned, disclaimed all idea of sending even the smallest detachment to the Mediterranean, having plenty of other employment for its troops in North Germany.² In the second, the attack upon Ponza stirred Murat to a menace of retaliation ; and, in the

¹ Bentinck to Sec. of State, 5th Dec. 1812 ; 18th, 24th Feb. 1813.

² Bentinck to Sec. of State, 23rd Feb., 3rd March ; Sec. of State to Bentinck, 19th Feb. 1813.

1813. third, the glorious constitution of Sicily suddenly showed signs of ignominious collapse. It will be necessary to look somewhat more closely into the last of these matters.

The internal troubles of Sicily arose, as usual, from the intrigues of the Queen of Naples, under whose influence the old King at the beginning of March took the government again in hand, striving to return to the old order of things and to neutralise the constitution. Bentinck who, to do him justice, was not a weak man, thereupon declared the British alliance to be at an end; and after a struggle the King gave way, leaving the Hereditary Prince to resume the sovereignty. There was, however, great excitement in the island; and Bentinck thought it necessary to recall two of the battalions which he had sent to Alicante, doubting whether he could control the situation without more British troops. The greater part of the garrison of Sicily consisted of seven thousand Neapolitan soldiers, who hated the Sicilians, and had only been kept true to their allegiance by the partiality of the Court and by the Queen's schemes for expeditions to Naples. The Sicilians for their part retorted an equal hatred upon the Neapolitan troops; and the Sicilian Parliament, having the power of the purse, took delight in harassing and persecuting their unfortunate officers whenever money was in question. The natural result was that the Neapolitans were to the last degree sulky and discontented; and Murat astutely took advantage of their sentiments to offer to take any Neapolitan officers, who might wish it, from King Ferdinand's service into his own. Since Murat had also made a great show of marine preparations, as if contemplating an attack upon Sicily, neither Bentinck nor his subordinate generals thought it safe to send back the two battalions to Alicante.

By the end of May, however, all seemed to be fairly tranquil. The Queen, who was at the bottom of the mischief, had announced that she would leave Sicily on May 27. the 27th of the month for Constantinople on her way to Vienna; and Bentinck, weary of civilian's work and

longing to be once again a soldier in the field, sailed ^{1813.} on that same day for Ponza on his way to Alicante. He took with him as many troops, British, Germans and Neapolitans, as Ponza would hold, his objects being as he said to cheer the Neapolitans with the prospect of return to Naples, to hearten Italy at large by placing these troops near her, to be ready to occupy any fortified place on the coast that might be reduced by local insurrection, and lastly to destroy effectually the enemy's coasting-trade. His instructions to his successor, General Macfarlane, at Palermo, left the latter free to withdraw every man excepting three battalions, two of them British, from Sicily, in case of an Italian insurrection which would paralyse Murat's force ; and to carry them, twelve thousand strong, to the help of the insurgents.

His confidence was destined to be rudely shaken. Hardly had he set sail when the Queen put off her journey on the ground of ill-health, and finally departed on the 14th of June not for Constantinople but ^{June 14.} for Zante. In a few weeks her power for evil was once again manifested. The Sicilian Government suddenly became obstructive to the last degree with regard to all measures proposed by the British officials. There was delay over the simplest business ; letters were unanswered ; and both Government and Legislature, being wholly occupied by their domestic quarrels, declined to take the slightest interest in the operations of the war or to make the slightest sacrifice for them. Bentinck had cherished hopes of help from the Parliament just assembled. Macfarlane did not share them. Never had the British General at Messina been so powerless. "The independence of Sicily will, I fear, be fatal to the influence which Great Britain must exert upon her Government," wrote Macfarlane ; "and influence in this case means a salutary despotism. How to reconcile this despotism with the independent opinions of a free people is the difficulty."

The same difficulty had arisen before in Corsica, where another blind enthusiast had imposed upon

1813. the country the favourite Whig nostrum for all political ailments. In Sicily matters very soon reached a perilous stage ; and by the third week in July Macfarlane could only define the political situation as alarming. The new constitution was on the brink of destruction. The Ministers were not only unpopular but powerless ; and the Opposition, refusing to vote any supplies, starved every branch of the administration and in particular the army. There were violent riots in Palermo, where seven hundred convicts were on the point of breaking out of the gaol without the slightest attempt at repression from the Sicilian authorities. Happily the Neapolitan troops proved to be faithful, and a little firing soon restored order ; but by the end of July Macfarlane had been obliged to recall the British troops from Ponza, and both he and the Hereditary Prince wrote urgently to Bentinck that he must return, or Sicily would be undone.

Lord William received this summons on the 30th of August in Spain, where we shall presently follow his operations, and was deeply chagrined at being torn away in the middle of his campaign. In his vexation he wrote to Castlereagh that, unless he could hold the military command in the Mediterranean without the civil, he should prefer to resign both ; and he denounced the Hereditary Prince and his ministers as weak, and the people of Sicily as depraved. It is very probable that these epithets were well-bestowed ; and yet who was responsible for the difficulty of reconciling salutary despotism with the independent opinions of a free people ? Bentinck and no one else. Moore had said from the first that, if the British took over the government of Sicily, a very few British troops would suffice to hold it, and that the island might be turned to good account in the contest with Napoleon. But to grant a constitution on the English model to such a people as the Sicilians was sheer folly. If Bentinck had not discovered their depravity before he gave them their new constitution, he was very blind ; and if he had discovered it, he was most culpably credulous to suppose that a new

constitution would be their cure. It must therefore be confessed that he was rightly served when he was taken away from his command in the field to set Sicily once again in order. 1813.

He left Spain on the 22nd of September, and arrived, at Palermo¹ apparently, early in October, where he found matters in a very critical state. The Queen had with some difficulty been persuaded to move on the 3rd of September from Zante, whence she had kept up a continual correspondence with Italy; but the trouble in Sicily had not abated, and in August the two Houses of Parliament had passed a resolution that a deputation should be sent to England to complain of the British Generals. Moreover, it was reported on good authority that Napoleon, having heard of the unrest at Palermo, had ordered the Toulon fleet to be in readiness to attack the island. Bentinck, therefore, was fully occupied in taking precautions against danger both from without and from within; and to repress the latter he very wisely proclaimed that all disturbers of the public peace, assassins or opponents of the Government, should be summarily tried and punished under military law. Thus order was restored; but meanwhile it was impossible to spare a single company of troops for service outside Sicily, and by this time the invasion of Italy had become a more practical project. In June Murat had opened a negotiation with Bentinck for friendship with England and hostility towards Napoleon; and in earnest of his good faith had betrayed the secret of the intended enterprise against Sicily. There was therefore some hope of solid assistance from that quarter, and of a regular campaign for Bentinck in Italy in 1814; but for the present it is necessary to turn back to his more legitimate sphere of operations on the east coast of Spain.²

¹ There are among the War Office Papers no letters from Bentinck between the 21st of September and the 6th of November.

² *W.O. Mediterranean.* Bentinck to Sec. of State, 15th March, 7th April, 27th May, 24th June, 30th Aug., 6th Nov.; Macfarlane to Sec. of State, 20th June, 14th July, 7th Aug.; Murray to Sec. of State, 14th, 16th Sept. 1813.

CHAPTER II

1812. UPON the close of the campaign of 1812 Joseph decided Dec. that the head-quarters of the Army of Portugal should be at Valladolid, with its cantonments in the provinces of Avila, Salamanca and Valladolid ; that the Army of the South should occupy the provinces of Toledo and La Mancha, with head-quarters at Toledo ; and that he himself should return to Madrid and distribute the Army of the Centre in the province of that name. Wellington then threw his army likewise into winter quarters, the bulk of the infantry being extended along the Douro for convenience of supply, and the cavalry on the Mondego for convenience of forage. The troops of Carlos d'España held Ciudad Rodrigo ; the Light Division remained on the Agueda ; two divisions were about Castello Branco ; and on the extreme right Hill's division lay at Coria and Plasencia, with an advanced post at Bejar. Of the Spaniards, the Galician Army retired to its own place ; Penne Villemur and Morillo crossed the Tagus at Alcantara into Estremadura ; and Del Parque, who had succeeded Ballesteros, led his force through the Sierra Morena into La Mancha. Soult's cavalry pressing south-eastward soon came upon Del Parque's advanced parties, and thrust them back to the Sierra Morena ; and the Marshal then pushed forward Darricau's division of infantry and the 2nd division of dragoons to Villarobledo and San Clemente, so as to cover the great road to Murcia and facilitate communications with Valencia.

Ever since the united French armies had marched

north-westward from Valencia against Wellington, 1812. Suchet had regarded his isolated position with the greatest anxiety. The concentration of so large a body of French troops had left the guerilla-bands free to work every possible description of mischief; and the encouragement given to them by the distribution of British arms, supplies and money, together with the presence of Popham's squadron on the north coast, had rekindled an insurrection in the north more formidable than any that had flamed before. Of the influence of this rising upon the operations of the main army more will presently be said in another place; at present we must confine ourselves to the effect which it produced upon the Army of Aragon.

To the great misfortune of Suchet the leader who had chosen Aragon for his operations was Mina, the most redoubtable of all. Earlier in the year 1812 this famous partisan had narrowly escaped capture near Huesca; but in November he reappeared on the road between Zaragoza and Jaca, cut off a company of Italians, and narrowly missed the capture of a large French convoy. He then besieged the small French garrison in the Castle of Huesca but was driven off, only to come back a few weeks later to Barbastro, from which it cost the French some seventy casualties to chase him away. Mina thereupon turned westward to the borders of Navarre, and cannonaded the small town of Sos, a little to south of Sanguesa, compelling General Paris to hasten thither from Zaragoza—where he was in command—and bring off the garrison. He then attacked Paris in difficult ground during his retreat, and was not beaten off until he had killed and wounded one hundred and fifty men.

On the south bank of the Ebro another leader, Duran, was not less active and enterprising. On the 11th of October he laid siege to Almunia and Borja with some heavy artillery given to him by Wellington, forced General Severoli to march out from Zaragoza in order to carry off the garrison of the former place,

1812. and captured the French troops in the latter. With these and other bands continually threatening his communications, harrying his outlying posts and exhausting his mobile columns by incessant marches, and with the British overlooking him in constant menace from Alicante, Suchet judged it imperative to make for himself a strong place of arms at Sagunto, where he stored provisions for two months. He also constructed an entrenched camp on very strong ground at Mogente, and shut up all the passes south-eastward of it toward Alcoy and the sea, so as to close all access from the south to the valley of the Xucar and to Valencia.

Meanwhile the bearing of the British detachment at Alicante had been and continued to be of the feeblest. General Maitland, after displaying miserable nervousness during his short period of independent command, resigned owing to ill-health towards the end of September, and was succeeded first by General Mackenzie, and on the 20th of November by General William Clinton, who arrived on that day from Messina. The command changed hands for the fourth time within five months on the 2nd of December, when Major-general Campbell sailed into Alicante with a further detachment of forty-five hundred men from Sicily. The troops under him, including the Spanish divisions of Roche and Whittingham, which were paid and clothed
1813. by England, were now some twenty thousand strong ;
Jan. and early in January 1813 he received a further reinforcement of the Twenty-seventh British¹ and of an Italian regiment, numbering jointly some two thousand soldiers. The Spanish army under General Elio—from ten to fifteen thousand men—being also at hand to co-operate with Campbell, that officer to all appearance should have been able at least to give very serious trouble to Suchet.

But Campbell's force was so full of defects that he had some excuse for attempting nothing. The Spanish

¹ 2nd Battalion.

Government had made no effort to form magazines ¹⁸¹³. for its armies either at Alicante or at Carthagena, and, after a desperate but futile attempt to throw the victualling of Roche's and Whittingham's troops upon the British, left them to shift for themselves. Lest these unhappy men should starve, therefore, it was necessary to spread the army over a front of some sixty miles from Altea Bay on the right to Orihuela on the left; and, though by these means they were kept alive in cantonments, it was difficult to say how they were to subsist when they took the field. The cavalry of the Allies was also very scanty; and, perhaps most important of all, Campbell did not trust his Italian troops. A great many of them were prisoners taken from the French; and one regiment presently evinced such a spirit of desertion and disaffection that, on hearing the reports of its officers, Campbell disarmed it and anchored the men in transports under the guns of the men-of-war. Altogether, though Suchet was reported to have fewer than fifteen thousand men south of the Xucar, it is hardly surprising that Campbell should not have attempted to molest him.¹

On the 25th of February a fifth general appeared to Feb. 25. take command of the Anglo-Sicilian army at Alicante, in the person of Sir John Murray, of whose inefficiency we have already had experience both in India and in Portugal. It seems amazing that such a person should have been selected; but Wellington, at a moment when there was no vacancy for a Lieutenant-general in his own army, had pronounced him to be a very able officer whom he would have been glad to have with him;² so Bathurst cannot be blamed for appointing him. By the time of his arrival the last of the detachments sent from Sicily had joined the army, giving it an additional five hundred cavalry and two thousand infantry, all of

¹ W. Clinton to Sec. of State, 9th Nov. 1812; Campbell to Sec. of State, 12th Dec. 1812; 21st Jan., 23rd Feb. 1813.

² *Wellington Desp.* To Torrens, 7th Sept. 1812.

1813. which—with the exception of two hundred of the Twentieth Light Dragoons—were Italian. After the experience of the disarmed regiment Murray, pardonably enough, did not greatly count on the troops of that nation; and he begged the Government not to expect too much, but to send him, over and above a regiment of Brunswick Hussars which was on the point of arriving from England, a further reinforcement of cavalry.

Meanwhile on the 3rd of March he drove in the enemy's outposts about Alcoy, and, conceiving that it might be possible to surround and cut off the French troops stationed there, formed his plans accordingly for

Mar. 7. the morning of the 7th. The attack miscarried owing to the retardation of the column which should have cut off the enemy's retreat; but it should seem that, thanks to the vacillation of Murray, an opportunity of inflicting substantial loss upon the French was thrown away.¹

However, he occupied Alcoy, and in the course of the next few days pushed back the French posts yet further after some trifling skirmishes. But hearing that Suchet in person had taken command of the troops south of the Xucar, he concentrated the Anglo-Sicilian force on

Mar. 20. the 20th of March at Castalla, from which point he could support Whittingham at Alcoy on his right, and Elio's advanced guard at Yecla on his left, while at the same time covering Roche's division at Elda. Unable, however, to make up his mind to attack Suchet's entrenched position, he after much hesitation decided to drive the French from it by harassing their rear. He therefore ordered Roche's division, some of Elio's troops and a British battalion to embark in the transports at Alicante, proceed up the coast under convoy of Admiral Hallowell's squadron, seize Valencia and, if possible, also Cullera at the mouth of the Xucar, or,

¹ Murray reported privately to Wellington (*Wellington MS.*, 4th March) that but for the drunkenness of a detachment of the 81st he would have surprised and captured a French picquet of 200 men. There is nothing incredible in this; but, as will presently be seen, it is never safe to accept Murray's statements in excuse of his failures.

should both of these enterprises prove to be impracticable, 1813. to land at Denia and lay siege to that fortress. Just at this moment, however, Bentinck recalled, for reasons that have been already stated, two thousand of Murray's best troops to Sicily ;¹ and though Sir John, according to his own account, had hopes of keeping the departure of this detachment a secret and of prosecuting his operations notwithstanding it, he soon found that Bentinck's orders were a matter of common talk, and was compelled to abandon the enterprise.

This interference of Bentinck with troops, which he had transferred from his own to Wellington's command, was of course a most awkward arrangement ; but it was authorised by Government and was therefore accepted without hesitation by Wellington. Napier of course assails Ministers most virulently for permitting such division of command ; yet it is difficult to see how they could have acted differently. They trusted that Bentinck had settled the internal affairs of Sicily once for all ; they had set their faces firmly against Lord William's favourite project of an invasion of Italy ; and they plainly felt confident that the greater part of the Sicilian force could safely be spared for the east coast of Spain. Yet, in the event of some unforeseen contingency in the Mediterranean, they could hardly deny to Bentinck the power to recall the whole or a part of it to Sicily. Bentinck, through his bungling in Sicily, was to blame, and not the Government ; and Wellington clearly perceived it. "The Secretary of State," he wrote to Murray, "did not advert to the possible call of the troops from Sicily on the ground of a counter-revolution in the Government, or of consequent internal disturbances ; but the object of his orders is that I should send the troops back, if there should exist any real necessity for that measure."² In this sentence lies

¹ Viz. the flank cos. of 2/10th, 21st, 31st, 62nd, 75th, and of the 3rd, 7th, 8th Line batts. K.G.L., besides the whole of the 6th line batt. K.G.L. The flank companies were of course the cream of the force, and the 6th K.G.L. were remarkably good.

² *Wellington Desp.* To Murray, 6th April 1813.

1813. the pith of the whole matter. Bentinck, reasoning from Whig formulas instead of from the facts of human nature, had reported all quiet in Sicily, and sent a very large proportion of his troops to Spain. Ministers naturally assumed that he would not have done so without good reason; and it was Bentinck's fault, not theirs, that they were deceived. As Charles Greville many years later pointed out, Lord William was a man who "had committed some great blunder or other in every public situation in which he had been placed."¹

In all the circumstances Murray judged that he must fall back upon Alicante and stand strictly on the defensive; but with characteristic indecision he remained still for the present at Castalla. Meanwhile Suchet determined for his own safety to take the offensive, which the situation of the Spanish troops, widely dispersed for purposes of subsistence, certainly invited him to do. Concentrating therefore the best of his soldiers on April 11. the night of the 11th of April at Fuente de la Higuera, he directed Harispe's division and half of his cavalry to fall upon Elio's detachment at Yecla before dawn, taking post himself with Habert's division, the Reserve division and the remainder of the horse about Caudete, so as to prevent Murray from sending assistance to Yecla. Harispe performed his part with vigour and ability; but the Spaniards were not caught by surprise, and made a stout retreat from position to position upon Jumilla, until at last, after repulsing two attacks of the French cavalry, some of them were surrounded and laid down their arms. The action cost them from fifteen to sixteen hundred killed, wounded and prisoners, whereas the loss of the French did not exceed seventy-nine.²

Suchet meanwhile advanced towards Villena, the castle of which was held by a good and strong Spanish battalion of Elio's army. Murray on his side moved up to the north of that town with all his cavalry

¹ Greville *Journals, George IV. and William IV.* vol. iii. p. 339.

² These are Suchet's figures and probably correct, for only four French officers were killed or wounded.

and a brigade of infantry; but fell back before the 1813. French through the pass of Biar, leaving only a detachment of foot under Colonel Adam in advance of the defile. He would have taken with him the battalion from the castle, but Elio refused his consent until next morning, when he begged Murray to send a April 12. force from Castalla to rescue it. Meanwhile, however, Suchet had burst in the gates of the castle and surrounded the garrison, which, after a slight resistance, surrendered on the morning of the 12th. Thus a thousand good Spanish soldiers were thrown away by the deliberate folly of their commander.

Having secured his prize Suchet continued his advance on the 12th, and at noon struck against April 12. Adam's brigade, numbering some twenty-five hundred men with four mountain guns, at the pass of Biar.¹ At about two o'clock he attacked with thirteen battalions under Generals Robert and Lamarque, while General Habert detached six hundred voltigeurs to turn the brigade's left flank. The ground was very steep; and Adam, having orders to delay the enemy as long as possible, offered a strenuous resistance, retiring from position to position, until after some hours² of fighting he was finally forced out of the defile, when he retreated in good order to Castalla, leaving behind him two disabled guns and forty-one prisoners—chiefly Italians—whose wounds were too severe to permit them to be moved. His total loss, however, was slight, and he appears to have handled his men with skill and gallantry, retaining the command, though wounded, throughout the day.³ The casualties of the French were probably

¹ British 2/27th; 1st Italian regiment; Calabrian Free Corps; two rifle cos. K.G.L.; 1 troop foreign hussars.

² Murray says five hours; Napier, two hours. The longer period is probably the more correct.

³ "The retreat was a beautiful field-day by alternate battalions. The volleys were admirable, and the successive passage of several ravines was conducted with order and steadiness. From the heights occupied by my troops it was one of the most delightful panoramas that I ever beheld." *Memoirs of Sir S. Whittingham*, 197.

1813, rather heavier, for they had ten officers killed and wounded.

After bivouacking for the night at the outlet of the defile, Suchet resumed his advance cautiously on April 13, the morning of the 13th towards the British position. This was well chosen and exceedingly strong. The left was extended for some two miles east and west along a line of rugged heights which abutted, at the eastern end, upon a conical hill, crowned by the castle of Castalla. From this castle as a centre the right, which was posted on low ground, ran for another mile north and south, and therefore at right angles to the left, its front being covered from end to end by the dry bed of a torrent, with sides so deep and precipitous as to be practically impassable. The extreme left, which was strongly entrenched, was held by Whittingham's division of Spaniards; next on his right was Adam's brigade; and, to the right of Adam, Mackenzie's division prolonged the line to the castle, about which Murray had concentrated the greater number of his guns. From the castle southward the right wing, *en potence*, was composed of Clinton's division and Roche's Spaniards, which last were very weak in number. Murray's force, which was made up of five different nations,¹ was reckoned to be about seventeen thousand strong.

Debouching warily into the plain, Suchet sent his cavalry out wide to his left to explore the ground thoroughly and, if possible, to ascertain the enemy's strength, for he could see nothing of their camp, which was hidden behind the hill on which Murray's left was stationed.² At the same time he detached six hundred

¹ British, German, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese (artillery). The Italians included men from all the provinces from Piedmont to Sicily.

² Napier makes a jutting spur from the main ridge (described a little further on) the feature that concealed from Suchet all the British troops and two-thirds of the whole army; but I do not know upon what he could have based this statement except on Suchet's *Mémoires*; and Suchet says that he wanted to see the

voltigeurs to turn Whittingham's left flank and dislodge him from his position. It so happened that just before this last movement an Italian officer had brought Whittingham an order, wholly unauthorised by Murray, to file away to his left and to move down into the valley upon Suchet's flank, while Murray himself should attack his front. How so extraordinary a mistake came to be made has never been explained; but as it appears that Murray, in spite of the strength of his ground, thrice gave the order to retreat, it may be that this staff-officer hoped to commit him at any rate to a fight. Be that as it may, Whittingham felt so sure of the incorrectness of the order that he left all his advanced posts and their supports standing, and led but three of his six battalions along their rear towards the plain.

He had only just begun the descent, when he received a message from one of the Spanish officers, left upon the hill, that the enemy had formed three strong columns at the foot of the heights and was preparing to attack. Whittingham at once gave the word to countermarch; and observing, as he moved back, a party of French sharpshooters on the summit of a height which commanded the left of his original line, he sent two companies to drive them away, which was successfully accomplished. By this time there was a general fire of skirmishers from the left of the Allied line to Castalla; and Suchet's plans became more apparent. The main body of his army he had drawn up along a low ridge parallel to Murray's left wing and about thirteen hundred yards in advance of it; and from thence he had sent forward five different columns, three of them directed against the position held by Whittingham, and two against that which was defended by Adam and Mackenzie; the

camp of the Allies so as to judge of their strength, but could not do so because they occupied a hill in advance of it. Napier does not say that the Allies occupied this jutting spur; and Wyld's *Atlas* shows that it was occupied by the French. Napier again says that Suchet sent his first column towards the right of the Allies; Suchet says that he sent it toward their left. Napier had never seen the ground; but unfortunately no more have I.

1813. two attacks being divided by a long spur which juts out
April 13. in a north-easterly direction from the main ridge. Suchet's own account is that he had no intention of making a serious attack ; and that he ordered only four battalions of the 3rd Light and 121st of the Line under General Robert to ascend the height, with the sole object of extricating the six hundred voltigeurs on his extreme right, who, as he could see, were being roughly handled by the Allies. But it seems certain that, whatever his intentions may have been, his reconnaissance became an assault, and that he committed more troops than these to a very unequal engagement.

Owing to the steepness of the ground the advance of the French columns was necessarily slow ; but, for the same reason, they were so well sheltered that every one of them seems to have reached the summit. The severest of the attacks appear to have been those directed against the left and centre of Whittingham's division and the centre of Adam's brigade, both of which were finally driven back by counter-attacks with the bayonet. Whittingham's Spaniards, indeed, behaved admirably, and charged with great spirit, driving the French in confusion before them. The onslaught of the Twenty-seventh was preluded by a dramatic duel between Captain Waldron of that regiment and an officer of French grenadiers, in which the former was victorious ; and the rout of the French was decisive. Thus by half-past four every battalion that Suchet had thrown into action had been hopelessly beaten. The 3rd Light and 114th of the Line had each of them lost thirteen officers, and the 121st nineteen officers killed and wounded ; some hundreds of men also had fallen ; and in fact all three regiments—amounting to about a fifth of Suchet's entire force—were unfit for further action. The French cavalry was far away from the main body opposite Murray's right ; and it was not possible to move the main body until it had been recalled. Even after the cavalry should have returned, the Marshal had still to retreat over more than a mile of open plain to the defile

which formed his only line of retreat, and in which his 1813. army, if sharply pressed, must inevitably have become April 13. crowded in great confusion.

On the other hand, the Allies, already immensely superior in numbers, had lost hardly five hundred men. Not a single corps had been really punished ; all were flushed with success ; and, if their quality was in some instances doubtful, there were at any rate five British and two German battalions, which were sufficient to stiffen the rest, while Whittingham's Spaniards, as we have seen, had conducted themselves remarkably well. It is true that the Allied cavalry was weak ; but that was the more reason for the Allies to move while the French cavalry was still at a distance ; and altogether every circumstance dictated to Murray a prompt and general advance which should convert his first success into a solid victory.

But a British general who distrusted himself so much that he sought to escape an action under most favourable conditions, until accident forced it upon him, was not likely to take advantage of this new bounty of fortune. After long hesitation, during which Suchet seized the opportunity to recall his cavalry, rally his infantry, and move off with all haste to the pass of Biar, Murray at length filed his right wing through Castalla and deployed it in the plain. His chief staff-officer however, General Donkin, being less ceremonious, of his own motion ordered Mackenzie to advance with a part of his division ; and Mackenzie, nothing loth, marched rapidly with four battalions and eight guns to the pursuit.¹ Arriving near the mouth of the pass, he found the access blocked by three battalions with eight guns, which he soon compelled to deploy and resist him ; and a sharp action had just begun, with every prospect that this

¹ Napier says three British battalions, which would be the 1/27th, 1/58th, and either 1/10th or 1/81st ; and one German, which would be either the 4th or 6th of the Line. The 27th and 58th alone of the British infantry suffered any casualties, but both the 4th and 6th K.G.L. lost a few men.

1813. rear-guard would be driven back in confusion upon the
- April 13. retreating troops in the pass, when Murray peremptorily ordered him to break off the engagement and retire. Suchet then took up a new position across the defile ; and after some time Murray brought up his whole force in pompous array of two lines, but attempted no more than a feeble and futile advance of a few light troops against the guns on the enemy's left. Nightfall finally put an end to the action, leaving the Marshal to pursue his retreat in safety to Fuente de la Higuera. Murray for
- April 14. his part was fired on the 14th with some idea of cutting off Suchet's retreat to Onteniente ; but, finding that the Marshal had already made his way thither by forced marches, halted and abandoned any further operations.

The loss of the French in the two days' fighting on the 12th and 13th can hardly have fallen below eleven hundred ;¹ whereas that of the Allies did not exceed six hundred and sixty-nine. The second battalion of the Twenty-seventh British was that which suffered most severely, having one hundred and seven casualties ; but one of the Italian regiments had nearly as many. Whittingham's Spaniards lost two hundred and fifty-eight killed and wounded, of whom, curiously enough, only six were officers, though it is certain that the conduct of all ranks was equally good. It is difficult to excuse Suchet's conduct in allowing his army to be dragged into a partial and absolutely purposeless assault upon a superior enemy in a strong position, with no retreat for himself except through a narrow defile. He deserved destruction, if ever commander did, and was very lucky to escape it. His defeat caused great exultation

¹ Suchet gives it at 800 killed and wounded and 41 prisoners for the three days, 11th-13th. But he lost 11 officers on the 12th and 46 on the 13th, which at the usual rate of 20 men to 1 officer makes 1140. Murray says that Suchet admitted a loss of 2500 (which he certainly did not), and that over 800 French were buried in one part of the field alone. Yet Martinien's lists show but 17 officers killed against these 800 dead men ! None the less in a second letter to Lord Bathurst of 30th April Murray wrote that Suchet's losses were fully as great as he had reported. It will be seen later in this chapter that Murray was not incapable of unblushing falsehood.

among the Spaniards, because it broke the spell of his ^{1813.} victorious career in the Peninsula ; but it seems reasonable to infer that, if he had ever been opposed by good troops under a good general, he would never have gained such a reputation as he did. As to Murray, who tried to excuse his miserable weakness by a wordy despatch describing the action as general, and reckoning Suchet's losses at three thousand, more shall be said presently, when the happy moment comes to take leave of him for ever.¹

At the close of the action Murray led his force to Alcoy with some vague idea of intercepting Suchet's retreat to Valencia, a plan which was easily frustrated by the rapid movements of the Marshal. He then sent off to Bentinck the balance of the detachment required by Lord William for Sicily, and professed himself unable to do more. He was not without excuse, looking to the heterogeneous and uncertain elements of which his army was composed ; for his British and Germans, barely six thousand strong, were the only troops that could meet the French upon equal terms. He complained too that he was in want of artillery-horses and drivers ; and, more serious still, that his light guns were completely outranged by the heavier pieces of the enemy, a defect which had been noticed also by Wellington. Finally he returned after a few days to Castalla, so as to be at once in a strong position and within easy reach of Alicante, pending receipt of further instructions from the Commander-in-Chief.²

On the very day after the action of Castalla, as it happened, Wellington had prepared these instructions.

¹ The authorities for the action at Castalla are few and meagre. Napier's is far the fullest, being founded on General Donkin's papers ; but Napier always needs checking, particularly when he speaks not as an eye-witness. Suchet's own account is meagre and not, I think, quite honest. Vacani says little, and in that little follows Suchet. Arteche is of little help ; Schwertfeger of none. Whittingham gives a clear account of the doings of his own division, which would be still clearer if there were a map giving the names that he mentions, which there is not.

² Murray to Sec. of State, 16th and 17th April 1813.

1813. The troops which he designed for operations on the April. east coast were those already under Murray's command, together with the Spanish regular troops of Elio's and Del Parque's armies ; and the objects which he prescribed for them were, in order of importance, first to gain possession of the open part of the province of Valencia ; second, to obtain an establishment on the east coast, so as to open communication with the Spanish Army of Catalonia ; and third, to compel the French to retire from the Lower Ebro. He therefore ordered Del Parque to move from his position at Jaen, and to put himself in communication with Elio by placing himself either at Almansa or Yecla. A force having been thus assembled to menace Valencia, the next thing was to induce Suchet to weaken himself in that quarter, to which intent Murray was instructed, immediately upon Del Parque's arrival, to transport at least ten thousand men by sea to Tarragona, and to lay siege to that fortress. Del Parque and Elio were to enter Valencia as soon as Suchet should have marched northward, but not before, and, if the Marshal should compel Murray to raise the siege and re-embark, Sir John was to return to Valencia, and land as far to north in that province as possible, forming on the right of the Spaniards. As a final elucidation of Murray's functions Wellington enjoined that on no account must any part of his forces be defeated. "I shall forgive anything," wrote Wellington, "excepting that one of the corps should be beaten or dispersed." Thus it was clear that Murray's duty was above all things to keep Suchet occupied, and that the method enjoined upon him for fulfilling this duty was to draw the Marshal northward by threatening Tarragona and, if he failed to take the place, to draw him back again to Valencia, continuing the process for an indefinite period until the French troops should have been marched to death, while his own travelled comfortably on board ship. So far as the word can be used of any operation of war, the plan was infallible.¹

¹ *Wellington Desp.*, 14th April 1813.

Translated copies of these instructions were sent to ^{1813.} the Spanish generals Del Parque, Elio and Copons, who were concerned in the operations ; and, though himself none too rich in guns or drivers, Wellington directed a company of artillery to be sent to Alicante from Lisbon. The month of May was consumed in further preparations ^{May.} on both sides. Towards the end of it Murray withdrew to Alicante, and the Spanish corps of Elio and Del Parque took the place of his army in the position of Castalla. Farther to the north General Copons with nine to ten thousand raw and undisciplined men, but without a single gun, formed a chain of posts in the mountains from Reus northward almost to the Ampurdan, watching the French in Catalonia generally and the garrisons of Gerona and Barcelona in particular. Suchet had intelligence that Murray was about to embark his force for a stroke at some point on the east coast ; but the secret of Sir John's destination had been well kept, and the Marshal could not divine where the blow might fall. He therefore called in Severoli's division from Aragon to join his main body in the entrenched camp of the Xucar, and stationed Pannetier's brigade midway between Valencia and Tortosa, ready to move northward or southward as circumstances might require.

On the 28th of May Murray began the embarkation of his British and Sicilian troops, and of Whittingham's Spanish divisions ;¹ and on the 31st, the armament, ^{May 31.} escorted by three ships of the line and several small

¹ <i>Cavalry.</i>	Officers.	N.C.O.'s and Men.
British (20th L.D.)	37	828
German (Brunswick Huss.)		
Sicilian		
<i>Artillery.</i>		
British, Portuguese and Sicilian .	43	1,035
<i>Engineers</i> (British) . . .	9	127
<i>Infantry.</i>		
British, German and Sicilian .	324	9,418
Whittingham's Spanish . .	228	4,777
Italian	67	1,451
	708	17,636

1813. craft under Admiral Hallowell, sailed with something May. over eighteen thousand men of all ranks and a train of heavy artillery for Tarragona. This fortress stands on an isolated rock by the sea, with an extreme elevation of over five hundred feet¹ above the level of the water. The loftiest point is at the eastern end, from which the ground slopes gradually to the westward; and on this higher ground, within an enceinte measuring some eleven hundred yards east and west, by half that distance north and south, stands what is now called the Upper City. The lower town lies to westward of the upper, and being sufficiently protected on the south side, for the most part, by cliffs and sea, was covered by fortifications on the north and west sides only. These works formed part of an outer line which ran from the mouth of the river Francoli on the west along the entire north front of the isolated hill, and turned backward from the north-east angle of the Upper City along the whole length of the eastern front to the sea. The southern face is absolutely precipitous, the eastern hardly less so; the northern is very steep; and the fortress practically dominated all ground within range of the ordnance of those days. On the north side, however, is a rocky hill about eight hundred yards distant from the walls, named Monte Olivo, which

Cavalry Brigade. Lord Frederick Bentinck.

Infantry. *Advance.* Col. Adam: 2/27th; Calabrese Light Corps; 2nd Italian Regt.; 1 co. Roll's Rifles.

1st Division. Maj.-gen. William Clinton: 1/58th; 4th Line K.G.L.; 2 Sicilian Regts.; Whittingham's Spaniards.

2nd Division. Maj.-gen. John McKenzie: 1/10th; 1/27th; 1/81st; Roll-Dillon's; 1st Italian Regt.

¹ It is extremely difficult to arrive at the correct height of the rock of Tarragona. Mr. Oman calls it 530 feet; the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, about 550 feet; Murray's *Guide to Spain*, 760 feet. On the other hand, Mr. Oman gives Monte Olivo at over 200 feet; and Belmas at 70 metres (rather over 220 feet); but Belmas says that Monte Olivo is nearly as high as the upper town of Tarragona; and Vacani says vaguely that it is "di un iguale elevazione con la piazza." But the plans of both belie their words.

risers to a height of over two hundred feet and commands at least a part of Tarragona. This eminence was accordingly crowned by a redoubt, a long narrow work, formidable in front, but closed in rear by palisades only; so that if captured it should afford no shelter from the guns of the Upper City. 1813.

To all intent, therefore, the fortress was unattackable except from the west; and it was from this side that Suchet had approached and stormed it. The most formidable defence in this quarter was a square bastioned fort, called Fort Royal, stuck on an isolated mound within the principal bulwark of the north-western angle. But this, having been a main object of Suchet's attack, had been greatly damaged; and indeed, according to the account of an Italian engineer¹ in the French service, not only Fort Olivo (which had also been battered and taken by Suchet) but every bastion of the external enceinte had been blown up or otherwise demolished, leaving only the interior works round the Upper City intact. The garrison did not exceed seven hundred and fifty French and as many Italians; and, as five hundred men were on guard every day, the soldiers were exhausted with fatigue. General Mathieu indeed reported on the 20th of May that unless two to three thousand men were presently thrown into the place, it must infallibly be lost.² These details as to the condition of the garrison were not known to Murray; but the state of the fortifications promised that Tarragona would prove an easy conquest.

In the afternoon of the 2nd of June the fleet and transports entered Salou Bay, about eight miles south-west of the fortress; and, before anchor was dropped, Murray detached Colonel Prevost's brigade under convoy of the *Invincible* to occupy the pass of Balaguer, about twenty miles west of Tarragona and on the direct road to that place from Tortosa. Here there was a June 2.

¹ Vacani, who, so far as I know, gives the only detailed account of the siege.

² Mathieu to Gen. Decaen, 20th May 1813. *Arch. de la Guerre.*

1813. small fort, San Felipe by name, which completely commanded the road through the pass; and the task assigned to Prevost was to wrest it from its French garrison, and thus to bar the way to any French force that might move to the relief of Tarragona from the south. Sir John then went ashore to see Copons, who had hurried down from Reus to meet him; and the Spanish general gave him an account of his dispositions. He had left about fifteen hundred men to overawe the garrison of Lerida, and some five thousand under Eroles at Vich, Manresa and Esparraguera to watch Gerona and Barcelona, at which latter place the French had three thousand men free for service in the field. If the force in Gerona should march southward, Eroles had orders to concentrate his troops and endeavour to stop it at the passage of the Llobregat, but in any case to follow the enemy's march and harass his flanks and rear.

The British general for the present asked for no more than two battalions to join Prevost at the pass of Balaguer on the following morning, which Copons readily agreed to give; and at eleven o'clock on the June 3. forenoon of the 3rd Prevost's detachment, having landed at a point a mile east of the pass, found the Spaniards punctually awaiting them.¹ The whole then marched away to San Felipe, which was presently so closely invested by Prevost's light troops that not a man of the garrison could venture to show himself on the parapet. On the morning of the 3rd likewise the main army disembarked in the Bay of Salou, the whole being set ashore, together with twenty-two pieces of cannon and nearly two hundred horses and mules, before three o'clock in the afternoon.² This done, they marched off under command of General Donkin, the

¹ Prevost's detachment consisted of 2/67th, Roll-Dillon; 1 co. Roll's Rifles; R.A. and 2 guns. The Spanish battalions sent by Copons were Palma and Barcelona. Roll-Dillon was formed of the remains of De Roll's and Dillon's regiments.

² *Court Martial on Sir John Murray*, p. 149.

Quartermaster-general, and before evening had invested Tarragona from sea to sea. 1813.
June.

Murray then sent again for Copons, and requested that the whole of the troops at his disposal might be joined to the besieging force, or at any rate placed in communication with it. The Spanish general for a time demurred to this proposal. He pointed out that he must look beyond the present moment, that many of his detachments were protecting the ingathering of the harvest, and that, if they were withdrawn, the enemy would gain these resources instead of the Spaniards. He urged further that his troops were ill-equipped and undisciplined, that his line of retreat led into the mountains north and westward, whereas that of Murray was to the sea south and eastward, and that his present dispositions enabled him to combine resistance to any march of the French from the north with the important objects which he had already enumerated. None the less Murray stuck to his point; and Copons, loyally yielding to Sir John's opinion, agreed to leave two battalions only with Eroles at Vich, and part of a detachment before Lerida, and to concentrate the remainder in the neighbourhood of Vendrell, about ten miles east of Tarragona. Copons then returned to his head-quarters at Reus, and next day received a civil communication from Murray to the effect that no doubt an officer who knew the country was best qualified to judge of the disposition of his troops, but that he wished the Spanish army to be within reach, in case it should be necessary to fight a general action against the joint forces of Suchet from the south and Decaen from the north. This would seem to indicate that the British general preferred to allow his enemy's troops to unite and to take his chance of beating them in a single action, rather than risk the less formidable hazard of beating them in detail.

Meanwhile the west front had already been chosen as the point of attack on Tarragona; and many of the garrison, when they saw the size of the hostile armament,

1813. thought that resistance was almost hopeless. The
June. Governor, General Bertoletti, however, roused their
spirits by a few stirring words, and set parties to work
at once to restore Fort Royal and the bastion of St.
Charles, which were the principal bulwarks on the
western side, at the same time taking every step to
strengthen the defences of the Upper City. Murray
viewed these preparations with dismay; and, although
the appliances for a siege had by no means all been
landed, he decided that two batteries must at once be
thrown up to check further work upon Fort Royal and
St. Charles. This was accordingly done on the night
June 4-5. of the 4th and 5th under cover of a heavy bombard-
ment from the ships; the first battery being raised within
six hundred yards of St. Charles, and the second within
nine hundred yards of Fort Royal. These opened fire
from four howitzers and two twenty-four pounders on
June 6. the morning of the 6th, and continued for seven hours
with some effect. When they ceased, a swarm of
skirmishers rushed forward, taking cover wherever they
could, and began an aimless fusillade upon the French
batteries. So absurd seemed this demonstration to the
French that they made up their minds that the besiegers
were not in earnest, but desired only to draw Suchet
away from the Xucar to the Ebro. Nevertheless, in
the course of the night Murray constructed a third
battery of two more twenty-four pounders near the
bridge of the Francoli and within closer range of Fort
Royal; and after twenty-four hours' firing his engineers
June 8. on the morning of the 8th reported that there was a
practicable breach. But Murray was in no hurry to
assault, for he was advised that immediate possession of
this work was no great object, and that it could be
taken at any time. It could, as a matter of fact, have
been stormed with equal ease on the night of the
investment; and such a stroke would probably have
shaken the nerve even of Bertoletti.

Meanwhile Fort San Felipe had fallen. The place
was only sixty feet square, with twelve guns and a

garrison of about one hundred and fifty men, and was 1813. commanded on two sides by the adjacent mountains. June. But these were so rugged as to be almost inaccessible, and Prevost could do no more on the first day than throw little shrapnel shells into the works from a six-pounder at a range of seven hundred yards. On the 4th two twelve-pounders and a howitzer were brought June 4. up to the same site with great exertion by the blue-jackets of the *Invincible*; and these played upon the fort all day, while two more batteries were prepared within three hundred yards of the walls. But rocky soil and bad weather impeded the construction of the platforms and the bringing up of the guns, and it was not until the evening of the 6th that five twenty-four pounders, together with two mortars sent by Captain Peyton of the *Stromboli*, were placed in position. At daybreak of the 7th the whole of them opened fire; June 7. and at six o'clock, after the explosion of an expense-magazine, the commandant hoisted the white flag. The casualties of the British did not exceed forty-three of all ranks killed and wounded. Those of the garrison were about the same in number, besides which rather more than one hundred were taken prisoners.

Thus six days had been consumed in reducing or breaching San Felipe and Fort Royal; and now Murray began to grow anxious. Wild reports had been current for some days that Decaen was advancing from the north and Suchet from the south; and indeed on the 4th Prevost announced that seven thousand French were expected to arrive at Tortosa that day, and that Suchet in person would infallibly attack him on the morrow. Two of Copons's battalions were hurriedly sent off to the pass of Balaguer upon this alarm, which seems to have been based upon nothing more than an order from Suchet to the governor of Tortosa to send a part of his garrison at once to relieve San Felipe. On the 7th false intelligence reached Copons that four thousand French had passed the night of the 6th at Uldecona, about seventeen miles south of Tortosa, and

1813. were to march on without halting, while General Musnier
June. was following them with seven thousand more. Further,
an intercepted letter from General Maurice Mathieu at
Barcelona to the governor of Tortosa announced that
General Decaen at Gerona would do all that he could
to succour Bertoletti.

In such circumstances Murray on the 7th wrote to
Wellington a prediction of his failure; and on the
June 8. 8th at last definite and positive intelligence came in
that not only Mathieu but Decaen also was on march
southward. Their joint forces might amount to twelve
or fourteen thousand men; and Murray, on hearing
the news, at once conferred with Copons as to the
means of checking them. It was then agreed that
all the Spanish troops, except two battalions, should
be recalled from San Felipe and dispersed between
La Bisbal and Vendrell, so as to command the four
roads leading from the north of Tarragona; that Murray
should assign certain corps of his army to support them;
and that the road leading from Lerida by Montblanch
should be destroyed. There was still no trustworthy
intelligence of Suchet's advance; and, as his most direct
road was sealed by the capture of San Felipe, there was
no reason why Decaen should not be beaten back.

It might be thought that in such a situation Murray
would have seen the necessity for dealing more vigor-
ously with Tarragona, though his chances of success
had been daily lessened by Bertoletti's energetic recon-
struction of his defences. Far from any such thing, Sir
John began laboriously to lay out two more batteries on
the lower slopes of Monte Olivo to play with twelve
June 9. pieces upon the Upper City. On the 9th came certain
and true information that Suchet had left Valencia on
the 7th, and was advancing by forced marches upon
Tortosa; while a letter from Eroles to Copons announced
that French troops from Gerona had moved as far south
as Hostalrich in the direction of Barcelona, and that
he was following them. Murray, greatly perturbed,
informed Donkin, his chief staff officer, that he should

raise the siege; and Donkin, according to his own 1813. account, interpreted the information as an order to June. make the necessary arrangements. Such a decision was perfectly intelligible. All information pointed to the conclusion that at least twenty thousand French were closing in upon Tarragona from north and south; and, though the joint forces of Murray and Copons might be reckoned at twenty-six to twenty-seven thousand, yet their quality was extremely doubtful. Copons confessed that his men could not be trusted except in a strong position; and in Murray's heterogeneous crowd of five different nations there were, as has been told, barely six thousand men who could be reckoned as equal to the French.

Moreover, there was a special difficulty in meeting the attack from the north. From Villafranca westward the enemy had a choice of at least two roads with no lateral communication between them, so that the defenders of any one road might be overwhelmed without a chance of support from the defenders of the other. There was, it is true, some hope that the French troops from Gerona might be held back by a diversion of the Mediterranean fleet, which Murray had some time before urged upon Sir Edward Pellew. There was also some chance of the arrival of a British and of a German battalion from Sicily, which Bentinck had promised to despatch in the fourth week of May. But, all things considered, there was much to be said for a re-embarkation. If Suchet, on hearing of it, should turn back to Valencia, there was nothing to prevent Murray from landing again; if Suchet continued his advance, Murray could easily recall him by sailing to Valencia. When, however, Murray broached his intention to Hallowell, he allowed himself, though unconvinced, to be overawed by that Admiral's evident disgust; and from that moment good feeling ceased between the naval and military commanders.

On the 10th fresh information came in confirming June 10. the general intelligence that ten thousand men were on

1813. march upon Tarragona from Barcelona, and as many
June 10. from Tortosa. Copons at once ordered his troops, six thousand in number,¹ to their appointed positions, and shifted his head-quarters to Torredembarre, off which point Hallowell had already stationed ships to cannonade the coast-road from the sea. Murray, who had retained Copons's chief staff-officer with him since the previous day, rode up in the afternoon to concert with the Spanish General the measures for repelling the column from Barcelona, and promised to support him with seven or eight thousand men whenever he should be attacked. While there, he learned that this column had reached the Llobregat by forced marches, and was pushing on with all possible haste ; but these tidings appear only to have confirmed him in his resolution to continue the siege.

On this very day more cannon and stores were landed ; and the two batteries on and near Monte Olivo, being armed, opened fire on the night of the
June 11. 10th and morning of the 11th. They did little to diminish the cannonade from the fortress, but they wrought considerable damage not only to the outer bastion of Penia on the northern face, but to the inner bastion of St. Paul also. Early on the morning of the 11th Murray placed General Clinton in temporary command of the siege, and ordered him to storm Fort Royal if the breach were reported practicable. He then rode out to Copons, whom he found in the act of choosing his ground for the coming engagement ; for it was now certain that the French column from the north had seized the pass of Ordal, not more than eighteen or twenty miles from Vendrell. Murray nervously expressed his fears of Suchet's arrival at Tortosa, but declared none the less his determination to support Copons in giving battle to the approaching enemy. The two after some discussion then agreed that they would receive the

¹ 1400 more were at San Felipe, and 1500 more with Eroles, making a total of 8900 men in all. Of his 6000 men, 1750 guarded the pass of Santa Cristina.

enemy's attack on the west bank of the Gaya ; and 1813. Murray, having undertaken to send thither at once a June 11. party of cavalry, despatched orders to Lord Frederick Bentinck to move four squadrons and two guns to Altafulla immediately. It should seem that Sir John spent the rest of the day in the vicinity of the chosen position, for he visited Bentinck at Altafulla in the evening, and did not return to Tarragona until past seven. Clinton then sent word to him that, the breach being reported practicable, he had made every arrangement to storm Fort Royal at ten o'clock ; and at nine o'clock he received an answer from Sir John that the assault should be delivered.

A few minutes later intelligence came in that Suchet had not only reached but left Tortosa, his advanced guard having reached Perello on the 10th. Looking to previous information, there was nothing very surprising or startling in this news. It was well known that the Marshal was advancing rapidly northward ; and Perello after all was at least thirty miles distant from Tarragona by the main road, which was barred by Fort San Felipe ; wherefore, unless Suchet delayed his advance to capture that place, he must needs go round by mountain roads, which would not only greatly prolong his march, but would compel him to leave his artillery behind. Murray, however, losing his head completely, countermanded the attack on Fort Royal, and determined to raise the siege immediately. Yet he seems to have hesitated even over this decision, for his chief artillery-officer, Colonel Williamson, received no instructions until midnight, when Sir John abruptly ordered him to bring the guns off immediately. Much taken aback, for he had only just brought up another gun to replace a damaged piece on Mount Olivo, Williamson pointed out that no preparations had been made for this sudden retirement, and that, before he could collect men or drag the guns half-way to the shore, the day would break and the whole of the working parties would be exposed to the fire of the fort. He therefore begged the general to wait for

1813. twenty-four hours, in which case he pledged himself to embark every gun and every article of stores. Thus pressed Murray gave way ; and it is very plain that, if he had issued his orders to Williamson at nine, when, according to his own account, he made up his mind to re-embark, the guns might have been brought off there and then.

Meanwhile Sir John had despatched an officer to Copons to tell him that, owing to Suchet's approach, he "had been under the necessity of withdrawing a part of his besieging apparatus," but would move nearer to his Spanish colleague in the morning, and was still resolved to give battle. This first message reached Copons between one and two o'clock in the morning of the 12th ; between two and three o'clock Bentinck at Altafulla received orders to return to the camp before Tarragona ; and between five and six o'clock a second messenger brought a letter to Copons from Murray. This missive announced that the siege had been raised, and bade the Spanish General, as soon as he should hear of the enemy's advance to Villafranca, to fall back and take up his appointed position, where six British battalions were on march to join him ; after which he must act according to circumstances. Not a word was said as to the withdrawal of Bentinck's cavalry, not a word to explain why the support of eight thousand men, promised on the previous day, had been reduced to six battalions, or at most four thousand. The messenger only informed Copons that Murray was determined to embark and on no account to risk a battle.

As a matter of fact Copons had at midnight learned of the arrival of five thousand French at Villafranca on the previous evening ; and he now imparted the intelligence to Murray (which he ought to have done long before), adding that he should fall back at once, pursuant to orders. He lingered on, however, in his advanced position, in the hope of checking the enemy's progress, and sent out the cavalry of his escort to

ascertain the French movements, but could find no trace of them west of Arbos, some five miles north-east of Vendrell. Later in the morning came in another letter from Murray, dated nine o'clock, saying that the rapidity of Suchet's advance compelled him to collect his army on the road by the pass of Balaguer, and that Copons might join him or not, as he thought best. Copons replied that he would stay where he was until nightfall to prevent pressure on the British rear-guard ; and in the evening he received yet another letter from Murray, expressing much regret and explaining at great length that the simultaneous advance of French columns from the north and from the south left him no alternative but to embark. At nightfall, therefore, the Spanish leader turned northward by the valley of the Gaya into the mountains, heading for the little town of Vilarrodona. What he thought of Murray's pitiable shuffling, of his evident irresolution from hour to hour, and of his final decision to leave the Spaniards to shift for themselves, he did not record in his journal, but in his heart he cannot but have felt unmitigated contempt.

Early on the following morning Copons's cavalry came in with the astonishing intelligence that the French had retreated from Villafranca at ten o'clock on the previous night ; and a few hours later a letter arrived from Eroles, written from Vich early in the morning of the 12th, to report that Pellew's squadron had appeared before Rosas, and that the enemy had made a retrograde movement to cover the place. The news was perfectly true. General Maurice Mathieu, after collecting troops with extraordinary energy at Barcelona, had marched southward with nine thousand men,¹ giving out that the whole army of Catalonia was following him ; and had arrived, as we have seen, at Villafranca on the evening of the 11th. On the 12th he pushed

¹ This is the figure given by Suchet, who ought to know ; but it is remarkable that Copons's scouts and intelligencers reported the strength of Mathieu at 5000 men only. It is, I think, certain that only a part of Mathieu's force reached Villafranca on the 11th.

1813. his advanced guard forward to Arbos, but hearing no firing at Tarragona, and inferring either that the place had fallen or that a large army was on his front, he fell back in the night to the Llobregat. Meanwhile Pellew, in response to Murray's request, had brought his fleet into the Bay of Rosas on the 9th, and had landed his marines; whereupon Decaen, who was moving south from Gerona to join Mathieu, took the alarm and retreated to avert the threatened danger. In fact the French effort to relieve Tarragona from the north had gone to wreck. Copons at once sent some light troops to follow up Mathieu; but whether from laziness, or from a pardonable unwillingness, he made no haste to transmit this important intelligence to Murray.

June 12. That officer, meanwhile, was cutting a deplorable figure at Tarragona. In the course of the night Colonel Williamson had brought down to the beach and re-embarked the guns of all the batteries except those on Monte Olivo, leaving these last, as he had already arranged with Murray, until nightfall of the 12th. When, however, General Donkin repaired to the Commander-in-Chief at daybreak of the 12th, Sir John told him that he had not been able to get the cannon to the beach and that they must be spiked and abandoned. Why Murray should have come to this conclusion is not apparent. No new intelligence had been brought in during the night. Maurice Mathieu, as we have seen, was truly reported to be at Villafranca, but with no more than five or six thousand men; while Suchet, though he had indeed reached Tortosa, could not move beyond it except by a very bad mountain road without his artillery. Williamson protested that Murray had promised to give him another evening in which to save his cannon, and that he would have destroyed them had he known that they were to be deserted. Three of the general officers waited on Murray, and pressed him to fall upon Mathieu at Villafranca, and overwhelm him while there was yet time; but the miserable commander could decide upon nothing. Within the

space of little more than an hour—from nine to ten in ^{1813.} the morning—General Clinton, whose troops occupied ^{June 12.} Monte Olivo, received from him no fewer than six different orders—first, to march with six battalions to the position chosen in concert with Copons; second, to march with his own complete division and with Whittingham's also to the same spot; third, to send the whole of his baggage towards the pass of Balaguer, where the entire army would shortly be assembled; fourth, to bring his division to Murray's head-quarters by the quickest route; fifth, to spike the guns and march his division to the beach for embarkation; and sixth, to make over his position on Monte Olivo to Whittingham's Spaniards, as the guns would be withdrawn in the night.

Finally the guns brought down in the night were, after Donkin had once directed them to be abandoned, safely shipped by the naval officers; those on Monte Olivo were spiked, and their carriages were burned in the batteries; and the infantry was embarked early in the afternoon. Of the cavalry a part was conveyed on board ship, pursuant to the General's orders; and the remainder, in obedience to his counter-orders, marched off together with fourteen field-guns to the pass of Balaguer. In vain the Admiral pledged himself to bring off every man and every gun, if the General would but wait till nightfall. Murray was in such an agony of nervousness and indecision that he could make up his mind to nothing but to go on board the flagship and retire to bed.

Meanwhile Bertoletti, observing the preparations for raising the siege, could hardly believe his eyes. His garrison was utterly exhausted by fatigue; and though he knew, through deserters from the Allied army, that Suchet was advancing to his relief, yet his information was both vague and imperfect. Suchet as a matter of fact had been unable to do more than push his advanced guard under Pannetier over the mountain road to the heights of Montroig, above the plain of

1813. Tarragona, where fires were lit as a signal to Bertoletti, but failed to attract the notice of any one in Tarragona. Nor can Pannetier have arrived very early, for his patrols were pushed back, when they tried to descend into the plain, by Bentinck's cavalry; and Bentinck had not started until after two in the afternoon. The night of the 12th passed in perfect tranquillity, and
- June 13. many stores were embarked even on the 13th without the slightest molestation; but the garrison came out from the walls and dragged off in triumph the eighteen pieces of ordnance which had been so basely left to their fate by Murray. It is worthy of notice that all of these had been placed in position, and many of them actually landed, since the 9th; on which day Murray had first resolved—if indeed the word resolution can be used of so deplorable a waverer—to raise the siege.

During the night of the 12th Sir John received information from Prevost that a French force of three thousand men—which we know to have been Pannetier's brigade—had entered the defile at Bandellos on its way from Tortosa to Montroig, and that the Colonel was afraid of being cut off from Tarragona. Murray therefore asked the Admiral to sail with McKenzie's division at once to Balaguer; which Hallowell duly did, arriving on the evening of the 13th and disembarking the troops that night. Meanwhile Suchet remained halted with his main body at Tortosa, unable to get any information (for the inhabitants had fled away) except that water was hardly to be found on the route taken by Pannetier. In painful anxiety, for he had news that Del Parque and Elio were threatening Valencia, he set his troops in motion along the main road to the fort of San Felipe; and on approaching it he found one of McKenzie's battalions drawn up before the place, and a British man-of-war firing upon his column from the sea. Advancing a little further, he perceived to his amazement the entire British armament anchored off the fort, and, realising the danger of Pannetier, at once turned back. Murray had in fact followed McKenzie

with the rest of the army, rejoining him on that very ^{1813.} day; and in the evening he received to his joy the intelligence that Maurice Mathieu had retreated, that Copons had returned to Reus, and that no reinforcements had been thrown into Tarragona. Safe on the deck of the flag-ship, with only one hostile force to think of instead of two, and that force divided, Murray was smitten with a brief spasm of enterprise. Instead of hastening back to Valencia to do mischief there, he was divided between three projects—to attack Suchet's main body, to cut off Pannetier at Bandellos, or to land five thousand men at Cambrills, out of sight of Tarragona, march upon the fortress and take it by surprise. This last idea he submitted to the Admiral, who answered drily that, if Sir John could not take the place with his whole force and over forty siege-pieces, he was not likely to do so with five thousand men. The rebuke was just; and yet the idea was not a bad one, provided that the execution had been entrusted to a leader of energy and pushed forward at once; for Murray was by no means a fool. However, after receiving the Admiral's answer, he decided rather to intercept Pannetier's brigade.

Accordingly on the 15th the entire army, except ^{June 15.} part of Whittingham's division, was again disembarked; a message was sent to Copons to ask for a train of pack-mules; and McKenzie's division was selected to march towards Bandellos. But on the same day Suchet brought off Pannetier's brigade, so that when McKenzie reached the village on the 16th he found it deserted. ^{June 16.} Meanwhile Maurice Mathieu, realising that Pellew's descent was but a diversion, counter-marched once more to westward, and on the 15th re-entered Villafranca. Copons hearing of this movement early on the 16th, sent off a messenger at five o'clock in the morning to apprise Murray; but presently received a letter from Sir John, dated the 15th, asking him to watch the Tarragona road, by which alone Suchet could obtain artillery. Copons answered that, in view of Mathieu's

1813. advance, he must look to the safety of his detachment at Santa Cristina and was moving on Valls, leaving only a small post of observation at Reus. While on the march he learned that Mathieu was still advancing, with intent to halt at Tarragona for the night and fall upon Murray's flank next day, whereupon he sent off a second emissary to warn the British General. At nine o'clock Copons received information that the French had reached Altafulla over four hours earlier; and at ten there came in another letter from Murray deploring the retreat of the Spaniards to Valls, and urging them to join him and thus render him superior to his enemy, or at any rate to attack the French in flank and cut off their resources. Now it is very evident that there was only one body of French that Copons could strike in flank, namely, Mathieu's column; and yet Murray had the effrontery to say, on his trial, that he heard nothing of Mathieu's advance until that General was entering Tarragona, and that his staff-officers had actually come upon Mathieu's army at Cambrills between two and three o'clock in the afternoon of the 16th, whereas in actual fact it did not reach that place till the 17th.

Having no artillery and knowing nothing of the enemy's intentions, Copons decided to stay where he was, but gave orders to be ready to march at daybreak. June 17. He was informed very early that the French were moving upon Tarragona,¹ whereupon he set off; and on the march there reached him yet another letter from Murray, dated the 16th, saying that the French were moving upon all sides, twenty-four thousand under Suchet and eight thousand under Decaen;² that he intended to fight them as early as possible on the morning of the 17th; and that he wished Copons to march upon Tarragona to distract Decaen. The

¹ Vacani says that Mathieu actually reached Tarragona on the evening of the 16th, and it may be that his advanced guard did so. Tarragona is only seven miles from Altafulla. I call the column Mathieu's, though Murray and all his people were persuaded that Decaen was at the head of it, and spoke of it as Decaen's.

² Meaning really Mathieu.

Spanish General accordingly altered his course at six in the morning for Reus ; but receiving on the march repeated accounts that Mathieu was directing his column upon that point, diverted his battalions to La Selva, and, advancing through Reus with his escort only, came upon the enemy at Villa Seca, a short five miles to the south of the town. At three o'clock in the afternoon he reported the result of his observations to Murray, and, learning soon afterwards that the enemy was marching on Cambrills, summoned his troops from La Selva to threaten Mathieu's flank. Considering the weakness of his force and his want of artillery, it must be admitted that Copons took no slight risk from sheer loyalty to the British Commander.

Meanwhile Murray had relapsed into his usual state of nervous irresolution. In the night of the 16th he recalled McKenzie's division from Bandellos ; and on the morning of the 17th, according to his own account, he expected a general attack. None the less it is certain that he held a council of war in the forenoon, at which he entreated his general officers to advise him what to do, his countenance and manner betraying such infirmity of purpose as to be absolutely painful. With one exception the generals favoured a re-embarkation, probably rather from a sense of Murray's hopeless incompetence than for any strictly military reason ; and it was decided to re-ship the troops in the evening. Late in the day, but before the operation had begun, Pellew's fleet came in sight, and signal was made from one of his ships that Lord William Bentinck was on board. "We are all delighted," was Hallowell's signal in reply ; and though it was unquestionably wrong thus to hold up the military Commander-in-Chief to the contempt of every man and boy in fleet and army, there can be no doubt that the Admiral accurately interpreted the feeling of all. Moreover, he had been sorely tried since the raising of the siege. "Bad as the indecision was at Tarragona," he said at Murray's trial, "it was nothing to that at Balaguer. The debarka-

1813. tion and re-embarkation continually going on was
June 17. enough to confound any operations in the world ; every mast-head was covered with the General's signals, and four fast-moving gigs were hardly sufficient to convey his orders." Of all the pictures—and there are many—which were drawn at Murray's trial to prove his unfitness to command, this free sketch in a few broad lines is beyond comparison the most powerful and the most damnatory.

Bentinck came ashore at once and questioned Murray as to the situation. Sir John answered that, according to his information, Suchet had twelve thousand men at Tortosa ; and, while the interview was yet proceeding, a messenger came in to report that Mathieu had reached Cambrills with seven thousand men. Both stories were in substance true, for Suchet had withdrawn to Perello and Amposta in the course of the 16th and 17th, being satisfied (to use Napier's words) that the fate of Tarragona had been decided for good or evil, and Mathieu had actually been seen at Cambrills by British staff-officers. But it is difficult to understand why Murray credited Suchet with twenty-four thousand troops when writing to Copons on the night of the 16th, and with only half that number when speaking to Bentinck on the evening of the 17th. Lord William, having reviewed the situation, quickly made up his mind to confirm the order for re-embarkation and return to Alicante. It would have been easy, as he said, to drive back Mathieu ; but he could not have prevented him from throwing a reinforcement into Tarragona, which circumstance, added to the loss of material sacrificed by Murray, would have made a second siege a matter of much time and of uncertain issue.¹ Reading between the lines of his letters, however, it is impossible for us to avoid the conclusion that the army was in no condition for further immediate service. Not only had horses, mules, and equipment suffered much from repeated embarkations and re-

¹ Bentinck to Secretary of State, 24th June 1813.

embarkations, but both discipline and moral force ^{1813.} had been seriously shaken. Murray had held all his ^{June 17.} generals, including Donkin, at a distance; he had alienated the Admiral; and he was an object of outspoken contempt to all ranks from the lieutenant-general to the drummer. It is said—and quite credibly said—that he was subjected even to personal insult; and an army, particularly a heterogeneous and polyglot army, in which such a spirit prevails is on the direct way to become a rabble.

The embarkation began accordingly on the night of the 17th, was continued throughout the 18th, and completed by three o'clock on the morning of the 19th without any molestation. Fort San Felipe was blown up; and the armament sailed for Alicante. Nevertheless, amazing as it may seem, not a word was sent to Copons to apprise him of what was going forward. Maurice Mathieu, learning late on the 17th of Suchet's retirement, fell back during the night upon Reus; and at half past two on the morning of the 18th he tried to ^{June 18.} surprise the Spaniards in that place. Fortunately Copon's advanced posts were on the alert, and he was able to retreat with little loss to La Selva, first writing to report the occurrence to Murray and to protest against being thus exposed to danger in supporting his operations. Early on the 19th intelligence came in that ^{June 19.} Mathieu was retiring towards Tarragona, and Copons set his troops in motion to follow him up; but late in the evening his aide-de-camp returned from Balaguer with the news that the fort had been blown up and that the Allies were re-embarking. Having undertaken to distract Mathieu upon the implied condition that Murray would attack Suchet, Copons was naturally indignant at such treatment; but at last on the morning of the 20th arrived a letter from Bentinck saying ^{June 20.} frankly that he had found the army in such a condition that he had no alternative but to re-embark. "Undeceived now as to the state of the Allied army," wrote Copons in his journal with justifiable contempt,

1813. "I have moved my troops for the attainment of different objects."

So ended the expedition to Tarragona, a failure in every sense of the word. The casualties of the garrison did not exceed one hundred and twenty, and it is difficult to understand how those of the besiegers could have been more numerous, though French authorities ascribe to the Allies a loss of six hundred men. But the really serious thing was the disgrace to the British arms, which unfortunately was not redeemed by Del Parque and Elio in Valencia. They pressed closely upon General Harispè, when marching from San Felipe to the Xucar on the 11th of June, but were driven back by a charge of cavalry ; and, attempting a more serious attack at Alcira on the 14th, they were routed with a loss of over one thousand killed and wounded. Lastly, stormy weather enabled Suchet not only to outpace the fleet on the return journey to Valencia, but to capture five small vessels which had been stranded by a gale. Thus the ascendancy of the French in the province, rudely shaken by the reverse at Castalla, was completely restored.

A strong letter of Admiral Hallowell to Pellew first drew attention at home to Murray's mismanagement ; and the general indignation could only be appeased by a public enquiry. Ministers accordingly gave orders on the 14th of July that the General should be tried by court-martial in Spain itself. But the difficulties, owing to the dispersal of witnesses and other circumstances, were great ; and Murray waited in Spain for the first nine months of 1814 in vain expectation of the assembly of the court, till at last he was ordered back to England. Herein no doubt he was badly treated ; and Ministers apologetically admitted the fact. It seems that they were very anxious for the court to be composed of Wellington's generals, with Lowry Cole for president ; but through some influence, which I have been unable to trace, they were thwarted ; and when Murray was finally brought to trial at Winchester in

January 1815, his judges included not a man, except 1813. Sir Edward Paget, who had served in the Peninsula.

Even so the prosecution was unskilfully conducted. All Spanish testimony, excepting a few official letters which had passed in the course of the campaign, was excluded, and most notably the journal of General Copons. Admiral Hallowell, who was the prosecutor upon one charge, and some of the principal witnesses also, showed a bitterness and a bias of which Murray was shrewd enough to take full advantage ; and the General further displayed an audacity of falsehood which appears to have paralysed his accusers. Thus he insisted both in his official despatch and in his defence before the court-martial that Mathieu had, in his counter-march from the Llobregat, reached Cambrills in the afternoon of the 16th, and that Copons had neither attempted to stop him nor sent intelligence of his coming. He also argued that it was the closing in of this force from the east and of Suchet's from the west upon Balaguer on the afternoon of the 19th, that caused him to give the order for re-embarkation on the 17th. Now it is absolutely certain, both from Copons's journal and from Bentinck's despatch, that Mathieu did not arrive at Cambrills until the afternoon of the 17th, long after Murray had decided to re-embark ; it is also proved by Copons's journal that he did give Murray early warning of Mathieu's approach, and that Murray received his letters and acknowledged them. Yet neither the Judge Advocate General nor Hallowell had the acuteness to detect this deliberate falsification at the time ; and by some strange oversight Napier overlooked it when reviewing the proceedings twenty-five years later. Other minor falsehoods were also left unexposed, and the Court finally acquitted Murray of everything but the error of judgment which prompted him to abandon unnecessarily the guns and stores at Tarragona. The general feeling seems to have been that, the war being well over, bygones might be suffered to be bygones.

Such, however, was not the opinion of Murray him-

1813. self. No sooner was the court-martial over than he asked for a medal to be issued to himself and to his officers for the action of Castalla. This, much to his indignation, was rightly refused, with the more firmness, perhaps, since he had the impudence to place the affair on the same level with the battle of Barrosa. Still persistent, he asked for a reward which had been rendered vacant by the death of Sir Edward Pakenham, and was again denied. Not yet suppressed, he claimed the immediate distinction of a red riband "to cancel former injuries"; and was for the third time repulsed. Finally his wounded spirit was soothed in 1818 by the grant of the Hanoverian Guelphic Order from the Prince Regent, a proceeding which suggests that Murray had from the beginning been under the protection of the Court.¹ Nothing, however, can redeem his memory from the stigma of incompetence thrice branded on him—in Malwa, at the passage of the Douro, and at Tarragona. The accurate and scornful analysis by Napier of his defence, when on his trial, long ago disposed of his pretensions to any military reputation; and it might have been sufficient to leave him with the contemptuous epitaph of "a man sufficiently acute and prompt when not at the head of an army." But justice to his Spanish colleague demands more than this. Murray, not content with calling Copons down to a dangerous position for his own benefit, and then deserting him, did not shrink from accusing him falsely of disloyalty and neglect of duty when Copons was not present to speak for himself, and of garbling facts and dates in support of such a contention. No acquittal by court-martial can avail an officer who, to save himself from deserved reproach, can stoop to such despicable meanness as this.

¹ This Order, now almost forgotten, was conferred by the personal favour of the Sovereign, not by the advice of Ministers, and was not very highly esteemed. It is perhaps best remembered by the story told of William IV., who informed one of his friends that he had "Guelphed" a certain individual. "Indeed, Your Majesty," answered the friend, who had no very high opinion of the individual, "it serves him damned well right."

He must be pilloried by history without mercy as a cowardly and dishonourable man, unworthy to hold his Sovereign's commission, or to wear the red coat of a British soldier.

The chief authority on the English side for the expedition to Tarragona is the shorthand report of the *Court Martial* held on Murray, which was published in 1815. My own copy has by chance a number of MS. notes and comments by General William Clinton, which, though bitter, are valuable and instructive. Supplementary to this are despatches from the East Coast of Spain in the Record Office (vols. 317, 318), in which will be found a translation of Copons's journal, and all Murray's letters respecting the Court Martial. Murray's letters to Wellington are all printed, together with one from Donkin in Wellington's *Suppl. Desp.* vols. vii. and viii. On the French side there is a long detailed account in Vacani *Storia delle Campagne e degli Assedi degl' Italiani in Spagna*, iii. 625-645, and the *Mémoires* of Suchet.

CHAPTER III

1813. THE ground is now cleared for the narrative of the most important military operations of 1813, namely, the final campaign of Wellington against Joseph and the French generals in the Peninsula. The contending armies, as we have seen, had retired into cantonments at the close of 1812; and Wellington, after fulminating his manifesto against indiscipline, was applying himself to the task of reorganising and re-equipping his forces for a great effort in the coming summer.

One of the first letters that reached him after his arrival upon the Agueda was a decree of the Cortes, dated the 18th of November, appointing him to the chief command of the Spanish Armies; and he addressed himself without delay to the fulfilment of the heavy duties thereby imposed upon him. The state of those armies, unpaid, unfed, unclothed and undisciplined, was almost hopeless; and Wellington realised at once that improvement was impossible unless he were vested in certain matters with full authority. It was essential in his judgment that the appointment, promotion and dismissal of officers, as well as the application of the funds supplied for the pay, equipment and supply of the troops should lie solely with himself, and that all correspondence between the Spanish Government and its military officers should be conducted through himself as Commander-in-Chief. Accordingly, in his first letter to the Spanish Minister for War Wellington suggested that these powers should be granted to him; and on the 12th of December he started for Cadiz, to second his demands in person.

After some delay on the road owing to flooded rivers 1813. he reached Cadiz on the 24th,¹ where, receiving only an indecisive answer to his suggestions, he converted them into claims, of which he peremptorily demanded speedy concession under threat of resigning the command. At the same time he put forward proposals for the reorganisation of the Spanish forces into four armies only, whose commanders should have full civil as well as military control over the provinces allotted to each army for its support. It is hardly matter for astonishment that the Cortes thought him extremely exacting ; but to all intent they granted the powers which he had asked for, though, under terror of the press of Cadiz, they declined to combine civil with military authority in the hands of military officers at the dictation of a foreigner. The whole system of government under the new constitution of Spain was so childish and in such confusion that Wellington thought it better to give way, than to enter into a prolonged dispute which could have no satisfactory ending. Accordingly he accepted the semblance of control conceded to him, and quitted Cadiz on the 10th of January 1813 for the north. He left behind him an unpleasant reputation for interference with Spanish domestic affairs which, though perhaps justifiable by the military exigencies of the moment, raised the animosity of the political factions in the Cortes to the highest point of bitterness.²

It was easy to obtain promises from the Spanish Government, not so easy to obtain their fulfilment. In less than a month after his departure from Cadiz Wellington was obliged to complain that no directions had been issued for the victualling of the Spanish troops by the provinces severally appointed for their support,

¹ Napier by a strange slip says that he arrived on the 18th, and made an unduly long stay, hinting that this Caesar had found a Cleopatra in Cadiz. There is nothing improbable in the story of a Cleopatra ; but it would have gained force if Napier had stated the date of his arrival correctly and not omitted to state the day of his departure.

² *Arteche*, xii. 434 *seq.*

1813. and that orders had been conveyed direct from the Ministry of War to Spanish generals without any notification to the Commander-in-Chief. A fortnight passed ; and he found that still no steps had been taken to provide for the pay and subsistence of the armies. Yet a week later he was driven to protest against the appointment of a Spanish general to high command without any reference to himself. The Spanish Government, however, took little notice, continuing to neglect the business of supply and to ignore the Commander-in-Chief entirely ; giving direct orders to generals, receiving direct communications from them, and moving bodies of troops at their own pleasure. At last, at the beginning of April, Wellington, by a second threat to resign, compelled attention to his remonstrances. Even so, however, the campaign opened before any provision had been made for the feeding and payment of the Spanish armies ; and late in the autumn the Regency, unmindful of its obligations, was still indulging itself in the arbitrary appointment and removal of officers. Altogether, therefore, the British General gained more trouble than help from his exalted position in the Spanish service.¹

As to the Portuguese contingent in his own army, it was necessary to stir up the Government at Lisbon likewise to do something for the pay and subsistence of its troops, which from sheer discouragement had acquitted themselves but ill during the last campaign. In March 1813 the pay of the Portuguese soldiers was eight months in arrear, and the *Junta de Viveres*—or Board of Commissariat—had proved itself in the past so wasteful and inefficient that Wellington roundly denounced it as an “infamous board,” and demanded its abolition. It was not his practice, as he said, to call attention to evils without pointing out a remedy ; and he had long before advocated the exaction from the merchants and capitalists of Lisbon, Oporto, and other cities of one-tenth of the huge profits which they were

¹ *Wellington Desp.* Jan., Feb., March, April 1813, *passim*.

gaining from the war, as also a rigorous audit of the 1813. accounts of the *Junta de Vivieres*. But his recommendations were made in vain. At the beginning of April in despair he addressed a strong protest to the Prince Regent of Portugal in Brazil, and forwarded it to Lisbon to be read to the Council of Regency; declaring flatly that, unless the troops were paid before they marched to the coming campaign, he should certainly transmit the letter to its destination. This rigorous measure had the desired effect, though it was still necessary for Wellington to write once or twice to Sir Charles Stuart in the course of the campaign to check the efforts of the Regency to evade its duties. Meanwhile Beresford, though his wound received at Salamanca was still unhealed, laboured indefatigably at Lisbon to perfect all details of organisation. So successful were their joint endeavours that at the end of July Wellington was able to describe the Portuguese as "the fighting cocks of the army"; but he added, "I believe we owe their merits more to the care we have taken of their pockets and bellies than to the instruction we have given them."¹

As regards the British Army, the Government, though still deferring its supreme effort, was straining every nerve to reinforce Wellington to the greatest possible strength. For the first time since the opening of the war no special provision was needed for raising recruits, though the Regular Militia showed signs of breaking down under the strain of the huge drafts made upon it to fill the ranks of the regiments in the field. Still, ordinary enlistment flourished amazingly; and at the end of 1812 the total number of British recruits enrolled by all methods and means during the year exceeded the British casualties by fully two thousand.

The first reinforcement to arrive after the close of the

¹ *Wellington Desp.* To Sir C. Stuart 7th March, 24th April, 17th July; to Dom Miguel Forjaz, 14th, 26th April; to the Prince Regent of Portugal, 12th April 1813.

1813. past campaign was a brigade of the Household Cavalry, to which each of the three regiments contributed two strong squadrons, numbering nearly three hundred and fifty of all ranks. They disembarked in the Tagus at the end of November, and were inspected a week later by Beresford, who pronounced the Blues to be in excellent order, both men and horses, with an efficient commanding officer, but would not say as much for the two regiments of Life Guards. These last indeed seem to have been shiftless beyond description. Their colonel was terrified at the weight of responsibility which had, as he imagined, fallen upon him, and, being as deficient in brains as in nerve, had lost his head completely. Both regiments had thrown away their curry-combs and brushes, under the impression that those implements were useless on active service, and needed to be furnished with a fresh supply; and Beresford remarked significantly that the sooner their Brigadier arrived the better. Cotton, who inspected the brigade three days later, confirmed the judgment of Beresford. The three regiments had had a rough passage from England, and one transport belonging to each of them had not come in; the missing vessel in each case being that which carried the veterinary surgeon, drugs, spare shoes and nails. Yet the Blues had already contrived to shoe most of their horses, had collected their transport, and were nearly ready to march up country; whereas the Life Guards had done nothing. "The Blues," reported Cotton, "are in very fine condition, superior in every respect to their neighbours, who certainly are very helpless." A few days later Colonel Willoughby Gordon, who had reached Lisbon on his way home, thought it his duty likewise to inspect the Life Guards, and found that their Brigadier, Rebow, had arrived and had taken the two regiments so briskly in hand that the Colonel and several officers of the Second were threatening to resign. Such were the defects bred by sixty years of duty at home, unvaried by active service, defects which may be

mentioned without fear, since the Life Guards have long since banished from themselves such reproach.¹ 1813.

The embarkation of the Brigade of Hussars was delayed owing to damage suffered by the horse-transporters on the voyage from Portugal to England; but all three regiments embarked apparently before the end of January and arrived in the Tagus in the course of February. The Tenth, Fifteenth and Eighteenth had been carefully selected by the Duke of York as having had previous experience of the Peninsula in 1809; and he had only refrained, in deference to Wellington's wishes, from giving the command to their former leader, Charles Stewart. A battery of horse-artillery was embarked at the same time; but no new battalion of infantry except the Twenty-ninth Foot, which was itself so full of recruits and boys that it could only be consigned to duty at Cadiz so as to release another battalion² from that garrison for the field. The Duke of York had in fact protested against the despatch of more regiments of any kind from the British Isles, and he was not without some excuse. In Great Britain at this time there were only thirteen thousand, and in Ireland only twelve thousand troops of the line, cavalry included; while in London the remains of the Brigade of Guards were hardly sufficient to carry on the daily duty. In fact the Regular Army and the Regular Militia were reduced to mere depôts of recruits, and the police of the British Isles depended wholly on the Local Militia.

The situation was further complicated by the fact that in some regiments and battalions, which had served for long in the Peninsula, the supply of drafts was inadequate to fill the gaps made in the ranks by the wear and tear of successive campaigns, and that certain units (as they would now be called) were reduced to mere skeletons. According to the principles of organisa-

¹ *Wellington MSS.* Beresford to Wellington, 6th Dec., Cotton to Wellington, 9th Dec. 1813. *Supp. Desp.* vii. 504.

² 2/59th.

1813. tion laid down at the Horse Guards, such skeletons should have been sent home and replaced by their affiliated battalions in the case of infantry, or by some other regiment in the case of cavalry. Wellington, however, being naturally anxious to keep with him every hardened and acclimatised soldier that he had, tried to accommodate his own wishes to those of the Horse Guards by a compromise. No fewer than eight of his battalions were too weak to keep the field as such, and he therefore proposed in December 1812 to draft two of them down to six companies apiece, which should serve still as independent units, and six of them down to four companies apiece, which should be combined, by pairs, into provisional battalions; the skeletons of the remaining companies being in every case sent home to form a *dépôt*.¹ The correspondence which ensued upon the subject is instructive in many ways. The Duke of York, while sincerely disclaiming any wish to weaken Wellington's force, and admitting to the full the value of hardened soldiers, strongly condemned the formation of provisional battalions, because it sacrificed for an immediate and comparatively trifling advantage the only foundation for the eventual efficiency of the Army. He pointed out further, that, when the skeleton of a battalion was sent home complete, the nucleus of old soldiers greatly hastened its reconstruction into an efficient body; whereas the experiment of sending home the half of a skeleton, without any old soldiers, had failed disastrously in practice. Finally, being a just man, he declared that he had no intention of withdrawing any troops whatever without sending others to take their place.

¹ To be drafted in four cos. and formed into provisional battalions.

1st Prov. Batt. : 2/31st; 2/66th (had been so since June 1811).

2nd „ „ : 2nd; 2/53rd.

3rd „ „ : 2/24th; 2/58th.

4th „ „ : 2/30th; 2/44th.

To be drafted down to 6 cos., and retained as independent units (being Light Infantry) 51st, 68th.

On the same day, however, the Duke of York sent ^{1812-13.} a further letter to Wellington suggesting that, in view of the large reinforcements of cavalry sent to him, he should draft the horses of at least two regiments of heavy dragoons to the other regiments, and send the officers and men home, but leaving the matter to his discretion. Wellington at once pierced to the heart of the subject. The Duke of York and himself could not, as he confessed, see eye to eye in this matter; for the Duke was responsible for the whole Army and the service of the Empire, whereas he himself had nothing to consider but his own force and the service of the Peninsula. If questions were left to his discretion, he would naturally decide them in the fashion most favourable to himself; but if the Duke of York sent him a positive order, he should cheerfully obey it. The situation indeed was precisely that which has been referred to in a former page of this work,¹ where discretionary orders were out of place, and as such had been condemned both by Nelson in 1803 and by Wellington himself in 1810. In this instance, however, Ministers interfered behind the back of the Commander-in-Chief by instructing Wellington privately that, in spite of the Duke of York's aversion from provisional battalions, he was at liberty to keep them for the present, and send the units home as soon as convenient to himself. In the end the Duke of York, finding himself unable, owing to calls from Canada, to send over more than one battalion of the relief which he had promised, consented that one only of the provisional battalions² should be sent home in exchange for it, and that the rest should be retained until they should in their turn be replaced.

The problem of the cavalry was not solved so fully to Wellington's satisfaction, for the Duke of York promptly substituted for discretionary orders a peremp-

¹ Vol. vii. 441.

² The 4th Prov. Batt. 2/30th, 2/44th, was that selected for sacrifice.

1812-13. tory command to draft the horses of five regiments of dragoons into the remaining corps in the Peninsula, and to send home the officers and men of the five regiments thus dismounted. It was a hard measure, so hard that he sent a private message to Wellington deploring the necessity which had compelled him to it, but pointing out that it was essential to the efficiency of the Army at large. The source of the whole difficulty lay in the dearth of horses after twenty years of war. "Horses in general," wrote the Duke of York, "have become very difficult to procure ; but horses of a sufficient age to be fit for immediate service it is impossible to purchase." Wellington without concealment professed himself incredulous upon this point. "Surely," he wrote, "horses of five and six years old cannot be wanting in England" ; and he suggested boldly either that the standard price of £25 offered by Government should be raised to £40, or even to £45, in order to obtain mature animals ; or that all troop-horses of five years old and upwards should be drafted out of the regiments at home for the squadrons in the Peninsula. It is unfortunately not easy to arrive at the truth upon this question, but, wherever it may lie, it is certain that Wellington, like other commanders in the field, was not squeamish about sacrificing the interests of others so long as his own wants were supplied. He would, as he admitted, have greatly preferred to take over the horses of the newly-arrived Hussar Brigade—much more those of the Household Brigade—for his old regiments on the spot, and send the men and officers home ; but he did not condescend to discuss the effect of such a measure upon the training and discipline of the cavalry in the British Isles. The Duke of York, however, was firm. The depôts of the cavalry in the Peninsula were exhausted both in men and horses, and the only remedy was to sacrifice a part of it for the full equipment of the rest ; for, as he reminded Wellington, it was his business to keep the force permanently effective. The regiments selected

for sacrifice were the Fourth Dragoon Guards, the 1812-13. Ninth and Eleventh Light Dragoons, and the Second Hussars of the German Legion ; and, as these sufficed to furnish the remounts required, the fifth of the doomed regiments was kept in the Peninsula.

In the matter of artillery once again Wellington's requisitions for the service of 1813 fairly staggered the Office of Ordnance, for he had asked for considerably more than half of the establishment of drivers and horses in the British Isles.¹ As has already been mentioned, a troop of horse-artillery was embarked for the Peninsula in January 1813 ; and the Duke of York presented a formal protest against the withdrawal of more. These facts elicited from Wellington no more than a dry expression of regret that he should have demanded that which was likely to be injurious to his country ; with the equally dry comment that, in such a case, the establishment of the Ordnance, however high, was too low for the strength of the Army. Once more the great difficulty lay in the scarcity of horses and mules ; and Wellington was at pains to demonstrate that the cost of a mule in Portugal was £60 in cash, so that it would be a positive saving to buy horses in England for £45 and to transport them at the cost of £10 more, particularly as these expenses could be defrayed in bank-notes. The question, however, seems to have been less easy than it appeared to Wellington ; or at any rate it was too difficult for the officers of the Ordnance. They were unwilling to raise the price of horses for their own department, lest they should raise it against the Government all round ; and they were fain—though far too late—to get over the difficulty by granting an allowance to dealers for the expense of bringing horses to the depôts. Drivers were hardly less scarce than horses ; and, since few could be obtained from England, Wellington was obliged to resort to dismounted Portuguese cavalry-men, supplied by

¹ The establishment was 4577 horses and 2746 drivers. Wellington asked for 2800 horses and 1700 drivers.

1812-13. Beresford. Altogether, though the horses of the new troop of horse-artillery were actually taken from it to draw heavier guns, there was no prospect that the army could carry with it the train of cannon which Wellington had desired.¹

So far as to the strength of the army ; let us now look at the means of turning that strength to account, and first to the general officers. Some mention has already been made of Wellington's difficulties with his new Quarter-master-general, Colonel Gordon, and of that officer's return to England on sick leave at the close of 1812. But there were others also of whom he was impatient to be rid ; namely, Erskine, Slade and Long, the commander and brigadiers of the Second Cavalry Division, who were all equally useless ; Chowne, formerly Tilson, who had often been troublesome and never efficient ; Victor Alten, who had incurred Wellington's righteous displeasure while covering the march of the army to Badajoz in April 1812 ; Bernewitz, who appears to have been admitted to the army by mistake ; and Löw, who was worn out. As regards these Wellington, though not concealing his desire to be quit of them, was strangely anxious that their feelings should not be hurt, expressing himself as willing to keep them rather than that they should be injured by his complaint. Ministers were also a little nervous lest a wholesale recall of Generals should attract public notice ; and the only person who faced the unpleasant duty with firmness was the Duke of York.

Gordon was the most difficult subject to deal with ;

¹ As to the provisional battalions and the cavalry, see *Supp. Desp.* vii. 524-525, 552. *Wellington MSS.* Duke of York to Wellington, 2nd Dec. 1812, 13th Jan., 16th Feb. 1813 ; Bathurst to Wellington, 3rd Feb. 1813. *Wellington Desp.* To the Duke of York, 6th, 20th, 26th Dec. 1812, 5th, 10th Feb., 11th March 1813 ; to Bathurst, 27th Jan., 9th March, 25th May ; to Torrens, 2nd Feb. ; to Colonel Sherlock, 17th March 1813 ; to V. Alten, 6th April 1813 ; to Cotton, 7th April 1813 ; G.O. of 13th March 1813.

As to the artillery and drivers, see *Wellington Desp.* To Bathurst, 27th Jan., 17th Feb., 3rd March ; to Beresford, 27th Feb., 18th, 24th April 1813 ; to Bathurst, 14th, 21st April 1813.

for Wellington had taken it into his head that an ap- 1812-13.
pointment in Ireland had been offered to his Quarter-
master-general, General Murray, on purpose that the
Duke of York might thrust Gordon from the Horse
Guards into his place. There was not the slightest real
ground for this suspicion ; but Wellington did not
readily part with ideas which had once laid hold upon
him ; and accordingly, when the Duke of York asked
for some definite complaint which would enable him to
revoke Gordon's appointment, Wellington shrank from
this invidious task, and suggested that Gordon should
be recalled to take up a new post at the Horse Guards.
He was answered with justifiable curtness that the Duke
of York had no intention of preferring officers of proved
inefficiency to high offices, merely to spare their feelings.
If Wellington wished to be delivered from Gordon he
must give a definite reason, so that the Duke should
not be thought to have recalled him from mere caprice ;
and upon the receipt of that reason the Duke would
take full responsibility for his action. The real diffi-
culty lay in the fact that Gordon was a favourite at
Carlton House ; but it was solved by Gordon's doctor,
who fortunately pronounced him unfit for active service
until he should have undergone a serious operation,
which would disable him for many months. Torrens
played his part so happily that he left Gordon mourning
over the disappointment which Wellington would ex-
perience owing to the impossibility of his return. "He
will not go out again," wrote Torrens privately to
Wellington ; and a week later George Murray wrote
joyfully from Ireland that he should be delighted to
return to the Peninsula as Quarter-master-general.

"Everything is accommodated smoothly for you,"
wrote Torrens at this time, "I wish it were so for the
Duke" ; but Wellington was troubled by no such
feelings. In compliance with his wishes the Commander-
in-Chief at the end of December recalled Erskine, Slade,
Long and Victor Alten in one batch, and a fortnight
later Chowne, Löw and Bernewitz also ; but in respect

1812-13. of the first four he was careful to add that such recall did not necessarily debar them from further employment, and that he should appoint no one to fill their places until he knew whom Wellington wished to recommend. Torrens privately informed Wellington that the incident might raise some clamour, but that once again the Duke of York was prepared to take his full share of the responsibility, though he expected Wellington on his side to take his share also. "You will find," added Torrens, "that His Royal Highness is heartily at your back in anything that has for its object the better discipline and arrangement of the Army." Still Wellington was not satisfied. He reiterated his wish that the four officers should be removed on the ostensible ground that the Commander-in-Chief desired them to occupy some definite posts at home; whereupon the Duke, very pardonably losing patience, told him flatly that if he were not satisfied with the measures already taken for relieving him of inefficient generals, he was at full liberty to retain them with the army.

Dreading, however, the consequences if Wellington should take him at his word, the Duke cast about for devices to compass the desired end by stealth. It was above all things important that Slade should leave the Peninsula, lest, in the event of any mishap to Cotton, he should rise to command the whole of the cavalry. Accordingly Henry Clinton received the local rank of Lieutenant-general on the staff of the cavalry in the Peninsula; and it was then pointed out to Slade that, as there could not by the rules of the service be two lieutenant-generals simultaneously upon the staff, he as the senior must return to England. Overcome by this subtle stratagem Slade sailed home with perfect contentment, and presently received a command in Ireland. Erskine, meanwhile, had removed all difficulties in his own case by suddenly rising from his sick-bed, to which he was confined by fever, and throwing himself out of the window. The poor man had been conversing quite calmly with the surgeon not five minutes before, and,

when picked up, ridiculed the folly of his action, declaring himself unable to account for it ; but he was certainly not of sound mind ; and his death a day or two later was a happy release for himself and for the army. Chowne, also, who was at home on leave, was prevented by a lucky accident from returning to the Peninsula. Picton, it will be remembered, had been invalided home before Salamanca, and apparently had no great wish to leave England again ; but, having been invested with the red riband by the Prince Regent on the 1st of February, he was so much pleased that on the very next day he went to the Horse Guards to say that he was prepared to go back to the front immediately. When, therefore, Chowne reported himself ready to rejoin the army, he was told that Picton's unexpected return left no place for him. Thus three of the undesirables, Gordon included, were gently and cunningly laid aside. Bernewitz and Löw, against whom age was their only reproach, disappeared likewise from their brigades before the opening of the campaign ; Long and Victor Alten alone marched to Vitoria ; but the former left the army before the battles of the Pyrenees, and the name of the latter is known no more after the close of 1813.¹

The whole incident might seem to show Wellington in an invidious light as a man who shrank from responsibility, and wished to foist upon others the odium of an unpleasant but necessary duty. His conduct herein, however, was strictly consistent with the principles which invariably guided him. He always wrote favourably even of his most inefficient generals in his despatches ; and, when a flagrant mistake was made by one of them—as for instance by Erskine at

¹ For the whole business of the recall of Gordon and the other generals here mentioned, see *Supp. Desp.* vii. 485, 489, 499. *Wellington MSS.* Letters to Wellington from Sydenham, 8th Dec. 1812 ; from Torrens, 23rd, 30th Dec. 1812 ; 13th Jan., 16th, 17th Feb., 31st March, 8th April 1813 ; from Duke of York, 28th Dec. 1812 ; from Gen. Low, 28th April 1813. Wellington to Torrens, 31st Oct., 20th Dec. 1812. *Wellington Desp.* To Torrens, 22nd Jan. 1813.

1812-13. Almeida—he did not hesitate to visit it, however unfairly, upon a subordinate. It was a part of his system of duty and discipline, which denied all rights to the individual as against the common weal, and considered it far more important to uphold the authority of a general than to spare the feelings, no matter how justly wounded, of a colonel or a captain. So far did he carry this principle that, when Slade on the eve of his departure asked for a letter of recommendation to the Commander-in-Chief, Wellington did not hesitate to write of him, “He has always performed his duties very much to my satisfaction”; adding with the veiled irony habitual to him, “I conceive that so fit a person as he could not be selected to command the depôt of heavy cavalry in the army.” Yet he was well aware of Slade’s incompetence; and he knew that the Duke of York, being equally aware of it, was recalling him lest unhappy chance should throw the supreme command of the cavalry into his hands. There is some justification, however, for all this. The discipline of the officers generally was bad. Criticism of superiors was too frequent and open by subordinates; and, as Wellington (himself an offender) realised, these criticisms had more than once developed into conspiracies for the displacement of a chief commander. But whatever judgment be passed upon Wellington’s behaviour in this respect, it seems to me certain that he acted from no motive of private advantage but, rightly or wrongly, for the good of the public service.

If Wellington were troublesome over the removal of generals, he was not less so over the appointment of others in their room. He wrote expressly and peremptorily that he wanted no generals from home, as they were useless and only served to keep out men who were useful; and he was not a little disgusted when Fane and Rebow came out to command the new brigades of cavalry. Torrens and the Duke of York, as usual, tried hard to meet his wishes; but, as they justly urged, it was not easy to refuse generals who

had done good service in the field. Moreover, Fane ^{1812-13.} was after all a man who had already served Wellington with distinction. There was also some difficulty with Ministers over the nomination of a second in command, which Wellington, not without reason, declared to be an obsolete system and likely to give great offence to Beresford, whom with all his faults he pronounced to be the only man in his army fit "to direct a great concern." Luckily the recovery of Graham presented a happy solution of this problem; while the promotion of John Byng and Thomas Brisbane, both of whom had seen eighteen months of war in the Peninsula, to say nothing of many other campaigns, provided two generals who, if new in rank, were certainly old in experience.

The extraordinary number of general officers who were at home on leave, nearly all for reasons of health, during the winter of 1812-13 possibly made arrangements the easier. Graham, Picton, Leith, Cotton, Houston, Pack, Brisbane and Byng were all in England and all anxious to return. Leith was still so far disabled by his wound that he could not go back till late in the summer; Cotton did not rejoin the army until three days after Vitoria; Pack, after refusing a command in Canada, returned together with Graham and Picton in good time, as did also Byng and Brisbane; but Houston, recovered at last from long prostration by illness, found to his grief that there was no room for him. He had at one moment a gleam of hope, for Lord Dalhousie declared that, unless he himself received the red riband, he would resign his command; but the fulfilment of his lordship's vow was deferred too late to be of service to Houston.¹ In Portugal itself Beresford, after much suffering, submitted himself in April once more to the knife of the surgeons, and wrote joyfully that a large piece of his great-coat had come away from the

¹ *Wellington MSS.* Bathurst to Wellington, 7th April 1813. Henry Clinton was also a little sulky just at this time for the same reason as Dalhousie. Torrens to Wellington, 31st March 1813.

1812-13. wound, and that he would be fit for service in a fortnight. From Lisbon likewise the gallant General Walker wrote to entreat that he might not be forgotten, since he had now—after eight months—“only one wound open in his breast,” while the ribs displaced from his breast-bone promised to revert to their proper station before the opening of the campaign. With such men about him it is perhaps not wonderful that Wellington wanted no new generals from home.¹

In the matter of the head-quarters staff, the return of Murray to the chief place was a very great gain. Delancey, “the idlest fellow that Wellington ever saw,” had performed the work of Quarter-master-general much better than Gordon,² but would do all the better with Murray over him. The Adjutantship-general, however, was vacant, Charles Stewart having accepted a mission to the Prussian Army when on the eve of returning to resume that office. As usual, the Duke of York left with Wellington the appointment of Stewart’s successor, the favourites for the post being Pakenham, Lord Aylmer and Byng, of whom the first was ultimately appointed. In the command of the artillery also there was a change. Colonel Robe, having been disabled at Badajoz, had gone home; and his successor by seniority was Lieutenant-colonel Fisher. This officer, however, soon received a hint from Wellington to resign; the officer next senior to him was ordered to stay at Lisbon; the Master-general of the Ordnance, at Wellington’s request, refrained from sending a new officer from England; and in the first week of May Alexander Dickson, a mere captain in the Royal Regiment and a

¹ For this paragraph see *Supp. Desp.* vii. 486. *Wellington Desp.* To Mulgrave, 27th Jan.; to Vandeleur, 23rd April 1813. *Wellington MSS.* Letters to Wellington from Maj.-gen. Walker, 8th Dec. 1812; Maj.-gen. Rebow, 14th Dec. 1812; Torrens, 30th Dec. 1812, 17th Feb. 1813; Leith, 31st Dec. 1812, 29th May 1813; Byng, 1st Jan. 1813; G. Murray, 20th Jan., 9th Feb. 1813; Bathurst, 3rd Feb., 7th April 1813; Houston, 10th Feb. 1813; Mulgrave, 25th Feb. 1813; Beresford, 14th April 1813.

² *Wellington MSS.* Wellington to Torrens, 31st Oct. 1812.

lieutenant-colonel of but one year's standing in the 1812-13. Army, was elevated to the command of all the artillery in the Peninsula. Such sudden promotion might well have turned the head of an ordinary man; but it is recorded that Dickson, with exquisite tact, at once exchanged his British uniform for an old and very shabby Portuguese uniform, which he wore in virtue of his rank in the Portuguese service, to avoid hurting the feelings of the officers senior to him.¹

Another change from 1812, hardly less important than the return of Murray, was the resumption of the office of Commissary-general by Sir Robert Kennedy. It is a little difficult for a historian to speak hardly of his temporary substitute, Mr. Bissett, who has left us one of the few books that exist upon the work of the Commissariat in the Peninsula, and later obtained just commendation from Wellington; but it is clear from Kennedy's first report to Wellington that on his return he found everything in "a very loose state," and that it was necessary to restore order and system in all ranks of the department.²

Let us next pass to the question of money, which, from its connection directly with the Commissariat and indirectly with the discipline of the army, will form an appropriate link between them. The remittance of £100,000 a month in specie from England had afforded the greatest relief to Wellington, for, apart from its intrinsic value, it had increased the produce of the bills drawn upon the Treasury; in fact, as Wellington confessed at the beginning of March, it had far exceeded his expectations and practically put an end to his complaints of want of money. Naturally, however, he was always anxious to obtain more; and a report, current a few weeks later, that the price of silver "had come to its standard" in England and that the price of gold was falling rapidly, encouraged him in the hope that he might do so. Bathurst's answer dispersed these flatter-

¹ Henegan, i. 311-312.

² Kennedy to Wellington, 4th Dec. 1812.

1812-13. ing illusions as to the state of the bullion-market. The price of silver, though slightly improved, was still high ; English silver tokens were very nearly even with their intrinsic value, and there was an alarming prospect that they might perhaps sink below it. The fall in the price of gold was likewise insignificant. Indeed the export of precious metals from Lisbon to the United States in payment for American flour had diminished the supply of both gold and silver. The Government, however, had sought out a new source of specie in India, and by recoinng pagodas into guineas was quickening the flow of gold into the Peninsula. Thus in the middle of April there was shipped to Lisbon £150,000 in gold ; in the first week of May £160,000 ; and in the third week £272,000, of which last sum £200,000 was in Spanish and Portuguese coin and the remainder in guineas. In fact the British Government in spite of a thousand difficulties did its utmost to render Wellington's financial position, if not easy, at least endurable.¹

Increased demands, none the less, cancelled many benefits of the increased supply. The army itself was stronger in numbers and therefore more expensive than ever before ; the arrears due to the Spanish muleteers mounted up steadily ; and, worst of all, the term of the first batch of British soldiers, who had been enlisted for limited service, came to an end, and heavy bounties were payable to them upon re-enlistment. Most unfortunately too the Treasury, owing to a misunderstanding, disapproved of two of Wellington's financial devices and ordered that they should be discontinued. The case was this. Payment for goods purchased by the Commissariat for the army was made by bills drawn by the subordinate Commissaries upon the Commissary-general, and known for convenience as commissariat-bills. The "sharks" in Lisbon—to use Wellington's description of the unclean speculators who infest the skirts of an army in the field—soon began to buy these

¹ *Wellington Desp.* To Bathurst, 3rd, 30th March 1813. *Wellington MSS.* Bathurst to Wellington, 28th April, 19th May 1813.

securities at depreciated rates, thereby doing so much injury to British credit that Wellington forbade the payment of such purchased commissariat-bills by bills drawn upon the Treasury. The speculators naturally raised a howl, which was echoed by their correspondents in London; and Wellington withdrew the obnoxious prohibition. The result was that cash in return for Treasury bills became unobtainable; whereupon Wellington solved the problem by making the rule that no purchased commissariat-bill should be discharged by a Treasury bill unless the holder deposited a quantity of coin, equivalent to the amount of his commissariat-bill, in the military chest in return for a second Treasury bill. The system worked well, and brought in monthly from three-quarters of a million to a million of dollars in cash, without friction and without complaint. Concurrently Wellington and Stuart had eked out this small supply of specie by ordering in 1810 and 1811 large quantities of corn, paying for it by bills on the Treasury, selling such amounts as were not needed by the army to the Portuguese Government at a profit, and thereby at once saving the Portuguese generally from starvation, and making a welcome addition to the military chest.

Both of these transactions were now condemned, the latter by the Board of Trade, the former by the Treasury. Wellington was inclined to admit that his time, as well as that of the British Minister at Lisbon, might be more profitably employed than in speculating in corn; but he pointed out that men, who had to carry on a war with only one-sixth of the necessary amount of specie, must needs be driven to strange shifts, and should be encouraged, rather than the contrary, to pursue them. But the criticisms of the Treasury on the so-called commissariat-bills made him furious. He complained bitterly that their Lordships neither consulted nor trusted him, that they knew nothing whatever about the matter, and that in short he should, pending further instructions, continue his

1812-13, former practice. It then appeared that the unfortunate officials of the Treasury were wholly innocent in the matter. They thought that they were addressing their censures only to their own subordinate, Sir Robert Kennedy, and had not the slightest idea that his measures had been taken on the initiative and with the approval of Wellington. All that they knew was that in Lisbon Treasury bills, for which they were responsible, were issued to certain creditors on conditions which were not of their imposing, and which seemed to be contrary to the tenour of the bills themselves; and the reason for their ignorance was that Kennedy, being jealous of Mr. Herries, the Commissary-general in England, declined to give him any information about anything. Pending further reports, therefore, the Lords of the Treasury allowed Wellington to go his own way; but in the autumn they decided the question against him, with the result of course that the "sharks" had their will and took full advantage of it.

Which party was in the right upon this matter, I cannot presume to decide. Mr. Vansittart, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer, certainly possessed no great financial ability; but it must be said for him that his primary objection to Wellington's proceedings was that they were not quite creditable to the honour of the nation. The General, on his side, never doubted that the monied interest had made a capture of the British Ministers by the usual method of threatening their very existence as a Government; and this was very likely true. Holders of money can generally inflict their own terms upon any Government in time of war or crisis; and Vansittart probably hit upon the best means of finding specie in 1814, when he gave Rothschild a secret commission to procure it. It is not in sport only that a poacher—if one may use the term without offence—proves to be the best gamekeeper.¹

¹ *Wellington's Desp.* To Sir C. Stuart, 3rd May; to Bathurst, 30th March, 21st April, 3rd Sept. 1813. *Wellington MSS.* Bathurst to Wellington, 5th May 1813.

“Our own troops will always fight,” wrote 1812-13. Wellington when comparing them with the Portuguese, “but the influence of regular pay is seriously felt on their conduct, their health and their efficiency.” At the close of the campaign of 1812 an attempt was made to make good what was then wanting in the behaviour of the soldier by improved methods of enforcing discipline. The House of Commons, it must be once more repeated, had in a moment of infatuated meddlingness destroyed the old machinery of regimental courts-martial; and the procedure which sentimental members, in their wisdom, had substituted was so cumbrous as to be absolutely useless. To enable Wellington the better to grapple with its difficulties, the Government towards the end of 1812 sent out to him, as Judge-Advocate-General and expert adviser, Mr. Francis Seymour Larpent.

Joining head-quarters in time to see the last two days of the retreat from Burgos, Larpent began work as soon as the army was settled in cantonments by taking over the business of thirty-two courts-martial, some of which had been pending for two years. It was a trying task, for there was much sickness in the Army; and, as fast as one prisoner or witness got well, another fell ill. His master also was sufficiently exacting. “Going up with my charges and instructions,” wrote Larpent, “I feel something like a boy going to school”; but he soon gained the confidence of his formidable Chief, and in a few months received from him the honour of “How are you?” at every chance meeting. The pair of them toiled almost ferociously at their labour; and, in spite of the lenity and blunders of the courts-martial, which provoked angry letters in public and still more angry expressions in private from Wellington, they had by the end of March tried fifty culprits, hanged eight men, flogged about sixty severely, and broken several officers. Infamous outrages still occurred, and one party of Irish recruits of the Eighty-seventh behaved so disgracefully on their march up country as nearly to secure for their

1812-13. regiment the dishonour of being sent into garrison at Lisbon.¹ However, the prospect of speedy punishment had its effect ; and the Portuguese Government, at last taking courage to follow Wellington's advice and to try British ruffians by Portuguese law, startled them by transporting two or three offenders to their penal settlements in Africa. Giddy, insolent and blackguardly officers (who were more numerous than they ought to have been) likewise took warning when they discerned that, if they infringed the laws of Portugal, Wellington would not protect them against the consequences.²

To overcome the difficulties presented by the Mutiny Act, however, it was not enough to import a Judge-Advocate who was conversant with its intricacies. It was further necessary to relieve courts-martial of some of their cumbrous forms ; and to this end the Act of 1813 had been amended in sundry small respects ; while at the same time there was re-enacted a section, first introduced in 1812, whereby the number of officers sufficient to constitute a general court-martial overseas was reduced from nine to seven. By some extraordinary bungling the Articles of War were not altered in accordance with this change, so that there was variance between them and the Act ; but none the less it was held to be a terror to evildoers that the agreement of seven officers was now sufficient to hang them, and that courts were held ready in every division for the purpose. Even this measure, however, was thought inadequate, and a draft bill was forwarded to Wellington at this time, providing that offences against the persons or property of inhabitants of a foreign land might be tried by a general court-martial of three officers,

¹ *Wellington Desp.* To Colville, 10th April. *Wellington MSS.* Colville to Wellington (enclosing a letter from Gough), 21st April 1813.

² I found in the *Wellington MSS.* (reference unfortunately lost) a letter to Sir C. Stuart from a subaltern, who had been guilty of gross misconduct, appealing to him, as a British subject to a British Minister, to save him from being tried by a Portuguese Court. But Stuart and Wellington declined to interfere.

whose sentence should be subject to the confirmation ^{1812-13.} of the Commander-in-Chief. It was Wellington's particular wish that, owing to the difficulty of bringing witnesses, both civil and military, from long distances to the military tribunals, courts-martial might be empowered to receive sworn depositions in writing in cases of robbery, plunder, house-breaking and violence; and a clause was actually drafted for that purpose. But though the practice was consonant with the laws of Portugal, the conscience, or perhaps the pedantry, of the British jurists would not permit them to countenance it; and Ministers, realising that their own law-officers would oppose the clause, were fain to withdraw it. The remaining provisions of the Bill were passed into an Act on the 7th of July, and thus the extreme penalties of military law hung even over the smallest detachments.¹

Next, in order that these legal powers might not be given in vain from lack of an efficient police, a special corps of cavalry called, according to the fashion of the time, a Staff Corps,² was created and attached to the Adjutant-general's department for the better preservation of discipline at large in the army. It should seem that the idea of forming such a corps occurred simultaneously to Wellington and to the Duke of York, though their plans for realising it were very different. Wellington had already, in 1809, organised under

¹ See 52 Geo. III. cap. 22, sec. 18; 53 Geo. III. cap. 17, sec. 20, and cap. 99. Wellington's *Supp. Desp.* vii. 560. *Desp.* To Bathurst, 13th April 1813. Larpent's *Private Journal*, ed. 1854, pp. 79-81, 98-99.

² The rule appears to have been that all troops subject to the jurisdiction of the Horse Guards, who were not cavalry or infantry of the Line, were *ipso facto* a Staff Corps. Thus the Commander-in-Chief's engineers were called a Staff Corps, though the Waggon-Train by some merciful dispensation escaped the name. It may not be inapposite to remind readers that the Guards were under the direct orders of the Sovereign (they tried to assert their privileges in the field with partial success; see *Supp. Desp.* vii. 574-575, 600); the infantry and cavalry of the Line under the Commander-in-Chief; the Artillery and Engineers under the Master of the Ordnance; and the Commissariat and Pay Departments under the Treasury.

1812-13. Portuguese officers a corps of guides, which was made up chiefly of foreign deserters from the French army, to reconnoitre the roads, act as interpreters with marching columns, and carry despatches and orders between the various divisions of the army. They had proved themselves thoroughly trustworthy, and their numbers had already been increased considerably with the view of placing them at the disposal of the Provost Marshal.

The Duke of York's plan was to form four troops of military police with a total of eleven officers, forty-eight non-commissioned officers, and one hundred and thirty-two men; two of the troops to be sent from England, and the remainder to be made up from the regiments of cavalry in the Peninsula. All ranks were to be carefully selected from officers specially fitted for the duty and from men of the best character; and a handsome addition was promised to their pay.¹ Their uniform was a plain scarlet jacket with plain collar and cuffs; and the Duke of York had intended to provide them, for purposes of distinction, with the fur-combed helmet formerly worn by the Light Dragoons. But at this point the Prince Regent, who flattered himself that he possessed exceptional taste and understanding in the matter of head-dresses, intervened to forbid anything but the monstrous shako which had gradually become the fashion in European armies. Wellington from the first insisted that he should want his guides as well as

¹ *Establishment.* 1 Major Commandant with pay of Adjutant-general.

4 Captains with additional pay of A.A.G.

4 Lieutenants " " 5/- a day.

2 Cornets " " 3/- "

6 Sergeants " " 1/- "

6 Corporals " " 8d. "

264 Privates " " 6d. "

Supp. Desp. vii. 541. But a letter from Wellington to Torrens of 8th April 1813 (*Wellington MSS.*) states the pay of both corporals and privates at 8d. The same letter shows that the men sent from England consisted of 3 N.C.O. and 15 or 16 privates, drawn from the 1st, 2nd, 6th, 7th D.G.; 2nd, 6th, 7th D.; and 23rd L.D.

the Staff Corps for purposes of police,¹ pointing out 1812-13. that the guides, unlike the British, could be trusted out of sight of their officers, and would in any case be wanted to keep order on the lines of communication ; but he seconded the Duke of York loyally by appointing Major Scovell, one of the very best officers on his staff, to be Commandant. The prospect of increased pay seems to have attracted good men, not always to the satisfaction of their commanding officers ; and Victor Alten tried hard to prevent the soldiers of the 2nd German Hussars from taking advantage of it. He was very peremptorily put down by Wellington for his pains ; but it is significant that not a man of the German Heavy Dragoons nor of the British Hussars would have anything to do with the new corps. However, the four troops were completed, and though four of the men sent out from England were tried by court-martial in August and returned to their depôts with their backs sore and their good characters lost, the campaign of 1813 enjoys, among its minor distinctions, that of having seen the birth of the first organised body of British military police.²

Yet it would be a mistake to think that none but repressive measures were taken to cure the indiscipline of the army. In a long report upon that unpleasant subject, written on the 19th of November 1812,³ Wellington had, not for the first time, advocated that the pay of the non-commissioned officers should be increased. The British subaltern, he said, never had performed and never would perform the duty of controlling the conduct and habits of the soldier ;⁴ but

¹ They were raised to a strength of two troops, with a strength of 14 officers and 193 N.C.O. and men. *Supp. Desp.* vii. 608.

² *Wellington Supp. Desp.* vii. 539-541. *Desp.* To Bathurst, 24th Feb. ; G.O., 13th March ; to Torrens, 24th March ; to V. Alten, 6th April ; to Duke of York, 21st April ; to the A.G., 17th Aug. 1813.

³ A fragment of this letter is printed in *Despatches*, ed. 1852, vol. vi. pp. 167-168, but the greater part of it has never been published.

⁴ Cp. Tomkinson, p. 211. "On the day he (Somers Cocks) mounted guard in the trenches (before Burgos) he went round

1812-13. this function must nevertheless be necessarily discharged by some one ; and having observed that the " respectable body of non-commissioned officers " of the Guards performed all the duties required from subalterns in the Line, he was anxious to see the like system extended to the entire army. Before the first increase of pay was granted at the beginning of the war, the proportion of the non-commissioned officers' pay to that of the soldier had been higher, and he desired to see that proportion restored. Such was Wellington's proposal ; and, at a time when specie was so scarce that the wages of the army in the Peninsula were always some months in arrear, it must have caused dismay to Ministers ; but none the less they responded to the best of their ability. Unable to accept the proposition in its entirety, they decided first to grant higher pay to one sergeant in every troop of cavalry, and to give him the title of troop-sergeant-major ; and in July they further informed Wellington that one sergeant in every company was likewise to receive higher pay than his fellows, to wear the regimental colours embroidered as a badge of honour below his chevron, and to be called the colour-sergeant.

It is evident that, in spite of all his denunciations, Wellington counted upon improvement in all ranks of the army, for he now adopted the practice, originally suggested by Craufurd but then rejected as impracticable, of serving out tin camp-kettles to the men, to be carried by themselves. The mules which had hitherto been used for the carrying of iron kettles were now destined to carry tents, for the army was in future to encamp and not to bivouac, partly to keep it in better health, partly to remove it from the temptations of towns and villages. For the better preservation of their health, likewise, their great-coats were taken from

himself to every sentry to see that they understood their orders. It is a rare thing for a subaltern with 20 men to explain and make the sentries understand their orders. He, a field-officer, went to every subaltern's picket and to the sentries of those pickets."

the men, the Principal Medical Officer having decided 1812-13. that the relief in the weight to be borne would more than compensate for any mischief from cold. It seems impossible to doubt that this was on the whole a sound resolution, thousands of men having broken down—not less in the French Army than in the British—under the sixty pounds loaded upon their backs; though it is hardly surprising that one at least of the divisional commanders, Dalhousie, viewed it with some dismay.¹

For the rest, under the vigorous impulse of Dr. McGrigor reforms were pushed forward in every branch of the medical department. At the termination of the retreat from Burgos the sick of the army numbered, roughly speaking, twenty thousand; and, apart from the dearth of doctors, there was not hospital accommodation for one tenth part of them. Contagious typhus fever broke out among them, and the loss was very great. The First Guards, who had marched into Viseu over two thousand strong, half of them fine young men from England, half acclimatised soldiers from Cadiz, suffered terribly. The disease which attacked them was so malignant that it carried them off within forty-eight hours; and its characteristic was low temperature and imperceptible pulse. The other brigade of Guards was afflicted with a different form of typhus, marked by high temperature and quick pulse, which, though less speedy in its effects, was equally deadly. The hospitals of the Guards, being managed upon their own system, had always been superior to those of the rest of the army; and the officers spared no expense to add to the comfort of the patients, but in vain. The quarters of the regiment were changed; the men were excused from all duties—a doubtful remedy—but nothing could arrest the mortality. Not a single officer, officer's servant nor artisan was taken ill, but the men continued to die. At last, in desperation, Wellington on the 24th of March ordered the First

¹ Tents and kettles, G.O. 1st March 1813; Great-coats, A.G. to Lord Dalhousie, 1st May 1813.

1812-13. Guards to Oporto. Roughly speaking, seven hundred marched out of Viseu, seven hundred remained in hospital, and seven hundred were in their graves; and then it seems that the plague at last was stayed.¹

The rest of the army escaped more lightly; but even so the number of deaths in the force at large averaged from four to five hundred a week from the middle of December 1812 to the end of January 1813. The soldiers who had served at Walcheren fell down faster than the rest, the Forty-third losing ninety out of two hundred men, who had caught the seeds of disease in that accursed island. It was noticed that Hill's division, which had had no share in the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, was the most healthy, having about seven thousand fit for service and fourteen hundred in hospital. Next to it came the Light Division; and considering its large share in the two operations aforesaid, one can only conclude that its immunity was due chiefly to the superiority of its discipline. The greatest sufferers of all, except the Guards who were newcomers, were the Fifth and Seventh Divisions.

In such circumstances McGrigor judged that the only thing to be done was to decentralise the medical administration and require each regiment to build its own hospital; a reform which Wellington, though not without reluctance, had refused to him not many months before. He now approved McGrigor's scheme; and the result was excellent. Hundreds of lives were saved by sparing sick men the exhaustion of a journey to the base-hospitals: the spread of contagion was limited; regimental doctors and commanders vied with each other in devising comforts for their patients; men who were only slightly ill returned to the ranks at once; the general improvement was so rapid that officers, primed with this experience, retrieved thousands of malingers from the hospitals at Lisbon; and the out-

¹ This account of the Guards is taken from Col. Stanhope's *MSS. Journal*, and is confirmed in its general purport by Larpent and by Wellington's despatches.

rages of parties of convalescents on their march to 1812-13. rejoin their corps came to an end. The work thrown on the medical staff was naturally very arduous. Not a few of them succumbed to typhus; and McGrigor was fain to gather in every doctor, Spanish, Portuguese or captured French, whom he could persuade to accept English pay. He himself was indefatigable in making visits of inspection to every hospital whether regimental or general; and meanwhile he pressed Wellington to requisition from home wooden hospitals, such as had already been used in the West Indies, of which the frame-work was sent out from England ready shaped and numbered, so that it could be put up by skilled men in a day. Without saying a word of approval or objection, Wellington sent at once for such a portable hospital for four thousand men, which was duly erected, after McGrigor's own plan, as a kind of village of wooden cottages, near the navigable water of the Douro hard by Castello Rodrigo.

One and all of these changes were in the highest degree beneficial, and, being chiefly within the jurisdiction of Wellington himself, were easily accomplished. It was quite another matter when the advancement of deserving medical officers was in question. In vain McGrigor recommended for promotion the men who were toiling with heart and soul among the sick and wounded in the Peninsula. The old jobbers of the Medical Board always gave the preference to those who came home and paid court to them; and, the stronger McGrigor's language of protest, the more resolute naturally was their adherence to their own methods. At last McGrigor enlisted the support of Wellington, who not only addressed Colonel Torrens publicly with his usual trenchancy on the subject, but in a private letter did not disguise that he entertained the very worst opinion of the Medical Board. "The Duke of York," answered Torrens, "entirely agrees with you. The Medical Board is the torment of his life, and the Director-General—a good man in his time—is an old

1812-13. driveller ; but so long as they are continued as a Board, the Duke must support them." This, though none of the Duke's fault, was not encouraging ; but the doctors in the Peninsula seem to have laid the blame on the right shoulders, for the best of them were content to work with equal skill and devotion till the close of the war.¹

Thus, setting aside the dearth of draught-animals for transport, the prospects of the army were fairly satisfactory ; but there was one matter outside of his own department which gave Wellington considerable anxiety, namely, the insecurity of navigation on the Portuguese coast. As we have seen, the successes of the American frigates against the British had angered him not a little ; but when in the spring of 1813 American privateers destroyed or captured ships off Oporto, including a transport containing some of the Eighteenth Hussars,² he became seriously alarmed. "I cannot express," he wrote in April, "how much we shall be distressed if the navigation of the coast should not be secure from Coruña at least to Cadiz. We have money, provisions, clothing, stores and equipments on all parts of the coast almost every day in the year, and the loss of one vessel only may create a delay and inconvenience which may be of the utmost consequences." The Admiralty replied that they considered Admiral Martin's squadron on the coast to be of ample strength, and excused themselves by the fact that three of Martin's ships had been cruising beyond their station about Bordeaux ; but they added that the three peccant captains had been called to account, and that no effort should be spared to ensure the safety of that navigation.

¹ *Autobiography* of Sir J. McGrigor, pp. 264-265, 320-328. *Wellington Desp.* To Torrens, 20th Dec. 1812, 31st Jan., 3rd Feb. 1813. *Wellington MSS.* Torrens to Wellington, 17th Feb. 1813. *Supp. Desp.* vii. 591.

² The transport contained 40 men and 60 horses, but being ransomed for £3000 came safely into Lisbon, though without arms. Malet, *Memoirs of the 18th Hussars*, p. 35.

Meanwhile ships carrying equipment for the troops 1812-13. had already been captured, just as Wellington had feared; and his correspondence with the naval officers on the spot shows that matters had not improved by the beginning of May. In June he was obliged to complain again of the hampering of his operations through the insecurity of the coast, adding the comment—not strictly accurate—that for the first time in history a British army was left with uncertain communications by sea. Then at last Lord Melville, the First Lord, made the confession that the Navy, owing to the neglect of his predecessors, was deficient in frigates and small vessels; that the number of these in commission in 1812 had been ninety less than in 1809; and that, though much had been accomplished by the building of new ships, it was impossible, owing to calls in America and elsewhere, to find sailors to man them. He added further that the straying of ships from their stations was accountable for much of the mischief; and that Admiral Martin, as well as Admiral Berkeley before him, had frequently detached ships under their command to great distances, where they could be of no service in protecting the shipping on the coast. The object of such remote cruising (though Melville did not say so) could only have been prize-money.

This answer, coupled with the successes of the American frigates in a series of duels, brought out two significant and disagreeable facts. In the first place the Navy, after sweeping the French fleet off the seas, had evidently grown slack and careless. There was too little attention paid to gunnery, and a great deal too much to prize-money, even to the neglect of important duty. Too harsh judgment should not be passed upon these shortcomings; for life at sea was full of hardship and peril; and up to a certain point men worked all the better for the prospect of reward. But, in the second place, it was very evident that the Government could not support an army even of forty thousand men for continual service in the field without robbing the Navy

1812-13. of its recruits. Melville indeed confessed this evil, but, greatly to his credit, declared that it was better to submit to it than to resort to the alternative of reducing Wellington's army.

Cupidity of naval officers and neglect of gunnery were faults which might be cured—which indeed were not to be found in a great many ships—but the weakness of the ship's companies, which had contributed enormously to the defeats at the hands of the Americans, was a failing not so easily to be amended. The situation opened up the prospect of dangerous hostility between the two services. Hitherto the Navy had always treated the Army with contempt; and its arrogance had been extravagantly heightened by its own glorious successes, and by the innumerable failures of the red-coats. Now the tables were turned. The Army was triumphant; the Navy was humiliated; and human nature asserted itself at once. "I think," wrote Larpent after recounting the news of the American victories at sea, "I think the Army rather rejoice, and laugh aside at all this falling on the Navy, as they bullied so much before." If Napoleon could have raised the money to send a fleet to sea, which was the course that Wellington half feared that he might take after his return from Russia, there is no saying what damage he might not have wrought to England and to Europe. A very slight naval reverse to the British would have made Wellington's position almost impossible; and the irresistible outcry of the Navy, that it could not do its work if the military service took all its men, might well have led to the evacuation of the Peninsula. Happily Napoleon had little money and preferred to spend what he had upon soldiers who might live, as for years they had lived, upon the resources of neighbours and enemies, rather than upon a fleet which must always depend for everything upon its own country. But the very same peril may recur in the future, and statesmen should be on their guard against it. Meanwhile, whatever may be said of Admiral Martin individually, the

Admiralty must not be held responsible for the capture 1812-13. of stores and ships off the coast of Portugal.¹

For the rest, the army after the retreat from Burgos enjoyed, as it sorely needed, the longest period of repose vouchsafed to it in the whole course of the war ; and happily we have inherited a journal from one new to arms and new to the country, which gives us much insight into its daily life. There was Wellington himself—since October 1812 a Marquess, since February 1813 a Knight of the Garter—working indefatigably in his office “with an eye which finds out even a wrong casting-up of numbers in the total,” a curious but undesigned parallel to another great soldier, him of the famous *redingote grise*, who had an even keener eye for an incorrect return. We can see his hand scrawling directions with a broad pencil on the top of despatches ; and we can watch the members of his staff enter one after another, trembling ; we can hear his voice gruffly bidding Colonel Fisher of the Artillery “go to hell,” and breaking into a laugh as that officer retired murmuring that “he would go to the Quarter-master-general for a route.” Wellington was a little hard upon the gunners, always excepting Dickson, and occasionally took care to “let one of them know that he thought him very stupid”—by telling him so in plain terms, as the Quarter-master-general surmised. On another day we catch a glimpse of him galloping off by himself seventeen miles to Ciudad Rodrigo, inspecting all the works there, and galloping back to dinner, having been absent only five and a half hours. On yet another day we find him inspecting the brigade of Household Cavalry, dressed in the full uniform of the Blues, of which he had lately been appointed colonel, and “looking very well in it.” Wellington knew the value of regimental *esprit de corps*.

¹ *Wellington Desp.* To Vice-Adm. Martin, 10th Dec. 1812, 28th April 1813 ; to Bathurst, 7th, 20th April, 6th, 25th May, 24th June, 2nd, 3rd, 10th July 1813. *Supp. Desp.* viii. 144-148. *Wellington MSS.*, 15th May 1813.

1812-13. We have a very different aspect of him in hunting-days, for the General hunted on three days a week. So keen was he to start that his staff and subordinate generals could obtain his assent to almost anything before he set off to the meet, or in the intervals of the day's sport. "Damn them," he said, "I won't speak to them again when we are hunting." The pack numbered some sixteen couple, hardened criminals, as we may guess, drafted from every kennel in England; and apparently there was neither huntsman nor whip. But at least there was a master, a captain, who was also earth-stopper. Foxes were plentiful, and as they lay in the open, and the country was without fences, it was easy for every one to get a good start. A fox once found, it appears that the greater part of the pack became skirthers on the instant; but the master made a great deal of noise and rode "violently"; and the field, including the Commander-in-Chief, did the like. It was rarely that a fox was killed, still more rarely that he was killed by fair means; but at least there was plenty of galloping, plenty of enjoyment, and plenty of falls, for the country was and is so full of rocks and bogs that only a Dartmoor man could feel at home in it. There were generally some lame horses at the end of the day, and occasionally a badly-injured rider; but every one was in good humour, and the Commander-in-Chief, who affected to believe that he would spend next winter also at Freineda, swore that he would collect twenty-five couple for next season.

Apart from the foxhounds, a great many officers kept greyhounds, most notably Sir Robert Kennedy, the Commissary-general, and Captain Harry Smith, who flattered himself that he owned the best greyhound in the world. There was also a pack of harriers, to which this same Captain Harry Smith of the Rifles acted as whipper-in; and a third pack, of beagles, kept by Mr. Commissary Haines. The Capitano Mor, or chief Portuguese official at Freineda, had attached to his service an old poacher who, with ferrets and a strange

assortment of curs, provided sport for the less wealthy officers. Others again took out their fowling-pieces and returned with mixed bags of hare, rabbit, partridge, woodcock and snipe, which made a welcome addition to the fare at mess; while some enthusiasts of the Ninety-fifth spent the days up to their waists in water in chase of wild fowl. Nor were quieter amusements forgotten; for Wellington gave dinners frequently in honour of great occasions, and once rose to the height of a ball at Ciudad Rodrigo, which went off with immense success. The only drawbacks were a large hole in the roof of the ball-room—due to damage done during the siege—and another smaller hole in the floor, over which a sentry was posted to prevent accidents. Lastly, the Light Division set up a theatre at Gallegos, and gave frequent performances, which the Commander-in-Chief did not disdain occasionally to attend.¹ Far away to the south at Coria Hill's division likewise had its pack of foxhounds and its theatre; and Sir Rowland made a point, after the play was over, of asking all the actors and actresses (the latter being ensigns in petticoats) to join him in their stage-dresses at supper.

As to the men, we have unfortunately less information than we could wish, except of the misdeeds of some of them and of the penalty which they paid for the same. But the Irishmen at any rate played hand-ball; and it is probable that there were in the ranks skilful poachers enough to take a fair share of hares and rabbits for themselves and for their comrades. But the really remarkable thing is that they had lost all semblance of soldiers, as soldiers were known in England. All traces of Frederick the Great's influence upon them had vanished. They were round in the shoulders and slouching in their gait; and Wellington declared that he was often quite ashamed of the sentries before his own quarters. The men at large had drifted into the way of doing everything in the easiest manner; and so

¹ One of the programmes at least of the Light Division's theatre has been preserved. Levinge's *History of the 43rd*, p. 172.

1812-13. quickly did this spirit overtake the new-comers that, by Wellington's own confession, even the Blues, if transported suddenly from the banks of the Agueda to Wimbledon Common, would have been sent to drill immediately and declared unfit for service. The like was observed of the French Army which conquered Upper Italy in 1796 ; and Napier quotes with approval a proverb of his day in the Peninsula, "The uglier, the better soldier." The firelocks, it seems, were an exception to the general rule of slovenliness, being always bright and shining,¹ but this exception was unique. Though the fopperies of parade are certainly out of place on the field, one cannot help wondering whether the readiness to abandon all that was smart and soldier-like may not have had its effect for evil upon the discipline of the army.

¹ The Horse Guards in January 1813 very sensibly suggested that in future they should be browned. *Supp. Desp.* vii. 542.

CHAPTER IV

LET us now turn to the enemy's side, and see how 1812-13. Joseph fared during this winter and spring. His first idea was to change the line of communication between Madrid and Burgos to the direct route by Aranda de Duero, and to throw up an entrenched camp at Aranda for the protection of hospitals, dépôts, magazines and transport, the Retiro at Madrid being ruined beyond repair for such a purpose. He would thus have had a place of concentration on the north bank of the Douro, only five days' march from Madrid and on the shortest and safest road to France. But to carry this plan into effect he needed the support of the Army of the North ; and Caffarelli, who had marched northward from the Douro to scour the great line of communication with France, sent in no reports and gave no sign of existence.¹ Noting the silence of this General, and still more the significant fact that no despatches were coming in from Paris, Jourdan in the first week of December urged Joseph to transfer his head-quarters immediately to Valladolid, to draw the bulk of the troops towards that quarter, and to make a great effort to clear his communications by suppressing the guerilla-bands of Mina, Longa and other chiefs, who were growing daily more formidable in boldness and mischief. But Joseph was unwilling to desert Madrid. His love of kingship, however flimsy that kingship might be, made him cling to his capital ; his empty treasury cried out for such succours as could be gathered in the custom-house of

¹ *Arch. de la Guerre.* Jourdan to Clarke, 30th Nov. 1812.

1812-13. Madrid ; and he quailed at the thought of the mob of hungry and penniless Spaniards who must of necessity follow him to Valladolid. He did not question the expediency of putting down the insurgent bands in the northern provinces ; but Caffarelli had already undertaken that task ; and, as Caffarelli sent in no despatches and asked for no reinforcements, it was, in Joseph's opinion, reasonable to assume that he could do the work without assistance.

So matters drifted on until the end of December 1812, when a letter reached Madrid from the Commandant at Burgos, announcing that Caffarelli had so far done nothing, and that Santoña was in serious danger from the British by sea and the Spaniards by land. At the same time, moreover, letters arrived from Suchet, who was growing very nervous over the accumulation of British and Sicilians at Alicante, and clamoured loudly for a division to be stationed at Cuenca, so as to deliver him from his isolation and enable him to keep touch with the remainder of the French armies. Joseph reported the whole affair to Clarke in high indignation. He had, he said, formulated a complete scheme for changing the cantonments of the troops, so as to shift the Army of the Centre to Burgos and its neighbourhood, and set free the entire Army of the North for operations in the field ; but for want of news from Caffarelli he had never put it into execution. He would, however, make the preliminary movements at once, so that the Army of the Centre should be ready either to move to Burgos or, if not wanted there, to open communications with Valencia by way of Cuenca. In any case he reckoned that ten or twelve thousand men could suppress the insurgents in the north within three months.

Accordingly he called the Army of Portugal down from Leon and Benavente to Avila, so that the Army of the South might be ready to move to Madrid, and might liberate the Army of the Centre from that quarter for the service prescribed to it in the north.

December passed away without a letter either from 1813. Caffarelli or from Paris ; and early in January 1813 Jan. Joseph ordered Palombini's division, which was temporarily attached to the Army of the Centre at Madrid, to march northward to Caffarelli's assistance.¹ January slipped away likewise without a word from the north ; but by the beginning of February Palombini Feb. made his presence felt, and, by driving away the bands of Longa and Mendizabel from about Burgos, set free the Emperor's despatches which had been accumulating there ever since November. When at length these reached Joseph's hands on the 16th of February, he had actually been for two months and a half without a line from Paris ; and even then there were no letters of more recent date than the 14th of January. Moreover, the latest despatches which had reached Paris from Madrid up to the 28th of January were those of the 4th of December, so that practically there had been no interchange of correspondence between the French armies in Spain and the capital of the French Empire for two entire months.

Napoleon's despatches above-named were dated from the first week of January. The earliest of them ordered that Joseph should transfer his head-quarters to Valladolid, holding Madrid only as the extremity of his line, and that he should take advantage of Wellington's inaction to reduce Navarre, Biscay and Santander to order. The next directed all provisional battalions to be drafted into the regiments to which the men included in them might belong, and for six battalions to be made over to the Army of the North by the Army of Portugal, as well as one regiment by the Army of the South, in exchange for these drafts. They ordained further that two or three complete battalions, together with the skeletons of from thirty to forty more, and of some fifteen squadrons, should be sent back at once to France. These skeletons, and some men of the artillery and train, were intended to form the nucleus of the new

¹ *Arch. de la Guerre.* D'Erlon to Clarke, 7th Jan. 1813.

1813. army which the Emperor was raising in France ; and, in addition to them, twenty-five picked men were required from every battalion of infantry and every regiment of cavalry, besides ten picked men from every battery of artillery, for incorporation into the Imperial Guard. At the same time a letter was sent to Soult to recall him from Spain into France, and Gazan was appointed to succeed him in command of the Army of the South.

Throughout the month of January Clarke kept reiterating these orders with ever-increasing emphasis and irritation. Caffarelli, who had appealed in vain to Reille for two divisions of the Army of Portugal to help him in his work, reported the circumstance to the Emperor instead of to Joseph, and, after receiving a stern rebuke for his pains on the 4th of January, was recalled in flattering terms¹ on the 19th to give place to Clausel. But as all these angry letters took from one to two months to reach Joseph, they for a long time produced no effect. "Seventy-two days have passed," wrote Clarke furiously on the 8th of March, "since the courier started with the Emperor's orders of the 4th of January. I have received no answer yet." Instructions of the same tenour addressed directly to Reille and Caffarelli did little to hasten matters ; and, when Napoleon's despatches at last came to Joseph's hand, their purport could not be immediately executed. On the 21st of February the King ordered the Army of the South to occupy Madrid, Avila and Salamanca ; but being much dispersed in its cantonments, it could not be assembled on the north bank of the Tagus until the 15th of March. At the same time the Army of the Centre was ordered up to Burgos ; but, on the receipt of further letters from the Emperor, importing that the Armies of the North and Centre would suffice to subdue the north, the movement was countermanded. At the end of March the French armies were grouped as follows : The Army of the South occupied Madrid,

¹ It is curious that Napoleon, not less than Wellington, shrank from recalling inefficient officers except in complimentary terms.

Avila, Salamanca, Toro and Zamora ; the Army of the 1813. Centre was in Segovia and in the southern province of Valladolid ; and three divisions of the Army of Portugal were about Palencia and Medina de Rio Seco, the remaining three being on march to join Clausel on the Ebro.¹ Joseph himself left Madrid on the 17th of March, and on the 23rd established his head-quarters at Valladolid. Mar. 23.

During this time the French troops made but one attempt to disturb the British in their cantonments, devoting their energy chiefly to the repression of the guerilla-bands, a task in which Foy, from his head-quarters at Avila, met with considerable success. In the middle of February this General resolved to go further, and to attempt the surprise of Hill's outpost at Bejar, where the old ruined fortifications had been repaired and a garrison installed of the 6th Portuguese Caçadores and the British Fiftieth Foot. Guided by excellent information, Foy laid his plans to arrive before the place with fifteen hundred men at daybreak of the 20th of February, knowing that most of the British Feb. 20. officers would be dancing at a public ball which had been fixed for that night. The peasants, however, had given warning to the British commandant of the enemy's approach ; and, though Foy forced back an outlying picquet of the Fiftieth and brought his soldiers near enough to the walls to call down a hot fire from the garrison, the French General wisely abstained from pressing home an attack which could not have succeeded. The loss upon both sides was trifling, though Foy claimed that the casualties of the Allies were five times as great as his own ; and the only result of the raid was that Wellington, having heard rumours of an intended attack upon the Sierra de Gredos from Salamanca, ordered the Fourth Division to cross to the east side of the Coa, so as to be at hand to repel it.²

¹ The Army of Portugal had been reorganised into six divisions of infantry.

² Girod de l'Ain, *Vie militaire du Général Foy*, pp. 384-387. *Wellington Desp.* To Hill, 22nd, 27th Feb. ; to Bathurst, 24th Feb. 1813. Fyler's *Hist. of the 50th*, pp. 149, 150.

1813. In the north, however, at the same period the guerilla-bands were at the height of their activity. Palombini had not been a fortnight at Burgos before he found one of his small outlying garrisons carried off almost under his eyes by Longa ; and on the night of Feb. 10. the 10th of February he himself was surprised at Poza de lo Sal, about thirteen miles north-east of that city, and driven out, with considerable loss of men and baggage, to Vitoria. A few days earlier Mina, having obtained the necessary artillery from Wellington, laid siege to Tafalla, about twenty miles south of Pamplona, beat off a column of three thousand men which had advanced to its relief from that city Feb. 11. under General Abbé, and on the 11th received the surrender of the place with its garrison of over three hundred French troops. The loss of Tafalla compelled the French to withdraw the garrison from Sos, some thirty-five miles south-east of Pamplona, which Mina permitted them to do ; but he fell upon their rear as they retired, inflicting on them a loss of nearly eight hundred men before they could reach the shelter of the fortifications.

These successes made Clarke tremble for the safety of Sanguesa and Tudela ; and he wrote furiously to Jourdan that the subjugation of the north should have been begun in January. All his hopes were now centred on Clausel who, after a short stay in France to recover from the wound received at Salamanca, was just re-entering Spain to replace Caffarelli. Accordingly on the 9th of March Clarke drew up instructions for the new general. These set forth that the guerilla-bands of Mina and Longa, having been practically unmolested for five months, were masters of Navarre and Biscay excepting the ground actually covered by French troops, and that the only method of reducing them was to take the offensive actively and root out their strongholds, dépôts and magazines. Simultaneously the communications with France were to be safeguarded by the erection of block-houses along

the main routes. Pamplona, which had long been blockaded by Mina, must be early relieved, and Santoña and the neighbouring ports—some of which had been too readily abandoned by Caffarelli—must positively be secured. It was specially enjoined upon Clausel that the operations on the coast of Biscay and in the interior of Navarre should be prosecuted at one and the same time, as the only method of re-establishing that hold upon the north which the Emperor deemed vital to the possession of Spain.¹

With these instructions Clausel reached Vitoria apparently on or about the 22nd of February.² Before the end of March the necessary exchange of troops between the Armies of Portugal and of the North had been effected; Barbot's division of the former army—lately commanded by Clausel himself—had arrived at head-quarters; and the divisions of Foy, Taupin and Sarrut were on the march to join him, all likewise from the Army of Portugal. On the 22nd of March Clausel visited Castro Urdiales in person, and at the beginning of April he was able to formulate his plan of campaign. Palombini's Italians were to act on the coast of Biscay, besiege Castro Urdiales, and, having taken it, proceed to fortify Bermeo. Foy's division was to cross the Ebro to Osma and Orduña, thence ascend the river, and sweep away all the bands in that country. Clausel himself with his own division and that of Taupin was to act directly against Mina in Navarre, and if necessary in Aragon, part of Vandermaesen's division of the Army of the Centre co-operating with him. Sarrut's division, when it should be near Burgos, was to send one mobile column north-eastward to the district of Rioja, and another north-westward to Villadiego to secure the communications between Burgos and Torquemada; and finally the 40th regiment from Vandermaesen's division was to clear the province of Guipuzcoa and cover the

¹ Clarke to Clausel, 9th March 1813. Ducasse, ix. 209-216.

² Clausel to Joseph, 22nd Feb. 1813. *Wellington MSS.*

1813. construction of block-houses on the road from Irun to Vitoria.¹

Within a week Clausel found that Foy's division, reduced by Napoleon's drafts, numbered no more than twenty-five hundred bayonets, that he must join Sarrut's to it to scour the Upper Ebro and cover the siege of Castro, and that he must call up a fifth division—that of Maucune—of the Army of Portugal for his own operations in Navarre. Thus only one division of that army was left to Joseph; and this was a very serious matter. It is true that the first thought that occurred to the King was that he might be obliged to evacuate Madrid and concentrate on the Douro, which was highly painful to him. But the delivery of five divisions of the Army of Portugal to Clausel upset all his plans for the revictualling of Burgos, and obliged him to entrust that very important business to Clausel himself, who might well be too much occupied to look to it. "If," he wrote to Clarke on the 1st of April, "the enemy takes the offensive in a decisive fashion before the return of the four² divisions of the Army of the North, we may have to await him at Burgos, and how are we to live there without magazines?" The words were prophetic, but the poor man was worn out by the impossibility of reconciling his own ideas with the orders issued by Napoleon directly to his subordinate generals. "There are four generals in chief assembled to-day on the Douro," he continued. . . . "I am not obeyed. . . . Time passes; disorder diminishes our resources; no magazines are formed; and the enemy is preparing to begin the campaign. . . . The commissary of the Army of Portugal declines to obey any one but General Reille, and has told my chief commissary so. . . . The Army of the South sets up the same pretensions . . . the new general of the Army of the North defies me on the strength of your last instructions . . . and the Emperor's ambassador repeats

¹ *Arch. de la Guerre*. Clausel to Clarke, 2nd April 1813.

² He did not yet know that Clausel had asked for a fifth division.

to me daily 'The King must make himself obeyed !' " 1813.

Joseph no doubt was guilty of mistakes ; but none so great, fatuous and fatal as Napoleon's blunder of attempting to direct the campaign in Spain from Paris.¹

Meanwhile all serious operations were delayed until the troops could be collected. On the 24th of March Mar. 24.

Palombini fought a sharp action outside Castro which cost him, though victorious, sixteen officers and presumably at least three hundred men ; and Barbot, incautiously exposing two battalions in isolation at Lerin, thirty miles south-west of Pamplona, on the 31st, Mar. 31.

allowed them to be overwhelmed by Mina. The French fought superbly, and hardly an officer was standing when they surrendered ; but none the less out of one thousand men there was hardly one that escaped.²

This was a heavy blow to Clausel, who thenceforward took a gloomy view of his work, and not without reason. He had no money, no magazines, no artillery-teams, no ambulances, hardly any of the things that are necessary to an army in the field ; and he felt his need of good troops so strongly that he begged for conscripts from France to garrison his strong places so as to release seasoned regiments for active service. However, on the 11th of April Foy reached Miranda del Ebro, Apr. 11.

whereupon Clausel, having sent him instructions as to the siege of Castro Urdiales, left Vitoria on the same day, and striking south-east assembled the force under his immediate orders—from twelve to thirteen thousand men³—on the 14th at Viana. From thence he marched Apr. 14.

¹ Joseph to Clarke, 25th March, 1st April 1813. Ducasse, ix. 232, 240-243. *Archives de la Guerre*. Clausel to Clarke, Vitoria, 10th April 1813.

² The two battalions were of the 27th of the Line and 25th Light. They lost between them 29 officers killed and wounded ; and Mina refused to take their swords from men who could so nobly use them. See Martinière's lists, and Arteche, xiii. 88.

³ 2nd Div. Army of Portugal 2,540
3rd „ „ „ 3,283
1st „ Army of North 3,000
2nd „ „ „ 3,000
Cavalry „ „ 800
12,623

1813. in three columns by Lerin upon Puente de la Reina,
 Apr. 15. where on the 15th he gained intelligence that Mina's force had divided itself into two parts, one of which had moved north to the valley of Aezcoa, by the western head of the Salazar, and the other southward upon Tafalla and Sanguesa. Accordingly he threw his army in between them at Puente de la Reina, Mendigorría and Artajona, and from these central points sent Taupin's division to scour Aezcoa, and Vandermaesen's upon Tafalla. But neither of these columns could overtake the enemy; and the operations reduced themselves to mere gathering of food and forage. "If my twelve thousand men were all free for work in the field," wrote Clausel, "I should have the means of acting with some hope of success; but as I must hold Estella, Puente de la Reina, Mendigorría, Tafalla, Caparroso, Lumbier, Sanguesa and Aoiz with four thousand of them, I have only eight thousand left. Mina's refuges are Aezcoa on one side and Roncal on the other, both of them districts which offer him defensive positions at every step. If I go to Roncal, he will slip into Aezcoa; as soon as I follow him thither, he will return to Roncal; and I cannot divide my troops, for he has ten thousand men against my eight thousand. If I had had four divisions of the Army of Portugal and had not been obliged to detach a division to Biscay, I could have driven Mina from Navarre."¹

The signs of discouragement in this letter are obvious enough; yet by a strange irony Clarke almost at the same moment was writing to Clausel that he could not and would not spare him any men from the reserve at Bayonne, which was needed to guard the frontier and

Force in Biscay was :—1st Div. Army of Portugal	. 2600
Palombini's Italian Brigade . . .	. 1200
40th and 101st Regiments . . .	. 1600
	5400

¹ *Arch. de la Guerre.* Clausel to Clarke. Pamplona, 20th April 1813.

escort convoys into Spain. "With your three divisions 1813. of the Army of Portugal," he wrote, "you have fifty thousand men. Allowing twenty thousand for garrisons, you have thirty thousand left for the field. Your operations must be pushed forward with vigour, and so combined that the guerilla-bands can find no point of escape." Clausel was spared the pain of receiving this missive for some weeks ; and it was well for him, for, to his extreme mortification, a detachment of fifty of his men at Mendigorria had surrendered a strong position to Mina almost without firing a shot. After a short halt at Pamplona he re-entered Navarre at the beginning of May, and declared his conviction that the pacification May. of the province was impossible unless it were occupied by at least twenty thousand men ; that, in fact, to attempt it with a smaller force would be sheer waste of time and soldiers. Then, going into details, he pointed out that half of the men would be needed for garrisons which he named, and the remainder for mobile columns ; whereas, as already shown, he had only eighteen thousand men to deal with Biscay and Navarre together. Moreover, the mortality among the conscripts was terrible. Of eight or ten thousand of them who had joined him at Pancorbo after the battle of Salamanca, not more than five hundred were fit for duty.

However, he overran Aezcoa and the adjacent valleys ; and then, moving to the Roncal, he endeavoured May 10-13. by an extremely clever movement of two columns from north and south to crush Mina between them. The plan failed, owing to the premature attack of the northern column, which cost the French over two hundred killed and wounded, and Mina apparently four times as many. The celebrated chief was in fact compelled to disperse his troops and retreat eastward by the valley of the Anso, and thence south to the Aragon, narrowly escaping capture on the way. Clausel, following up his advantage, chased Mina hotly across the Aragon by Xavier, thence eastward to Pintano, whence the fugitive doubled back to Sos, and from that place south-westward

1813. to Carcastillo. There on the 18th the French General
May 18. abandoned direct pursuit and devoted himself to
breaking up the Spanish depôts on the Roncal, and
keeping Mina's scattered regiments apart. With but
six thousand more troops he might, as he averred, have
destroyed the battalions that had fought him in the
Roncal, and exterminated those in Aezcoa. Yet in these
very days General Buquet reported from Burgos that
Pamplona was as strictly blockaded as ever, and that
articles of prime necessity could only be bought for
extravagant prices, sure proof that Mina's ascendancy
was not yet lost, and that his partisans were far from
being reduced to despair.¹

Meanwhile Foy, after a successful action against the
bands of Mendizabal on the 29th of April, had invested
Castro Urdiales on the 4th of May, broken ground on
May 11. the 6th, and on the night of the 11th stormed and
sacked the place with a total loss of fifty casualties to
himself and of about three hundred to the Spaniards.
Leaving Palombini's brigade to hold the captured
fortress, he spent some days in collecting supplies, and
May 27. on the 27th marched eastward from Bilbao to make an
end of the remaining bands—numbering some eight or
nine hundred men—in Biscay. Notwithstanding all his
efforts his troops could find no subsistence except by
marauding, with the usual result that discipline suffered,
outrages were multiplied, and the inhabitants, deserting
their villages, threw every obstacle in the way of the
invaders. However, by long and swift night marches
Foy succeeded in annihilating a guerilla-battalion, nearly
six hundred strong, and inflicting serious loss upon
another; after which he overran the coast westward
from Guetaria to Bermeo, so as to secure every port by
which the Spaniards could obtain succour from England,
and prepared to drive the three battalions of the
guerilla-leader, known as the Pastor, from Guipuzcoa.

June. It was now the first week in June, and Clausel, after

¹ *Arch. de la Guerre.* Clausel to Clarke, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 16th,
19th, 24th May; Buquet to Berthier, 23rd May 1813.

a third scouring of the Roncal and another fortnight's^{1813.} futile hunting of Mina, had retired to Pamplona, whence he indited a despatch—evidently intended for Napoleon's eye—to the effect that Mina was beaten and discouraged, his influence gone, and the general inclination of the inhabitants more favourable to France. Clausel's complacency was somewhat disturbed by an impatient letter from Clarke, complaining that for weeks he had received no letters from him; and the General was obliged to represent with some bitterness that, while Foy was engaged before Castro and himself occupied with the pursuit of Mina, it was not difficult for the four thousand men of Longa and the fifteen hundred of the Pastor to beset the communications at Miranda del Ebro and Vergara. The fall of Castro, however, put a new face on affairs. A few days later^{June 11.} Clausel was again at Puente de Reina, hoping to chase the Pastor, who had retreated from Guipuzcoa into Navarre, back into the arms of Foy at Villafranca. By this time Sarrut's¹ division had come up and was pressing back the bands of Longa towards the mountains of Santander and Asturias; and the process of subjugating the northern provinces was at last going forward with some vigour, when on the 15th Clausel received^{June 15.} an urgent order from Joseph that he was to break off his operations, leave garrisons at Pamplona, Bilbao, Santoña, Castro, and at the posts necessary to ensure communication between Irun and Vitoria, and send every man that could be spared of the Armies of the North and of Portugal towards Burgos.

¹ It is difficult to understand Clausel's constant complaints that Sarrut had not joined him and was not at his disposal; for, according to Jourdan, Sarrut was already marching to Burgos on the 19th of April. On the 4th of May Clausel declared that the division had not yet reached him; on the 6th he said that Sarrut had the King's orders to watch the road from Torquemada to Burgos and to provision Burgos; yet on the 9th Jourdan reported (not, it is true, from information of Clausel's) that Clausel had ordered Sarrut to Logroño, obviously to join in the chase of Mina. *Arch. de la Guerre.*

1813. With no very good grace Clausel prepared to obey. "I can take only five thousand men of the Army of the North to the King," he wrote from Pamplona on the 15th, "and unless a mobile column is sent from France to Vergera, it will be impossible for messengers to pass, for the bands will reassemble there at once and intercept all correspondence." A second
 June 16. message received from the King on the following day was answered more seriously. "Sarrut's division is on the Ebro; Foy's is on its way thither; Taupin's is only one day's march distant; so of four divisions of the Army of Portugal on this side the Ebro, three have already rejoined the King. Vandermaesen's and Barbot's divisions will probably come in to-day; and in four days all the available troops in Navarre, Guipuzcoa and Biscay will have rejoined the King's Army." So Clausel wrote on the 16th of June, and yet, as we shall see, only one of all these divisions had joined Joseph when on the 21st he fought the battle of Vitoria.¹

Ever since the unhappy King of Spain had transferred his head-quarters to Valladolid, his situation as Commander-in-Chief had gone from bad to worse. Clarke, faithfully imitating his great master, never ceased to shower orders upon him in a most offensive tone, ignoring the fact that his letters took from three weeks to a month to reach their destination. "The Emperor's orders do not bind the King to occupy Madrid, the less so as Leval's position there is dangerous," was his comment, not unnecessary but highly belated, upon Joseph's new dispositions. "You must not confound the King of Spain with the Commander-in-Chief," was Clarke's answer to Joseph's complaint that he could not victual Burgos because the commissaries with the various armies would not obey Favier, the King's commissary-in-chief; "the Generals will obey Jourdan, and the commissaries will obey Favier;

¹ *Arch. de la Guerre.* Clausel to Clarke, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 15th, 16th June; to Joseph, 4th, 11th June 1813. Girod de l'Ain, *Vie du Général Foy*, 202-208. Belmas, iv. 557-567.

but the subsistence of French troops must not be placed ^{1813.} at the mercy of Spanish agents. Therefore you can easily provision Burgos." Such was Clarke's logic, which was not accepted even by himself, for he sent orders to Clausel that Burgos was to be the centre of supply for all the armies; and that he, Clausel, must look to it. Another constantly reiterated order was that Joseph was not to send too many troops to the north, but to make a demonstration towards Ciudad Rodrigo with the bulk of his force so as to hold Wellington in awe. After some weeks of endurance Joseph in his turn at last became impatient. Clausel had already taken from him four divisions of the Army of Portugal, but, as we have seen, was still so impotent that he had been obliged to drain the garrisons of Briviesca and Burgos to dangerous weakness. Dreading the presence of Longa about Miranda, Joseph, at the end of April, ordered the 5th division of the Army of Portugal to guard the communications between that place and Burgos, and echeloned the 6th division between Burgos and Palencia. He also further reinforced Reille, who was in command of these troops, by directing Darmagnac's division of the Army of the Centre to cross the Douro into Leon and to support the cavalry which was observing the Army of Galicia. "Now," he wrote, "the whole Army of Portugal except three battalions has been sent to the north, and we at Valladolid are left with one brigade of infantry, a huge burden of artillery and the cavalry. How am I to make a demonstration towards Portugal? To do so I must in the first instance concentrate the troops, which is impossible owing to want of victuals. And what is the use of it, if I make such a demonstration? Wellington will not be deceived, for he knows that the whole Army of Portugal is engaged in the north, and that I have had to send large drafts to the Emperor. These facts indeed are published in the Gazettes of the insurgents. . . . I hope Clausel may succeed, but I doubt it, and I am afraid that

1813. his divisions will be exhausted when they have to meet Wellington.”¹

All this was sound sense. Neither Napoleon nor Clarke in the least understood the situation in Spain ; and it is tolerably clear that the guerillas in the north, backed by the British squadron, were in themselves almost sufficient to find occupation for the whole of Joseph's army. The King, as Jourdan himself admitted, might well have begun the work of repressing these bands earlier in the year, and he certainly ought to have strengthened his position by evacuating Madrid ; but it may be questioned whether a great effort in the north—quite apart from anything that Wellington might do—would not have ruined the troops for the next campaign. They had no transport and no supplies ; the hardships in the mountains during late winter and early spring would have been very great, and the work of hunting down irregular parties is proverbially arduous. Foy, as we know, had the greatest difficulty in maintaining discipline ; and Clausel proved his assertion, that he had none of the necessary appliances for taking the field, by the dry report that two thousand convalescents had died for want of common comforts.² But by the middle of May Joseph and Jourdan were troubled by graver anxieties. Since the departure of Clausel they had not received a word from him ; and whether this were due, as Clausel averred, to the interception of his letters, or, as Joseph hinted, to that General's neglect, it was fairly obvious that Clausel considered his operations to be quite distinct from theirs. They knew that Wellington had been reinforced, and they expected him to move at any moment. They themselves could assemble thirty-two thousand infantry from the Armies of the Centre and the South, nine thousand cavalry and one hundred guns.

¹ Clarke to Jourdan and Joseph, 23rd, 29th April ; Joseph to Clarke, 2nd, 6th May 1813. (Printed in Ducasse, ix.)

² “Faute de soins.” *Arch. de la Guerre*. Clausel to Clarke, 6th June 1813. The colonel of the 75th reported on the 22nd of February that in the past year his regiment had been reduced by sickness from 800 to 300 bayonets.

If Wellington should advance before Clausel had completed the pacification of the North, what were they to do? Were they to defend the passage of the Douro with this small force, and risk a battle? Or were they to suspend the operations in the north and summon Clausel to them? Or were they to fall back behind Burgos until Clausel should have finished his work, and then advance with the entire army? Such were the three questions urgently pressed upon Clarke by Jourdan and the King on the 16th and 20th of May; and Joseph added words which showed how little he trusted his own authority. "If the enemy is in force, and Clausel cannot return me the divisions of the Army of Portugal, it is important for you to order him to restore to me any troops that he does not urgently require." These questions were never answered, for there was no time to answer them until too late.¹

¹ Jourdan and Joseph to Clarke, 16th, 20th May 1813. (Printed in Ducasse.)

CHAPTER V

¹⁸¹³. WELLINGTON had originally intended to set his troops in motion on the 1st of May, when the young grass and corn might ensure him a supply of forage ; though extraordinary drought during the winter and spring portended some difficulty in this matter. The rains at length broke in good earnest in the fourth week of April ; but at the last moment the advance was delayed by mishaps to the pontoon-train, which, although new, had suffered inordinately both in boats and carriages on the short march from Abrantes to Castello Branco. As it happened, Wellington was attacked on the 1st of May by so severe a cold as to render him unfit for duty for two or three days, so that the delay was perhaps less regrettable than it might have been ; but the reports of the pontoon-train continued to be so bad that he
May 13. became seriously anxious, and galloped off on the 13th to Sabugal to see things for himself on the road. To the great indignation of the gunners, he had taken the horses from one brigade of nine-pounders and from part of the reserve of artillery, for the pontoons ; and the change from the slow, steady draught of the bullocks to the livelier and quicker motion of horses and drivers accustomed to draw guns, had been the cause of many accidents.¹ The bridge being imperatively necessary for the coming campaign, there was further delay while the damaged wheels of the train were replaced by others taken from the carriages of the artillery ; and from one

¹ See *Dickson MSS.* pp. 879-882.

cause and another it was not until the 22nd that headquarters left Freineda. 1813.

May 22.

But long before this day the troops had begun their concentration. Wellington's plan was one which conclusively confutes the criticism of foreigners that he was a mere tactician and no strategist. He proposed first to turn the French position on the Douro by throwing the left wing of his force across that river within the boundaries of Portugal. He would indeed have taken this route for the entire army, but for the extremely advanced position of his right at Bejar. To get over this difficulty he had determined to march himself with the right wing upon the Tormes, ordering Hill to meet him on the Huebra at Moralaja, and, after forcing the passage of the Tormes, to establish a bridge on the Douro below Zamora so as to ensure communication between the two wings. The left wing after traversing Tras os Montes was to join hands with the Spanish Army of Galicia on the Esla; and the whole line was then to advance, manœuvring always by its left, so as to turn the right of the French, and trusting in due time to open up new lines of supply from the ports of Biscay and Guipuzcoa.

The line of concentration extended along a front of some thirty miles on the north-eastern frontier of Tras os Montes, from Bragança south-eastward through Outeiro and Vimioso to Miranda do Duero. The cavalry brigades of Ponsonby, Anson, Bock and Durban, together with their horse-artillery and Pack's and Bradford's brigades of Portuguese, being already in cantonments north of the Douro between Braga and Oporto, had only to march eastward upon Bragança and Outeiro. Of the rest of the left wing the First Division from Vizeu and the Fifth from Lamego were to cross the river at Pezo da Regoa and make for these two same places; the Third from Moimento da Beira was to cross at São João da Pesqueira and move to Vimioso; the Fourth, Sixth and Seventh, together with the Hussar brigade, all of which lay farther to the east, were to cross at Poçinha

1813. and assemble at Miranda do Duero, the heavy artillery May. and pontoons following in their rear. The whole were to be set in motion between the 13th and 17th of May, and to reach their destination between the 21st and 27th;¹ after which they were to advance eastward under Graham's command in three columns—those from Bragança upon Tabara, those from Outeiro and Vimioso upon Losilla, and those from Miranda do Duero upon Carvajales, where they were to arrive on the 28th and 29th.

On the south of the Douro Wellington was to march with Alten's, Slade's and the Household brigades of cavalry, the Light Division of British, Amarante's division, Campbell's brigade of Portuguese infantry and the Spanish regiment of Julian Sanchez. He was to pick up Hill's division and Long's cavalry, as well as Morillo's Spaniards, at Moralaja on the 22nd; reach Salamanca on the 27th and the junction of the Escla with the Douro on the 30th, on which day the pontoons were timed to arrive at the same spot, so as to link the two wings of the Army together. The full strength of the Anglo-Portuguese army was about seventy-seven thousand men of all ranks, of which about fifty-two thousand formed the left and twenty-five thousand the right wing. The British alone numbered some forty-

¹ The destinations and the dates at which the various units were to reach them were as follows :

At Bragança.	Pack's brigade.	21st May.
	Anson's brigade	22nd "
	Ponsonby's brigade	22nd "
	1st division	24th "
At Outeiro.	Bock's brigade	22nd "
	D'Urban's brigade	21st-23rd "
	5th division	24th "
	Bradford's brigade	21st "
At Vimioso.	3rd division	20th "
At Miranda	6th division	24th "
do Duero	7th division	23rd "
and vicinity	4th division	26th "
	Hussar brigade	27th "
	18th Port. brigade	21st "

seven thousand, in such a state of health and strength ^{1813.} as had never before been seen in the Peninsula. The ^{May.} addition of the Spaniards—eight thousand from Estremadura who were to accompany Wellington, and twelve thousand in Galicia—raised the total to little short of one hundred thousand men, besides which the cavalry of General Freire and a reserve of infantry under General O'Donnell were to move by Bejar upon Valladolid as soon as they could be assured of subsistence upon the journey.¹

The combinations in this plan, being somewhat delicate and minute, depended chiefly upon intimate knowledge of the French dispositions, with corresponding ignorance on the French side of the movements of the Allies; and it is curious to note how far these conditions were fulfilled. Of the earlier transactions in the French army Wellington was correctly and rapidly informed. Thus he learned almost immediately of the recall of Caffarelli and Soult, of the appointment of Clausel and Gazan to succeed them, of the arrival of conscripts from France and of the drafting of old soldiers to Napoleon's army, of the transfer of Joseph's headquarters to Valladolid, and of Foy's march to the north. He received also speedy and accurate intelligence of every movement of the Armies of the Centre and South; but, except as regards Foy's division, he was unaware of the movements of the Army of Portugal. On the 21st of April, when Reille had already sent four divisions to Clausel, Wellington could only say vaguely that the Army of Portugal was "apparently about Palencia"—which was true of two divisions only—and even as late as the 3rd of June he had still no idea of Reille's whereabouts. The failure of his intelligencers in this respect is remarkable, and all the more so when we recall Joseph's comment that full reports were published in the gazettes of the insurgents. According to Napier, Wellington's spies were bewildered by the incessant

¹ *Wellington Desp.* (ed. 1852), vi. 457, 469, 480, 484, 493; *Supp. Desp.* xiv. 209-210.

1813. march of drafts to and from the French frontier, and May. could not distinguish these from Clausel's fighting columns. It may well have been difficult to differentiate one from the other ; yet the reports of Mina and Longa, as to the regiments of the French soldiers whom they had killed or taken, must certainly have given some clue concerning the movements of the Army of Portugal. Indeed, Mina's great success of the 31st of March plainly showed the presence of at least one brigade of the 2nd division of that army. But, though the fact was doubtless realised at Wellington's head-quarters, it seems certain that he was singularly ill-apprised of what was going forward in the north.

To the French on the other hand the Allied preparations behind the Portuguese frontier were in great measure unknown, or were so misrepresented by common fame as to give rise to the most ridiculous rumours. Clarke contributed to Jourdan's distraction by a wild report that Wellington was about to embark several thousand men for some unknown destination ; but above all, the advanced position of Hill at Coria and the constant movement of his Spanish troops served, as Wellington had intended, to attract the attention of the French staff to the wrong quarter. At the end of March a faithful spy brought Gazan from Hill's cantonments so alarming a prospect of an immediate invasion of Castile that the French general hastily called in his cavalry from the south of the Tagus ; and, when a day or two later Leval supplemented this by a cry that Hill was in full march upon Madrid, Jourdan actually set every man that could be spared from the armies of Gazan and d'Erlon in motion to support him. Leval, it may be mentioned, being a nervous creature, was seized periodically with panics of this kind, which, however, were wisely ignored by Gazan.

Then followed an extravagant report, which Jourdan thought worth transmission to Paris, that the British were retiring from the Portuguese frontier, leaving

Castafios to take their place, and that Wellington meant ^{1813.} to march upon Madrid by Estremadura on the 15th of May. Within a week this absurdity, which arose probably from the westward movement of the cavalry towards Braga, was discredited ; and with the advent of May the French intelligence showed on the whole decided improvement. From the 9th onwards all reports agreed that the British would advance shortly ; though until the 12th it was confidently asserted that they had not left their cantonments. It was, however, rumoured that Wellington had started for Cadiz ; and some colour was lent to the idea by the fact that just at this time some Spanish generals offered to bring over to Joseph's service ten thousand men of the army lately commanded by Ballesteros ; while the bad relations between Wellington and the Cortes were matter of common knowledge. Still Jourdan neglected no precautions, instructing Gazan to push forward cavalry to Salamanca and to make frequent reconnaissances towards Ciudad Rodrigo, and Reille to do the like towards the Escla, Benavente and even as far as Astorga. On the 19th came intelligence that Hill was about to move ^{May 19.} by the pass of Baños upon Avila ; upon which Jourdan made the shrewd comment that he was more likely to advance upon Alba de Tormes and join Wellington by Salamanca. The Marshal, therefore, made up his mind that Hill had no intention of marching upon Madrid by Talavera, and authorised Gazan to summon Leval to join him from the capital whenever he should think it necessary.

On the 20th detailed news from Portugal of extreme ^{May 20.} importance reached Jourdan's head-quarters. Between the 6th and 8th, it was said, three divisions of infantry and eight regiments of cavalry had crossed the Douro at Lamego and were heading for Astorga ; on the 12th all the reserve of artillery had been at Sabugal ; on the 14th the pontoon-train had marched for the Douro ; on the 17th the Seventh Division had crossed that river, and the Sixth would cross on the 18th, when the pair of

1813. them, together with the greater part of the force above-mentioned, would enter Spain by Alcañices and Puebla de Sanabria. Wellington, it was added, was still at Freineda and on the 17th had reviewed the Light Division and Household Cavalry; but orders had been given for his troops to cross the Agueda on the 22nd and 23rd. The dates and minor details of this intelligence are frequently inaccurate; but the general substance—that five divisions of infantry and eight regiments of cavalry had crossed the Douro and would enter Spain by Alcañices—was remarkably correct; and the perfectly true¹ incident of the review held by Wellington on the 17th shows that the intelligencer spoke from observation on the spot.²

May 22. On the 22nd Leval's cavalry patrols at Puente del Congosto gathered information that Hill had marched from Bejar, apparently heading for Salamanca; and on the 23rd Jourdan received reports that the Allies had marched between the 15th and 20th. But the continuance of Wellington's head-quarters at Freineda after the latter date, which was purposely designed to deceive the French, seemed to indicate that no movement had yet taken place, and Jourdan accepted this indication as a fact. Again, intelligence that Portuguese cavalry had crossed the Douro at the end of April—which was quite correct of the British cavalry—was nullified by a message from Mermet at Benavente, to the effect that only a few commissaries had passed into that region to make purchases, and that the troops which had been at Bragança had marched for Ciudad Rodrigo. Duped, apparently, by this reassuring information from an officer generally accounted worthy of trust, the Marshal made no change in his dispositions.

The situation of his armies in the middle of May was, roughly speaking, as follows. The entire Army of the North was of course engaged, either directly or

¹ Larpent, 3rd ed. p. 116.

² The above details are taken from the letters of Gazan and Jourdan (under the dates given in the text) in *Arch. de la Guerre*.

indirectly, in seconding the operations of Clausel, which ^{1813.} absorbed likewise — as we have seen — Palombini's May. division of the Army of the Centre and the divisions of Foy, Barbot, Taupin and Sarrut from the Army of Portugal. The remaining infantry of this last army, with the exception of one brigade, was within the province of Burgos, as were also three regiments of cavalry, the whole being employed in keeping open the lines of communication; and it is to be noted that Clausel had authority to summon to him another division—the 6th—if he should need it. For the present it remained under the command of Reille, who kept the brigade above-mentioned in the province of Palencia, and retained the direction also of one brigade of light cavalry and of Boyer's division of dragoons, the latter of which were extended along the Douro to the Esla and up the Esla as far as Benavente. The Army of the South was widely scattered. Gazan's head-quarters were at Arevalo, but Conroux's division was at Avila; the 2nd division (late Barrois's) together with Treilhard's dragoons of the Army of the Centre, was with d'Erlon at Segovia; Villatte's division was at Salamanca; the divisions of Darricau and Digeon were at Zamora and Toro; that of Leval, together with at least one brigade of Tilly's division of cavalry, lay at Madrid. If the march of the Allied army were accomplished exactly according to the table of dates laid down by Wellington's orders, there was every prospect that the French would be caught unconcentrated and great part of them destroyed in detail.

Happily for Joseph unexpected obstacles delayed the Allies from the first. On the 15th Wellington, owing to the slowness of the pontoon-train, was obliged to send Hill orders to halt for two days; and the First Division, owing to difficulties in passing the Douro, was two days late at Bragança, arriving on the 26th instead ^{May 26.} of on the 24th. The roads in Tras os Montes also proved worse than had been expected. "It was much easier," in the words of Lieutenant Tomkinson of the

1813. Sixteenth Light Dragoons, "to march up an English May. staircase than to descend them"; but nevertheless Graham by great exertions made good way, and on the 20th orders were issued for Wellington's head-quarters to move on the 22nd to Ciudad Rodrigo. On the previous day the Light Division had crossed the Agueda; and on the 22nd the whole of the right wing began its advance on Salamanca, the left column moving by Martin del Rio and San Muñoz, and head-quarters marching farther south by Tamames and Matilla, which May 25. latter place was reached on the 25th.

The reports sent in by the French generals during the 24th and 25th show imperfect appreciation of the true state of affairs. Reille could only say that a part of the Allied army was marching on the Esla.¹ Darricau announced from Zamora on the 24th that two thousand British cavalry had reached Alcañices, which was certainly not the case,² and that thirty thousand men were following them; that he was calling in his mobile columns, except the 16th Dragoons and four companies of voltigeurs, which he was leaving at Morales; and that he should fall back to Toro as soon as Villatte should have left Salamanca. Villatte on the same night—that of the 24th—stated correctly that south of the Douro the heads of the Allied columns had reached Tamames and San Muñoz; that he had given orders to evacuate Ledesma; but that he should not leave Salamanca until convinced by his own observation that the Allies were really marching against him. He added that Wellington was still unwell and was travelling in a carriage a day's march in rear of the army.

Gazan, for his part, was so uneasy that he came to Joseph's head-quarters on the night of the 24th to obtain express authority to call in Leval from Madrid; and on the 25th he wrote from Medina del Campo that

¹ I have been unable to find these reports, so can only give Jourdan's account of them.

² Anson's and Ponsonby's brigades, which formed the cavalry of Graham's most northerly column, did not reach Alcañices till the 26th.

he was sending orders to Darricau to fall back at once ^{1813.} after breaking down the bridge on the Douro. He ^{May.} added that, as soon as he reached Arevalo, he should summon Leval and Conroux to him, and probably take up a position together with Villatte upon the Trabancos, which river had been suggested to him by Jourdan in April as offering a good line of defence. He said nothing, however, of any orders that he might have given to Tilly's and Digeon's divisions of dragoons, wherefore Jourdan assumed that he must have directed them to the Tormes to cover Villatte's retreat. The Marshal accordingly on the 25th confirmed Gazan's orders, and sent word to d'Erlon to take his troops to Olmedo as soon as the head of Leval's column should appear on the western slopes of the Guadarrama. North of the Douro he thought it sufficient to bid Reille collect his cavalry and the divisions of Darmagnac and Maucune, to watch the Army of Galicia on the Esla; and to leave only one regiment of cavalry and the 6th division of the Army of Portugal to guard the communications from Briviesca to Torquemada.¹

On the 26th Wellington's wing moved forward, ^{May 26.} carrying his left to the Valmuza, and the Spaniards on his right to Alba de Tormes, while Hill and Amarante came level with him at Aldea Tejada in the centre. Ledesma, pursuant to Villatte's orders, had been evacuated; but that General himself, true to his resolution to ascertain everything with his own eyes, was still in Salamanca with only his own division and three to four hundred cavalry; the latter, with a detachment of infantry, being at Alba de Tormes. At eight in the morning his outposts were driven in; and presently an officer of dragoons hurried back to him to report that eleven or twelve thousand men were marching down to the Valmuza, and another deep column advancing by the road from Tamames. Villatte at once sent every

¹ Darricau to Gazan; Villatte to Gazan, 24th May; Gazan to Jourdan, 25th May; Jourdan to Clarke, 26th May, 1813. *Arch. de la Guerre.*

1813. Frenchman out of the town, leaving only picquets to
May 26. hold the bridge of the Tormes till the last moment ;
but he waited until half-past ten, when the Allied
columns had already crossed the Valmuza, before he
gave the order to retreat, and, after falling back to the
heights of Santa Marta, halted once more to reconnoitre
his enemy thoroughly. This was imprudent in the
presence of such a man as Wellington. Under cover
of the ground Fane's brigade¹ quietly forded the
Tormes at Santa Marta towards the rear of the
French, while Victor Alten's passed on towards the
bridge against their front ; and Villatte, observing Hill's
infantry also advancing to the ford of Santa Marta,
suddenly awoke to the fact that he was in danger of
being cut off. For a couple of miles he seems to
have retired in disorder, but at the next height of
Cabrerizos, as became a good and valiant officer, he
rallied and re-formed his men for the perilous work
that was before them.

The Allied cavalry presently came up within short
cannon-shot, but did not venture to attack until the
hostile column was in motion again, when a troop
of British horse-artillery advanced and opened fire
upon the French squares. Three times in the course
of the three miles from Cabrerizos to the defile
of Aldea Lengua Fane essayed to charge, only to be
repulsed with invincible steadiness by the 27th Light
Infantry and the 94th of the Line. But the trial to the
French was very severe. Men dropped in numbers
under the British round-shot, and still more thickly
under the rays of an unusually fierce sun ; and thus
scores of stragglers fell into the hands of the Allies.
Moreover, at the defile of Aldea Lengua the overturning
of a gun blocked the road, and seven tumbrils of
ammunition were captured by the Allies.² From noon
till six o'clock the running fight continued, until at

¹ Late Slade's : 3rd D.G., 1st Royals.

² Napier says seven guns, but Wellington says tumbrils only,
and no narrative except Napier's mentions the capture of the guns.

Villoria Wellington called off the pursuers; the detachment from Alba having joined Villatte's main body, whereas the Allied infantry were still far in rear. Nearly two hundred prisoners were taken; and Villatte admitted the loss of four hundred men in all, a large proportion of whom succumbed to the overpowering heat. His retirement in the presence of ten times his numbers was a fine feat of arms, but does not excuse his blunders, first in withdrawing too late, and secondly in choosing the worst road for his retreat. The casualties of the Allies, liberally estimated by Villatte at two hundred, appear to have been trifling.¹

From Villoria Villatte continued his retreat upon Cantalapiedra and Nava del Rey, whither he had asked General Tilly to send forward cavalry to his assistance. It appears, however, that he had made this request before the action and before he had seen the full force of the Allies, for he reported them to number no more than ten to twelve thousand men; and, extraordinary as it may seem, Gazan, who lay at Arevalo, not more than twenty-five miles from Cantalapiedra, had, as late as on the morning of the 27th, no further information as to Villatte's doings than was contained in the letter to Tilly above cited. Gazan determined, however, to evacuate Arevalo at once, and marched early on the 27th for Rueda, in order to meet Villatte; hoping that another day would see Conroux join him from Avila, and Leval—from whom he had heard nothing—crossing the pass of Guadarrama. Meanwhile Mermet, who was at Valderas, ten miles north-east of Benavente, continued to furnish very incorrect intelligence, stating that the two British divisions north of the Douro had reached Alcañices and Carvajales, and that he did not estimate them at more than ten thousand men; also

¹ *Arch. de la Guerre.* Villatte to Gazan, 26th May. *Wellington Desp.* To Bathurst, 31st May 1813. *Cannon's Hist. of the Royal Dragoons* says that one squadron in a single charge captured 143 prisoners and four tumbrils, but I can find no confirmation of this.

1813. that between three and four thousand British and Spanish cavalry were already arrived, the latter under Julian Sanchez and Penne Villemur, both of whom, as it happened, were with Wellington.

May 27-28. The British General for his part on the 27th and 28th wheeled his army slightly to the north, and halted with his front at Aldeanueva de Figueroa and his right at Orbada, the independent Portuguese troops being a little to the north of Salamanca, and the Spaniards pushed out wide upon both flanks. Then turning over the command to Hill, Wellington set out early

May 29. on the 29th for Miranda do Duero to see to the left wing. His information as to the enemy's whereabouts was singularly accurate, and was supplemented on the night of the 28th by an intercepted letter from Villatte to Digeon, saying that he had halted at Cantalapiedra for a few hours on the 27th to rest his troops, but would shortly push on and take up a position on the road to Nava del Rey. On the night of the 27th in fact Villatte reached Carpio; and Gazan, knowing that this division, as also General Tilly's division of dragoons, would in a few hours be under his hand, sought out a defensive position and found it, not on the Trabancos, which had been the line prescribed by Jourdan, but on the right bank of the Zapardiel. Here therefore he posted his 3rd division, keeping Villatte at Nava del Rey; Tilly at Alaejos, with one regiment detached to guard the ford of the Douro at Pollos; Conroux, who had arrived on the 28th, at Medina del Campo, and Darricau at Toro. He had heard also that Leval had marched from Madrid, and therefore had good hope of rallying him and d'Erlon upon his line within a very few days. But the information that came to him from the Esla was puzzling, for it stated quite correctly that five British divisions were on the north of the Douro, but that Wellington was with them (which at the moment he was not) and that he was ascending the Esla to Astorga. From other reports, however, Gazan rightly judged that Wellington

intended to turn the French right and advance rapidly upon Burgos.¹ 1813.

On the 29th Wellington passed the Douro at Miranda May 29. in a basket slung on a rope from bank to bank ; and on the 30th, the day originally fixed for the laying of the May 30. pontoon-bridge over the Douro, he reached Carvajales. The left wing, in spite of the difficulties of the march through Tras os Montes, had arrived punctually on the appointed days at Tabara, Losilla and Carvajales ; but at the Esla it was checked. All boats had been removed. The river itself—as broad as the Thames at Windsor—was rapid, the banks were steep, the fords were both hard to find and dangerous when found, and every passage was watched by French picquets of cavalry and infantry. On the 30th a Portuguese officer discovered a very difficult ford at Palomilla, which was unknown to the enemy ; and Wellington set the whole of the troops in motion to pass it that night. A covering party of the Hussar brigade, the Fifty-first and some of the Brunswick Light Infantry, was first sent across by the ford of Almendra, the foot-soldiers clinging to the stirrups of the hussars. But during the night the river had risen ; the officer of the Eighteenth Hussars, who acted as guide, became puzzled ; several men and some horses were swept away and drowned, and only with the greatest difficulty did the bulk of the detachment arrive on the eastern bank, with all ammunition spoiled. Happily the French had withdrawn the mass of their posts during the night, and the hussars, pushing forward, surprised and captured an officer and thirty-three men of the 16th dragoons.² At the ford of Palomilla after

¹ *Wellington Desp.* To Hill, 28th May. *Wellington MSS.* Hill to Wellington, 28th May. *Arch. de la Guerre.* Gazan to Joseph, 27th, 28th (2), 29th May ; Mermet to Gazan, 26th May 1813.

² Digeon at first reported a loss of 20 men only out of a party of 100, adding that the British had two officers and several men killed. *Arch. de la Guerre.* Digeon to Gazan, 31st May 1813. A subsequent report gives the loss that I have stated, but in each case the casualties are said to have been suffered in a charge, and it is added in the second letter that the British dared not impede the retreat

1813. many attempts the crossing was abandoned, and the infantry was marched back and hidden away. At noon, however, Bock's and D'Urban's brigades passed the ford with some loss, and later in the day the pontoons were laid, which enabled the rest of the cavalry and three divisions of infantry to cross before nightfall.

June 1. On the 1st of June, while the rear of the army was still making its way over the Esla, the cavalry advancing to Zamora found it evacuated and the bridge destroyed, Digeon having withdrawn his division of

June 2. dragoons to Morales de Toro. On the 2nd the Hussar brigade and a troop of horse-artillery moved up to Toro, which again was found empty, with the bridge destroyed; but the inhabitants signalled that the enemy was close at hand. Digeon had in fact stationed his second brigade before the village of Morales, and his first brigade a short distance in rear of it on the road to Pedrosa del Rey, the two being separated by the river Bajez, over which there was a bridge some two or three miles to north. According to Digeon's account he sent out at dawn a reconnoitring party of one hundred men of the 16th and 21st dragoons, which entered Toro at five o'clock, found no enemy, and began to return at its leisure. It should seem, however, that these French dragoons were disturbed by the approach of the British while actually in Toro, for their breakfast was found cooking by some men of the Eighteenth. Be that as it may, the Tenth Hussars advanced at once northward upon the retreating body, while the Eighteenth made a circuit eastward to turn the enemy's left flank.

Digeon, perceiving the advance of the British from

of the remainder of the party. British narratives, however, agree that the picquet was surprised, and one of them gives the detail that the officer was shaving when captured. Napoleon's generals had certainly caught from him the instinct of lying. The best account of the passage of the Esla is in Malet's *Memoirs of the 18th Hussars*, with which compare Wrottesley's *Life of Burgoyne*, i. 257-258; and Greene's *Vicissitudes of a Soldier's Life*, p. 149.

a distance, ordered his second brigade to mount, 1813. and set it in motion to retire over the bridge; but June 2. to his amazement the reconnoitring party, serenely unconscious of its danger, continued to move placidly at a walk. He galloped out towards it to order it to trot, but arrived too late; for the Tenth were already within striking distance; and the colonel of the 16th, wheeling about the only squadron that was with him, most gallantly charged to save his comrades. He seems to have broken a squadron of the Tenth, which met him alone, but was of course overpowered by the rest. Digeon, who had sent for the two remaining squadrons of the 16th, made a desperate attempt to stay the pursuing hussars; but the sudden appearance of the Eighteenth on his left flank threw the dragoons into panic, and they broke and fled over the plain towards the bridge, with both British regiments in eager chase. When, however, the bridge was passed, the guns of a battery with the other French brigade at Pedrosa del Rey warned Grant that he had gone far enough; and he very wisely rallied the hussars—though not before an officer and one or two men had been cut off—and retired. Darricau in fact had joined the cavalry with both infantry and guns, and the shattered remains of the 16th were at last able to take refuge behind them. They had lost about one hundred and fifty men and a rather greater number of horses; and the full list of French prisoners taken, wounded and unwounded, slightly exceeded two hundred. The loss of the British was not above three officers and eighteen men killed, wounded and taken.

Altogether this was a brilliant little affair which, when read in conjunction with other incidents of these few days, does not increase our respect for the officers of the French cavalry. On this same evening Julian Sanchez surprised a post of two officers and thirty troopers at Castro Nuño. Another such post had been surprised on the Esla, as we have seen, on the 31st of May; the officer in command of Digeon's

1813. reconnoitring detachment walked away over the plain of Morales so heedlessly that he allowed himself to be overtaken by a brigade; and finally Digeon himself took so little care of his flanks that the attack of the Eighteenth came as an absolute surprise to him. He actually reported that the British hussars must have crossed the Douro by some unknown ford, whereas they had never been on the south of the river at all.¹

June 3. The Douro being fordable, the junction of the two wings of the Allies was secured; and Wellington halted on the 3rd to allow the rear of his columns to close up and the Army of Galicia to come forward from Benavente. He utilised the time in throwing the right wing across the water; the Second and Light Divisions passing by the bridge of Toro, which had been roughly repaired, and the mounted troops and baggage by a deep ford a little farther up stream. Thus the enemy's line up the river was turned, though too late, owing to the delay in crossing the Esla, to take advantage of the dispersion of his force. On the 30th of May Jourdan, being still in the dark as to the strength of the Allied troops on the Esla, was awaiting further reports from Reille's cavalry on the subject; and, since as yet there was no news of Leval, the Marshal was in the greatest anxiety over the possible results of an irruption of the Allies to north of the Douro. In the circumstances he submitted to Joseph the expediency of recalling the troops which had been detached to the north; but the King doubted whether he could do more than order Clausel to send them back, if it were agreeable to the Emperor's views; and, in point of fact, when writing to Clausel on this day he contented himself with a very vague sketch of the general situation and with instructions to that General to collect his army.

¹ There are accounts of this action in Grant's very meagre report (printed in *Wellington Desp.* ed. 1852, vi. 516); in Liddell's *Hist. of the Tenth Hussars*, pp. 105-107 (where by a gross blunder the French reserves are said to have been at Morales instead of Pedrosa); in Malet's *Memoirs of the 18th Hussars*, pp. 46-48; and in *Arch. de la Guerre*; Digeon's two reports to Gazan of 2nd June 1813.

The 31st, however, came as a day of relief. ^{1813.}
 Intelligence arrived that the bulk of the Allied army ^{May 31.}
 was certainly to north of the Douro, that Leval
 had reached Segovia on the previous evening, and
 that d'Erlon had in consequence pushed forward
 cavalry and Cassagne's division into Olmedo. Even,
 therefore, if Wellington's plan had been punctually
 executed and the two wings of the army had been
 united on the right bank of the Douro on the
 30th, he could hardly have "surprised and separated"
 the French, and overtaken and beaten some of their
 divisions, as Napier suggests; for Gazan would have
 had plenty of time to move to Tordesillas. Moreover,
 even if d'Erlon had (as is hardly likely) been too late
 to cross the river at Puente Duero, he and Leval also
 could have turned eastward to Cuellar and made their
 choice of the bridges of Tudela, Penafiel or—in case
 of extreme danger—at Aranda. Jourdan's worst fears
 foreboded to him nothing more serious than that the
 junction of his whole army might not be effected short
 of Burgos. Indeed, if Gazan had obeyed his orders
 and called in Leval at once, instead of galloping to
 Valladolid to make Joseph repeat them a second time,
 there would have been no doubt of the safe assembly of
 the army under Jourdan's hand in his chosen position
 on the 30th of May. As things fell out, this result was
 accomplished without hindrance by the evening of the
 2nd of June. Reille with his cavalry and Darmagnac's ^{June 2.}
 division were at Medina; Maucune's division was at
 Palencia; Gazan with the entire Army of the South
 lay between Torrelobaton and Tordesillas; d'Erlon was
 at Valladolid; and head-quarters were at Cigales.¹

Now, however, arose the question what should be
 done next; for, when the position of Rio Seco had
 been selected as a battle-ground against the Allies,
 Jourdan had reckoned that the whole Army of

¹ *Arch. de la Guerre.* Jourdan to Clarke, 30th May; Joseph to
 Clausel, 26th May (with postscript of 30th). Ducasse, ix. 283.
Mém. de Jourdan, pp. 465-466.

1813. Portugal would be with him ; whereas five out of its six
June 2. divisions of infantry were in fact absent. Jourdan was for recrossing the Douro, feeling sure that Wellington would follow him rather than sacrifice his line of communications with Portugal. In this case, at the worst, the French could retreat upon Aranda de Duero, whence they could proceed either to Zaragoza or to Burgos, giving Clausel plenty of time to rejoin them. Joseph saw the merit of this plan, and rejected it only because he thought it too much opposed to the Emperor's commands, which bade him above all things to preserve the most direct line of communications with France. The only alternative was to retreat ; and orders were accordingly issued to that effect.

On the 2nd the King's carriages, the members of his household, his Ministers and the Spanish families which had accompanied him from Madrid, set out for Burgos, and were followed on the next day by another huge party of refugees, and by the park of heavy artillery ; the several convoys requiring an escort of no fewer than
June 3-4. four thousand men. On the 3rd and 4th the whole army marched northward up the left bank of the Carrion, Reille to Palencia, d'Erlon and head-quarters to Magaz, Gazan to Dueñas. Finding that Wellington was not at his heels, Joseph halted, hoping always that Clarke would send Clausel to his assistance ; but, as the troops depended for food upon what they could pick up, he was obliged to extend them along a broader line and to shift his head-quarters to Torquemada. In
June 5. this place on the 5th he received letters from Clarke, three weeks old, which by a bitter irony assured him that Wellington had detached fifteen thousand men to some unspecified point, and that the King had therefore no excuse for omitting to threaten Portugal, to reinforce Clausel, and even to send troops into Aragon. "I know nothing about Aragon," answered poor Joseph ; "I have never received a report from any of the commanders there. I don't even know their names. Clausel has already all the infantry of the

Army of Portugal but one division. I have by all ^{1813.} accounts eighty thousand men against me, and only ^{June.} forty thousand to oppose to them. Am I to order the Army of Portugal to join me?¹ I have asked you this once already. If it be the Emperor's wish, I beg you to give Clausel the necessary orders, for I suppose that you receive reports from him. I receive none. I am telling him of our situation; but I cannot say if he will think it right to join me in the plain of Burgos. As a good Frenchman and servant of the Emperor I repeat to you once more, *Let us beat the English: that is the best way to make the Spaniards our friends.*"²

Meanwhile Wellington, upon joining hands with Giron's Army of Galicia, was at once plied with complaints that the Spaniards had no ammunition. His answer to Giron was curt. "Either stay and do your best, or go back, and I'll do my best without you." On the 4th he set his army in motion in four columns,³ the ^{June 4.} Spaniards on the extreme left, Graham on the left centre, head-quarters on the right centre, Hill on the right, along a front running from Benavente to Morales de Toro, with a general direction to north-east. On the 6th ^{June 6.} Giron reached Villarramiel; Graham, Villerias; head-quarters, Ampudia; and Hill, Mucientes, a little to south

¹ Jourdan, it must be mentioned, writing at the same time, also pressed this question urgently upon Clarke.

² *Arch. de la Guerre.* Jourdan, Orders of 3rd June, letter to Clarke, 5th June 1813. *Mém. de Jourdan*, pp. 466-467; Ducasse, ix. 271-273, 275-277, 283-287.

³ *Stanhope's Journal* says that there were 5 columns, viz.:

- (1) Giron. Spanish Army of Galicia.
- (2) Graham. 1st and 5th Divs. Anson's and Bock's brigades of cavalry.
- (3) Picton. 3rd and 4th Divs. Ponsonby's and Durban's brigades of cavalry.
- (4) Head-quarters. 6th and 7th Divs., Alten's and Household cavalry.
- (5) Hill. 2nd Divs., Amarante's Portuguese, Morillo's Spaniards, Long's cavalry.

But Nos. 3 and 4 were practically one; and the Hussar brigade (omitted by Stanhope) was attached to it.

1813. of Cigales. On this morning Joseph had repaired to
June 6. Palencia to consult Gazan and Reille as to his next movement, but, on arriving, he learned that the British cavalry was already in contact with his advanced posts, and the whole army of the Allies not far behind. As he could not dream of accepting battle, he was fain to
June 7. retreat once more during the night; and on the 7th his army was stationed on the heights between the confluence of the Pisuerga and the Arlanza, Reille being at Castrogeriz, Gazan about Palenzuela, and d'Erlon in reserve at Los Balbases.

The position was so strong that it might have been held for some days; but the French were without food; it was dangerous, with Wellington so near at hand, to detach large bodies to collect it; and the retreat was perforce continued on the
June 9. 9th to Burgos. Here Reille took post in rear of the Hormasa; Gazan astride of the Arlanzon between the Arbel and the Arcos; and d'Erlon in the suburbs of Burgos; head-quarters being in the city itself. The fortress Jourdan had already ascertained to be in a hopeless condition. In spite of the orders sent to Clausel and to Sarrut to revictual it, nothing had been done. The huge convoys which had arrived from Valladolid were rapidly exhausting such supplies as remained; and the defences were untenable, the new works being incomplete and the old unrepaired. Obviously therefore Burgos could not be held; and Jourdan had already given orders for the artillery and ammunition to be evacuated upon Vitoria, though the Director-general, having no means of transport, had been unable to obey. Horses were therefore borrowed from General Tirlet to carry off a part of it; the park of the Army of Portugal was sent off likewise to Vitoria; and thither also was despatched, under convoy of Lamartinière's division, a vast train of ministers and courtiers, refugees and plunder. "If all this population remains at Vitoria," wrote Jourdan, "they will consume all its resources, as they have at Burgos." On every

side the outlook was gloomy. Joseph now learned for 1813. the first time that the Army of Galicia, which he over- June 9. estimated at twenty-five thousand men, was marching with Wellington. In his total ignorance of affairs in the east he had already summoned Suchet, whose hands were fully occupied with Murray, to move to Zaragoza. In despair, Joseph at last despatched on the 9th an order to Clausel to rejoin him with the whole of the Army of Portugal and with every man that he could safely take from the Army of the North. If Wellington should advance by the great road from Valladolid to Burgos, he might be checked for a time ; but the reports from the cavalry gave little hope that he would oblige his enemy by making such a blunder.¹

Wellington, as a matter of fact, was steadily pursuing his policy of turning the French right. On the 7th June 7-10. the positions of Giron, Graham, head-quarters and Hill were respectively Becerril, Grijota, Palencia and Dueñas ; on the 8th Villoldo, San Cebrian, Amusco and Torquemada ; on the 9th Villasarracino, Santillana, Amusco and Villalco ; on the 10th Herrera, Zaragoza, Melgar de Fernamental and Pedrosa del Principe. On the 11th Giron was ordered to halt ; while Graham June 11. came forward a short march to Sotresgudo, head-quarters to Castrogeriz, and Hill to Barrio de Santa Marta, just to east of the latter town. On the 12th June 12. three out of the four columns were halted, the army having outmarched its supplies. Already on the 8th Graham had represented that the Fifth Division was seriously in want of bread ; that many battalions of the First Division had been for some days on half rations ; that the British and Portuguese Commissaries had begun to wrangle over such provisions as were to be found ; and that Giron, whose troops were starving, had added to the confusion by seeking bread for them in Palencia. At Grijota too some of the troops had begun to plunder the wine-vaults, the new Staff Corps

¹ *Mémoires de Jourdan*, pp. 468-449. *Arch. de la Guerre*. Jourdan to Clarke, 11th June 1813.

1813. being too weak in numbers to preserve discipline ; and
June 12. Graham, after calling the cavalry in to help in keeping order, asked anxiously as to his powers of summary punishment.¹ The trouble, however, did not become serious, and the point is interesting only for its demonstration that the British army was not even yet provided with proper machinery of discipline. "The army," wrote Wellington about this time, "is in better order than I have ever known them. God knows how long this will last." As regards victuals it seems certain that bread was frequently wanting during this rapid advance, but that the meat, which accompanied the troops "on the hoof," never failed. Wellington had already given orders for opening a new base of supply at Santander, as soon as the enemy should quit it, and for bringing the store-ships from Coruña to that port. It was with no vain boast that, when he crossed the frontier on the 22nd of May, he had waved his hand, and cried "Farewell Portugal."²

While the three columns above mentioned remained halted, Wellington pushed forward the whole of the cavalry attached to his own and Hill's columns, with the Light Division and Hill's infantry in support, against Reille's position. The French General, wishing to ascertain the force of the Allies, did not immediately retreat, but waited until the Allied cavalry had overlapped his right, when he withdrew in excellent order southward by the bridge of Villa de Buniel upon Burgos, before Wellington's infantry could come up. Gardiner's troop of horse-artillery was able to pour a few shot into the retreating column, and a squadron of the Fourteenth Light Dragoons by an opportune charge captured a few prisoners ; but on the whole Reille's loss was trifling, though he was obliged to abandon one

¹ *Wellington MSS.* Graham to Wellington, 8th, 9th June 1813. Wellington's answer of 8th June (printed in *Despatches*) shows a secret dread of the House of Commons in case the Provost Marshal's authority were strained too far.

² *Wellington Desp.* To Lieut.-Col. Bourke, 10th June 1813.

gun that had been overturned. Once again Joseph ^{1813.} was confronted with the alternative of a general action ^{June 12.} before he had collected the whole of his force, or of a retreat. He decided to retreat, being perhaps the more inclined to this course by the fact that on the evening of the 9th he had received a letter from Clausel, the first that had reached him since that General had taken command in the north. The document was dated the 4th of May, and was of course utterly valueless for purposes of intelligence; but still it created a sense of communication re-established, which cannot but have been reassuring.

On the evening of the 12th Jourdan despatched to General Thouvenot at Vitoria letters for Sarrut and Foy, of whose whereabouts he was ignorant, bidding the former march to Briviesca and the latter to Miranda del Ebro, so that their divisions might join the main army. In the night the army defiled through Burgos, assembling in rear of the town; and at six o'clock the Castle of Burgos was blown up with disastrous results. General Aboville, being unable to remove all the ammunition and fearful lest it might be used by the Allies for the siege of Bayonne, had half loaded six thousand shells and placed them at a short distance from each other, in such a way that the firing of a mine should explode them all. The device succeeded only too well. By accident or negligence the mine was kindled before the troops were clear of the town, and a brigade of dragoons, which was passing under the Castle at that moment, was overwhelmed by a tempest of falling iron, stones and timber. A hundred and twenty men besides a great number of horses were thus killed or disabled, and the carelessness which brought about such a catastrophe can only be described as unpardonable. The army was already discouraged by the bare fact of retreat; Julian Sanchez had gathered in a considerable harvest of stragglers; the cavalry had suffered severely in more than one important engagement; and it was cruel to crown

1813. these misfortunes with so wanton a piece of mismanagement.¹

June 13. On the 13th Joseph's head-quarters were at Quintana-vides; on the 14th at Briviesca; and on the 15th at Pancorbo; the army remaining halted on these two latter days between the Oca and the Montes Obarenes. But want of supplies compelled Joseph to extend the

June 16. quarters of his troops, wherefore on the 16th d'Erlon was pushed eastward to Haro, Reille northward across the Ebro by Puente Larra towards Espejo, and Gazan's army was extended from the north bank of the Ebro beyond Miranda to the rear of the defile of Pancorbo, so as to ensure the power of retaking the offensive. Joseph, however, had the satisfaction of picking up Lamartinière's division at Briviesca; and on the 16th Sarrut's division also joined Reille, thus restoring to him more of the infantry of his army, and enabling him to send back Darmagnac's division to d'Erlon. Here Jourdan hoped that he might remain in position until Clausel should join him.

He was, however, still anxious about supplies, for, except at Haro, there were not victuals enough to subsist the troops for many days without help from France. Moreover, he was even more anxious about the movements of the Allies, as to which his information was extremely vague. According to report (which, as shall be seen, was not far from correct) forty thousand of the Allies were marching on Villarcayo and Medina de Pomar, and the British cavalry had actually entered the latter place on the 16th. Jourdan had from the first divined that Wellington intended to manœuvre against his right, with the object either of covering the siege of Santoña or of threatening the French communications by occupying Bilbao; and for this reason

¹ *Arch. de la Guerre.* Jourdan to Thouvenot, 12th June 1813. *Mém. de Jourdan*, pp. 468-470. Napier states the losses by the explosion at 300 men killed; Jourdan in a letter to Clarke of 16th June gives it at 100 killed and wounded, which seems to me more likely to be correct.

the Marshal had desired, when the army retreated from 1813. Burgos, to push Reille's troops rapidly forward upon June. Villarcayo to oppose any such movement, and to check the head of the Allied columns until the main French army could act upon their flank. He was, however, overborne by the counsel of others, who urged that the roads of the Upper Ebro were impracticable for artillery, and that Wellington must perforce take the great road from Burgos onwards. Indeed they represented that, even if Wellington did succeed in traversing these impassable ways, he would lay himself open to an irruption upon his communications as soon as Clausel should join head-quarters with the three remaining divisions of the Army of Portugal. Jourdan, however, was not convinced, and remained nervously apprehensive lest the Allies should be beforehand with the French at Valmaseda or even at Bilbao. Then there would be nothing for it but retreat upon Vitoria; and already General Thouvenot was complaining that Vitoria was hopelessly encumbered by the unwieldy convoys directed upon it from Burgos, while the undisciplined detachments of the Army of Portugal were squandering all food and forage within reach.¹

Jourdan was not far wrong, though he had not completely realised his adversary's purpose. On the 13th June 13. Wellington turned the whole of his columns a little more directly towards the north; Giron from Aguilar del Campo to the extreme upper waters of the Ebro; Graham to La Piedra; head-quarters to Villadiego; Hill to Villarejo. On the 14th Giron reached the Ebro June 14. at Polientes, and Graham at San Martin; head-quarters came to Masa, and Hill to Montorio. On the 15th June 15. Giron was at Soncillo; Graham at Villarcayo; head-quarters crossed the Ebro by the bridge of Arenas; and Hill approached the river at Villaescusa de Butron. On the 16th the whole wheeled eastward. Giron advanced June 16. to Quintanilla de Pienza; Graham to La Cerca; head-

¹ *Arch. de la Guerre.* Thouvenot to Jourdan, 12th June; Jourdan to Clarke, 16th June 1813.

1813. quarters to Medina de Pomar ; and Hill, after passing the Ebro at the bridge of Rampalaz (the next above Arenas), fell in rear of head-quarters and came to Villalain. Practically this brought the entire army together, and on the evening of the 16th there dined with Wellington not only General Giron, but Generals Mendizabal and Longa, who had led forward their troops to join in the great advance.

June 17. The Sixth Division was now left at Medina to guard the stores and supplies ; and on the 17th the rest of the army continued its progress. Graham took the lead along the main road to Vitoria, with Wellington following next after him, and Hill in rear ; head-quarters halting for the night at Quincocoe de Yuso. The marches on these days were most arduous and difficult, the country being barren, rocky and mountainous, the villages few and the roads abominable. Jourdan's staff was not greatly mistaken in judging that these by-ways were impracticable, for in the long descent to the Ebro it was necessary to bring down the guns by hand, with teams taken out and wheels locked ;¹ and even so, in spite of every care, a few wheels gave way. Yet by one shift or another the artillery was brought forward ; and, considering the nature of the country, the advance was astonishingly rapid. On the 15th, for instance, Wellington's own column traversed twenty-eight miles, and this although bread was scarce ; for the supplies, with no blame to the Commissaries, could not keep pace with the army. It is difficult to know which to praise the more, the skill of the General who devised this great turning movement, or the indomitable spirit of the troops, which triumphed over all hardships and fatigues to accomplish his purpose.

Throughout these days Jourdan waited with many misgivings for news of his enemy's advance along the road which the French had taken ; and his apprehensions were increased when his patrols could find nothing in

¹ Wellington himself led his horse down, instead of riding (Henegan).

that direction but the scouts of Julian Sanchez and the ^{1813.} guerilla-bands. On the 17th Maucune reported from ^{June 17.} Frias that his patrols had found British troops in the direction of Puente Arenas; and then at last Joseph despatched orders to Foy to march to the help of Bilbao, and to Reille to assemble the Army of Portugal at Osma and move in the same direction, so as to head back the British who were advancing by that way. Accordingly Reille sent forward Sarrut's division to the defile of Osma, following it himself with Lamartinière's division and three regiments of light cavalry, and ordering Maucune's division and two more regiments of light cavalry to make their way in course of the night to the same point. Information had been received during the night that the British had reached San Martin de Losa and Mambliga, which indicated a movement eastward upon Vitoria rather than northward upon Bilbao; and on reaching Osma on the morning of the 18th Reille ^{June 18.} perceived Graham's column, which had halted during the previous night at San Martin, marching down the road from Bilbao to the little plain wherein Osma stands. Pushing forward Sarrut's division to compel them to deploy, he was promptly engaged by Halkett's light battalions of the Legion; and, both sides bringing their artillery into action, there ensued a sharp skirmish and a prolonged cannonade. Meanwhile there was no sign of Maucune, though the sound of guns to the south-west suggested that he also was engaged with the enemy; and at length, perceiving that three divisions of the British, the First, Third and Fifth, besides a large body of cavalry, were opposed to him, Reille, after losing rather over one hundred men, fell back southward to Espejo.

Here the head of Maucune's column came surging in upon him in haste and confusion from the west. Maucune, blindly trusting that no enemy would be moving in his direction, had taken the shortest route upon Espejo, instead of marching by the south bank of the Ebro, crossing it by the bridge of Larrai and

1813. thence striking northward, as Reille, without giving a
June 18. positive order, had suggested to him. More than this, his leading brigade had halted by the village of San Millan to await the coming of the rear of the column, and was lying there at its ease without a single picquet thrown out, when the Light Division, which was advancing, as usual, parallel to Graham's column, suddenly caught sight of Maucune's rear-guard—a squadron of light cavalry—which was riding quietly into the village. A troop and a half of the 1st German Hussars, which was at the head of the Light Division, at once trotted forward to engage them, and after a sharp encounter drove off the enemy with a loss of some prisoners. Meanwhile Charles Alten, on hearing of the presence of the French infantry, promptly pushed forward the First and part of the Third battalion of Rifles against their front and flanks; and Wellington, coming up at this moment, supported them with the rest of Kempt's brigade and a battalion of Caçadores from Vandeleur's brigade. Part of the French were by this time beyond the village, part passing through it, and part waiting to enter it. These last deployed to hold off the Riflemen, but were soon broken and dispersed. The village was cleared; a second deployment of the French beyond it was also broken up; and the Riflemen, following the column through the woods on both flanks, hustled it forward with a biting fire for three or four miles before they abandoned the pursuit. Wellington had hurried the Fourth Division to Espejo to intercept it, but apparently too late, for after a slight skirmish the French succeeded in making their escape.¹

While this fight was going on, Maucune's second brigade suddenly emerged from a rocky defile, whereupon Vandeleur's brigade instantly flew upon their left flank. The unhappy French made for a hill a little

¹ Wellington's despatch makes no mention of this, but circumstantial details are given by Surtees (*Twenty-five Years in the Rifle Brigade*, pp. 198-200), which are confirmed in substance by Leach and by the casualty lists.

way to their front; but the Fifty-second, who were ^{1813.} stationed beyond this hill, turned about and raced them ^{June 18.} for the summit. A rude scuffle followed, but the bulk of the enemy, half flying, half fighting, made their escape through wood and mountain to Miranda del Ebro. The baggage which followed them was less fortunate. The mules galloped away in terror to the highest pinnacle of the mountains; and the escort, huddled together among the rocks, fought desperately until overpowered. Finally every animal was captured, together with some three hundred prisoners. The casualties of Maucune's division altogether amounted to four hundred, raising the total loss of Reille's troops to over five hundred killed, wounded and prisoners. The casualties of the British in the two affairs appear not to have exceeded at the most one hundred and fifty.¹

On that night the columns of Graham and Wellington encamped between Berberana and Espejo, with Hill's in rear at Mambliga; while Giron made his way northward to Valmaseda. Reille for his part fell back a few miles east of Espejo to Salinas de Anaña, where he rallied his three divisions in the course of the night. The line of the Ebro being now certainly turned, he proposed to retire towards Navarre by the south bank of that river; but Joseph dared not take a step which would have involved the sacrifice not only of the huge convoys brought in from Madrid and Burgos and of his principal line of communication with France, but possibly even of Clausel's detachment, if it should arrive at Vitoria and find there the Allies instead of the French army. He decided therefore to retreat to Vitoria in the night. Everything, in his judgment, really depended upon Clausel, upon whose arrival he still reckoned, and would no doubt have reckoned still more surely had he

¹ All the chroniclers of the Light Division give an account in some detail of this action at San Millan. Ch. Alten's report, dated 20th June, is in *Wellington MSS.* Reille's, dated 19th June, is in *Archives de la Guerre.* I have followed Reille's account of his casualties.

1813. known that that General had received his urgent letters
June 18. of summons on the 15th and, having brought three months' bread and flour into Pamplona, was collecting the Army of Portugal and four thousand men of the Army of the North for a march to Burgos.¹ Vitoria, not more than sixty miles by road from Pamplona, lay on the direct route to Burgos; and the distance might be traversed, by a great effort, in two days. Pressing orders were sent to Thouvenot to hasten Foy's division back from Bilbao to the main army, and for the garrison of Bilbao and Palombini's Italians to retire to Durango.
- June 19. This done, the troops of Gazan and d'Erlon were set in motion from Miranda upon Vitoria, a critical movement, for the columns could only enter the basin in which that city stands by the pass of Puebla, and Wellington was nearer to that pass than were the French. Reille was therefore instructed to fall back to Subijana de Morillas on the Bayas, and to contest every inch of ground in order to assure the safety of their march. It is uncertain whether Wellington appreciated the chance that lay open to him of seizing Puebla before the French, cutting them off from Vitoria and overwhelming them when entangled in the defile, which so dangerous a flank march certainly invited him to do. In any case, his columns did not arrive at the Bayas until one o'clock, when by a frontal attack of the Fourth Division, combined with a turning movement of the Light Division on the southern flank of the French, he manœuvred Reille out of his position. The French General, however, had disputed every foot of ground; and, when at last he withdrew eastward behind the river Zadorra, which formed the next line of defence, d'Erlon was already

¹ Clausel to Jourdan, 15th June 1813 (printed in Ducasse, ix. 294); Clausel to Clarke, 15th June 1813 (*Arch. de la Guerre*). Ducasse points out the importance of the former letter, but omits to say when it was received. As neither he nor Jourdan say a word about its receipt, I infer that it was delayed; but I see no reason why it should not have come to hand by the 17th if not by the 16th. If it did reach Joseph on either of these days, he had the better reason for falling back to Vitoria.

in position behind it, and Gazan coming rapidly up to 1813. form in his rear. The firing therefore ceased, and the June 19. Allies encamped along the Bayas from Zuazo on the north to Pobes on the south, the Third, Seventh and Second Divisions with some of the cavalry remaining in second line on the Onecillo from Berberana to Espejo.

On that night Jourdan was a sorely puzzled and harassed man. All the French reports mentioned only six divisions of British as taking part in the advance, which left the whole of Hill's command and the Spaniards unaccounted for. What had become of them? Jourdan, as we have seen, had from the beginning apprehended that Wellington would move upon Bilbao, besiege or mask it, seize the pass of Durango some thirty miles to the east of it, and strike full upon the main French line of communication with Bayonne. All his manœuvres so far pointed to such a design; and Jourdan dreaded it, for, if it should come to pass, Joseph would be compelled to march with all speed upon Mondragon in order to avert disaster. He might possibly be constrained even to evacuate Spain altogether, owing to the impossibility of feeding his army in that district of the Pyrenees. On the other hand, a letter had just arrived from Clausel, dated from Pamplona on the 17th, saying that all the troops in Navarre were marching from Logroño; and, though Logroño is two marches distant from Vitoria, it was likely that Clausel might hear in time of the situation of the main army, or at least so hasten his movements in response to the King's urgent summons, as to arrive at Vitoria on the morning of the 21st. If he did so, Joseph reasoned that it would be possible to take the offensive immediately, and so to clear his communications.

There remained, however, the chance that Wellington might attack before Clausel should arrive; and there was no dissembling the danger to the French army if he should do so; for it had little hope of gaining a victory against the superior numbers of the Allies, and, if beaten, must of necessity retreat upon Pamplona over roads almost

1813. impassable by artillery. There remained two alternatives, the first being to march northward with the whole army towards Mondragon, and to take up a position at Salinas to protect the communications. But to this course there were several objections. In the first place the junction with Clausel would be abandoned ; in the second, most of the cavalry and artillery would be useless and must be sent back to France ; in the third, the troops would starve in so barren a country ; and in the fourth, the army could not hope to hold its position against the Allies on its front and the guerilla-bands on all sides, and would be compelled to evacuate Spain ignominiously without trying the hazard of a battle. The second alternative was that suggested by Reille, to retire into Navarre by Salvatierra ; and even on the 20th Jourdan still expected that Joseph would adopt it, in spite of its violation of the Emperor's orders, though he had grave misgivings whether the road would be practicable for artillery. For the present, however, the King, while still hesitating to take a decision, was inclined to stand his ground.¹

June 17. Clausel, meanwhile, faithful to his word, had marched from Pamplona on the 17th with Taupin's and Barbot's divisions of the Army of Portugal, and Abbé's and Vandermaesen's of the Army of the North. On the 18th he reached Estella ; and on the 19th was close to Logroño, where, hearing no news of the main army—for Joseph's messengers had been intercepted or had gone astray—he was uncertain what he ought to do. In the evening he heard that d'Erlon had left Haro for Miranda, which was not far from the truth and yet misleading, for d'Erlon, as we know, had ascended the Ebro only so far as the junction of the Zadorra, where, instead of turning north-west upon Miranda, he had turned north-east upon Vitoria. Assuming therefore,

¹ Jourdan, in his *Mémoires*, says that Joseph decided on the night of the 19th not to move ; but in his letter to Clarke of the 20th (*Arch. de la Guerre*) he says "le roi ne sait pas encore quelle partie il prendra."

not unnaturally, that Joseph was making for the Upper 1813.
Ebro, Clausel decided to follow the river upward, and
spent the whole of the 20th in movements in that false June 20.
direction. It was therefore—so fate decreed—impos-
sible for him to reach Vitoria on the 21st.

Foy, for his part, had hastened a detachment, as
ordered by Joseph on the 17th, to the help of Bilbao ; June 17.
and on the 19th was at Vergara, a little to south-east
of Durango. At the moment he had with him one
single battalion only ; his first brigade being at Villa-
franca, protecting the march of a column of prisoners
which was on its way to France ; and his second brigade
near Vitoria, escorting an unwieldy convoy towards
San Sebastian. Moreover, as the communication
between Vitoria and Tolosa was kept open by his
troops alone, and the guerilla-leader known as the
Pastor was known to be in the vicinity, he thought it
unsafe to move them for the present, the more so as
Thouvenot had warned him that a succession of convoys
would be passing from Vitoria into France. In any
case he could not possibly collect his division until the
20th. On that day he received Jourdan's orders that June 20.
Bilbao should be evacuated and that he himself was to
come into Vitoria ; but he dared not withdraw the
brigade from Villafranca until the convoy was in
security, and he felt bound to leave four battalions to
look to the safe retirement of the garrison from Bilbao,
concerning which he was extremely anxious. It
followed necessarily that, at the earliest, he could not
hope to reach Vitoria before the 22nd ;¹ and the 22nd
was one day too late.

¹ Jourdan, *Mémoires*, pp. 485-486 ; Girod de l'Ain, pp. 393-394.

CHAPTER VI

1813. THE basin of Vitoria, into which Joseph had retired,
June 20. measures, roughly speaking, twenty miles east and west by ten miles north and south. It is pent in upon all sides by rugged offshoots of the Pyrenees, those to north and west being known as the Sierra de Morillas, those to south and east as the heights of Puebla. The river Zadorra, entering it from the north and east by the village of Durana, flows west, as soon as it is clear of the mountains, for some seven miles. Then, striking against a spur of the Sierra de Morillas, near the village of Tres Puentes, it doubles back in a huge loop to the south-east and, still following the contour of the Sierra, makes two more great bends before it settles down to flow southward through the gorge of La Puebla de Arganzon. I shall call the most easterly of these loops the loop of Tres Puentes, and that next to westward of it the loop of Nanclares. The Zadorra is a merry brawling trout-stream, for the most part about forty yards broad, and would be fordable nearly everywhere but for certain mill-dams, which shall presently be described, and for the precipitous character of the banks at sundry points. It is, however, furnished with a great number of bridges, which must be described in their order.

The highest up the water, with which we are concerned, is the bridge of Durana, connecting the road to Durango on the right bank with that to Irun on the left, and therefore of importance because these roads were Joseph's direct line of retreat. Some two

miles below it is the bridge of Gamarra; yet a mile farther down, and nearly due north of Vitoria, is the bridge of Arriaga; fourteen hundred yards below this is the bridge of Yurre; and more than a mile farther down the bridge of Gobeo. Then comes an unbridged length of some three miles of water until the great loop of Tres Puentes is reached, where the bridges of Mendoza and Tres Puentes traverse the northern bend, and the bridge of Villodas the southern bend of the loop. The next bridge is that of Nanclares, in the western bend of the next great curve of the river; the next, which I shall call D'Urban's bridge, stands at the apex of the most westerly of the three bends; and the last, that of Puebla, carried the main road over from the west into the basin. A partial explanation of this multitude of bridges is that there are mill-dams just below the bridge of Arriaga and at the very apex of the great loop of Tres Puentes, which make the water still and deep for fully half a mile above them. The bridges themselves, it may be observed, are no two of them alike, and for the most part, though unpretentious, of singular grace and beauty.

The basin itself, thus divided by the Zadorra, is of diversified character; the higher ground, which predominates, being mere moorland of gorse and heather, while the level is for the most part cultivated. The most marked features in it are a chain of semi-isolated knolls, which at the western end run across from the foot of the heights of Puebla to the river, and form, roughly speaking, two parallel ridges, the more westerly extending from the village of Subijana de Alava into the loop of Nanclares, and that next to eastward from the village of Gomecha into the loop of Tres Puentes. The largest and most conspicuous of these knolls lies just to north of the village of Ariñez (by which name I shall call it), and is famous for the heroic exploit of Sir Thomas Felton, who perished there with his hundred men, fighting to the very last, in 1397. It is covered by low scrub, is exceedingly steep on its western

1813. face, and rises some three hundred feet above the river.
June 20. North-westward from it the ground ascends more gradually into a hill which fills the loop of Tres Puentes, the summit ending in a sheer precipice over three hundred feet above the stream.¹ This eminence I shall, for reasons which will presently appear, call Barnard's Hill. Eastward of this ridge the country to south of the river rolls in gentle undulations to Vitoria; the next vantage-ground to eastward, and practically the last defensive position west of the city, being about the villages of Armentia and Zuazo.

It must be noticed that the waters so plentifully shown on the maps as running down from the Puebla heights to the Zadorra are the merest trickles, so slight as to form no obstacle at all. The villages, with which the basin is thickly sprinkled, are nearly all of them little more than hamlets. Ariñez, for instance, has not more than twenty houses; and, with the exception of Tres Puentes and Estarrona, the others are as small or even smaller. They have, however, gardens enclosed by stout though unmortared walls, two-thirds the height of a man, which afford good shelter. Of woodland there is comparatively little south of the Zadorra; though there was a wood to north-west of Subijana de Alava, another of considerable extent to west of Armentia, and a third to west of Ali. But on the north side of the river there is a very large belt of scrub passing round the whole of the loop of Tres Puentes; another patch by the bridge of Gobeo; and a third clothing the bank of the river farther up stream for about a mile to the village of Abechuco. Lastly, it must be remarked that all features in the basin are dwarfed by the ring of mountains which encloses it. The heights of Puebla are very lofty, rocky and steep, with a comb of crags at the summit. The Sierra de Morillas is still loftier and quite as rugged; and the low scrub evidently has to

¹ No maps, except possibly Wyld's, which is very vague, and no descriptions mention this precipice; but I verified its existence myself when visiting the field.

fight a desperate battle for existence. Indeed, where the spurs of this range abut upon the river round the apex of the loop of Tres Puentes, they end in a sheer face of bare rock which is very nearly a precipice. 1813.
June 20.

The ground was occupied by the French according to the following dispositions.

The Army of the South formed the first line ; the advanced guard—Maransin's brigade—occupying Subijana, with strong posts pushed out southward to the summit of the heights, and westward towards Puebla itself. Next to the right, or north of Maransin, stood Conroux's division on a knoll south of the road ; on Conroux's right was the first brigade of Darricau's division in first line, with the second brigade in rear ; and, on the right of Darricau, Leval's division occupied the hill within the loop of Nanclares. Each of these three divisions had one field-battery unlimbered in its front. Upon a slight eminence, in advance of the main position and to north of the road, a field-work had been thrown up for a mounted battery, which should sweep the road itself and the bridge of Nanclares. As a support to the whole, Villatte's division was posted upon the knoll of Ariñez with one field-battery in its front, and two batteries of the reserve, which had been brought forward from Vitoria, in the same line with it behind the village. Soult's division of light cavalry was likewise about Ariñez ; Tilly's division of dragoons was at Ali, and Digeon's at Arriaga, these last two sharing between them a battery of horse-artillery. The whole numbered some twenty-two thousand bayonets and four thousand sabres, with fifty guns.

The Army of the Centre occupied the height immediately in front, that is to say to west, of the village of Gomecha ; Darmagnac's division being to north and Cassagne's to south of the road, each with a battery before it ; while Joseph's Spanish brigade, with two guns, was detached upon the road that leads northward from Vitoria to Salinas. Treilhard's dragoons and Avy's light horse were in rear. This

1813. army numbered from eight to ten thousand bayonets
June 20. and about a thousand sabres, with fourteen guns.

The mass of the Army of Portugal was drawn up to the right rear of that of the Centre, on a level with the village of Zuazo; the cavalry occupying the villages from Gobeo to Margarita, while detachments watched every bridge and every ford, as well as the ground to north of the river. Lamartinière's division was on the left before the village of Armentia; Maucune's on the right of it; and Sarrut's on the right again. One battery of horse-artillery was unlimbered on the plateau of Zuazo; each of the three divisions had a field-battery before it; and the reserve—twenty-five guns—was parked in rear of Vitoria, together with the reserve artillery of the rest of the army, that of Gazan excepted. Reille's command numbered about eleven thousand bayonets and twelve to thirteen hundred sabres, with forty-two guns.

Joseph's whole army, therefore, may be set down at about forty-three thousand infantry and six to seven thousand cavalry, with one hundred and fifty guns. The object of his dispositions is not very clear. On the hypothesis that the Allies were advancing by the great road of Burgos, the successive positions of Subijana, Ariñez and Gomecha and Zuazo were well calculated to cover the evacuation of Vitoria and a retreat eastward, whether upon Pamplona or Zaragoza; but for any other purpose they were both futile and vicious. As we have seen, Joseph even on the 20th was still in doubt whether he should not retire into Navarre by Salvatierra, and there are circumstances which seem to indicate that he meant ultimately to adopt this course. On the 19th he sent away one huge convoy of useless vehicles and individuals towards the north; he had resolved to despatch a second at daybreak of the 21st: and it may be that he would have parked a huge mass of waggons and baggage, which lay in confusion about Vitoria, but for an unfortunate accident. He had arranged to go carefully over the whole position

of his army during the course of the 20th; but Jourdan, ^{1813.} having been seized by a violent attack of fever in the ^{June 20.} early morning, was unable to accompany him; and the reconnoissance, which might possibly have led to some wholesome decision, or at least to sound precautionary measures, was put off until the 21st. Jourdan, it is true, expected little from it; for the Allies, being in possession of the heights of Morillas, could see every motion of their enemy, while themselves free to make any movement that they pleased unseen under the concealment of that inaccessible barrier.

But the Marshal himself was in some degree the victim of a preconceived illusion. Looking to the line of the Allies' advance, to their strategy throughout the campaign, and to the studied mystery of their present position behind the mountains, he was prepossessed with the idea that Wellington would continue to threaten the French communications by shifting the mass of his troops either upon Bilbao itself, or at any rate upon Murguia, which commanded the road from Vitoria to that fortress. Under his inspiration, therefore, Reille pushed forward Menne's brigade of foot from the 4th division, together with a brigade of dragoons, along that road, with orders to penetrate to Murguia, some ten miles to north-east. But before this party had traversed more than half of that distance,¹ it was stopped by Longa's force; and after a desultory fusillade retired with a loss of nineteen men killed and wounded. Digeon, who had followed Menne to see things for himself, reported to Jourdan that Longa must assuredly be covering some important movement of the Allies; and the Marshal was rather confirmed than otherwise in his belief that Wellington must be marching upon Bilbao. In any case the course of the Zadorra was not properly reconnoitred; no effort was made to destroy any of the

¹ Digeon says three-quarters of a league; the chief of Reille's staff says a league and a half; and neither of them say whether they mean a Spanish league of 4 miles or a French league of 3.

1813. bridges, nor to survey the best fords,¹ nor to mount
June 20. artillery to defend them; and Digeon was fain to take charge of two bridges—apparently those of Arriaga and Gobeo—and of a portion of the course of the river, though he had received no orders to that effect. Late at night Gazan sent in to head-quarters a deserter, who affirmed that Wellington with a strong corps of troops was on the Bilbao road; and, combining this information with the reports sent in by Menne and Digeon, Joseph ordered Sarrut's division to cross the river by the bridge of Arriaga, and place itself astride of that road about Aranguiz.²

Wellington, as Jourdan rightly judged, was in no condition to attack on the 20th after the arduous marches of the preceding days, being more intent on closing up the rear of his columns. The Third and Seventh Divisions were brought across the Bayas; Giron was summoned to march from Orduña to Murguia as early as possible; and Graham was directed to occupy Murguia itself in force without delay, taking care to establish sure and expeditious means of communication between that place and the centre of the army. Dispositions were then made for attacking the enemy in four different columns.

The right column under Hill was to enter the basin of Vitoria through the pass of Puebla, the Spaniards under Morillo climbing the heights of Puebla, and advancing along the summit, while the remainder of Hill's command moved parallel to it by the great road.

The Right Centre column, consisting of the Light

¹ The reports of the French officers differ as to the condition of the river; one of them going so far as to say that it was fordable anywhere. Every fisherman knows that a mountain stream of the size and description of the Zadorra must be a succession of shallow rapids and deep pools, the former greatly preponderating, except where the water is held back by a mill-dam. Such a river may be said to be fordable anywhere, though it does not follow that the banks necessarily permit ready access to every shallow.

² *Arch. de la Guerre.* Reports of Digeon and of Chief of Staff and Commanding Engineer of Army of Portugal on the battle of Vitoria. *Mémoires sur la retraite des armées françaises en Espagne*, 1813.

and Fourth Divisions, with the Hussar brigade, the Household Cavalry, Ponsonby's brigade and D'Urban's Portuguese horse, under Cole, were to move by Subijana de Morillos and Montevite to Nanclares, and there await further orders. 1813.
June 20.

The Left Centre column, consisting of the Third and Seventh Divisions under Lord Dalhousie, was to approach the river by the roads leading to the bridges of Tres Puentes and Mendoza.

The Left column, consisting of Longa's guerillas, the First and Fifth British Divisions, Pack's and Bradford's infantry and the cavalry brigades of Bock and Anson, all under command of Graham, were to march along the direct road from Murguia to Vitoria. These two last columns were to preserve communication with each other, and to regulate their movements by those of the two columns on their right, but were to take any opportunity of turning the enemy's right flank.

The whole force counted about seventy-two thousand sabres and bayonets, of which rather over sixty thousand were British and Portuguese, and about eleven thousand, Giron's division not included, were Spaniards. They had with them ninety guns.

At one o'clock on the morning of the 21st of June Sarrut's division left Zuazo,¹ and at daybreak took up its position with the left brigade by the village of Aranguiz, and the right extended along the summit of the heights to east of it. A battery of artillery was unlimbered in front of the division, and one brigade of Curto's light cavalry was stationed on its left, with advanced parties pushed forward to the villages of Mendiguren and Foronda in the front. At three o'clock Maucune's division and four guns started to escort Joseph's second enormous convoy to Bayonne, thus June 21.

¹ Jourdan says that both the remaining infantry divisions of Reille's army crossed the Zadorra before the battle; but this is contradicted by the report of Reille's Chief of Staff and Chief Engineer.

1813. weakening the army by some four thousand men. An
June 21. hour or two later, in mist and dropping rain, Joseph accompanied by Jourdan began the reconnaissance which had been postponed from the previous day. They proceeded first to the position of Zuazo, which struck Jourdan as very favourable. Its flanks were protected by the mountains on the left and by the Zadorra on the right ; it was commanding without being too lofty ; it offered a field for the employment of every gun of the French artillery ; and it was in closer touch and better communication with Aranguiz than the position of Ariñez. Joseph was strongly disposed to bring Gazan's army back to this line, and to place d'Erlon's where it would link together the Armies of the South and Portugal. So far there was neither sign nor warning of an impending attack ; and the King actually sent an aide-de-camp to summon Gazan to a consultation, while he himself proceeded towards Margarita.

Here, however, he was met by a messenger from Gazan, reporting that since five o'clock he had observed a stir in the Allied camp—that the tents were struck and the troops in motion. The King galloped at once to Leval's division, verified the news with his own eyes, and saw that it was too late for any change of position. Towards eight o'clock Maransin's outposts sent word that the Allies had crossed the Zadorra at Puebla, and were advancing in two columns, the smaller of which was ascending the heights of Puebla, while the stronger was threading the defile by the great road. Presently a message came in from General Avy, who was reconnoitring with his light cavalry on the north of the river about Mendoza, to the effect that a strong column was advancing upon Tres Puentes, and that there were signs of yet another corps moving behind the wood upon Nanclares. No message had yet come in from Reille, though it was expected that he might be attacked at any moment. Jourdan had no great fear of the frontal attacks at Puebla and Nanclares ; but he dreaded the turning movements on the mountains to his left and

at Mendoza to his right. He therefore ordered Gazan ^{1813.} to transfer Maransin's whole brigade at once to the ^{June 21.} summit of the heights of Puebla, and to support this brigade with a division; and he directed d'Erlon to send Darmagnac's division and all the cavalry of the Army of the Centre to defend the passage of the river at Tres Puentes. At the same time five batteries of Reille's reserve artillery were summoned from Vitoria, two to be unlimbered on the plateau of Subijana, and three in rear of the hamlet of Ariñez.

It was apparently at about half-past eight¹ that Morillo's leading brigade turned off to its right after passing through the village of Puebla, and following a rugged winding track began the ascent of the heights of that name, while the remainder of Hill's column was massing itself on the main road. Advancing through dense scrub, Morillo's skirmishers reached the summit, and, on emerging upon the open ground, found themselves face to face with the French advanced posts. These after a sharp skirmish were driven back, but rallied on a more commanding peak farther to the eastward. It is clear that Joseph's orders to Maransin, to occupy the crest of the hill in force, were given too late, and that Morillo should never have been allowed to gain his advantage so easily. But the arrival of the rest of Maransin's brigade, the total strength of which was nearly three thousand men, restored the fight; and Hill sent the Seventy-first and the light companies of Walker's brigade to reinforce Morillo. The struggle now became keen. Morillo was wounded, but refused to quit the field; and Colonel Cadogan of the Seventy-first was almost immediately stricken to the death, but insisted upon being carried to the highest point of the ridge from which he could watch the progress of the battle. The French contested every inch of ground obstinately, and appear to have shown themselves

¹ Hope (*Military Memoirs*) gives the time as 9.45; but all the French accounts of the Army of Portugal say that they heard heavy firing at 9.

1813. superior as skirmishers to the British ; but they were
June 21. steadily driven back until they had passed the head
of a deep ravine which traverses the ridge from north
to south. There they lined the eastern side of this
ravine, and being gradually reinforced by one brigade
from Conroux's, and by St. Pol's brigade from Darricau's
division, which were moving to their assistance, stood
formidably at bay. The Allies now lay down, the
Spaniards on the left, and the Seventy-first above them
on the right, and exchanged a lively fire with the
enemy's skirmishers, neither side being as yet in strength
for further attacks or counter-attacks.

Meanwhile in every other part of the field all was
quiet. Reille so far had found nothing in his front ;
and the British troops which were massed about
Nanclares were peacefully halted, excepting one party,
which could be seen on its way to Villodas. The
truth was that Dalhousie's column was late, and that
Wellington was unwilling to order a general advance
until it had come up to its place. This apparent torpor
of the Allied Right and Right Centre puzzled the
French generals. Gazan, according to his own account,
considered the attack on the heights of Puebla to be a
false one, designed only to make Joseph weaken his right
and strengthen his left. Jourdan, on the other hand,
declared openly that Wellington's movements against
the French right were mere demonstrations, and that
the heights of Puebla must be retaken at any cost. The
Marshal's opinion prevailed with Joseph. Tilly's division
of dragoons and Cassagne's division of foot were directed
to Berrostegueta, high up on the spurs of the mountains
to south of Gomecha, upon the supposition that a column
of the Allies would come in by that quarter from the
side of Logroño ; and Villatte was ordered to leave the
knoll of Ariñez, lead his division up the heights by the
village of Zumelzu, and then, turning westward along
the crest, to carry everything before him.

During this time the ground already won had enabled
Hill to pass his main body over the Zadorra by the

bridge of Puebla, and through the defile by which the ^{1813.} main road debouches into the basin of Vitoria ; and he ^{June 21.} now sent Callaghan's brigade forward against Subijana, while detaching the Fiftieth and Ninety-second Highlanders to the help of the Seventy-first. These two regiments accordingly ascended the hill and, after some delay through contradictory instructions, were finally sent forward, the Fiftieth to the summit and the Ninety-second along the northern slopes, against a couple of battalions which had been posted to preserve communication between the French troops in Subijana itself and those on the hill. As the Fiftieth was coming up, the officer who had succeeded Cadogan in command rashly ordered four companies of the Seventy-first to cross the ravine, and the remainder of the battalion to move round its head and ensconce themselves in some rocky ground on the other side of it. Apparently a large body of French on the hill beyond the chasm was mistaken for Spaniards, being dressed in great-coats with white covers to their hats ; but be that as it may, the enemy's commander astutely withdrew these troops out of sight of the Seventy-first until the latter had fairly emerged, alone and unsupported, on the open ground, when he suddenly closed in towards their rear and poured in such a succession of volleys as laid low some two hundred of the British. Taken utterly by surprise, for they had thought that they were moving towards friends, the Seventy-first broke and ran down the furzy hill with the French hard at their heels. Happily the Fiftieth coming up into position covered their retirement as they scrambled up the opposite slope ; and the Ninety-second, having seen their appointed adversaries retire to a height farther eastward, came hastening up to the left of the Fiftieth. Thereupon the two regiments with a couple of rapid volleys drove back the pursuing enemy, and gave the Seventy-first time to escape and to re-form.

While this was going forward O'Callaghan's brigade advanced to the village of Subijana under a heavy but

1813. not destructive cannonade, and actually found the
June 21. buildings and gardens unoccupied.¹ The adjacent ravines and woods were, however, full of French troops, and O'Callaghan's brigade made little progress, the French being decidedly the better fighters in this broken and difficult country. The combat wavered backwards and forwards, the principal contest being in the wood below the village; and both parties alternately gained and lost ground, though the British appear to have suffered more heavily than their adversaries. After a time the head of Villatte's division appeared on the upper slopes of the heights of Puebla, and descended the ravine to make a counter-attack. Colonel Cameron of the Ninety-second, who had now taken Cadogan's place, sent down a few skirmishers to harass them as they ascended the steep incline, but made the rest of his three battalions sit down at the edge of the summit with their muskets sloping to the rear, until the right moment should come. When the French were within thirty paces, the red-coats sprang to their feet, poured in a terrific fire, and drove their assailants down to the bottom. After a pause another French column of attack was formed, with a great parade of heavy supports in its rear; but signs of hesitation were visible among the men as they advanced, and, after a half-hearted semblance of assault, the whole fell back. There was indeed every reason why they should do so.

It was apparently just before noon that the Light Division and the Hussar brigade under the personal guidance of Wellington himself took post within two hundred yards of Villodas; their march and their halting-place being alike concealed by the scrub on the lower slopes of the Sierra de Morillas. Cole's column was in its place behind Nanclares, and Picton's division at Mendoza, but the Seventh Division was only in part

¹ So says Sherer of the 34th, and I know no reason why he should lie about it. Possibly Gazan, being short of troops, preferred to keep his men in more advantageous positions.

present, for its second British brigade and its Portuguese ^{1813.} brigades had lost their way in their march over the ^{June 21.} mountains. Wellington waited impatiently for Dalhousie ; and presently a small party of French voltigeurs crossed the bridge and opened a skirmishing fire. They were promptly driven back by the riflemen ; and the two parties then engaged in a duel of sharp-shooters across the river. Shortly afterwards a Spanish peasant presented himself with the news that the bridge of Tres Puentes was unguarded, and offered to lead the British troops to it. Kempt's brigade was set in motion at once, the first battalion of the Ninety-fifth under Colonel Barnard leading, and proceeded at a rapid pace along a rugged path, which was sheltered by rocks from the view of the enemy. Arrived at the bridge the brigade doubled rapidly across it, ascended the hill for a short distance, and came in sight of Joseph surrounded by troops—evidently Darmagnac's division, which had been shifted from the knoll of Tres Puentes—on the summit of the heights of Ariñez. Only two cannon-shots were fired at Kempt's men as they crossed the river, one of which killed the unfortunate peasant who had acted as guide ; and then the brigade was left actually in occupation of part of the French position, hidden in a hollow of ground, unobserved and unmolested.

Kempt, unable to understand the situation, which was indeed sufficiently curious, sent for the Fifteenth Hussars, which galloped across the bridge in single file, apparently without opposition of any kind, and dismounted in rear of the Light Infantry. But d'Erlon, mistrusting Joseph's dispositions, had himself accompanied Cassagne's division to take care that it should not be moved too far away, and had kept Avy with his cavalry on the north side of the river to watch the country beyond Mendoza. It was a party of Avy's horse, seemingly, which presently rode slowly down towards Kempt's brigade, and being saluted with a shot or two retired instantly. D'Erlon,

1813. meanwhile, having heard from a prisoner that there
June 21. was nothing but detachments on the south side of the Puebla hills, halted Cassagne's division ; and, presently learning from Avy not only that a party of the Allies had passed the river at Tres Puentes, but that other columns were preparing to cross it lower down, he flew at once to the threatened point. By a singular irony Joseph was just about to order Darmagnac and Cassagne to make a counter-attack upon Hill's troops between the heights of Puebla and the Zadorra, when he was staggered to find that the Army of the Centre was itself dangerously menaced.

Seeing that Hill was in possession of Subijana di Alava, Wellington gave the order for the Third and Fourth Divisions to cross the river ; and Picton at once led his men down to the bridge of Mendoza. Some squadrons of the enemy's dragoons and a number of sharp-shooters came down to defend the passage, and the French battery over against Tres Puentes opened fire ; whereupon Colonel Barnard, issuing from his hiding-place with some companies of riflemen, ran up the bank of the river and, heedless of the enemy's horse, poured so sharp a fusillade upon the French gunners that they were fain to limber up and retire in haste. Picton's leading brigade then doubled across the bridge and formed contiguous columns on the south bank, while the rear brigade, Colville's, forded the river higher up the stream. Dalhousie's column, which had at last arrived at Mendoza, prepared to follow them ; and the Fourth Division likewise passed the bridge of Nanclares, practically unresisted. Jourdan, in fact, perceiving that the line of the river was hopelessly lost, had given orders to Gazan to draw back Maransin's brigade, together with Villatte's, Conroux's and Darricau's divisions, slowly from position to position as far as the heights of Zuazo ; and Gazan had no sooner written the necessary instructions in detail than he galloped off with all speed to the knoll of Ariñez, and summoned Leval to join him there from the loop

of Nanclares. D'Erlon also led Darmagnac's and Cassagne's divisions to Margarita, in echelon to the right rear of Gazan. In fact, the rest of the fight was to be a rear-guard action; and as a first step it was imperatively necessary to hold the knoll of Ariñez stoutly, so as to ensure the retreat of the left wing to Zuazo. The number of batteries massed together about Ariñez—from fifty to sixty guns¹—gave the French generals some hope that they might escape without great loss; but just at this moment a cloud of light smoke and a faint sound of cannon told Wellington that Graham had, on his own initiative, opened his attack on the Allied left; and the British Commander-in-Chief could look forward with good hope to the issue of the battle.

It will be convenient first to follow the troops under Wellington's immediate command. Dalhousie's division and Colville's brigade at once engaged d'Erlon about Margarita and Lermanda; and Wellington in person led Picton with Kempt's and Brisbane's brigades at a running pace against the northern slope of the knoll of Ariñez. Leval's division was not yet in position, but Gazan had kept one regiment of it in the village from the first, and Picton's attack was met at once by a cloud of skirmishers. Under cover of these and of a tremendous fire of artillery, Leval made his dispositions for safe withdrawal rather than for defence, leaving Mocquery's brigade to hold the upper part of Ariñez, and stationing Rémond's, with a proportion of guns, at the defile in rear of it. Having only one road, the great road, by which guns could advance, Dickson also had nearly the whole of the Allied artillery under his hand, and could concentrate an answering fire upon the French batteries, so that the cannonade upon both sides was of unusual intensity. Barnard's riflemen were the

¹ From the report of General Tirlet it appears that there were five batteries of the reserve, the divisional batteries of Leval and Cassagne, and one if not two batteries of horse-artillery on and about the hill of Ariñez.

1813. first to ascend the hill and gradually drove back the
June 21. enemy's skirmishers, till they were stopped on the declivity just to north of the village by a line of French infantry behind a wall, and by a tempest of grape and round shot.

Though Picton "in a blue coat and round hat"¹ was at the head of Brisbane's brigade, swearing with the strength of fifty devils, Wellington had followed the riflemen in person in order to observe the enemy's dispositions for retirement; and it was he who halted and re-formed the Eighty-eighth and Seventy-fourth before allowing them to proceed, and then launched them to the storm of the village.² The French made a desperate resistance among the houses and gardens, in order to secure the retreat of the main body and artillery, but were ultimately driven out, not without heavy loss to the assailants. The mounted battery, which had been posted in the earth-work by the great road at the outset of the action, here found its retreat blocked by the retiring infantry, and lost three of its pieces.³ The French then turned their cannon upon the village, and their infantry made a gallant rush to recapture these trophies, but were obliged to abandon them, the traces having been cut and the drivers and horses shot down. At the defile, again, the British skirmishers, and seemingly some of the hussars also, outflanked the enemy's guns and shot down or sabred the gunners, while Ross's troop of horse-artillery played upon the infantry. But the first line of the French artillery about Ariñez had already been withdrawn to Gomecha and there unlimbered; and under cover of their fire and of his skirmishers,

¹ Picton suffered from weakness in the eyes, and wore a round hat (that is to say a "chimney-pot") with rather a broad brim to shade them.

² *Wellington Desp.* To Picton, 16th July. The blanks should be filled in with the number 88th. As Picton's suspicions of the misbehaviour of the regiment seem to have been groundless, I can see no indiscretion in lifting this scrap of a veil.

³ Tirlet says one gun; Kincaid and Leach say three.

both mounted and afoot, Leval made shift to carry off ^{1813.} most, if not all, of the pieces of the first line, together ^{June 21.} with his infantry, to the same point. Here he rallied his men on the north flank of Gazan, who was already in position about Zuazo.

At about the same time d'Erlon, after holding out for an hour, was likewise compelled to fall back. It should seem that at the outset Colville's brigade was left unsupported in this quarter and suffered considerably in holding its own against d'Erlon's entire force. What Dalhousie was about at this time is not very clear.¹ His division, having crossed by the same bridge as Brisbane's brigade, would of course be a little later in coming into action; but his leading brigade, which he described as supporting Picton's attack on Ariñez, appears not to have come under fire at all, though his second brigade was on Colville's right, with Power's Portuguese of the Third Division upon its own right. It seems, however, that when d'Erlon, seeing his left uncovered by Leval's retreat, was preparing to withdraw likewise, Dalhousie was still debating with the chief of his staff as to what should be done. At this moment Harry Smith, brigade-major of Vandeleur's brigade of the Light Division, which had been detached in support of the Seventh Division, galloped up and asked for orders, and catching the words "better take the village" as they dropped from Dalhousie's lips in discussion, clapped spurs to his horse and was gone. In a few minutes the Second battalion of the Rifles swarmed out as a cloud of skirmishers upon Margarita, followed by the Fifty-second in line, with Dalhousie's second brigade in support. The village was instantly

¹ The authority for what follows is Harry Smith (*Autobiography*, i. 97-98). Sir Harry was not averse from blowing his own trumpet, but I believe his account to be true for the following reasons: (i.) The village of Margarita was certainly carried by Vandeleur's brigade of the Light Division; (ii.) the 1st brigade of the Seventh had not a single casualty. We know that this latter brigade had come up in good time (*Dickson MSS.* p. 926), so that it must have been doing nothing.

1813. stormed with no great loss to the British,¹ and Gough
June 21. at the head of the Eighty-seventh shortly afterwards
broke into Lermenda. D'Erlon, however, brought
away the bulk of his troops to the right of Gazan's
new position about Zuazo, where he posted Darmagnac's
division on the north of that village, and extended
Cassagne's from thence to Crispijana, with Treilhard's
and Avy's dragoons behind a wood in its rear. Hill
also had been forging slowly but steadily ahead through-
out this time, the ground between his force and Picton's
division being filled on his immediate left by the
cavalry and the Fourth Division. But the struggle
had been sharp at every point of the field ; the ground
was broken and difficult everywhere ; and the enemy,
though their retreat had not at every point been
orderly, had succeeded in taking up the new line from
Gomecha through Armentia and Zuazo to Crispijana,
their front being covered by about a hundred guns.

To turn now to the Allied left, Graham began his
attack, before receiving any orders from Wellington,
at two o'clock. He had not, however, been wholly
unobserved ; for at noon Digeon with an officer of
Joseph's staff rode out to Sarrut's position, noticed two
strong columns of infantry and one, half-concealed, of
cavalry to east of the other two, and hastened back to
send a regiment of dragoons to the bridge of Gamarra
and to warn Reille. The latter general, however, had
already taken the alarm and had brought Lamartinière's
division up to the bridge of Gamarra. Meanwhile
Sarrut, outnumbered and outflanked, had fallen back
slowly from Aranguiz towards the bridge of Arriaga ;
wherefore Graham detached Longa to his left upon
Gamarra Menor and upon Durana, the bridge of which
was defended by a brigade of Joseph's Spaniards. These
appear to have given way at once, being probably not
very alert to fight their own countrymen, and it is not

¹ Harry Smith says that 12 guns were captured ; but neither
Moorsom, Cope nor Napier confirm the fact ; so, though Sir
Harry's narrative is circumstantial, I doubt the truth of this detail.

easy to see why Longa did not at once pass the river ^{1813.} and come down upon Reille's right flank at the bridge ^{June 21.} of Gamarra. He remained, however, motionless ; and Reille, having sent a brigade of Curto's light horse to support the discomfited Franco-Spaniards at Betoño, made the following dispositions. Menne's brigade, the 2nd of Sarrut's division, was posted at the hamlet of Abechuco and the heights beside it to defend the bridge of Arriaga and the approaches thereto ; Lamartinière's division was drawn up about Gamarra Mayor to perform the same function for that bridge ; and Sarrut's 1st brigade under Fririon was stationed midway between the two bridges on the north side of the river, to form a reserve to both. Digeon's division of dragoons was placed in rear of the village of Arriaga ; Mermet's in rear of Gamarra Mayor ; and Curto's remaining brigade was sent down the river to watch the banks from Arriaga to Gobeo.

General Oswald, who was in charge of the Fifth Division, Pack's Portuguese and Anson's cavalry, then brought up two guns before Gamarra Mayor and launched Robinson's brigade at the village with the bayonet, in three columns, each of a battalion. They were received by such a blast of grape and musketry, Reille having posted a battery to enfilade the approaches, that they stopped to return the fire. The columns became intermixed and there was some confusion ; but, inspired by the example of Robinson and their officers, they returned to the attack, swept the French out of the village, and actually crossed the bridge, capturing a gun. But Reille now turned a second battery on to them ; while Lamartinière rallied his battalions under cover of their fire, and by a desperate effort retook the bridge and swept the British back into the houses. Indeed the French claim to have recaptured the village also, and may have recaptured a part of it. In any case, it is certain that there was very severe fighting at this point, for a French officer has recorded that the contending parties charged and counter-charged each other seven times.

1813. Oswald now sent down Hay's brigade to relieve
June 21. Robinson's, which had suffered heavily; the Royal Scots leading, followed by the Thirty-eighth and the Ninth. For the second time the village and bridge were carried; and for the second time the bridge was gallantly recovered by the French. So far, however, as casualties can be a guide to conduct, it should seem that the leading British battalion was for some time unsupported by the two rear battalions, whose loss was not by one-third as heavy as that of the Royal Scots. Graham meanwhile had brought up two batteries before Abechuco which, being on the main road, was more easily accessible to guns than Gamarra; and with this to prepare the way for them, Colin Halkett's two light German battalions stormed the tiny hamlet with little delay or loss, and captured four guns. There, however, their success came to an end. The bridge of Arriaga was nearly half a mile from Abechuco, and it does not appear that any serious attempt was made to carry it, for the casualties of the whole of the First Division, including Bradford's Portuguese, did not amount to one hundred killed and wounded. Be that as it may, it is certain that Graham's force was absolutely stopped by one-half—if Giron's Spaniards be included among his troops, then by one-third—of their numbers.

During this time Wellington's centre and right continued to move forward, not without heavy losses from the French artillery in its new position, but with little serious opposition from formed infantry. Above all, Villatte's division on the heights of Puebla seems to have offered no such resistance as it ought, possibly because it had a good view of the confusion below. Gazan also appears to have made no stand with his infantry about Zuazo, though d'Erlon held Crispijana and his end of the line firmly enough. Gazan said that he abandoned the position on receiving the order to retreat; Jourdan declared that he gave the order to retreat when he saw Gazan abandon the position and d'Erlon's left flank exposed. At all

events, at about five o'clock Joseph issued commands ^{1813.} to all the generals to fall back on Vitoria, and take the ^{June 21.} road to Salvatierra, sending General Tirlet in all haste to look to the withdrawal of the park.

D'Erlon accordingly retired as he had been bidden ; and the Seventh Division, at once advancing, drove back Curto's second brigade from Gobeo upon Sarrut's left flank. "What are we to do?" said poor Sarrut in despair, looking at the masses of Graham's infantry preparing to attack the bridge of Arriaga ; "the enemy is going to turn our left. Look at our cavalry coming back." "Hold the bridge," answered Digeon ; "I'll support you to the last extremity. The Armies of the Centre and South will certainly join us and cover Vitoria"; and, having ordered his second brigade at once to Sarrut's left, he sent an aide-de-camp flying into Vitoria to say that one fresh division and twelve guns would restore the fortunes of the day. But no such help could be forthcoming. The main French army had made a final stand along the line of Armentia and Ali, where the terrific fire of their musketry and artillery brought the Third Division fairly to a standstill before the village of Ali. Gazan, so far, had lost only four of his guns and, still hoping to make an orderly retreat, had begun to draw off his battalions and batteries in succession, beginning with Leval's division. This movement seems to have unsteadied the troops on the left of the French line. The Fourth Division coming up abreast and to right of the Third stormed a hill on their front and drove the enemy in confusion from it. The French who were descending from the mountains swerved back to the ascent again, much harassed by the British skirmishers, and the last line of defence was broken.

Meanwhile the British hussars had poured through the gap, left by the withdrawal of d'Erlon, between the river and Ali, and with the whole of the Seventh Division in support, came full upon Sarrut's left flank. The gallant French general led his grenadiers to a final

1813. counter-attack on the bridge, and fell mortally wounded.
June 21. The 5th dragoons of Digeon's 2nd brigade thrice charged desperately to save the remnant of Sarrut's division; and Digeon himself charged at the head of the 12th to cover the flank of the 5th, but was stopped abruptly by infantry formed in square. The leading battalions of the First Division had by this time crossed the bridge of Arriaga, while those of the Fifth Division were making their way over the bridge of Gamarra. Reille was in desperate straits; but, using Fririon's regiments as a centre of resistance, he drew off his two divisions by succession of brigades under the shelter of Digeon's charges. The road being already filled with the Allied troops, he was obliged, as d'Erlon had been before him, to move over swampy ground, intersected with ditches, and to leave nearly the whole of his artillery behind him; but none the less he was able by noble and persistent effort to rally his shattered forces finally about Betoño.

It was then half-past seven o'clock. The British hussars had long since entered Vitoria, where at least one regiment, if not more, had dispersed itself to plunder and could not be collected. Others had passed on through all obstructions by the road to Pamplona in pursuit of the French columns. Anson's and Bock's brigades were making their way towards the same point, moving due east from the bridge of Gamarra; and the infantry was following them with all speed. Entering the large wood to east of Betoño, Reille traversed it in good order, though two British columns were hard at his heels and others passing round his flanks; and on emerging on the open ground he found before it a body of cavalry, which appears to have been the Fifteenth Hussars. Of what followed the details given by the two sides are conflicting. The Fifteenth claims to have charged a regiment of French dragoons and driven them back upon a body of some hundreds of infantry, who laid down their arms; but the Fifteenth had hardly time to recover its order before it was charged in turn

by a body of hussars and another of lancers, and, though 1813. these were overthrown, the French prisoners seized the June 21. opportunity to recover their arms and either to escape or to open fire. The French account (if indeed it describes the same incident) mentions a conflict of French hussars and dragoons with the Allied cavalry without any hint of the result, but adds that the Allies charged Fririon's brigade and were beaten off with heavy loss. There seems to have been a considerable strength of British horse of one kind and another in this part of the field, but there was no unity of purpose in its movements. Odd squadrons of several regiments were careering in all directions, without further guidance than that of their own leaders; their attacks were often ill-judged and always disconnected; and hence, though they suffered some loss, they failed altogether to do serious injury to the French rear-guard. Joseph's army consequently accomplished its retreat with comparatively small loss to Metanco, where darkness and the exhaustion of the Allies put an end for the time to the pursuit.

Meanwhile in Vitoria itself there had been and continued to be wild confusion. Some three thousand vehicles of one description and another, together with cattle, sheep and horses, were jammed in one seething mass in and about the town, filled with screaming women and cursing drivers, while a horde of followers, skulkers and marauders of all the armies in the field, scrambled among them for the booty.¹ Joseph himself, if we are to believe more than one narrative, had only just time to leave his carriage, jump on his horse and gallop away from the Eighteenth Hussars. Everything that belonged to him and a great many works of art, that he had intended to steal, were taken, together with the whole of his papers, including a mass of correspondence, military, civil, and amatory. Both documents and pictures are now at Apsley House. Jourdan's bâton was appropriated by a corporal of the Eighteenth, who

¹ The Commanding Engineer of the Army of Portugal reported that the French cavalry, while retiring, took part in the plunder.

1813. had only time to break off the gold ends before the rest
June 21. of the bauble was stolen from him by a drummer of the Eighty-seventh ; but both corporal and drummer appear to have restored their portions, and the bâton, having found its way to Wellington's hands, was by him sent to the Prince Regent, and is still to be seen in the Grand Entrance to Windsor Castle.

Little else of value found its way to the Commander-in-Chief or to the military chest of the army ; for the men were hungry, their pay was in arrear, and there were two million dollars in the French treasure-waggons, besides private hoards, to be had for the taking. There were officers, it must be regretfully recorded, as well as men who took a share in the plunder ; and altogether only one-twentieth part of the French treasure was secured for public purposes, though Wellington was, now as always, in great straits for specie. It was of course the followers and skulkers who for the most part, though not exclusively, took the lion's share of the pillage ; and such portions as came to the Spanish peasants may be held to have fallen into the right hands. There were, however, many regiments which took no part in the spoil. General Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry, for instance, passed by a heap of dollars scattered about the road, and not a man attempted to touch them ; whereupon the general left a sergeant-major behind who brought in as many of the coins as his horse could carry, thus enabling a distribution to be made of five dollars apiece to every one of the thirteen hundred men. In the night there was a regular fair, at which eight or nine dollars were offered for a guinea, the silver being too heavy to carry ; and beyond question there were men who acquired hundreds of pounds, with results to their discipline that shall be seen later on. The trophies actually gathered on the field amounted to one hundred and fifty-one guns¹ of all calibres, four hundred

¹ But Major Sherer of the 34th, who was left behind with a fatigue party, says that 174 guns were dragged into park, 90 of them field guns still foul with recent use. Some of the rest may have been cannon evacuated from Burgos. *Recollections of the Peninsula*, p. 331.

and fifty caissons, a hundred forge- and forage-waggon, 1813. and a vast quantity of ammunition. Only two guns and June 21. twenty-two vehicles succeeded in making their escape.¹

The actual loss of the French in men is difficult to ascertain. Jourdan states it, giving details of the numbers of officers and men killed, wounded and taken, at slightly over seven thousand²; and unfortunately the only casualty-lists that I have been able to discover in France are inexact or incomplete.³ It must, however, be noticed that Martinien's lists, which are themselves imperfect as regards the Franco-Spanish troops, show that the officers killed numbered thirty-eight, and the wounded one hundred and ninety-six; whereas Jourdan gives them respectively at thirty-one and one hundred and sixty-one. Nevertheless, even so, the French losses probably fell below eight thousand; and no individual regiment suffered nearly as much as some of the British battalions.

The total casualties of the Allies amounted to something over five thousand killed, wounded and missing of all ranks, the British casualties being more than double those of the Spanish and Portuguese jointly.⁴

¹ Yet d'Erlon writes of having 5 pieces on the 23rd; and Reille claimed to have saved 3 (which is contrary to Tirlet's report) of the Army of Portugal. Vidal de La Blache: *L'Évacuation de l'Espagne*, i. 65.

² *Killed*: 31 officers; 694 men. *Wounded*: 161 officers; 4170 men. *Prisoners*: 22 officers; 1882 men. Total—414 officers; 6746 men. Grand total: 7160 (incorrectly stated by Jourdan at 6960).

³ Those of the Army of Portugal include all losses from 27th May to 1st July; and those of the Army of the South, besides lacking any return of the artillery, include all losses from 20th to 28th June.

	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.	
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.
British . .	22	479	167	2640	...	266
Portuguese .	7	143	52	847	...	...
Spanish . .	4	85	11	453	...	...
	33	707	230	3940	...	266

1813. Taken as an isolated unit the Seventy-first suffered far
June 21. more heavily than any other, counting no fewer than fifteen officers and three hundred and one men killed and wounded ; but this was of course due to exceptional misfortune, for, of the two battalions brigaded with it, the Fiftieth had only one hundred and four and the Ninety-second only twenty casualties. Hill's second brigade also suffered much ; the Thirty-ninth losing two hundred and fifteen of all ranks, the Twenty-eighth two hundred, and the Thirty-fourth seventy-six. In Brisbane's brigade of the Third Division, which bore the brunt of the fighting, the Eighty-eighth had two hundred and fifteen, the Seventy-fourth eighty-three, and the Forty-fifth seventy-four of all ranks killed and wounded ; while in Colville's brigade, the fallen of the Eighty-seventh numbered one hundred and eighty-seven, of the Fifth one hundred and sixty-three, of the Eighty-third seventy-four, and of the Ninety-fourth sixty-six. In the Seventh Division, which supported the Third, the Eighty-sixth lost one hundred and twenty-five ; but the Fifty-first and Eighty-second of the same brigade had between them but sixty casualties. In the Fifth Division the Royal Scots lost one hundred and eleven of all ranks, the Fourth ninety-one, the Forty-seventh one hundred and twelve, and the Fifty-ninth one hundred and forty-five ; but the two remaining battalions escaped almost untouched. The Fourth Division had only just over one hundred and twenty casualties altogether, and the Light Division but very few more. The two brigades of Guards, Löw's brigade of Germans, Byng's brigade of Hill's division, and Barnes's of the Seventh Division never fired a shot. Among the cavalry the Fifteenth, Sixteenth and Eighteenth lost a few men unnecessarily from charging formed infantry, which they had better have left alone. To all intent, therefore, the French were driven off by two-thirds of Wellington's infantry ; and this raises the question whether due advantage were taken of the numerical superiority of the Allies and of the bad dispositions of the enemy.

The impression left upon my mind is that the results ^{1813.} of the day were very far from satisfactory. There can ^{June 21.} be no doubt that the delay in the arrival of Dalhousie's division, whether avoidable or otherwise, must have marred Wellington's plans ; but on the other hand such a stroke of luck as the unhindered passage of the Zadorra by Barnard's brigade and the Hussars went far to redeem this mishap. What seems more important is that, during the subsequent advance, the divisional generals appear never to have had their supports well in hand to maintain the firing line. The casualty-lists show clearly that the brunt of the work fell upon a very few battalions, which were often very hardly pressed ; and although Wellington's first rush for the hill of Ariñez and the inevitable delay in filing troops over narrow bridges may in part excuse this failing, it can hardly do so altogether. Indeed I find it difficult to understand why the shallow waters of the Zadorra were not forded far more often than was actually the case. But the great miscarriage of all was Graham's failure to force the passage of the river at his point of attack. It is true that both he and Wellington imagined Reille to have two more divisions than he had in fact, for they could not know that Maucune had marched with a convoy, and were unaware that Clausel had more than one division with him. But, even so, it is not clear why Graham confined his attempts to the bridges of Arriaga and Gamarra, when not only was the river fordable at other points, but the bridge of Durana was actually in the possession of Longa. He had with him fourteen thousand good British and Spanish infantry, twelve hundred good cavalry, Longa's guerillas, and Giron's Spaniards as a reserve ; and it appears amazing that he should have made no use of this bridge. Indeed, the obvious course that suggests itself to the critic in his arm-chair a century after the event is that Graham should have left Giron with one brigade of British to hold the bridges of Arriaga and Gamarra, and carried the rest of his force over the bridge of Durana against

1813. Reille's right flank and rear. If he had done so the
June 21. greatest part of Joseph's army must have been cut off,
and either taken or destroyed.

The apparent facility of such a proposition is perhaps sufficient to condemn it; but it must be noted that, even after the passage of the Zadorra had been won by the advance of the Light Division upon Sarrut's left flank, Graham's cavalry was not pushed forward with the vigour demanded by the occasion. The blame for this omission cannot be fastened upon Sir Thomas, who had other matters to attend to; and the failure in the handling of the cavalry on the British side seems to have arisen from the fact that it was organised in brigades only, without a single divisional commander. That the ground was generally unfavourable for the action of horse is clear from the admission of the French as well as of the British generals; but one has only to contrast the concentrated energy and activity of Digeon with the bewildered and spasmodic efforts of the British brigadiers and colonels, to decide that what was lacking on the side of the Allies was a leader of cavalry. Had Cotton been present, or had Bock been in supreme command of Anson's brigade as well as of his own, the story might have been very different. It may be added that Wellington's own habit of taking from time to time personal command of a division here or a division there, instead of looking to the whole army, may not have been without its influence, for evil as well as for good, upon the fortunes of the day.

It must be said that, considering the circumstances, the French in general, and Reille's troops in particular, fought most admirably. The French soldier's military instinct is quick and sure; and not a man in the field can have failed to realise almost from the first that the day had begun badly and was likely to go on worse. Very grave mistakes had been committed, most notably the omission to defend the bridge of Tres Puentes and to hold the heights of Puebla in force; but it seems

unjust to charge the whole of them upon Joseph. The Chief of the Staff must bear a heavy share of blame for the neglect to watch and to secure the passages of the river; and, though it may be urged that Joseph's irresolution made it difficult for his subordinates to arrange any definite dispositions, yet Jourdan must be held not a little responsible for that irresolution. It was his fixed idea that Wellington was bent upon manœuvring and not upon fighting; and his head was full of turning movements. Thus he could see nothing in Longa's occupation of Murguia but a screen to cover Wellington's march to the north; and, when Hill began his attack on the heights of Puebla, Jourdan's brain conjured up visions of a column of red-coats ascending these same heights five or six miles farther to the east from the direction of Logroño. To use Napoleon's phrase, "he made himself pictures," instead of observing what was before his eyes. It is fair to add that Jourdan blamed Gazan greatly, and seemingly with reason, for reinforcing the heights of Puebla piecemeal by single battalions and brigades instead of by whole divisions; but this fault, though grave, was small compared to the hideous blunder of denuding the knoll of Aríñez in order to meet an imaginary enemy. Not a French soldier in the field, I repeat, can have failed to mark these false movements and the infirmity of purpose which was manifested by them; yet the resistance offered to the Allies in every part of the field, and the skilful use made of Joseph's superiority in artillery at every point, show that neither officers nor men were flustered or discouraged. They fought a running fight well and resolutely over some twelve miles of difficult country, and though they lost everything, literally everything, from their heavy guns to their love-letters, they left few prisoners behind them, and retired from the field sore and humiliated indeed, but not disgraced.

Nevertheless, Vitoria must remain always one of the greatest victories of the British army, less because of

1813. the trophies that were gathered than because it was the
June 21. climax of a great campaign. The famous English historian of the war has declared that Wellington's success would have been impossible if Joseph had obeyed Napoleon's orders, and that the French King was to blame in that he did not delay the Allies for some days at least at the lines of the Carion and of the Pisuerga, nor neutralise the turning of the Ebro by keeping his army concentrated. Thereby, as I venture to think, Napier has missed the essential truth that Wellington's triumph in the Peninsula at large was one of organisation rather than of strategy and tactics. Joseph could neither halt nor concentrate, as has been suggested, because he was unable to feed his troops. Wellington's supplies were always hunting for his army ; Joseph's army was always hunting for its supplies ; and thus, whereas to the Allies a halt signified replenishment, to their opponents it spelt starvation. It is easy to say that Joseph might have collected victuals ; but, even if this doubtful assumption be granted, it leaves the difficulty of transporting them untouched. In fact, the whole of Napoleon's instructions are vitiated by the false postulates that an army can always live on the country, and that Spain, speaking generally one of the bleakest and barrenest of lands, could be treated as if it were the plain of Lombardy or the valley of the Danube.

Of the absurdity of the details of the Emperor's orders, issued hundreds of miles from the scene of action, enough has already been said ; but it must be repeated that his refusal to entrust to Joseph supreme authority, and his issue of orders directly to Joseph's subordinates—a practice in which he was imitated by Clarke—was one principal cause of the disasters of 1813. "He (Joseph)," writes Napier indignantly of the first days of that fatal year, "was not even acquainted with the true state of the northern provinces." It is difficult to see how he could have been, considering that Caffarelli steadily refused to report to

him ; and since Caffarelli, though recalled, remained ^{1813.} unrebuked, it was natural that his successor, Clausel, ^{June 21.} should have pursued the same methods. Between the 22nd of February, when he announced that he had assumed command, and the 4th of May Clausel sent only three letters to Joseph. One of these was undated ; two either complained of want of troops or contested the King's commands ; and not one said a word about his operations. Not until the 29th of May, when he had gathered practically all of the infantry of the Army of Portugal under his command, did he condescend to apologise for forgetting to report Barbot's disaster of the 31st of March, and to undertake the duty of revictualling Burgos.

And, as in the military, so in the civil administration, Napoleon deliberately set himself to thwart his brother. The Emperor, as we have seen, assigned certain districts to the support of each army, which arrangement was a fruitful source of discord between them ; for if, as was inevitable in the course of the operations, troops of one army were moved into the district of another, there were immediately loud complaints from some French general that the new-comers were consuming his resources. Joseph, in order to introduce some kind of method into this system, but chiefly no doubt to provide for his own treasury, had ordained that every commander of an army should present to him a monthly budget of revenue and expenditure ; but this arrangement was promptly cancelled by Napoleon in an order that the armies were to live entirely on their respective districts, and that the commanders were held responsible for their doing so. After this it was hopeless to think of checking the peculation of generals, or of putting the finance of the army upon an economical basis by sound administration.

Lastly, as a striking instance of the mischief of Napoleon's intervention, it must be recollected that, but for his stringent orders, Joseph would no doubt have fallen back from Vitoria upon Zaragoza, where, rallying

1813. to himself the forces not only of Clausel but also of Suchet, he would have assembled such a body of troops as might well have compelled Wellington to retreat once more to Portugal. Joseph was not a great man, nor was Jourdan in the highest rank of generals; but each was in his own province something more than respectable; and it cannot, I think, be doubted that, if they had been clothed with full authority and left to themselves, instead of being hampered with the Emperor's ill-timed instructions, they would at least have made a far better fight for the Peninsula, and in all probability might have saved the northern portion altogether.

CHAPTER VII

AT ten o'clock on the night of the 21st the head of the 1813. French army resumed the retreat towards Salvatierra, June 21. and at two on the morning of the 22nd the rear-guard June 22. was halted at Alegria. The march was continued a few hours later, and at Ciordia Jourdan halted the Army of the Centre, so as to let it relieve the Army of Portugal as rear-guard. Resting for the night at Alsasua, he resumed his march at five in the morning of the 23rd, June 23. breaking down the bridge behind him; and on arriving at Irurzun he ordered Reille to move northward with his troops to Tolosa, with the double object of joining Foy, who was presumed to have retired to that town, and of picking up Maucune's division and the troops dispersed along the lines of communication, so as to hold the defile of Tolosa against the Allies. Reille, however, represented so strongly that the Allies might have gained the pass before he could reach it, that Joseph revoked the order, and empowered him to march straight to Irun by way of Santesteban and Vera. The main body of the army continued its journey to Pamplona.

On the side of the Allies, the Spaniards of Giron June 22. and Longa, with two batteries of the reserve artillery, marched northward upon Mondragon in pursuit of Maucune. The heavy cavalry, D'Urban's Portuguese, Pakenham's division (which was coming in from Medina del Pomar), and the Fifth Division were left at Vitoria in case Clausel should appear, together with a small detachment from every British and Portuguese

1813. battalion to preserve order and gather in the trophies.
- June 22. Wellington with the rest of the army marched at ten o'clock by three routes upon Salvatierra in pursuit of Joseph.¹ In the course of the afternoon Wellington, at the suggestion of Sir George Murray, directed Graham with the First Division, Pack's and Bradford's Portuguese and Anson's brigade of light cavalry, to strike northward upon Villafranca, on the main road from Bayonne to Vitoria, in the hope of intercepting some of the French forces or convoys; but by some mistake the order miscarried, and in consequence the movement was delayed, with most unfortunate results, until the next day. On that night the main body bivouacked at Salvatierra, the advanced cavalry penetrating to Ciordia and regaining sight of the enemy
- June 23. though not actual contact with them. On the 23rd the leading horsemen having forded the Burunda with some difficulty above Alsasua, came up with the French rear-guard; and the French, being blocked in a defile beyond the village of Echarriaranaz, were overtaken by the first and third battalions of Rifles, together with Ross's battery, which force pressed them so hard that Jourdan was twice obliged to take up positions at Lacunza and
- June 24. Villanueva to hold the pursuers at bay. On the 24th the chase was resumed; and Jourdan having a defile of ten or twelve miles before him, sent the cavalry forward to form at the far side of it, and appointed Darmagnac's division to be the rear-guard.

Before the French infantry were well in motion, the Rifles were seen crossing the Araguil by the bridge, which the French had no time to destroy; and Ross's guns, which no difficulty nor obstacle could check, unlimbered to play upon Darmagnac and the few French cannon which had escaped from Vitoria. Darmagnac,

¹ Right column. Hill's corps.

Centre column. V. Alten's, Ponsonby's, and Hussar brigades of cavalry, 3rd, 4th, 7th Light divisions of infantry.

Left column. Graham's corps.

however, conducted his retreat with coolness and skill 1813.
 until he reached Berrioplano, two or three miles from June 24.
 Pamplona, where, being very hard pressed, he unlimbered
 two pieces upon the great road. Victor Alten's dragoons
 at once galloped down upon them ; and one of the guns
 in the haste of retirement was upset over the wall of
 a causeway, a sheer drop of fifteen feet, and abandoned
 beyond hope of recovery to the British. In the evening
 the French army bivouacked on the plains of Pamplona
 in such a state of wretchedness and insubordination, so
 it is said, that the Governor would not admit them into
 the town ;¹ and on the 25th, under cover of the June 25.
 fortress, the retreat was continued, the Army of the
 Centre moving northward into the valley of Baztan,
 and that of the South north-eastward towards the Pass
 of Roncesvalles, under no further molestation than that
 of the Spanish bands. Though the weather had been
 miserable and the roads were consequently in a dreadful
 state, it does not appear that the French losses from
 the 22nd to the 24th were very heavy.²

The truth is that the late victory had for the time
 demoralised the British army. Thousands of the men
 had appropriated large sums of money by plunder ; and
 beginning (to use the words of one of them) "to look
 upon their life as of some value, were not over-anxious
 to go much to the front."³ Thousands more, falling
 in with the French supplies after many days of priva-
 tion, had so gorged themselves and loaded their

¹ I know not on what authority Napier states that the magazines in Pamplona were reduced very low. Jourdan says that the supply both of victuals and of ammunition was lower than it ought to have been, but Clausel averred that on the 15th of June he had brought into the fortress 350 waggon-loads of victuals, making up its supplies to 3 months' bread and flour. *Arch. de la Guerre*. To Clarke, 15th June 1813 ; Jourdan to same, 26th June 1813.

² The details on the French side in the foregoing paragraph are taken from Jourdan's letter to Clarke, 1st July 1813. *Arch. de la Guerre*.

³ Costello, p. 163. Yet Costello was not a bad soldier, for he had been of the forlorn hope both at Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz.

1813. haversacks that they were hardly able to move.¹
June 22. Wellington of course was furious. "We started," he wrote, "with the army in the highest order, and up to the very day of the battle nothing could get on better, but that event has, as usual, annihilated all order and discipline. . . . The soldiers of the army have got among them about a million sterling in money. . . . The night of the battle, instead of being passed in getting rest and food to prepare for the pursuit of the following days, was passed by the soldiers in looking for plunder. The consequence was that they were . . . totally knocked up . . . I am quite convinced that we have now out of the ranks double the amount of the loss in the battle, and that we have lost more men in the pursuit than the enemy have. . . ." The detachments left at Vitoria to preserve order and collect the wounded also behaved outrageously. "It is quite impossible" Wellington continued, "for me or any other man to command a British army under the existing circumstances. We have in the service the scum of the earth as common soldiers; and of late years we have been doing everything in our power both by law and publications to relax the discipline by which alone such men can be kept in order. The officers of the lower ranks will not perform the duty required of them for the purpose of keeping their soldiers in order; and it is next to impossible to punish any officer for neglects of this description."²

It may be guessed, therefore, that the Commander-in-Chief was not in the best of tempers during this pursuit; and most unfortunately he visited his wrath, which should have been turned against the House of Commons and William Cobbett, upon one of his best officers. As we have seen, the instructions for Graham to turn northward had gone astray, with the result that a part of his column, for want of orders, overshot the turning for the pass of San Adrian, and continued to

¹ *Autobiography of Sir Harry Smith*, i. 102.

² *Wellington Desp.* To Bathurst, 29th June, 2nd July 1813.

march with the main body. Observing this, Wellington ^{1813.} halted Norman Ramsay's troop of artillery, and told ^{June 22.} him that he was not to move without further instructions from himself. In the confusion that followed the miscarriage of the original directions to Graham, some staff-officer or general directed Ramsay to move on, which he did. Wellington had anticipated that some such unauthorised command would be given to Ramsay, and came up in person to the troop when Ramsay had ridden ahead to look for his way. Very angry at finding his express orders disobeyed, and Graham's march in consequence retarded, he treated the incident as only one more instance of the prevalent indiscipline, and left word for Ramsay to be placed under immediate arrest. The unhappy captain was almost broken-hearted; and it speaks volumes for his merit that more than one officer braved the Commander-in-Chief's displeasure to intercede for him. In fact it was in response to a letter from Colonel Frederick Ponsonby that Wellington three weeks later restored Ramsay to the command of his troop. But, in spite of all possible pressure from the whole of the Royal Regiment at home and abroad, he refused to recommend the unlucky man for promotion on account of his services at Vitoria; and Ramsay took the whole affair so much to heart that he never quite recovered his spirits. The incident would be hardly worth mentioning, were it not that the delay in Graham's departure, to which Ramsay had innocently contributed, had very important consequences, which Wellington evidently foresaw. "Captain Ramsay disobeyed a positive order given him verbally by me in expectation of a circumstance which occurred, namely that he would receive orders from somebody else to move, as I did not wish him to move."¹ Such was his version of the affair; and he would listen to no explanation. It is, however, certain that the whole army considered that Ramsay, an

¹ Minute inscribed on Col. F. Ponsonby's letter, 13th July 1813. *Wellington MSS.*

1813. excellent officer, had been treated, if not with injustice, at any rate with undue severity.¹

June 23. Graham's column, having been at length disentangled very late on the 23rd, began its march over the mountains to the pass of San Adrian. "Such a march I never saw," wrote James Stanhope, who took part in it. "The road we marched by was old *pavé*, totally broken up, worse and steeper than any stairs. Our men had not reached their ground before midnight the night before, and torrents kept falling night and day." The ground was so slippery that the men could hardly move, nor could the horses keep their footing. On the summit the road passed through a natural cavern or tunnel, some eighty yards in length; and here a great part of the troops bivouacked, too thoroughly fatigued to go any further.

Meanwhile Foy, of whom Graham was in search, had passed through two exceptionally trying days. On the evening of the 21st Maucune's convoy had reached Mondragon from Vitoria, and had continued
June 22. its journey at dawn of the 22nd; but, as the head of the long train was entering Vergara, the rear-guard was overtaken by fugitives, crying aloud that the King had been defeated and that the enemy was upon them. Three of the French garrisons on the road had abandoned their posts in panic, after spiking the guns and destroying the ammunition; and the whole came marching hastily into Vergara. Foy begged Maucune to hurry his monstrous convoy forward and return with

¹ There is an elaborate defence of Ramsay in Duncan's *History of the Royal Artillery*, where, however, nothing is said of the circumstances. Tomkinson also alludes to the incident and appears to lay the blame on Anson, but mentions the general confusion from want of orders. Henegan, ii. 23-24, professes to have met Ramsay a few days after the battle, and to have heard General Vandeleur inform him of his release from arrest, which story is effectively disposed of by dates. Samuel Lover gives yet another version of the tale in *Handy Andy*. Norman Ramsay must have been a remarkable personality to become thus almost a centre of legend; but something must be allowed for the general animosity of the Artillery against Wellington.

his troops as speedily as possible ; and then, rallying 1813.
the retreating garrisons, he marched with them and June 22.
two of his own battalions upon Mondragon. Here he met the Spaniards of Longa and Giron, whom, though greatly superior to him in numbers, he made shift to check for a time, while he sent orders to hurry the garrisons of Bilbao, Durango, and El Orrio to Vergara. Gradually the French were pushed back ; but, being reinforced by three more battalions, Foy succeeded in stopping the advance of the Spaniards two miles in rear of Mondragon. The day's fighting had cost him two hundred and fifty killed, wounded, and prisoners ; but he had gained at any rate pretty accurate knowledge of the result of the great battle, of the line of Joseph's retreat, and of the movements of the Allies.

On the 23rd, as none of the outlying garrisons had June 23.
come in, Foy again advanced to Mondragon, and found that the Spaniards had not yet come forward, but had prolonged their right eastward to Ouate as if expecting the arrival of a parallel column by the pass of San Adrian. He therefore instructed Maucune to throw his convoy into Tolosa, march his division to Villafranca, and push one brigade forward, that is to say southward, to Segura. Towards noon the outlying garrisons came in, five thousand strong, with their artillery, and were sent eastward towards Villareal ; and in the night news came to Foy that a column of the Allies, which we know to have been Graham's, had crossed the pass of San Adrian, evidently making for Béazain in order to cut off his retreat. Without losing a moment Foy set his troops in motion at three o'clock in the morning of the 24th. Anson's cavalry, meanwhile, June 24.
had entered Segura before daylight, but remained there halted for three hours until the infantry could come up, when Graham advanced with his two Portuguese brigades and the light battalions of the German Legion upon Béazain. Foy's soldiers could be seen in the distance filing eastward, but Maucune's division stood in the way strongly posted ; and the first attack of

1813. Bradford's Portuguese, which appears to have been
June 24. carelessly delivered, was repulsed with some loss. Working, however, towards Maucune's right flank, Bradford induced him to weaken his centre; and Halkett's Germans, advancing by the main road, stormed the village of Béazain. But Foy's reserve of two brigades had already taken up a new position before Villafranca; and, while Graham's columns were moving round to turn this also, Maucune quietly withdrew from Villafranca. Night put an end to the combat, Graham halting at Villafranca, and Maucune at Alegria, while Foy took up a strong position about Tolosa. The loss of the Allies did not exceed ninety-three killed and wounded, whereas that of the French amounted to two hundred. Detached bodies of Spaniards, probably guerilla-bands, also attacked Foy's rear-guard on the main road, and were not beaten off without the loss of eighty to one hundred of Palombini's Italians.

On the evening of the 24th the whole of Graham's corps was at Villafranca, to which place the heads of Longa's and Giron's columns also closed up before nightfall. Foy, meanwhile, had picked up at Tolosa three complete battalions,¹ and detachments equal to another, belonging to the Army of the North. Soon
June 25. after dawn of the 25th Maucune was compelled by Graham's advance to fall back from Alegria to Tolosa, which Foy, having still some hope that Joseph might have turned northward from Irurzun, resolved to hold till the last minute. Foy's position being unassailable in front, Graham detached Longa to turn his left by Alzo and Lizarza, and asked Mendizabal, who was lying at Azpeitia, to advance some battalions to turn his right. In so rugged a country these movements took long to execute; and it was not until six in the evening that Graham could launch his main body in two columns to

¹ 1 batt., 22nd Line; 2 batts., 64th Line; det. of 34th Line from Vandermaesen's division; dets. of 1st Line from Abbé's division.

the assault of Tolosa. Two French brigades were very nearly cut off by this movement, but, being covered by the fire from the town, managed with some difficulty to retire without entering it. The place was enclosed by a wall, which was loopholed; and the gates, being barricaded, could only be blown open by cannon. Consequently the fight for about half an hour was exceedingly hot. At one moment indeed there was some little disorder, for, the Spaniards being slow in coming to the attack, Graham sent on the first German battalion, which was much maltreated and driven back. Graham himself, receiving a severe contusion, was obliged to leave the field. But, the gates once forced, the enemy was quickly driven out and, but for the darkness, which prevented the distinction of friends from foes, would have suffered severely. The loss of the Allies, on whose side no British troops were engaged, amounted to four hundred and twenty killed, wounded, and missing, evenly distributed between the two light battalions of the Germans—one of which was rather heavily punished—and two brigades of Portuguese. Foy admitted a loss of four hundred; but, as the Spaniards captured two hundred prisoners, this is probably an understatement.¹ However, he accomplished his retreat in safety, and during the night took up a fresh position about six miles to the north at Andoain.²

Graham now ceased the pursuit, not, as he informed Wellington, because he saw any danger in pressing it, but because his troops were thoroughly exhausted; and the Spaniards alone continued the forward movement to

¹ Foy, though a most gallant and able soldier, was as little free from mendacity as the rest of Napoleon's generals. He reports in his despatch that over 500 of the Allies fell before the gate of Tolosa, and reckons their total loss at 1200. He also says that he did not leave a single wounded man behind, whereas Graham reported several taken at Tolosa; and that he removed even the guns from the blockhouses, though Longa reported the capture of six of them.

² This narrative of the march of Graham is taken from his despatches of 26th June and 2nd July (both printed in *Wellington Desp.* and *Supp. Desp.*); Tomkinson, pp. 257-260; Beamish, ii. 221-228; Girod de l'Ain, pp. 397-403.

1813. Villabona.¹ Foy, whose strength had been raised to nearly sixteen thousand men by the arrival of more
June 27. outlying garrisons, fell back on the 27th to Hernani, having first detached a brigade towards the valley of Baztan to discover what had become of the main army. Reille, as it happened, at about the same time sent out parties to look for Foy. Arriving with the wreck of the Army of Portugal at Santesteban, he had halted there for a day, and after picking up nearly three thousand stragglers of various corps had proceeded to Irun with Fririon's division, leaving that of Lamartinière, swelled by the incorporation of the stragglers aforesaid to five
June 28. thousand men, at Vera. On the 28th he recalled Foy from Hernani, which guarded the approach to San Sebastian, and drew him back to Oyarzun, about six miles to east of that fortress. Reille's nerves were shaken by the recent defeat; and, after inspecting the advanced posts at Oyarzun, he ordered Foy's main body to Urrugne and Croix des Bouquets on the north bank of the Bidassoa, posting four battalions only on the south bank to guard the bridge of Béhobie.

- Meanwhile Graham, pursuant to orders from
June 29. Wellington, resumed his advance on the 29th and, leaving the bulk of his troops near San Sebastian, reached the Bidassoa on the 30th; but he made no attempt to attack, having instructions to stand on the defensive after driving the enemy into France. On
July 1. the 1st of July the Spaniards opened a skirmish with the French sharp-shooters, and occupied some houses near the bridge, the southern end of which was defended by a blockhouse. Dubourdieu's British battery soon drove the defenders from this little stronghold; and the French, after suffering some loss in an abortive counter-attack, retired over the bridge, which was of wood, and burned four arches of it. They had fired a mine to destroy the blockhouse before they evacuated it, but the explosion did little damage; and thus not only was the only bridge over the Bidassoa broken

¹ *Wellington MSS.* Graham to Wellington, 26th June 1813.

down, but the bridge-head was left in possession of 1813. the Allies. During these same days Guetaria was July 1. abandoned; and the port of Los Passages, with a garrison of one hundred and fifty men, surrendered to Longa. It was evident that for the moment all ranks of the French army were demoralised.

An exception must be made, however, in the case of Foy, whose conduct is worth a few remarks before we quit the operations of Graham's column. There can, I think, be little doubt that, but for the mistake in the transmission of Wellington's orders to Graham, Foy and his troops would have been cut off; but the sagacity with which he divined the possible advance of an Allied column by the pass of San Adrian, and his promptitude in sending Maucune to Segura to delay it, deserve high praise. At Tolosa beyond question he continued his resistance for too long, and only narrowly escaped a reverse which might have cost him two or three thousand men. However, the general result was highly creditable to him. It may be that, if he had taken part in the action of Vitoria, he would not have escaped the diffidence and discouragement which afflicted Reille; but, as things fell out, he well earned the eulogy passed upon him by Jourdan and Clarke.

To return now to the main army, Wellington decided on arriving at Pamplona to abandon further pursuit of Joseph, and, while investing the fortress, to devote his main efforts to the interception of Clausel's corps. The charge of Pamplona was therefore committed to Hill, who, in order to keep the Army of the South moving, pushed forward Byng's brigade and Morillo's Spaniards towards Roncesvalles. Clausel himself had on the 22nd moved as near Vitoria as to Trevino, June 22. where he learned from the peasants the result of the battle, and retraced his steps southward to Laguardia. On the 23rd he marched eastward to Viana, whence he June 23. again turned north to seek for Joseph's army; but disquieting rumours of the presence of the British and of Mina's troops in that direction caused him to return

1813. again to Logroño on the 24th in order to withdraw the
 June 25. garrison. On the 25th he marched down the Ebro to Mendavia, whence he again struck northward for Pamplona ; but finding Mina on his front and on his
 June 26. left flank he gave up the attempt, and on the 26th crossed the Ebro towards Calahorra.

Wellington's first knowledge of Clausel's movements was derived from an intercepted letter in which the French general announced his intention of moving upon Salvatierra ; and in consequence he ordered the Fifth and Sixth Divisions and two brigades of cavalry to move
 June 24. on the 24th from Vitoria towards Logroño. Later in the day, however, he obtained correct information of all Clausel's movements as far as Laguardia, and inferred from them that he was making for Tudela. Being
 June 26. confirmed in this belief on the 26th by further intelligence of Clausel's arrival at Mendavia, he asked Mina to push on to Tudela, and himself marched with the Hussar brigade and the Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Light Divisions due south on the road to Tafalla. On
 June 27. the 27th the Hussars moved to Tafalla, and the Fourth and Light Divisions to Mendivil, while Picton and Dalhousie halted some way in rear of them. Clausel on the same day reached Tudela, where he hastily destroyed all the stores, and blew up the bridge ; which done, he added the garrison to his own four divisions, and continued his march to Zaragoza. Wellington, thinking that he might turn north upon Jaca, struck
 June 28. eastward on the 28th to the valley of the Aragon upon Caseda and Gallipienza ; but, hearing at the end of the march that Clausel had passed Tudela and was gone beyond hope of interception, he halted his weary troops
 June 29. on the 29th, and turning back towards Pamplona,
 June 30. established his head-quarters on the 30th about three miles to north-east of that fortress at Huarte.¹

Here he received the despatches of Murray and Bentinck reporting the failure of the siege of Tarragona

¹ *Wellington Desp.* To Graham, 26th, 27th June ; to Hill, 28th June 1813. *Supp. Desp.* viii. 31-33 ; Vidal de Lablache, i. 83-87.

and the abandonment of the British siege-train, news ^{1813.} which was particularly unwelcome at a moment when Clausel was in a position, if he wished it, to join Suchet. Wellington, evidently to cover his own disappointment, wrote to Bentinck that he had given up the pursuit of Clausel because he thought it better to leave the road to Jaca open to him, rather than force him into Suchet's arms; but Clausel had no idea of marching northward simply because the way was not closed. Arriving at Zaragoza on the 30th, he halted for two days, deposited ^{June 30.} his eight guns in that place, and, having drawn two hundred thousand rations from the magazines, marched on the 3rd of July up the Gallejo. "I am going to ^{July 3.} establish myself on this river," he had written to Suchet on the 1st, "so as to join you if Wellington detaches troops from his main army to fight you, and to join the King if he decides to attack Wellington."

Such an attitude was probably calculated to give the greatest possible embarrassment to the Allies; and Suchet on receiving the letter was enchanted. After the re-embarkation of Murray's army by Bentinck, he had returned to the Jucar, and was in course of driving back the Spanish troops under Del Parque, Elio, and Villacampa, when on the 2nd of July he received the ^{July 2.} news of the battle of Vitoria. The accounts that reached him did not reveal the full extent of the disaster, nor had he as yet any report from Clausel except of his march upon Zaragoza; but he deemed it imperative to move towards the Ebro at once. Having, therefore, collected his troops he left a garrison at Denia, and traversing Valencia arrived at Murviedro on the 5th. ^{July 5.} He then installed a garrison of twelve hundred men, with abundance of stores and supplies, in Sagunto so as to assure himself that it would be practically impregnable. Thence following the road by the coast he dropped another garrison at Peniscola, and on the 8th reached ^{July 8.} Benicarlo, where he received a letter from Joseph dated the 16th of June, expressing a hope that the Army of Aragon would be able to move from Valencia to

1813. Zaragoza. Suchet now believed that he saw his way clearly. Clausel, according to the Marshal's view, could in his selected position keep open the road from France into Aragon, should Joseph determine to re-enter Spain and transfer the sphere of operations to that quarter; while, even if Joseph decided not to move from the frontier, the Army of Aragon joined to Clausel's troops would make up a force of thirty thousand men, which could operate in combination with the main army against Wellington's right flank and rear. He therefore ordered General Paris at Zaragoza to transfer fifteen hundred men to Clausel, and, after leaving a sufficient garrison in the citadel, to march down the Ebro, calling in the outlying posts as he went, and meet him at Mequinenza.¹

June 28. Joseph meanwhile had fixed his head-quarters on the 28th of June at St. Jean de Luz, thus placing himself close to Reille, but sacrificing communications with the Army of the Centre, which remained in the valley of Baztan. On the 26th the Army of the South had already reached Roncesvalles, where a horde of disorganised men burst into the villages, pillaging the houses, driving off the flocks, and maltreating the women as wantonly on the French as on the Spanish side of the frontier. This force was, in fact, in a disgraceful state, most discreditable alike to Soult, its late commander, and to Gazan. The great bulk of the useless carriages and of the harlotry that travelled in them belonged to this Army of the South; and none among the females were more conspicuous than "Madame Gazan" and "Madame Villatte."² It is not difficult to understand why Jourdan employed always the Armies of the Centre and of Portugal to form the rear-guard during the retreat.

However, in the course of the few days while

¹ *Arch. de la Guerre*, Suchet to Clarke, 3rd, 17th July. Vidal de Lablache, i. 93.

² Soult later in the year drove "Madame Villatte" in common with others of her tribe unceremoniously from Bayonne, to the fury of the General whose name she had adopted.

Wellington was absent, the French armies at large ¹⁸¹³ began to settle down. At the instigation of Foy June. General Lhuillier sent up the reserve division of conscripts from Bayonne, one brigade of it to Ustaritz, about twelve miles east of St. Jean de Luz, and the remainder to command the outlets of the two main roads from Tolosa to Bayonne, and from Vera to Sare, on the right bank of the Bidassoa. But the outlet from the pass of Roncesvalles, St. Jean Pied de Port, was for some days left in the sole keeping of a battalion of National Guards, strengthened by a handful of light troops; until, apparently on the 30th of June, it was occupied in force by Conroux's division. On the 1st of July Gazan, by Joseph's order, brought up his army between the Nivelle and the Nive, fixing his head-quarters at Ustaritz; and on the 2nd his troops July 2. were moved slightly forward, Leval's division to Ascain, Villatte's to Sare, four and seven miles respectively south-east of St. Jean de Luz, Maransin's division in second line to St. Pée,¹ and the cavalry still farther in rear to Arraunts and Ahetze. D'Erlon with the Army of the Centre occupied Sumbilla, Santesteban and Elizondo in the valley of Baztan, with advanced posts at Elgorriaga, Donamaria and Ituren towards the west and south, and Irurita and Berroeta towards the east. It was arranged on the same day that d'Erlon's communications with Joseph should be by way of Sare, and with Reille by way of Vera. Clarke having on the 24th of June demanded, by Napoleon's order, twelve regiments of cavalry² from the troops of Spain for the Emperor's own army, these were at this time set in march to join him. On the other hand, through the energy of General

¹ Maransin had succeeded to the command of Darricau's division, Darricau having been wounded at Vitoria.

² Army of the South. 2nd dragoons.

Army of the Centre. Treilhard's division of dragoons (13th, 18th, 19th, 22nd); Avy's brigade (27th dragoons.)

Army of Portugal. Boyer's division of dragoons (6th, 11th, 15th and 25th); Curto's 2nd brigade (14th, 26th chasseurs, 3rd hussars.)

1813. Tirlet the troops on the Bidassoa by the same evening June. had their artillery increased to twenty-eight pieces.¹

From the narrative of these dispositions it is tolerably clear that, if Wellington had pushed straight on instead of turning aside to follow Clausel, he would have found the French armies disconnected and ignorant of each other's whereabouts; which defects, when added to the demoralisation of recent defeat, would probably have unfitted them to make any great resistance. For the moment, however, any disappointment over his failure to catch Clausel was overshadowed by other hardly less serious annoyances. As regards operations on the east coast, he had intercepted a letter from Joseph instructing Suchet to return to Zaragoza; but being doubtful whether the Marshal would obey it, he ordered Bentinck to make a diversion in Valencia. Wellington was however gravely anxious lest Suchet, knowing that Bentinck had no siege-artillery, should leave the fortresses in Valencia to take care of themselves for a time, and lead his force against the right flank of the Allies. Lord William himself would have preferred to blockade the French strongholds in Valencia and move his main army to Cataluña; but his heart was always in his Italian projects; and Wellington was obliged once again to forbid them, unless Murat should honestly throw in his lot with the Allies, in which event he gave Bentinck a free hand to do what he pleased. A further disappointment was the removal of Castaños and Giron from their military commands, and the recall of the former to Cadiz by the Spanish Government, for no particular reason and in direct breach of the agreement upon which Wellington had accepted the position of Generalissimo of the Spanish Armies. Nevertheless he contented himself with a dignified protest and a threat

¹ Ducasse, ix. 334-347, 350-353; Vidal de Lablache, i. 98-102. Captain Vidal's statement on p. 102 that Tilly's dragoons had been withdrawn by Napoleon from the Army of the Centre to the Grand Army is a slip. Tilly belonged to the Army of the South, and only one regiment of his division was withdrawn from him.

of resignation, knowing that, however contemptible the 1813. Spanish rulers in Cadiz, it was important not to strain July 2. relations with them too far.

He was less tolerant of the failure of the British Admiralty to secure his maritime communications with Lisbon. A week earlier he had ordered his battering-train from Santander to the port of Deva, only to find that no stores or supplies of any kind had yet arrived at Santander, though the ships had been ready in the Tagus since the 12th of May. Again, the stragglers who were absent from the army, marauding, still numbered nearly three thousand, while there were bitter complaints of the outrageous misconduct of the detachments left at Vitoria. A staff-officer and an Assistant Provost Marshal were at once sent thither, the former charged to enquire and report as to the delinquencies of officers and men, and the latter armed with full powers to hang on the spot any marauders caught in the act, and to shoot any that resisted his authority. Altogether the only comforting news was that O'Donnell, following the track of the British march, had received the surrender by capitulation of six hundred and fifty French troops which formed the garrison of Pancorbo.¹

However, though at the outset Wellington had proposed to besiege Pamplona, he now decided to blockade it; and on the 2nd of July he placed Dalhousie in charge of the operation until the duty could be turned over to the Spanish troops. The Third, Fourth, Seventh and Light Divisions had by this time returned to the vicinity of the fortress; and on that same morning he sent Hill with his first and third British brigades, Ashworth's Portuguese and the half of another Portuguese brigade up the valley of Baztan; the head of the column reaching Berroeta on the afternoon of the 3rd. A reconnaissance July 3. on the 1st had shown that the village was occupied by the enemy; and indeed d'Erlon, being in a nervous

¹ *Wellington Desp.* To Sir G. Collier, 26th June; to Bathurst, 29th June, 2nd, 3rd July; to Bentinck, 1st July; to Wellesley and the Spanish Minister of War, 2nd July 1813. *Supp. Desp.* xiv. 246-247.

1813. state, proclaimed the arrival of two thousand of the
July 3. Allies at Lanz, some seven miles south of Berroeta, forty-eight hours before Hill came near the place. Joseph, meanwhile, fearing that the Army of the Centre was too weak to hold the valley, ordered the Army of the South to change places with it on the morning of the 3rd. The general idea, which probably emanated from Jourdan, was sound. By assembling the bulk of the French troops in the centre, well in advance of the wings, there was good hope that the Allies could be stopped at the Pass of Velate, if they attempted to penetrate by the valley of Baztan ; while, if they attacked either of the French wings, this central mass could fall upon their flank. Moreover, Gazan's force was, as Jourdan hoped, sufficiently strong to cover all the passes between Lamartinière's division at Vera and Conroux's at St. Jean Pied de Port.

But Joseph had overlooked one detail—how the Army of the South was to be fed. The valley of Baztan contained in itself but few supplies, and the inhabitants were by no means disposed to share them with the troops. The Commissariat was helpless and disorganised. Thanks to the absence of British cruisers, French coasting craft could carry provisions by sea to St. Jean de Luz, from which place the great road to Spain made transport to Irun an easy matter ; but, though Reille's corps was thus abundantly furnished, there was as yet no means of distribution along the roads, impassable by wheeled vehicles, to the rest of the troops. D'Erlon upon arriving at St. Pée predicted that Gazan's army must infallibly disperse unless accompanied by a convoy of victuals ; and the prophecy was the more likely to be fulfilled because these unfortunate men had received no bread—nothing more than a little maize-meal—either on the 1st or the 2nd of July. Moreover, Gazan and his men, even if amply supplied, could not fail to ask themselves why, if it were necessary to station them in the valley of Baztan, they had not been sent direct from St. Jean Pied de Port to Elizondo by

the pass of Ispégui instead of by the very circuitous ^{1813.} route of St. Pée. However, the orders were issued July 3. that the movement was to be made in two columns, Leval's division marching by Sare to Echalar, Sumbilla and Santesteban ; Villatte's and Maransin's, together with Gruardet's reserve brigade, by Ainhua and the pass of Maya to Elizondo. Gazan, not in the best of tempers, declared that the project would need two days for execution.

Shortly after noon on the 4th of July Villatte's July 4. division reached Santesteban, and Maransin's, with Gazan at its head, Elizondo ; while Cassagne's division of d'Erlon's corps, upon the arrival of this relief, was marching from Elizondo towards Maya, having left the 16th Light Infantry in occupation of Berroeta. D'Erlon and Gazan themselves were in conference at Elizondo when news came in that the Allies were attacking. Hill, in fact, under Wellington's direction had sent his first brigade by a very rough path to turn the village of Berroeta by its eastern flank, while the rest of the force advanced by the road straight upon it. The voltigeurs of the 16th fell back to Aniz, and from thence to Ciga, where they were reinforced not only by the rest of their regiment but by the whole of Braun's brigade, to which they belonged, and by St. Pol's brigade of Maransin's division, which had hastened to their help. The British advanced guard was speedily driven out of Ciga, and the French took up a position behind the ravine, which separates Aniz from Ciga. Braun's and St. Pol's brigades were in first line, and the rest of Maransin's division, together with Villatte's division and Gruardet's brigade in support. Hill made some attempt to recover Ciga but, finding that it was strongly held, decided to do nothing further on that day.

The losses on both sides were trifling, but Gazan, fortunately for himself, captured three prisoners, who told him that Hill's whole corps was behind Aniz, that another corps was at Burguete within a few miles of Roncesvalles, and that Wellington in person was at

1813. Pamplona. Gazan did not like the situation thus
July 4. presented to him. By calling up Villatte he had left a gap of seven miles between his main body, about Elizondo, and Leval's division, which was already at Echalar and Santesteban; and the Allies might strike through this gap and turn his right. Again, there was only one valley, that of Baigorri, between him and the valley of Baztan; and the force at Burguete might traverse the passes through the intervening mountains and come in upon his rear at Ariscun. Conroux at St. Jean Pied de Port was not less frightened than Gazan, and indeed added to the latter's fears by imparting to him his own. As a last and most cogent motive for retreat, there was the ominous fact that the Army of the South had been without bread for nearly four days.

July 5. Gazan looked for Hill to renew his attack in the early hours of the 5th, for the British reconnoitring parties were observed in the front at six o'clock in the morning; but it was noon before Wellington arrived on the spot and set the troops in motion. Hill's second brigade then advanced against the French centre at Ciga, while the first brigade toiled up a steep and slippery mountain to turn their left flank. Gazan had already moved back Villatte's division to the heights of Irurita, and he now withdrew his first line to the rear of it, and continued to retire, offering but little resistance, by alternate bodies till he reached Maya. Here he stationed Maransin's division before the village, and Villatte's in rear of it, with Gruardet's brigade in rear of Ariscun, astride the road which debouches at that point from the valley of Aldudes. Gazan's movements had been quiet and orderly during the day, but at nightfall a portion of his troops straggled back as a rabble over the pass of Maya in search of food; and the General himself was become querulous and diffident. He had already yielded up much ground without an effort, and, it may be added, without the slightest notice to his colleagues right and left of him; but he was not disposed

to stop until he reached Urdax, where he intended to defend the pass of Maya with real tenacity. Meanwhile he asked for reinforcements, complaining that he had only eight thousand men to match against Hill's fifteen thousand ;¹ whereas he had in fact an actual superiority of numbers. He exaggerated the strength of the Allied force at Burguete, and was altogether in a mood to raise difficulties and do nothing to combat them. The impression left upon Joseph by Gazan's reports of the 4th and 5th was that the Allies were preparing to attack his left; and, after taking counsel with Reille and d'Erlon on the 6th, he decided to transfer the divisions of Leval, Cassagne, Darmagnac and Thouvenot² with all speed to St. Jean Pied de Port; the flank march being covered by Reille, with Foy's, Maucune's and Lamartinière's divisions extended between Hendaye and Vera, and the reserve division at St. Jean de Luz; and by Gazan, with the divisions of Villatte and of Maucune and Guardet's brigade about the pass of Maya.

The movement began on the same day, which passed without any menace on the part of the Allies; for Wellington, to whom possession of the pass of Maya was vital if he were to occupy, as he intended, the valley of Baztan, was busy making thorough reconnaissances of the ground. At eleven o'clock on the morning of the 7th, however, Hill's third brigade³ struck northward from Lecarroz over the mountain of Atchiola, which bounds the basin of Maya on the west, pointing for Gazan's right flank; and two hours later the first brigade, approaching undiscovered close to Villatte's division, which formed Gazan's right, swept it without difficulty from the summit of the hill of Maya.⁴ Some

¹ He had the effrontery to report to Clarke that the Allies on the 5th showed at least 30,000 men. *Arch. de la Guerre*, Gazan to Clarke, 12th July 1813.

² Thouvenot's was a provisional division formed by Reille out of odd units of the Army of the North.

³ 28th, 34th, 39th.

⁴ Gazan sent to Clarke a glowing account of an obstinate fight in which the French were victorious. He declared further that the

1813. attempts appear to have been made to recapture the lost position, but they cannot have been very energetic, for the losses on both sides were small ; and the resistance in the centre seems to have been equally feeble. Wellington had ordered up the Seventh Division to take part in the action, apparently by turning the French left, but these troops did not arrive in time ; and the engagement, while still indecisive, was broken off by fog. Under cover of this Gazan began his retreat, sending Villatte's division towards Urdax and Gruardet's brigade to Zugarramurdi and Sare. He had written in the evening to ask Joseph's leave to retire ; but early on the morning of the 8th, without waiting for an answer, he drew off Maransin's division likewise, and fell back to Ainhoa. The operations from the 4th to the 8th had cost the Allies one hundred and twenty-nine and the French three hundred and forty-four killed, wounded and missing.¹

Thus dishonourably, thanks to the poor spirit of Gazan, did the French army quit the soil of Spain ; and, if Wellington had but known what was going forward behind the pass of Maya, he might have ended the operations very differently. On the 7th Joseph and his head-quarters left St. Jean de Luz for Espelette, a village about half-way between that town and St. Jean Pied de Port ; Thouvenot's division reached St. Pée ; and the divisions of Leval, Darmagnac and Cassagne had halted at Mendionde, some seven miles east of Espelette, on their way south-eastward to join Conroux. Hearing the sound of the firing at the pass of Maya from Espelette, and fearful lest the Allies should force it and cut in upon his column of route, Joseph ordered

Allies had triple his force, that several of their regiments had 300 killed and wounded apiece ; and that Wellington himself had been wounded. Gazan to Clarke, 12th July 1813. No French general of this period lies more shamelessly than Gazan, whose measure has been accurately taken by Captain Vidal de Lablache.

¹ Authorities in Vidal de Lablache, i. 111-114. Hope's *Military Memoirs*, 289-299.

Thouvenot to march at daybreak of the 8th to Ainhua, 1813. so as to be at hand to support Gazan, and recalled the July 8. three divisions above-named to Espelette. If, therefore, the fog had held off on the afternoon of the 7th, and the Seventh Division had come up in time, Wellington might have struck in upon the flank march of the French with some effect, for the Light Division also had reached Santesteban that very day. Even as things were, his success, or rather Gazan's timidity, caused the greatest confusion. Reille, on hearing of the loss of the valley of Baztan, became fearful for his left flank, and sent Menne's brigade to Sare and Fririon's to Olhette, at the same time ordering Lamartinière to concentrate his division about Vera, and in case of need to retreat towards Olhette. At the other end of the French line Conroux was not less disquieted; for the Allies, being masters of the pass of Maya and of the passes leading into the valley of Aldudes, could follow the river of that name into the valley of Osses and cut off his communication with Bayonne at Irissary. Jourdan therefore was fain to give Conroux a free hand for his subsequent movements, stipulating only that he should leave a strong garrison and a trustworthy commandant at St. Jean Pied de Port.

On the morning of the 8th, pursuant to Joseph's orders, the divisions of Thouvenot, Leval, Darmagnac and Cassagne came into Ainhua, making with Gazan's force six divisions massed together in that quarter, besides Casapalacio's Spanish brigade (which having been at first sent to the rear was now hastily recalled to the front) and Joseph's Guard, which was at St. Pée. Gazan, who was busy devising apologies for his misconduct, could spare no thoughts for the need for action; and d'Erlon, who with the help of the country people had thought out the means of manœuvring the Allies out of the pass of Maya, could obtain no hearing. During the next three days Joseph rode hither and thither giving contradictory orders. Jourdan, fearing an attack by Urdax upon Sare, wished to keep the troops massed

1813. where they were. Joseph, who was possessed by un-
July. reasoning terror for St. Jean Pied de Port, desired to make his dispositions accordingly. The result was that Joseph on the 11th ordered d'Erlon to shift his two divisions to Mendionde and Irissary; and that Jourdan on the 12th moved the one which had gone to Mendionde back to Espelette, though he consented to extend the other somewhat farther to south and west for the support of Conroux.

Wellington for his part was for three days quite unconscious of what was going forward. On the 8th and 9th his head-quarters were at Irurita, and his chief concern was the improvement of the lateral communications between the valleys of Baztan, Aldudes and
July 10. Roncesvalles. On the 10th he was at Zubieta, about twelve miles west of Elizondo, on his way to Graham; and here in the course of the night he received intelligence that the entire Army of the South, with eight guns, was in front of Hill. He, therefore, sent a letter
July 11. to warn Sir Rowland, bidding him bring up a battery of artillery to his advanced position and keep another in reserve at Lanz. "I don't think they will attempt anything," he added; and though Gazan had by this time thirty-eight guns instead of eight, Wellington was right in feeling no apprehension so long as Joseph retained the chief command.¹

At the same time there came in news from Mina that Clausel had marched from Zaragoza to Jaca. This intelligence was not in itself sufficient to clear up the situation to eastward, which indeed was more complicated than Wellington could have imagined. Clausel's letter to Joseph announcing his arrival at Zaragoza reached the King on the 5th; and thereupon Jourdan put forward a new and audacious plan of operations. He proposed to leave fifteen thousand men on the Bidassoa to hold the Allies in check, and to move the rest of the army over the pass of Somport into Aragon,

¹ Authorities in Vidal de Lablache, i. 114-118; *Wellington Desp.*, to Hill, 11th July 1813.

where, having rallied the troops of Suchet, Clausel and 1813. every man that could be spared from Cataluña, the July. whole should advance north-westward and threaten to pen the Allies into Navarre. It would be impossible to take guns over the pass, though some might perhaps be found in Zaragoza; but in Aragon there would at any rate be plenty of supplies, while the country, being open, would be far less to the advantage of the Spanish troops than the mountains. So Jourdan argued, and Joseph appears at first to have accepted his conclusions, for he despatched Tilly with his division of dragoons to Oloron, at the entrance to the pass of Somport, with orders to place himself at Clausel's disposal.¹ For the moment it seemed as if Joseph, Suchet and Clausel were agreed, without consultation as to the course that should be pursued for restoring the supremacy of the French army.

Yet on that same day, the 5th, by a strange coincidence Clausel wrote from Ayerbe both to Joseph and to Suchet to say that, as there were no hostile troops on the south bank of the Ebro which could give any trouble to the Army of Aragon, he should march on the 6th into the valley of the Aragon river and strike thence north-westward upon Roncal and Ochagavia to regain communication with the King's army. He proceeded accordingly; but on reaching the Aragon he echeloned his troops between Berdun and Jaca, and reported to Clarke that, in the absence of orders from Joseph, he should govern his movements by those of the enemy, and should go to Suchet's assistance if Wellington should detach any troops against that Marshal. He had in fact reverted to his first idea of placing himself midway between Pamplona and Zaragoza; and to that end he purposed to move a little to the south, about Uncastillo, where he would be within easy reach of the main roads to both places. But to Suchet he wrote not a word of his halt at Jaca; and the Marshal, receiving the letter of the 5th upon his own arrival at Vinaroz on the 9th, naturally concluded that Clausel

¹ Ducasse, ix. 368-376.

1813. was gone northward beyond recall, and uttered a wail July. of despair. "With thirty thousand men on the Gallego," he wrote, "where Wellington could not have brought artillery against us, I could have held my own for some time on the north bank of the Ebro, kept Zaragoza, and secured my communications with France; but no doubt General Clausel has acted as he thought best."

This last proposition seems to be questionable. Clausel had informed both Clarke and Joseph on the 5th that his purpose was to regain touch with the main army; and, as he was short of ammunition, he had every reason to draw near the French frontier. But, if that reason were cogent on the 5th, it was equally so on the 7th; and, though both to Joseph and Clarke he grounded his change of plan on the expectation that Wellington would detach a force against Suchet, yet he gave no intelligence which in the least warranted such an expectation. Again, if the idea of taking up a central position between Pamplona and Zaragoza be admitted to be sound, a force of thirty thousand men would have been infinitely more formidable than one of fourteen thousand; yet Clausel, far from apprising Suchet of his halt at Jaca, allowed him to believe that he had marched to rejoin Joseph. The inference is that Clausel, having tasted the sweets of independent command, was unwilling to change them for the humbler diet of subordination.¹

Meanwhile Mina, following on the track of Clausel, had captured three hundred prisoners, presumably sick, and two guns at Tudela, after which he continued his march down the Ebro upon Zaragoza. General Paris, having received Suchet's letter on the night of the 6th, had collected his troops, though owing to Clausel's departure he could hand over no portion of them to him; and on learning of the approach of the Spaniards, he took up a position to south of the town and river to bar the road from the north-west. Here he checked

¹ *Arch. de la Guerre.* Clausel to Joseph, 5th July; to Clarke, 5th, 7th July; Suchet to Clarke, 17th July 1813. *Vidal de Lablache*, i. 88-89.

one column, six thousand strong, of Mina's force for 1813. some hours ; but finding that two more columns, the July. one from the south under Duran, and the other from the north on the other side of the river under Mina's second-in-command, were advancing upon him, he blew up two arches of the bridge on the night of the 10th, and after installing a garrison of four hundred men in the Castle of Zaragoza, retired north-eastward, closely pursued by the Spaniards. On the afternoon of the 11th he reached Alcubierre, after a march of thirty miles, having lost three hundred killed, wounded and prisoners in the three days' fighting ; and on the same night, after a feint movement towards Lerida, he turned abruptly to the north-west, and brought the bulk of his force, rather over five thousand men, into Jaca on the 13th. The retreat was so distressing that all discipline seems to have been lost. The troops, unfed and unpaid, plundered all the property of the unfortunate Spaniards of the French faction whom they were supposed to escort, and whole detachments of starving soldiers drifted by the pass of Somport over the French frontier. Nothing was now left to the French in Aragon but the citadels of Jaca and Zaragoza, both of which were presently blockaded, the one by Mina, the other by Duran.

Meanwhile Clausel, hearing on the 10th that Zaragoza was attacked, sent Barbot's division southward to restore communication with the city. "No doubt I shall be obliged to go myself to Zaragoza with my whole corps," he wrote to Clarke ; "I think that when we join Suchet we shall make a diversion which will be favourable to the King's troops ; and I look upon this as the only means to make Wellington retire." On the 11th news reached him that Zaragoza had been evacuated, or in other words that communication with the Army of Aragon was hopelessly severed ; and on the same day arrived a curt order from Joseph that he was to bring his force into St. Jean Pied de Port. The fact was that Tilly owing to various impediments had taken

1813. five days to march to Oloron, and that during those five days the King, after much consultation with Jourdan, Reille, Gazan and d'Erlon, had changed his mind about operations in Aragon. Holding Clausel responsible in some measure for the disaster at Vitoria, which on the whole was unjust, he showed his animosity against him by adding to his order a hint that that General was deliberately creating difficulties. Clausel answered sharply, saying that he would not take the blame for other people's mistakes, and declaring that he would have rejoined Joseph without receipt of any order. On the July 12. 12th he set his column in march for the pass of Somport, and wrote in high dudgeon to Clarke that he had been compelled against his will to abandon both Paris and Suchet. But for the King's irresolution, he said, Zaragoza need not have been evacuated nor communication with the Army of Aragon sacrificed—a brazen piece of effrontery, when we consider that Joseph's order of recall did not arrive till the 11th, that Zaragoza was evacuated on the 10th, and that, as Suchet certainly understood him, Clausel had resolved to abandon the Army of Aragon on the 5th. On the 13th he reached Oloron, from whence he wrote another angry letter to Jourdan, and a few days later he marched with nearly twelve thousand men and six mountain-guns into St. Jean Pied de Port.¹
- July 13. By the 19th Wellington was aware of this movement and of the retreat of General Paris, and, though uncertain as to the doings and intentions of Suchet, divined that that Marshal meant to hold his ground in Cataluña. His penetration was not at fault. The Duke of Albufera, after the loss of Aragon, considered it impossible to maintain himself south of the Ebro, and accordingly crossed that river at Mora, Mequinenza and Tortosa on the 14th and 15th, sending a flanking column to

¹ Vidal de Lablache, i. 90-97. *Arch. de la Guerre*, Clausel to Jourdan, 13th July; to Clarke, 10th, 12th July 1813. Ducasse, ix. 391-401. *Wellington Desp.*, to Graham, 19th July; to Conde de la Bisbal, 20th July 1813.

bring in the outlying posts on the right bank of the river, 1813. while the main body continued its march northward by July. the coast. This latter, though cannonaded by the British fleet about Cambrils, pushed on apparently without any loss by Reuss and Valls to Tarragona. Here on the 17th Suchet halted for some days, being unwilling to evacuate the town, though making every preparation to destroy what was left of the fortifications. For the defence of the strong places he left troops in Lerida, Mequinenza and Monzon, and reinforced the garrison of Tortosa to a strength of forty-five hundred men. Then, leaving General Bertolotti in command at Tarragona, he marched his main body to Villafranca, where he could draw his supplies from the country and be at hand to support either Bertolotti in the south or Decaen at Barcelona in the north. Meanwhile the last of Bentinck's transports had reached Valencia on the 10th, and there found the armies of Elio and del Parque close at hand, but unable to move. Murray with his usual blindness and perversity had discharged the hired transport which he had collected for his advance to Tarragona; but the harvest was abundant, and Bentinck announced that he should be able to advance with the British corps on the 15th, leaving the Spaniards to follow. It was already reported that Suchet had evacuated Aragon, and retired into Cataluña, whereupon Lord William proposed to march up forthwith and besiege Tarragona. It did not really matter very greatly what he did, so long as he occupied the attention of Suchet and, by delivering Wellington from any danger to the right flank of the main army, could leave him free to beleaguer San Sebastian.¹

This fortress had for some time past been treated by the French as a mere advanced base; and the greater number of its guns had been withdrawn for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and for arming the

¹ *Wellington MSS.*, Bentinck to Wellington, 13th July. *Wellington Desp.*, to Bentinck, 8th, 20th July. *Arch. de la Guerre*, Suchet to Clarke, 17th July 1813. Suchet's *Mémoires*, ii. ch. xx.

1813. captured strongholds of Santoña and Castro Urdiales. July. With the advance of the Allies, however, it resumed its former importance as the gate of the road to Bayonne, though, when the battle of Vitoria was fought, it was in no condition to stand a siege. On the 22nd of June General Rey, who had been despatched from Vitoria in charge of a convoy, arrived at the place, and found it literally swamped by Spanish refugees, who had been sent up there for safety by Joseph. Rey was in despair, for these unhappy people must either remain in the fortress and eat up the whole of its supplies, or be turned out at the hazard of capture and possibly of massacre by the Spanish patriots, for the garrison was too weak to afford them a sufficient escort. For four days he remained in suspense, until on the 26th he received a note from Foy, saying that he could not hope to hold Graham at bay, and that San Sebastian must be thrown upon its own resources. Thereupon the refugees streamed out in panic, the most part into the road to Bayonne under the protection of a hundred invalids of Joseph's Spanish Guard, while the officials and their families embarked in every description of craft for St. Jean de Luz. By good fortune both convoys reached their destination in safety. Thus relieved, Rey applied to Foy for troops, having brought with him none but a part of the garrison of Burgos and such men as were unfitted by wounds or sickness for service in the field; whereupon Foy, after sending at once two battalions and forty gunners, left two more battalions there on the evening of the 27th in exchange for five hundred recruits from the garrison, which gave to Rey a net strength of some twenty-three hundred men. On the next day, as we have seen, Mendizabal blockaded the place by land; but the communication by sea with St. Jean de Luz remained long open, much longer indeed than was to Wellington's liking.

The town of San Sebastian stands on a low peninsula which juts out from south to north for about eleven hundred yards from the mainland and terminates in a

rugged hill, rather over four hundred feet high, named ^{1813.} Monte Orgullo. On its eastern side is the river and ^{July.} estuary of Urumea; and on the western is a tiny bay about sixteen hundred yards across at its broadest, which is formed by another rugged hill called Monte Iguedo, the entrance being narrowed by an islet, known as the Island of Santa Clara, and by a chain of rocks which runs from this to the western shore. The most striking feature of the whole place, to one who views it from a military standpoint, is its extreme minuteness; and it is hardly astonishing that at first sight the engineers pronounced it a trifle, and that Wellington, little more than a week after breaking ground, spoke confidently of being in possession within a few days.¹ Nor was the fortress without great elements of weakness. At high water, it is true, both flanks of the isthmus were inaccessible; but for two hours before and after low water the Urumea was fordable, and, except for the tide, the defences along the whole length of the town both on the eastern and western sides consisted only of a high wall, eight feet thick, with no more formidable flanking defences towards the Urumea than the small bastion of St. Elmo at the north-eastern angle, and the two petty towers of Los Hornos and Las Miguetas towards the southern end.

The landward front was indeed more elaborately fortified, having a bastion in the centre, covered by a horn-work with the usual counterscarp, covered way and glacis; but these works were dominated throughout by the neighbouring heights, which were within range of cannon, and on the eastern front the wall was visible from coping to base from the sand-hills of Chofre, little more than six hundred yards away. At the northern end deep water and cliffs effectually protected Monte Orgullo from assault; and the guns of the Castle of La Mota on the summit as well as of two batteries to right and left of it, were able from

¹ Tomkinson, p. 260. *Wellington Desp.*, to Bentinck, 20th July 1813.

1813. their great elevation to sweep the isthmus from end to
July. end. For the rest, there were no casemated defences for the garrison except in the bastion of the landward front ; and water, owing to the severing of an aqueduct by the Allies, was obtainable only from a few wells which were both foul and brackish.

The ground outside the horn-work being covered by two suburbs and many convents, Rey's first care was to occupy with one battalion the outermost of these, known as the Convent of San Bartolomeo, upon a commanding height just south of the neck of the isthmus, so as to cover the demolition of the remaining buildings. On the night of the 28th the two suburbs and the bridge over the Urumea were burned ; which done, Rey proceeded with the work of clearing the ground of other buildings and trees, of fortifying San Bartolomeo, and of impeding the approaches to it. The internal defences were also taken in hand, the inhabitants showing the best of good will ; and the guns were mounted, thirteen on Monte Orgullo and forty-five in the body of the place, eighteen more being held in reserve. A half-hearted attempt of the Spaniards to storm San Bartolomeo was easily repulsed ; and on the 1st of July the garrison of Guetaria entered the fort in safety, raising the strength of the defenders to about three thousand men.

July 3. On the 3rd a British frigate and nineteen smaller craft began the blockade of the port, but could not prevent the frequent entry by night of vessels from St. Jean de Luz. During the following week there were no operations of importance, until on the 11th Wellington shifted his head-quarters to Hernani for two days, July 12. and on the 12th reconnoitred the fortress in person. After consultation with Major Smith he sanctioned in part the plan of attack which had been adopted by the Duke of Berwick in 1719, namely, to erect his batteries on the Chofre sand-hills on the east bank of the Urumea, so as to make two breaches in the eastern wall which could be stormed at low water. Accordingly, on

the 13th Graham was ordered to relieve Mendizabal's 1813. troops in the work of the investment, and the Spanish general was directed to detach a portion of them for the blockade of Santoña. The right or eastern attack was entrusted to Bradford's Portuguese brigades, the left attack to the Fifth Division under General Oswald; and the port of supply for guns or ammunition was the little haven of Passages, a mile and a half distant from the Chofre hills along a good road, but five miles over bad and heavy track-ways to Oswald's attack.

As a preliminary to all operations it was imperative first to master the convent of San Bartolomeo; and accordingly on the night of the 12th the construction of two batteries for four guns and two howitzers was begun at a furlong's distance from its south-western front. On the night of the 13th these were completed; and on the 14th the guns opened a heavy cannonade July 14. which, being maintained for three days, and supported by the fire of seven pieces on the other side of the Urumea, effectually knocked the building into ruin. On the morning of the 17th the convent was stormed July 17. with no great difficulty by the Ninth, supported by three companies of Royal Scots and strong detachments of Portuguese; but the assailants, foolishly moving down to the isthmus to meet a party of the enemy which was advancing from the horn-work, came under the fire of the guns, and were driven back to the captured position with some loss, the Ninth alone counting seventy officers and men wounded. Meanwhile, on the night of the 13th, one battery had been begun upon the heights to north-east of the sand-hills and three on the sand-hills themselves; and on the night of the 17th two new ones were commenced on the heights of San Bartolomeo, and two additional ones on the sand-hills. On the 20th four batteries on the right July 20. bank of the Urumea and two on the left opened fire from thirty pieces of artillery; and on the 21st July 21. Lieutenant Reid of the Engineers, having discovered the line of a subterranean aqueduct, laid a mine at the

1813. end of it where it joined the western demi-bastion of the
July. horn-work, in the hope that the explosion would throw up sufficient rubbish to make the scarp easily ascendible.

During this time the cannonade was continued for three days, a breaching battery playing upon the wall between the towers of Los Hornos and Las Mezquitas with eleven twenty-four-pounders at a range of little more than six hundred yards; and, though the French concentrated their fire upon this battery, and even disabled one of the cannon, a practicable breach
July 23. had been made by the morning of the 23rd. Graham then ordered the guns to be turned upon the wall a little to south of the tower of Los Hornos; and before evening a second breach, at least thirty feet wide, had been battered in at this point also. At the same time some houses were kindled by shells and the fire spread rapidly, the besieged having no means of quenching it. Rey, expecting an assault at every moment, worked with desperate energy through the night to retrench his damaged fortifications, and flank the breaches with artillery. Nor were his fears unfounded, for the British storming columns were actually assembled in the trenches
July 24. before daylight of the 24th; but, as the burning houses seemed likely to check the advance of the assailants after the breach should have been carried, it was decided to defer the attack. The breaching battery therefore resumed its fire, which was directed against Rey's new defences; and on the evening of the 24th Graham ordered the assault to be delivered as soon as the tide should have fallen sufficiently low on the following morning, which was reckoned to be at the hour of daybreak.

The troops selected for the storm were of the Fifth Division. Of them the Royal Scots were to assault the great breach with the Ninth in support; and the Thirty-eighth the lesser and more distant breach; while a detachment selected from the light companies of these battalions was placed, together with a ladder-party, in the centre of the Royal Scots, in order to

clear the high curtain wall on the north face of the town as soon as the breach should be won. The enterprise was difficult and hazardous. The troops were assembled in the trenches on the isthmus, and, on emerging from the right or eastern flank of these, they had to pass for three hundred yards along the left bank of the Urumea, exposed for the whole way to the artillery of the fortress, and for some distance actually hugging the *fausse-braye* of the western branch of the horn-work, the parapet of which was covered with hand-grenades and other projectiles ready to be thrown down upon them as they passed. Moreover, the shore of the Urumea after the fall of the tide was rocky, covered with slippery seaweed and much broken by large pools of water, which must make progress of any kind slow and difficult, and effectually prevent any advance in regular formation. In the face of all these perils the arrangements for the assault were infamous. Firstly, the Thirty-eighth, being assigned to the more distant breach, should of course have led the columns; but on the contrary they were stationed in rear of the Royal Scots and Ninth. Secondly, the time of low water had been miscalculated; and the tide left insufficient space for the progress of the troops except in straggling disconnected bodies. Lastly, whereas Wellington had expressly recommended that the attack should take place by daylight, the hour was fixed for half past four in the morning, when it was still too dark for the batteries on the west bank of the Urumea to open upon the defences.

Punctually at the appointed time the mine at the end of the aqueduct was sprung with great effect, blowing down a considerable length of the counter-scarp wall of the horn-work. The garrison, taken by surprise, abandoned this part of the defences for the moment; and the stormers rushing down into the ditch planted their ladders, but being riddled with grape and musketry on both flanks, were obliged to retire with great loss. Meanwhile the defenders

1813. allowed the Royal Scots to arrive at the foot of the
 July 25. breach almost without firing a shot, when they suddenly poured a tempest of projectiles upon their front and flanks. The commanding officer, Major Fraser, and Lieutenant Harry Jones, the engineer, actually surmounted the breach and descended by a sharp drop of fifteen feet into the town, but were stopped by burning houses. Fraser was killed; Jones was wounded; and the few brave men who followed them were shot down. The rear of the column was so heavily punished by the fire on its flank as it advanced that, in Napier's words, it was already in confusion before the head was beaten. When the Thirty-eighth and Ninth tried to advance they were met by the Royal Scots retiring. For a time they surged forward in response to their officers, and then back from a sense of the hopelessness of the enterprise; and finally the whole turned and ran to their trenches, leaving behind them four hundred and twenty-five officers and soldiers killed, wounded, and taken.¹ The Royal Scots alone lost eighty-six officers and men killed and two hundred and forty-five wounded, so it cannot be said that they were disgraced. The whole affair was, in fact, one of the grossest mismanagement.

The consequences of this reverse were very much more serious than could be calculated from the mere loss of four hundred men. General Oswald had in council strongly protested against the plan of attack; and his objections, whether through his initiative or otherwise, were loudly echoed by the principal officers of his division. There arose in consequence a distrust, which nothing could overcome, of the skill and competence of the engineers. These last, by the confession of Burgoyne, the ablest of them, had certainly been guilty of one serious blunder by building their breaching batteries and making their breach before the trenches were sufficiently

¹ Killed	8 officers	121 men.
Wounded	30 "	142 "
Taken (mostly wounded) .	6 "	118 "

advanced to contain the storming parties, and thus revealing their plan prematurely to the enemy.¹ The mistake was the more unpardonable since Wellington had given express warning against it. "I think," he wrote to Graham on the 19th, "that you should not begin to batter in a breach until you are established on the esplanade," that is to say upon the landward front ; and it is evident from another letter, written on the same day to Lord Bathurst, that he expected his hint to be taken.

The officers of the Fifth Division, very sore at their defeat, passed far more sweeping judgment upon the scientific corps. "I do not think," wrote Gomm, a good and able soldier, "that we have been engaged in as hazardous an attempt since this country became the scene of our adventures, not even at Badajoz . . . I have always had a dread of being engaged in any of these sieges. . . . No doubt if we had attended to all the niceties of the art in the attack of Ciudad Rodrigo or Badajoz, it is possible we should have taken neither. . . . I am afraid the success on these occasions, owing to the almost miraculous efforts of our troops, have checked the progress of science among our engineers. . . . Our soldiers have on all occasions stood fire so well that our artillery has become as summary in their proceedings as the engineers ; and provided they can make a hole in the wall by which we can claw up, they care not about destroying its defences or facilitating in any degree what is, under the most favourable auspices, the most desperate of all military enterprises. . . . In a very few minutes five hundred of the flower of the army were cut down—the Royal which was the pride of the division, the Thirty-eighth, an excellent corps. The Ninth fortunately had not time to suffer much, but they lost nearly as many heads as they showed. Most fortunately the troops behaved as they have always done."²

¹ Wrottesley's *Life of Burgoyne*, i. 270-271.

² *Life of Sir William Gomm*, pp. 311-312.

1813. The spirit revealed in these extracts is not such as is July. desirable to observe in an army; yet its existence cannot be considered surprising. It may be unjust to hold the engineers exclusively responsible for the conduct of the sieges undertaken by the British during the Peninsular War; but there can be no doubt that one and all of these operations were very ill-managed, and it is now manifest also that the troops were growing weary of making good this mismanagement at the expense of their lives. This was an unpleasant symptom, and Wellington cannot escape a share of the blame for having provoked it. More disquieted than he cared to show by the mishap, he rode over to San Sebastian immediately upon hearing of it, declared his intention of persevering, and demanded a project for a regular attack on the place from the landward front. Moreover, to mark his disapprobation of the behaviour of the Fifth Division, he called for volunteers from the rest of the army for the next assault, to which summons there was a willing response. Meanwhile, owing to want of ammunition, it was necessary to turn the siege into a blockade. All spare artillery and stores were embarked at Passages, and all the guns excepting one or two were withdrawn and parked by the place of embarkation. But even so misfortunes were not ended, for on the morning of the 27th the enemy made a sally from the horn-work, surprised the Portuguese, and carried off over two hundred prisoners, a few of them British. Thus ignobly ended the first stage of the leaguer of San Sebastian,¹ which was quickly to be forgotten in the excitement of greater and more successful fighting. But before going further it is necessary first to trace the effect of the victory of Vitoria upon the affairs of Europe.

¹ Authorities for the siege of San Sebastian: Jones, Belmas, Wrottesley's *Life of Burgoyne*; *Wellington Desp.*, to Graham, 19th-20th July, to Bathurst, 19th July 1813.

CHAPTER VIII

BEFORE beginning his campaign of 1813 it was every-^{1813.} thing to Napoleon to secure if possible the active alliance of Austria, or at least her neutrality, until he could fight and beat the Russians. Austria's withdrawal of her military force and her armistice with Russia were at the outset discouraging symptoms, in consequence of which the Emperor hastened to send a new ambassador, M. de Narbonne, to Vienna, while himself holding continual conferences with Schwarzenberg at Paris. On the 7th of April Narbonne laid before Metternich Napoleon's definite proposals, namely, that Austria should enter into immediate negotiations with Russia, raise her auxiliary force to fifty thousand men, concentrate that number of troops in Bohemia, and enter the war as a principal with one hundred thousand men. Metternich, after some delay, answered declining to augment the auxiliary force, and stating plainly that Austria would place her army at the disposal of the Power which, in the circumstances of the moment, might seem most natural to her. In other words, Austria repudiated her treaty with France, and under the name of mediation would throw her sword into the scale which it would profit her best to weigh down. Metternich had already sent an envoy to London to broach this same project of mediation, but Castlereagh would have none of it. The British Minister was disinclined for peace now, until the total overthrow of Napoleon should offer some security for its permanence. Soon afterwards the Tsar and the King of Prussia met at Dresden, where they were joined

1813. by Lord Cathcart and Sir Charles Stewart, who were at once attachés at the head-quarters of the two sovereigns and vested with authority for negotiations. Through them England signified her rejection of Metternich's proposals, and thereby practically compelled Austria to join a new Coalition ; for without money she was helpless, and money could be obtained only from England. This was the first exertion of that hidden power of the purse which was to make Castlereagh almost supreme arbiter of the destinies of Europe.

On the 26th of March, meanwhile, Blücher had invaded Saxony to punish the King for his desertion of the cause of Germany ; and on the 15th of April Napoleon left Paris to take the field against Blücher. In his own miraculous way the Emperor had formed a new army of two hundred thousand men, and had actually trained them while on their march to Saxony. The infantry was good ; but the cavalry was insufficient, and the artillery ill-equipped ; moreover—a most significant fact—a third of the entire force was composed of Germans from the Confederation of the Rhine. On the 24th of April Napoleon reached Erfurt ; and on the
May 2. 2nd of May he beat the Russians and Prussians at Lützen. Though from want of cavalry he was unable to turn the victory to account, he reckoned with high hope that it might bring back Austria to his side. On the 8th of May he entered Dresden where, hearing that the King of Saxony had accepted the Austrian mediation and that his subjects and his army, under the inspiration of German patriots, were inclined to turn against France, he delivered to the unfortunate monarch an abrupt ultimatum. The King, he said, must either declare his adherence to the Confederation of the Rhine and join his troops to those of France, or forfeit his throne. Within four days Frederick Augustus returned to his obedience to the terrible master ; but kings are not peoples, and the Saxons both civil and military remained sullen and sulky, ripe for defection at the first opportunity. During this time Russia and Prussia,

full of mutual recrimination over their defeat, appealed ^{1813.} to Metternich who, fearful lest Napoleon should invade Bohemia before Austria's military preparations were mature, decided that he must at all costs restrain the Emperor by offers of mediation until the end of May. By that time all would be ready ; and the offer of unacceptable terms would then furnish a pretext for declaring war. He therefore trifled with Narbonne at Vienna, and sent Count Bubna to do the like at Napoleon's head-quarters, while he arranged with Hardenberg and Nesselrode the final conditions to be offered to France. The purport of these was practically that Napoleon should yield up Holland and all conquests east of the Rhine and Alps ; and his rejection of the terms was considered so certain that, on the very day ^{May 16.} when the three statesmen agreed upon them, Austria and Russia came to an understanding as to the military operations that they should pursue in concert. It will be remarked that nothing was said about Spain ; and indeed England was left wholly unconsulted in the matter.

Enlightened by intercepted letters of Metternich, Napoleon detected that statesman's machinations, and sought to evade them by making overtures to Russia ; but the Tsar effectually foiled any such attempt by refusing to receive his emissary. On the 20th and 21st ^{May 20-21.} of May Napoleon again beat the Allies at Bautzen, but indecisively, although his adversaries set but eighty thousand men in line against one hundred and thirty thousand French, and were short of ammunition. Their difficulties and perplexities were, however, such that only an armistice could save them, and both the Tsar and the King of Prussia made a desperate appeal to Austria to come to their assistance. But Napoleon was unaware of this, and was himself desirous above all things of gaining time. He expected the arrival of stores and reinforcements ; he counted upon an advance of Eugène's army to crush Austria ; his intelligence from Paris warned him that public confidence in him was shaken and the people sick of war ; even in the field

1813. his officers from highest to lowest were murmuring that the Emperor would not be content until the last of them was killed. For the success at Bautzen had been dearly bought, and the stubborn tenacity of the Allies showed that the days of easy and complete victory were over. Lastly, it was worth much to him to clear his hands of Russia and Prussia, if only for a time, in order that he might be free to deal with Austria.

May 30. Accordingly, on the 26th of May he dictated instructions for an armistice, and on the 30th sent Caulaincourt to negotiate with the Allies for that object. Then Metternich saw that the decisive moment was come. A truce would give time for Austria to complete her armament and enable her to enter upon the scene as mistress of the situation. All that was needed—and the task seemed likely to tax even Metternich's skill—was to keep both parties for a certain period in suspense. On the 1st of June, therefore, he set out together with the Emperor Francis for the

June 3. Tsar's head-quarters, and on the 3rd they arrived at Gitschin, where Metternich satisfied Nesselrode as to Austria's co-operation. Napoleon, meanwhile, awaited the issue of the negotiations with feverish anxiety, recognising that he had blundered in proposing an armistice at all, and longing to be quit of the matter in one fashion or another. On the 2nd he instructed Caulaincourt to make concessions; and on the night of the 3rd he ordered his army to be ready to march in the morning. But there was no occasion for him to exert

June 4. pressure. His conditions were accepted; and on the 4th an armistice, affecting military matters only and extending until the 30th of July, was signed at Pleischwitz.

The signature of this instrument caused some alarm among the British Ministers. "I fear political treachery and the machinations that are in the wind more than any evils from Bonaparte's myrmidons. We must keep a sharp look-out, especially since our refusal of Austria's mediation," wrote Charles Stewart to Castlereagh on the 6th of June. "We are not considered (from all I

see going on) in the Cabinet. . . . Wellington must ^{1813.} send you a victory to bruit forth with the armistice." June. Bathurst was inclined to doubt if the truce would enable Napoleon to send any reinforcements to Spain, seeing that he would need all his strength to persuade Austria to a convenient agreement; but he recognised that everything depended upon Austria, and that Austria would naturally work for her own hand. Meanwhile the British Ministers pursued their aims quietly with such instruments as they could find to their hand; and, when Bernadotte asked for a British garrison for Stralsund, so as to liberate the more Swedish troops for service in Germany, they agreed at the end of June to send him six weak battalions under Major-General Gibbs for that purpose.¹ Cathcart and Charles Stewart also, who had been in Silesia close to the frontier of Bohemia since the end of May, had begun to exert their silent power of the purse, addressing themselves first to Prussia. Yielding to inexorable pressure Frederick William agreed, in return for England's guarantee of the Treaty of Kalisch, to territorial concessions for the aggrandisement of Hanover; and bound himself, upon receipt of a subsidy of nearly £700,000 to place eighty thousand men in the field. England also undertook to make good one half of the five millions sterling of paper currency, which was to be issued by the coalesced Powers.

The two envoys next approached Russia, and with her also came to an agreement which made her a party to the two compacts above-mentioned, on condition that England should pay her a subsidy of a million and a half sterling. These two treaties, known as the first and second Treaties of Reichenbach, were signed on the 14th and 15th of June, and contained one clause which ^{June 14-15.} was all important towards the overthrow of Napoleon. This was, that the contracting parties should act in perfect concert in all military operations, and should

¹ First detachment: 2/25th; 2/54th; 2/73rd; 2/91st. Second detachment: 4/1st; 2/33rd.

1813. neither negotiate nor sign any peace, truce or conven-
June. tion with the common enemy except by the consent of each and all of them. Stewart wrote to Castlereagh with depreciation of his own work. "It is best," he said, "to show something done, even under doubtful circumstances." Castlereagh himself, while approving the Treaties, did not perceive the significance of the clause above quoted. "You must guard," he wrote, "against a Continental peace being made to our exclusion." He did not comprehend that this object was already accomplished, and that the terms offered to Napoleon by Metternich were invalid unless accepted by England.¹

June 24. It should seem that the Ministers of the three great Powers were fully alive to the extent to which they had committed themselves; for almost immediately afterwards they resolved to invite England and Sweden to participate in the negotiations for a final settlement. But they were for some time at variance over the conditions that should be propounded as to the preliminaries of peace, and it was not until the 24th of June that these were agreed upon and embodied in a third Treaty of Reichenbach between Prussia, Austria and Russia. This instrument bound Austria to join Prussia in arms, unless Napoleon before the 20th of July should consent to four preliminary conditions broached by her; and once again there was inserted a clause barring all negotiations with the enemy except by common consent, which, when read with the previous treaties, made the concurrence of England as necessary as that of any of the three contracting parties. Signature of this treaty was deferred until the 27th, in order to enable Metternich to assure Napoleon on the 26th that Austria was still unfettered by any engagement with other Powers. The dramatic incidents of the interview between the Great Emperor and the Austrian statesman are too well known to need recapitulation here. For the moment Napoleon came off the better, as Metternich was sufficiently impressed by his haughty language to wish to prolong the

¹ Castlereagh's *Letter and Despatches*, ix. 22, 29-30.

armistice, but it was no easy matter to obtain such a ^{1813.} concession either from Napoleon or from the Allies. The Emperor indeed seemed to be determined against any accommodation; and Metternich was on the point of entering his carriage on the 30th of June, when Napoleon ^{June 30.} suddenly summoned him and signified his willingness to consent to a convention. Under this instrument it was agreed that France should accept the mediation of Austria; that a congress of French, Russian, and Austrian representatives should meet at Prague on the 5th of July under that mediation; and that the armistice should be prolonged until the 10th of August. Napoleon evidently clung to the hope that, having once drawn Austria into the path of negotiation, he could keep her in it or constrain her to neutrality until he had crushed the armies of Russia and Prussia.

On that same evening there reached the Emperor the news of the battle of Vitoria. This affected his situation profoundly, not only by laying open the southern frontier of France and thus threatening his rear, while the Continental Allies assailed his front, but by giving Metternich a strong argument to urge with the Emperor Francis in favour of war. The Austrian Minister had the greatest difficulty in persuading the Tsar and Frederick William to accept the prolongation of the armistice, and indeed only obtained their consent by promising effective help after the 10th of August. However, this obstacle having been removed, the Allied Sovereigns called Bernadotte into their councils for military advice, and flattered themselves with the hope that Moreau, who was expected to arrive from the United States, would accept a military command. On the 5th of July the Congress met at Prague, and entered with great solemnity upon the function, which Metternich expected from it, of wasting time. Napoleon, who had his suspicions of its true object, was likewise in no mood to hasten its business, and spun out the negotiations by every possible formality, being unable to believe that Austria would turn against him.

1813. The history of the proceedings is too long and
Aug. 5. tortuous to be recounted here. On the 5th of August, the Emperor who had returned to Dresden, made up his mind that hostilities would be renewed, and instructed his chief plenipotentiary, Caulaincourt, to obtain from Austria an exact statement of her conditions within twenty-four hours, and to promise an answer within three days. By subterfuges of one kind and another Metternich continued to evade any reply until the 7th, when he tendered to Caulaincourt terms which had been so framed as to ensure rejection by Napoleon, and intimated that, unless they were accepted by the 10th, Austria would declare war on the 11th. As a matter of fact, these terms did not come to Napoleon's hand until the 10th, when only six hours were left to him to make his decision, and, as he gave no definite answer but sought to put forward counter-proposals, the Prussian plenipotentiary at midnight declared the Congress to be dissolved. Metternich transmitted the news by signal to Silesia so that the troops might advance. Throughout the 11th Caulaincourt was kept busy by a
Aug. 12. farce of further negotiations; and on the 12th Austria declared war. On the 13th Napoleon's answer arrived, and yielded the points which he had on the 10th disputed; but Metternich declared that everything now rested with Russia. On the 15th the Tsar arrived at Prague with King Frederick William, and refused to hear another word of negotiation. The Allies had gained their point. The Russian reserves had arrived; Prussia had completed her national levy; Bernadotte's contingent was on the way, and the Austrian preparations were finished. Only one of the helpmates, whom Metternich had thought to sweep into his net, had escaped him, namely Murat, who at the last moment abruptly returned to his allegiance, and flew to the side of his chief at Dresden. But this was a matter of relatively small importance, for all the great Powers were now leagued together for the final overthrow of Napoleon's Empire.

During much of this time Soult had been at the Imperial head-quarters at Dresden. Upon his arrival at Paris in March, Napoleon, ignoring all Joseph's complaints against the Marshal, had called upon him for a report upon the war in Spain; whereupon Soult, setting forth the evils of divided command in the Peninsula and the obstacles opposed by Joseph's presence to any reduction of those evils, had advocated a return to the offensive under the direction of a single chief. For a moment the Emperor entertained some idea of sending Soult straight back to Valladolid to take supreme command; but upon reflection he decided to take the Marshal with him to Saxony, in order to discuss the feasibility of withdrawing his armies from Spain and reinstating Ferdinand at Madrid. Soult's functions at Dresden were quite secondary, but, when the first news of the defeat at Vitoria came in, the Emperor instructed him to start for Paris secretly before ten o'clock on the night of the 1st of July, to call upon Clarke and Cambacérès there, and to continue his journey within twelve hours to Bayonne. Soult's letter of service constituted him the Emperor's Lieutenant-general of the Armies in Spain and the Pyrenees, not excluding Joseph's Spanish Guards, with full powers to reorganise them as he thought best; and his instructions bade him "re-establish the Imperial business in Spain, and save Pancorbo, Pamplona and San Sebastian." July 1.

On the same day Napoleon despatched instructions to Cambacérès to break to Joseph, through some suitable emissary, his order that the King should resign his command to Soult, and should await further signification of the Imperial pleasure at Bayonne. Cambacérès selected Roederer for this unpleasant mission, and hurried him with all speed upon his journey lest Soult should arrive before him. Rumours of the supersession of Joseph were already current among the troops when Roederer on the 11th of July reached the royal head-quarters at St. Pée; and the unfortunate King, on learning that his liberty was restricted and that Soult was to all intents July 11.

1813. his gaoler, vented his feelings in violent diatribes against
July 12. that Marshal. The arrival of Soult on the following day made matters worse. Joseph fled away secretly on the morning of the 15th. Soult gave orders for him to be brought back as quietly as possible. Joseph declined to submit to any dictation ; and the situation was rapidly becoming intolerable when in the nick of time there came in a courier from Napoleon, giving his brother permission to retire with all privacy to his seat in the
July 20. country. A few days later Jourdan was recalled and relegated in disgrace to an obscure house in the provinces, to expiate the blunders which were not his own, nor even Joseph's, but mainly and principally those of Napoleon himself.¹

Thus Soult at last obtained the position which he had coveted of Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of Spain and, as such, of protagonist of France against England. He was now forty-four—of the same age as Wellington—a big, rough, coarse man, vindictive in temperament, surly even to brutality in character, and above all things self-seeking and greedy of gain. The convoy of plunder which he took with him from Spain into France was so large as to excite general remark ; and he was as merciless in exaction from his own countrymen, for behoof of himself and his wife, as ever he had been in Spain. Where the chief set such an example, his subordinates naturally copied him ; and it has already been said that his late army, that of the South, was the most rapacious, the most cumbered with women, the most disorderly and worst-disciplined of all the French troops in Spain. Not the less for these defects was Soult an extremely able administrator, acute of perception, keen of insight, swift and firm of decision. As a general his strategic gifts were remarkable. No man had greater skill in bringing his troops up to the battle-field, but in the actual combat he was weak, timid and diffident. In brief he was a manœuvring and not

¹ Authorities in Vidal de Lablache, i. 126-140 ; Lecestre, *Lettres inédites de Napoléon*, ii. 255-258.

a fighting commander. Hence, although he had a little 1813. clique of admirers among the officers whom he had July. pushed forward for promotion, he was neither liked nor trusted by the army at large ; for he was known to be one who played for his own hand, and he could not redeem that failing by brilliant leadership in action.

He approached his task none the less in a spirit of almost arrogant confidence. The Emperor was anxious for him to lead the army back to Spanish soil as soon as possible, with the double object of strengthening his position in the negotiations with the Allies, and of maintaining his troops at the enemy's expense. Soult was perfectly ready to oblige him. "I shall assemble the army and take the offensive in a very few days," he wrote to Napoleon before he had even left Paris, and after arriving at the scene of action he maintained the same tone. He passed lightly over the defeat of Vitoria as an accident due merely to the errors of the supreme command, and described Reille's soldiers, who were perhaps the most thoroughly demoralised of all by pillage and indiscipline, as in good order and good spirits. By a stroke of the pen he reorganised his forces, which numbered nominally some seventy thousand men,¹ into a right wing under Reille, a centre under d'Erlon, and a left wing under Clausel, each composed of three divisions of infantry ; with the Spanish division under Villatte as a reserve, and two divisions of cavalry under Pierre Soult and Treilhard.

This was very well on paper, but on paper only. Some of the regiments were mere fragments, mustering no more than three hundred men with the colours ; others counted as many as fourteen hundred or even eighteen hundred in the ranks. The weakest of the French divisions numbered fewer than four thousand men, the strongest over seven thousand. Some of the

¹ Vidal de Lablache gives the total at 59,450 combatants, 8546 horses, 4460 non-combatants, and 140 guns (i. 153) ; but a return in *Archives Nationales* shows 1660 officers and 68,884 men, exclusive of artillery and engineers.

1813. cavalry regiments had fewer than two hundred troopers, July. others over four hundred. Everywhere there was a lamentable deficiency of officers, vast numbers having been drained away to the Grand Army in Germany; while those that remained had little control over their men and apparently little will to exert such control as was theirs. French villages were pillaged as pitilessly as those of Spain, and there seemed to be no means of checking the evil. Colonels who carried with them baggage-trains of thirty vehicles containing plunder and women, were hardly in a position to reprove soldiers who desired likewise to help themselves to luxuries; and indeed they did not attempt it. The entire army was in fact demoralised, as much by long irregularity and indiscipline in the Peninsula as by defeats in the field. It was sick of the Spanish War, and anxious to have done with it for ever.¹

Wellington upon his side was to all intents reduced to the defensive, the sole function of his line being to cover the blockade of Pamplona and the siege of San Sebastian; and to understand his dispositions it will now be necessary to examine more minutely the topography of the Western Pyrenees. The field of operations was the quadrilateral contained within the four fortresses of Bayonne on the north, St. Jean Pied de Port on the east, Pamplona on the south, and San Sebastian to the west, all of which were in the possession of the French. The line from Bayonne to St. Jean Pied de Port is about twenty-seven miles as the crow flies; from St. Jean Pied de Port to Pamplona is about thirty miles; from Pamplona to San Sebastian forty miles; and from San Sebastian to Bayonne some twenty-nine miles. The highest spine of the Pyrenees which, falling gradually lower from east to west, forms the boundary between France and Spain from the Mediterranean to the Bay of Biscay, breaks into twain soon after it enters this quadrilateral, throwing off one great ridge due west in the direction of Vitoria, and a confusion of

¹ Vidal de Lablache, i. 149-173.

spurs to the north and north-west which culminate 1813. finally in the grand peak of La Rhune, from five to six July. miles south of St. Jean de Luz.

North of the great ridge above mentioned, that is to say on the side of San Sebastian, the ground is relatively speaking easy, and the principal lines of defence are formed by three rivers, whose general course is from south-east to north-west. These are the Nive, which runs from St. Jean Pied de Port to Bayonne; the Nivelle, whose head-waters unite near Ainhoa and flow thence to the sea at St. Jean de Luz; and the Bidassoa which, having gathered affluents from all points of the compass near Santesteban, runs by Sumbilla, Vera, Biriadou and Irun into the beautiful bay of Fuenterrabia. But in any advance upon Pamplona from the French side the great spine itself is the capital obstacle, which can be surmounted only by three principal routes. Of these the most westerly is the valley of Baztan, into which from the side of France there are seven entrances; namely, in the west by the passes of Vera and Echalar; further to east by the passes of Maya and Zurella; and south-eastward of these by the passes of Ispégui, Elhorrieta and Berdaritz. The whole of these ingresses descend upon a single road north of the pass of Velate, which road trends due south by Lanz, Olague, Ostiz and Sorauren to Pamplona. The next valley to eastward is that of Baigorri, which follows the course of the river Aldudes, but has no issues southward except the roughest of tracks through three passes, of which the most easterly is that of Atalosti, and the most westerly that of Urtiaga; the pass of Sorhoguain lying midway between them. The third entrance is by the valley known as the Val Carlos which runs up the waters of the Nive from St. Jean Pied de Port to its source; from whence the route, crossing the main ridge at the pass of Roncesvalles, bears south-westward by Burguete, Espinal and Linzoain to the valley of the Arga at Zubiri, and thence by Zabaldica to Huarte. There it turns sharply to the westward,

1813. and, joining the road from the valley of Baztan at July. Villaba, runs with it into Pamplona.

The roads in all of these valleys were bad, particularly those that issue southward from the valley of Baigorri, and the lateral communications between them were even worse. Yet such lateral communications did exist, notably the passes of Ispégui, Elhorrieta and Berdaritz, between the valleys of Baztan and Baigorri ; and that of Atalosti, from which a cross-road ran by Espinal from the valley of Baigorri to the Val Carlos. It was even possible to move direct from Olagüe in the valley of the Ulzara to Roncesvalles in the Val Carlos. But these rough tracks were practicable only for infantry and for such cannon as could be carried on a mule's back, and even for them in small bodies only. To all intent, therefore, it was impossible for Wellington to concentrate rapidly to a flank ; whereas the French could assemble at their leisure on the Nive, and launch the bulk of their force upon any point that they might prefer. Whether they could effectively deploy any large body in such a tangle of mountains and strong positions was another question ; but the greater facilities for an offensive movement undoubtedly lay with them.

July 14. A general sense of insecurity prompted Wellington on the 14th to close a weak point in his line by occupying the southern outlet of the pass of Vera, for which purpose he on the following day moved forward the Seventh and Light Divisions. The French, who were still very nervous, withdrew after a trifling resistance ; and the Light Division then occupied the village of Vera, with the Seventh encamped on the heights above July 17. the river from Vera to Echalar. On the 17th O'Donnell took over the blockade of Pamplona with his army from Andalusia, which enabled Wellington to make his final dispositions. These may be recapitulated as follows : On his extreme right Byng's brigade of about sixteen hundred British soldiers and two Spanish battalions occupied Altobiscar, astride of a road—at that time the main carriage-road—which runs parallel to that over the

pass of Roncesvalles, and about two miles east of it. 1813. Another Spanish battalion held Orbaiceta in the valley July. of the Iratin, still farther to the east ; and Morillo with his main body was stationed on the heights immediately to the south of the village of Val Carlos, and on the western side of the road. On the left of Byng and Morillo, Campbell's Portuguese, about two thousand strong, watched the valley of Baigorri from a height above the village of Aldudes ; and in support of all these detachments the Fourth Division lay at Viscarret, on the main road about seven miles south-west of the pass of Roncesvalles. The supreme command of the right was entrusted to Cole, with instructions to defend the passes as long as was possible without committing Byng and Morillo to any engagement in which the enemy's superiority of force might countervail the advantage of the ground held by the Allies.

In the centre Hill with the Second Division (less Byng's and Campbell's brigades), Sylveira's Portuguese,¹ and some cavalry—about ten thousand men in all—occupied the valley of Baztan ; his two British brigades under William Stewart holding the pass of Maya, while the Portuguese and cavalry observed the three passes into the valley of Baigorri. In reserve both to centre and right the Third Division under Picton lay at Olagüe, from which it could join either Cole by way of Eugui, or Hill by following the road up to the valley of Baztan. On the left of Hill, as we know, the Light Division was about Vera and the Seventh about Echalar ; while the Sixth Division, now under command of Pack,² was at Santesteban, equidistant from Maya and Vera, and with an independent line of retreat by the pass of Doña Maria through Elsabara and Lizasso to Pamplona. On the extreme left, with Longa's Spaniards forming a connecting link along the Bidassoa, Graham's covering force before San Sebastian closed the line at Oyarzun. Head-quarters were at Lesaca, from two to three miles

¹ Late Ashworth's.

² Pakenham had just taken up his duties as Adjutant-general.

1813. south of Vera, communicating with the right wing by
July. Santesteban, Elizondo and the pass of Berdaritz, and
with Graham by the paths over Monte Aya.

Soult meanwhile, after some preliminary alarm over Wellington's advance to Vera on the 15th, was earnestly considering his plan of operations. Having learned on the 18th through an emissary from Rey that San Sebastian could hold out for more than a fortnight, he decided that he would force Wellington's right by simultaneous attacks at Roncesvalles and Maya, seize all the outlets that issued upon Pamplona, and so push the Allies out of Navarre; which done, he would manœuvre against their communications with Tolosa and Vitoria, so as to liberate San Sebastian simultaneously with Pamplona, and drive his enemies back to the Ebro. His first task was to rearrange his line according to his new organisation, which placed Foy's and Maucune's divisions on the right at Biriattou, Urrugne, and Olhette, and Lamartinière's on their left on the heights of La Bayonnette. Then came a gap which was filled only by the huge mass of La Rhune—ground not impassable by active troops—then Villatte's Reserve about Sare; and then d'Erlon's three divisions, of which Maransin's and Abbé's lay about Ainhoa, and Darmagnac's in rear of them at Espelette, communicating thence with Clausel's three divisions, stationed, or soon to be stationed, at St. Jean Pied de Port. These movements produced endless confusion, and were made only to be in part unmade on the 18th and 19th, when Reille's three divisions were skilfully drawn off under cover of the ground, and their places taken by the single division of Villatte.

July 20-21. On the 20th and 21st Reille's divisions marched with sixty-six guns for St. Jean Pied de Port, and Soult himself set out for the same destination from Bayonne on the same day, impatient to take the offensive, for he flattered himself that he had already restored the discipline of the army, and that a single success would be sufficient to set everything right.

Matters, however, went wrong from the first. The

weather was abnormally wet. Rain fell in torrents ^{1813.} during the 19th and 20th, and the road from Bayonne July 19, to St. Jean Pied de Port was so bad as to be almost ^{20.} impassable ; while the bridge over the Nive at Cambo was carried away by the flood, compelling some of Lamartinière's division to retrace their steps to the bridge of Bayonne. The bulk of Reille's troops did not arrive at St. Jean Pied de Port until late on the 22nd ; a great many stragglers did not come in until the 23rd, and a considerable part of Lamartinière's division not until the 24th. Hence Soult, who had counted upon beginning his movement at latest on the 24th, was obliged to wait until the 25th. Nor was this all. Soult had ordered four days' bread to be ready for the troops, but the service of supply at Bayonne was as usual imperfect, and Reille's soldiers instead of biscuit received only flour, which was soaked through and through by the pouring rain. Even d'Erlon's division which was halted at Ainhoa did not receive regular rations ; and, in fact, the results of twenty years of subsistence upon marauding and requisition in foreign countries were now seen to perfection upon French soil. Soult had assembled three hundred pair of oxen to drag his guns to the summit of Roncesvalles. The starving soldiers fell upon them and upon the baggage-waggon, and had to be beaten off by force. They then turned upon the houses, whose owners were doing duty as National Guards on the mountains, and stripped them bare. Soult fulminated orders, but without any effect. Some favoured troops received two days' victuals, others received none, and St. Jean Pied de Port became the scene of appalling confusion.

Wellington, meantime, was troubled by some instinct of uneasiness. He had received reports from a good source on the 22nd that the French were preparing a flying bridge at Urrugne and were about to transport it to the Bidassoa at Béhobie ; which as a matter of fact was true, though designed by Soult only as a feint. But on the evening of the 23rd there reached him certain July 23.

1813. intelligence that the bulk of the French army had
July 23. moved to St. Jean Pied de Port; and his conclusion was that Soult wished to divert attention from the French right, and then to attempt to pass the river about Irun. None the less Wellington sent warning to Cole that the passes of Roncesvalles must be defended to the utmost, that solid communication must be established between Byng and Campbell, and that every precaution must be taken to prevent the turning of Byng's right at Orbaiceta, though any wider turning movement need cause no serious anxiety. Soult on his side was not well informed as to Wellington's dispositions. He had a correct idea of the situation of the divisions of Graham, Hill and Dalhousie, but he thought that the Sixth Division was alongside the Seventh, that the Light Division (or, as he called it, the Eighth) was at Altobiscar, that the Third and Fourth were still blockading Pamplona, and that Campbell had a British instead of a Portuguese brigade at Aldudes. However, his orders had already been issued to d'Erlon to carry the pass of Maya, enter the valley of Baztan, follow the road over the pass of Velate, and effect a junction with the divisions of Reille and Clausel, which were to debouch upon Pamplona by Roncesvalles. The attack was to begin on the 25th at both places simultaneously.

Upon his arrival at St. Jean Pied de Port on the 16th Clausel had pushed out reconnaissances in every direction, had ascertained the stations of Byng's and Morillo's troops, and, after setting men to work to repair the road to Roncesvalles, had occupied in force certain positions in front of the Allies. The divisions of Vandermaesen and Taupin were posted at the Venta d'Orisson on the carriage road, with a detachment in advance at Chateau Pignon, and a whole regiment a couple of miles to the west at Arneguy in the Val Carlos. In the valley of Baigorri Conroux's division lay at St. Étienne, with an advanced post at the foundry at Aldudes, a flanking party at the pass of Ispégui, and two regiments pushed forward to the peaks of Arrola and Adarca, in the

dividing range between the valleys of Baigorrry and Carlos. Soult's orders were that Reille on the afternoon of the 24th should relieve Clausel's troops in these positions, take over from him eight mountain-guns, and mass the bulk of his troops out of sight behind the peak of Arrola. This done he was to direct the National Guards of the valley of Baigorrry to march in the night to Mount Hausa, between the passes of Ispégui and Berdaritz, so as to be ready to seize them. Clausel, having been relieved, was to form the whole of his troops upon Taupin's division at the Venta de Orisson; and a detachment of National Guards from the eastern valleys was directed to assemble under cover of night on his left front between Béhorobie and Mount Yropil, so as to be ready to turn Byng's right flank. 1813. July 23.

At four o'clock in the morning of the 25th there was to be a general movement along the whole line. Reille with his three divisions and eight mountain-guns was to follow the crest of the ridge, that divides the valley of Baigorrry from the Val Carlos, as far as Lindux, from which central point he would command the heads of both valleys. Once established there, he was to send out detachments not only to east, south and west to seize the passes of Ibañeta, Roncesvalles and Espinal on the one side, and of Atalosti and Sohorguain on the other, but even so far to south-west as to threaten the outlets of Urtiaga from the valley of Baigorrry, and of Velate from the valley of Baztan. At the same time his National Guards were to make a great demonstration of force on Mount Hausa, and, as soon as the Allies should begin their retreat from the Baztan under pressure of d'Erlon's attack, they were to move south-westward along the comb of the mountains upon the pass of Velate, force their enemy to swerve off to westward, and capture his baggage and artillery. Simultaneously Clausel was to move forward in compact order from Chateau Pignon upon Altobiscar; while his National Guards, having likewise magnified their apparent strength by a vast extent of camp-fires and similar devices, were to threaten

1813. the right flank and rear of the Spaniards at Orbaiceta.
July 23. Soult judged that Byng, finding both his flanks menaced, in the east at Orbaiceta and in the west at Lindux, would make little resistance at Altobiscar; wherefore Clausel was to seize that position, press his retiring enemy sharply, and continue his advance by Ibañeta and Roncesvalles to Burguete. Reille and Clausel were then to manœuvre in concert towards Zubiri or some other point, according to the movements of the troops opposed to them; and it was reasonable to suppose that the Allies in the valleys of Baigorri and Baztan, on realising the danger to their right flank and rear, would retire or weaken their posts on the pass of Maya, enabling d'Erlon to force it without difficulty and to press forward to the pass of Velate, there to join hands with Reille for a further combined movement.

Owing to the general confusion at St. Jean Pied de Port, Reille's leading division—that of Foy—did not leave that place until four o'clock in the evening, instead
July 24. of at noon of the 24th, and was obliged to bivouac half way up Mount Béharia, from two to three miles short of its appointed station at Mount Arrola. Maucune's division came up still later to the left of Foy's; while Lamartinière's was fain to halt at Anhaux, a good mile further in rear. Advanced parties, however, had relieved Clausel's troops at their various stations; and that General was able to concentrate his divisions, as had been ordered, between the Venta d'Orisson, Chateau Pignon and Arnéguy. During the night General Vandermaesen had tried to capture some of Byng's advanced posts north of Mount Leizar-Atheca, in order to facilitate the access of his division to the narrow ridge of Chateau Pignon, but he had succeeded only in giving the alarm to the British general, who at once reported to Cole that he expected to be attacked on the morrow. Cole therefore ordered Ross's brigade to march at daybreak from Espinal to Lindux, so as to protect Byng's left flank and his communications with

Campbell, and directed Anson's brigade and Stubbs's 1813. Portuguese to take Ross's place at Espinal.

At six o'clock on the morning of the 25th Clausel, July 25. under the personal direction of Soult himself, came up before the British position at Leizar-Atheca, and sent forward the 1st of the Line and 25th Light of Vandermaesen's division to the attack. Strongly ensconced among rocks, the Buffs, Thirty-first and Sixty-sixth,¹ resisted strenuously, in spite of many attempts to out-flank them; and at ten o'clock Clausel called off his two regiments, which had suffered considerable loss, and brought up the mass of his force in their place. Between eleven and twelve Soult renewed the frontal attack with the same troops, sending Vandermaesen with the 27th and 130th of the Line to turn the position by a wide movement to eastward. But Byng held his own stoutly until three o'clock when, finding that his ammunition was beginning to fail, he abandoned his few wounded men and fell back to Altobiscar, where he again stood at bay.² Cole had arrived shortly after the opening of the second attack, and had at first ordered Anson to move round Byng's rear towards Orbaiceta, and Stubbs to march to the head of the Val Carlos. But perceiving the advance of Reille on the opposite side of the Val Carlos, he recalled Anson to support Ross, and hastened himself to the threatened point of Lindux. In the middle of the afternoon³ a heavy fog descended on the mountains; and Byng, unable to see Clausel's movements and knowing that the French General could, since the British retreat from Leizar-Atheca, send an overwhelming force against Orbaiceta, decided to retire. He had held his own against greatly superior numbers for nine hours, and had

¹ The 57th had been sent in the night to Val Carlos. The 31st and 66th formed a Provisional Battalion.

² Clausel in his report says that the 50th of the Line carried the position of Leizar-Atheca with the bayonet; but I prefer Byng's sober story to the theatrical narrative of Clausel, good soldier though Clausel was.

³ Clausel says at 3 P.M., Byng, 5 P.M.

1813. done excellent service. Clausel for his part bivouacked
July 25. for the night over against Altobiscar, having lost, according to his own account, no more than one hundred and sixty killed and wounded, among the latter being General Vandermaesen.

Reille's column was in motion before daybreak, following a path so narrow that the men could only advance in single file, and so difficult that in bad weather it would have been impassable. Hence it was half-past one before the leading files reached Mount Laurigné,¹ still two miles short of Lindux, at which hour the rear-guard had hardly left the bivouac of the preceding night. As the 6th Light, the leading battalion of Foy, ascended Mount Laurigné from one side, Ross's advanced guard climbed it from the other; and Ross, hastily forming three companies of the Twentieth and one of the Brunswick Regiment, led them straight against the ranks of the French. The 6th Light were nothing loth to close with them, and there ensued that rarest of incidents, a sharp fight with the bayonet, which ended with the arrival of the main body of the 6th and the repulse of Ross's brave men with the loss of one hundred and eighty-one killed and wounded. However, their devotion was not thrown away, for their bold attack gained time for the remainder of Ross's brigade to take up its position at Lindux and check Foy's further advance.

Reille was perplexed and annoyed. The comb of the hill along which he was advancing was only thirty paces wide, with a very steep downward slope on either hand; and it was not only encumbered by scrub, but cut at one point by a deep trench dug during the campaign of 1793. It was therefore impossible to bring up troops without endless delay, whereas the slopes towards the British centres at Espinal and Burguete were easy, and the roads had been widened by Wellington's order. There was thus every prospect

¹ Reille's official report says Mount Achistoy, which puzzles even Captain Vidal de Lablache.

that Ross would be reinforced before a superior French force could be brought forward to overwhelm him. And, in actual fact, before a second battalion of Foy's division could advance and form on Mount Laurigné, Anson's Brigade came up in rear of Ross, and was shortly afterwards joined by Campbell's Portuguese. Campbell had done his duty admirably. So far from allowing himself to be distracted by the demonstration of the National Guards, he had driven them headlong into the valley of Aldudes, and made such a demonstration himself as to alarm Reille for the safety of his own right flank. He had also from his commanding position counted every man of Reille's column, and thus enabled Cole to judge correctly of the force opposed to him. Reille's task was for the moment hopeless. After long delay Foy brought forward the whole of his division, and sent his skirmishers on against Ross ; but all their bravery was of no avail. The rear of Maucune's division did not arrive till five o'clock, the first brigade of Lamartinière's not till half-past six, the second brigade never arrived at all. The fog put an end to all further movements, and at seven o'clock Reille's troops bivouacked where they stood, having lost three hundred and seventy killed and wounded.

Cole had lost only ten men more than Reille, and had successfully held his own ; and it is possible that if he had received Murray's order of the 24th in time, he would have clung stoutly for yet some hours to Lindux. It is true that his right flank was laid bare by the evacuation of Orbaiceta ; yet, for the time at any rate, all operations were suspended by the fog, and turning movements take many hours to accomplish in so mountainous a country. But Cole was nervous, as were all Wellington's divisional leaders when in independent command, and he was dismayed by the accounts given by Campbell of the enemy's numbers, which certainly were about thrice his own. "All the beatings we have given the French," wrote Wellington in reporting the matter, "have not given our generals

1813. confidence in themselves and in the exertions of their
July 25. troops. They are really heroes when I am on the spot to direct them, but when I am obliged to quit them they are children." So Cole retreated at nightfall, prematurely as Wellington thought, and took post on some heights in rear of Linzoain. Thus the main ridge was abandoned to the French. Still it cannot be said that Soult's initial operations against the Allied right had been very successful. According to his plans he should have been in possession of all the passes by the evening of the 25th; whereas, partly in consequence of the fog, partly owing to the nature of the tracks by which they had been compelled to advance, the columns both of Clausel and Reille had failed to drive either Byng or Ross from their positions.

On the Allied left fortune was more favourable to the Marshal. The custody of the pass of Maya, the most important point in that quarter, was entrusted to General William Stewart with Cameron's and Pringle's brigades¹ of Hill's division. The low dip in the hills which goes by the name of the Col de Maya comprehends actually three different passages: the pass of Maya proper on the south, the pass of Zurella in the centre, and the pass of Aretesque on the north, of which the two first named were entrusted to Cameron and the last to Pringle. The right of the British line of defence rested on the Rock of Aretesque, a natural citadel commanding a path known as "Gorospil Path" or "Englishman's Way,"² which follows the range of Mondarrain southward upon Maya. Pringle's brigade was encamped on the north side of the pass of Maya, with a picquet of eighty men at the Rock itself (which was a long climb of two miles and a half from the camp) and an intermediate post of three companies midway between the two. Of Cameron's brigade the Seventy-first and Ninety-second were encamped on the Spain-ward slope of the main pass, on each side of the

¹ Pringle had taken command of Walker's brigade on the 24th.

² Chemin des Anglais.

great road, and the Fiftieth farther to the east; the 1813. advanced parties being pushed well forward almost July 25. within musket shot of the outposts of Maransin's division, which lay concealed behind a peak to the north of Urdax. D'Erlon's two remaining divisions, those of Abbé and Darmagnac, were at Ainhua and Espelette respectively; and these marched during the night of the 24th under cover of the hills to an appointed place of concentration to north of Mount Mondarrain. By nine o'clock on the morning of the 25th the whole were assembled; and at half-past ten d'Erlon gave Darmagnac orders to mass together all his companies of voltigeurs without their packs, and to push them forward by the Gorospil path against the Rock of Aretesque; while the remainder of Darmagnac's division, with Abbé's in support, followed a parallel track slightly to left of the voltigeurs on the eastern slope of the ridge of Mondarrain. Maransin's division was specially charged to keep its bivouac fires burning all night, and to make no visible sign of movement until informed by signal that the Rock had been taken, when it was to advance upon the pass of Maya by the high road.

On the British side Wellington had ridden to Graham's camp early on the 25th upon hearing of the failure of the assault upon 'San Sebastian. William Stewart, who was in command of the entire force about the pass of Maya, on hearing the fusillade exchanged between Campbell's Portuguese and the National Guards on Mount Hausa, decided that he would not be attacked, and that he had better place himself near the scene of action. Accordingly he ordered half of his troops back to camp, directed the whole to cook their breakfasts, and proceeded himself to Elizondo. The action was highly characteristic of the man, who preferred anybody's business to his own, and could not receive an order to do one thing without an irresistible itching to do something very different; but considering that Pringle, his second-in-command, had not

1813. joined the army more than twenty-four hours, it was
July 25. nothing less than criminal. The captain of the out-lying picquet, when relieved at seven o'clock in the morning, mentioned that he had seen cavalry and a column of infantry in motion at dawn, and that they had passed out of sight. The officer who relieved him, Captain Moyle Sherer, begged him to make special report of this at the head-quarters of the division, which was faithfully done. But Stewart had gone away to mind Cole's affairs instead of looking to his own; and no one came to the front except a junior staff-officer, who, riding forward at nine o'clock, caught sight of Abbé's column, but decided that the movement was of small importance, and merely ordered the light companies forward to join the picquet.

In due time Darmagnac's column came up; and d'Erlon, judging that the capture of the Rock would ensure the mastery of the entire English position, launched the voltigeurs and 16th Light Infantry at the height, and ordered the 8th of the Line to the rear of the Rock, so as to fall on the left flank of any British reinforcements that might come up, and to cut off any of the fighting line that attempted to retire. There was, however, a ravine in front of the Rock, where Sherer held the voltigeurs at bay for a long time, repulsing several attacks with a stubbornness of which Darmagnac confessed that he had rarely seen the like. The alarm also was given, and Pringle hurried to the scene of action, directing his battalions to follow in all haste. But the troops could not be quickly collected from their various camps, and the ascent to the threatened spot was both long and steep. The Thirty-fourth came up first, company after company, disordered and breathless, and succeeded in joining the picquets and light companies and in prolonging their resistance. But after a time the 8th of the French Line reached their appointed station, and were able to check the Thirty-ninth and Twenty-eighth, which likewise came up panting and piecemeal; and d'Erlon,

throwing three more regiments into action, bore the 1813. British back, fighting furiously, towards the main road. July 25. Then the remnants of the picquet and of the Thirty-fourth, outflanked on both sides, abandoned the Rock, leaving many prisoners behind them, and fell back to the next height.

Here they were joined by the Fiftieth, which had been detached by Cameron to their assistance; this regiment having already charged and driven back a party of hostile infantry which was emerging from the pass of Zurella. Formed in line the Thirty-fourth and Fiftieth met the French columns with the same unyielding tenacity and with a most destructive fire till forced back by superior numbers; when they retired in good order to the next height, whither Cameron had sent the right wings of the Seventy-first and Ninety-second, together with four Portuguese guns. Two of these guns were disabled while ascending the pass, and the officer kept plying Pringle—who understood the Portuguese language very imperfectly and had no idea what Stewart's plans of defence might be—for orders. The Highlanders, however, coolly deployed within pistol shot of the advancing voltigeurs, and plied them with so terrible a fire that they fairly brought them to a stand for a time, the French refusing to advance beyond their heaps of dead in spite of most gallant leading by their officers. The duel was continued for twenty minutes, and two-thirds of the right wing of the Ninety-second had fallen, when the left wing of the regiment came up and sustained the combat with unabated obstinacy. Maransin's division had by this time showed itself in force upon the main road; and at this juncture Stewart arrived and ordered a general retirement to the south over Mount Atchiola, covering the retreat alternately with the left wings of the Seventy-first and Ninety-second, and the right wing of the Seventy-first and the Fiftieth.

In spite of heavy losses the British fought as stoutly as ever; and it was not until Maransin's division joined

1813. Abbé's that the Highlanders slowly and sullenly fell back, July 25. still contesting every inch of ground. Maransin's troops, however, pressed them hard ; and a party of the Ninety-second,¹ which had been detached at the beginning of the action to hold the rocky summit of Mount Atchiola, was compelled to meet the attacking columns by rolling down stones upon them, their ammunition being exhausted. Between six and seven o'clock Stewart despaired of retaining this stronghold any longer, and sent orders for it to be abandoned ; but in the nick of time General Barnes came up with his brigade from Dalhousie's division, having hurried to the spot in response to Stewart's urgent messages for help. Placing himself at the head of the Sixth and the Brunswick Regiment, Barnes charged Maransin's troops with such audacity that he not only drove them back to the pass of Maya, but struck alarm into d'Erlon himself. So much perturbed was the French General that he sent a brigade of Abbé's division to the assistance of Maransin, who had already at least six battalions with which to meet Barnes's three, and recalled Darmagnac, who had pushed forward to the village of Maya in the hope of cutting off some Portuguese troops, which were retiring from the pass of Ispégui. Thus at about eight

¹ Napier says the 82nd Regiment under Major Fitzgerald ; but Col. James Hope (*Military Memoirs*, p. 311) says 150 of the 92nd under Capt. Campbell. The 82nd belonged to Inglis's brigade of the 7th Division, and I cannot see why it should have been at Atchiola, unless the rest of the brigade had been closer at hand than Barnes's, which evidently it was not. Possibly Napier dragged them in for the sake of glorifying Irishmen, who need no glorification as fighting men. He had the effrontery in his 1st edition to describe the 92nd as principally composed of Irishmen, but was forced, upon plain proof to the contrary, to retract. It must, however, be mentioned in extenuation of some of his outrageous misstatements that, while writing the later volumes of his history, he was in such a state of irritation through pain and disease as to be hardly sane. For this reason many persons who were in a position to correct his inaccuracies abstained through sheer compassion from doing so. The fact was brought to my notice by some letters among the Gurwood Papers, which were kindly sent to me by Lord Esher.

o'clock, after ten hours of hard fighting, the combat of Maya, which d'Erlon declared to be one of the sharpest affairs ever seen in war, came at last to an end.

An action more creditable to the British troops engaged it would be difficult to find. Stewart's two weak brigades were opposed to three divisions numbering altogether some fifteen thousand men.¹ There was no central direction whatever on the British side. Battalions, or more often companies, simply took up their ground and did their best under their regimental commanders, fighting with a cool and steadfast constancy which is beyond praise. The loss that they inflicted upon the French was very severe. D'Erlon confessed to fourteen hundred killed and wounded in Darmagnac's division and about six hundred in Maransin's; and Abbé's men can hardly have escaped without three or four hundred casualties more. The 103rd of the Line in Maransin's division had only three officers left unhurt at the close of the day; and the survivors did not disguise their hope that their efforts might lead to the conclusion of a peace at Prague. But the British loss also was very heavy. The Ninety-second went into action with eight hundred and fifty-three of all ranks, of whom nearly three hundred and fifty were killed or wounded, and twenty taken. In the Fiftieth forty-four of all ranks were killed and one hundred and one wounded; in the Thirty-fourth, out of five hundred and thirty of all ranks engaged, one hundred and five were killed and wounded, and eighty-three, many of them hurt, made prisoners. In the Thirty-ninth one hundred and

¹ Return of 18th July 1813 (*Arch. Nationales*):

Darmagnac's Division	. 161 officers	6,602 men.
Abbé's	. 175 "	7,348 "
Maransin's	. 132 "	5,641 "
	468 "	19,591 "
Total of all ranks	. .	20,059

I have deducted one-fourth for sick, camp-guards, etc.

1813. eighty-eight were killed and wounded besides twenty-two
July 25. missing ; in the Twenty-eighth there fell one hundred and fifty-seven ; and in the Seventy-first, seven of whose officers fell, the proportion can hardly have been less. Altogether these two gallant brigades lost some fourteen hundred men ; and d'Erlon reported with exultation that he had captured five hundred prisoners. The whole of the camp was also taken, besides four Portuguese guns which were abandoned and disabled, though their teams were saved. And all this sacrifice of brave men was occasioned (in Wellington's sarcastic phrase) "by the fancy which people have to attend to other matters than their own concerns, and to form opinions of what is passing in other quarters."

In his report of the affair Wellington ascribed the loss of the guns to Stewart's interference with Pringle's orders, which statement called forth a very angry letter of protest from Stewart. Wellington retorted with still more mordant bitterness. "I attributed the loss of the guns then, as I do now," he wrote, "to unfortunate accident, to which the best arrangements must be liable, and above all to that most unfortunate accident of your being absent when the attack was made" ; and he flatly declined to reopen the question. Still unabashed, Stewart wrote a second letter, of which Wellington took no notice whatever ; but, having by a strange coincidence received almost at the same minute directions to invest Stewart with the Order of the Bath, the Marquis invited him in soothing terms to repair to head-quarters for the ceremony, and to bring with him such officers of his division as he desired. Thus, by a touch of irony which no one could have better appreciated than Wellington, a very grave neglect of duty was rewarded by the red ribbon.¹ Stewart was a good trainer of troops and a most gallant soldier ; and after his belated return

¹ The correspondence is in *Wellington MSS.*, Stewart to Wellington, 11th, 19th Sept. ; and *Wellington Desp.*, to Stewart, 13th Sept. (where the blanks should be filled with the name of Gen. Pringle) and 23rd Sept. 1813.

to his men in the action he continued in spite of a severe 1813. wound to direct their movements to the end. But look- July 25. ing to his blunder at Albuera, his direct contravention of orders during the retreat from Burgos, and his absence from his post at the moment of d'Erlon's attack at Maya, he would have met with no more than his deserts if he had been immediately sent home in disgrace.

Another question arises which cannot be suppressed : Where was Hill, Stewart's commanding officer, and what was he doing throughout this day ? The enquiry reveals a very curious state of affairs. During Wellington's absence at San Sebastian his chief staff-officer, Murray, rightly took upon himself the chief command at head-quarters ; and it appears from his letters that he contemplated the possibility of a French attack along the whole line, and warned Hill that it might be necessary to retire from the most advanced positions in the valley of Baztan. Yet it was not until four o'clock in the afternoon that Murray had any information of the attack on the pass of Maya, and then only through vague reports from Dalhousie.¹ Wellington's headquarters being at Lesaca, it is perhaps intelligible that news may have taken six hours to reach him ; but Hill's were at Elizondo, not more than six miles as the crow flies from Maya ; and, if Stewart could reach the front from thence, Hill could surely have done likewise. Yet we hear nothing of Hill's presence or influence or orders, though the whole line from Roncesvalles to Maya was under his command, and though the weather was so fine that the firing could hardly have failed to reach his ears. By his own account he was at Aldudes,² but he was evidently as ignorant of what had passed on the right as on the left. In the evening, having intercepted and read Cole's report to Murray of the evacuation of the pass of Roncesvalles, he withdrew Stewart's troops and Campbell's Portuguese to the

¹ *Supp. Desp.* viii. 119.

² Wellington to Graham, 26th July 1813.

1813. heights of Irurita, about a mile and a half south-west of
July 25. Elizondo ; but on the 26th he was still ignorant of the details of the fight, and reckoned his loss at no more than six hundred men.¹ The entire episode is extremely obscure ; and, though perhaps susceptible of explanation, is at first sight by no means satisfactory.²

Thus upon the whole the first day of Soult's offensive movement had proved not unsuccessful. Wellington first heard that there had been firing about Maya while on his way back from San Sebastian to Lesaca, and on reaching his head-quarters he was informed that the French had attacked Byng ; but up to ten o'clock at night he knew no more. Being unable to divine Soult's plans, he sent out only precautionary orders. Graham was to prepare to embark his siege-train ; O'Donnell was to send half of his infantry to Zubiri so as to maintain touch with Picton ; Mina was to reduce the siege of Zaragoza Castle to a blockade, and hold himself ready to approach Pamplona with the bulk of his forces ; and Cotton was to concentrate the cavalry near that fortress, with posts of communication at Ostiz and Lizasso on the approaches to the valley of Baztan. A verbal account of the fight at Maya and of Hill's retreat reached him shortly afterwards, whereupon he directed Dalhousie's division to retire to Sumbilla ; but he still kept the Light Division at Lesaca and Yanci, and Longa's troops in their old position on its left, so as to cover San Sebastian. At the same time he ordered two brigades of Pack's division to move to Legasa and one to Santesteban, so as to support

¹ *Supp. Desp.* viii. 121.

² The clearest account of the combat of Maya is that of Napier, which can be checked to some extent by the narratives of Sherer, *Recollections of the Peninsula* ; Patterson, *Adventures of Capt. Patterson* ; James Hope, *Military Memoirs* ; Gardyne's *Life of a Regt.* (92nd) ; Fyler, *History of 50th Foot* ; Bell, *Rough Notes of an Old Soldier* ; and the reports of d'Erlon, 3rd Aug., and Darmagnac, 10th Aug. 1813, in *Archives Nationales* ; which are abstracted and supplemented by Vidal de Lablache. The greatest difficulty in the way is the want of a decent map, and the confusion of the local names by the different narrators.

Hill's left and ensure the safe withdrawal of the baggage of the army. Early in the morning of the 26th July 1813. he rode himself to Irurita, where he learned all the details of the combat of Maya, and later in the day he decided to transfer his head-quarters to Almandoz, about midway between the pass of Velate and Elizondo.

Soult on this morning of the 26th, though still ignorant of what had passed on his right, had made up his mind to renew the attack on the left. Reille had already occupied the passes of Sohorguain and Atalosti with Lamartinière's division; and the Marshal, upon hearing of Cole's retreat, determined to move straight upon Espinal with Clausel's troops, bidding Reille to follow the movement on Clausel's right, and to march as much as possible on the summit of the ridges, so as to seize the passes of the Baztan in Hill's rear while d'Erlon should press Sir Rowland in front.

The fog was still thick on the hills when the head of Reille's column plunged into the valley of Espinal before it realised where it was going; and, though there was still time to correct the error, the General decided not to do so. In the first place the descent to Espinal brought his force nearer to its baggage; and in the second he flattered himself that he should be able to regain the crest of the hills at the pass of Velate or elsewhere. He therefore threw his force into the track of Clausel's and followed in rear of it, leaving d'Erlon in isolation, and permitting the British troops in the valley of Baztan to retreat to Pamplona in perfect security. Meanwhile Clausel advanced slowly and cautiously owing to the fog, and at about three o'clock in the afternoon struck against Cole's rear-guard near Viscarret. As the main body of the French came up, Clausel manœuvred the British out of three different positions, Cole retiring slowly and always showing his teeth, until at last he turned to bay on the ridge that divides Erro from Zubiri. Picton's division had by this time reached the latter place; and Campbell's Portuguese had arrived at Eugui, so that the junction of

1813, all the forces of the Allied right was assured ; but these July 26. troops were not actually in position with Cole's, and every circumstance invited Soult to attack.

The Marshal, however, never very resolute on the eve of battle, hesitated to commit himself. He judged the force in front of him to be at least fifteen thousand strong, and thought, perhaps with some justice, that little could be accomplished so late in the day. He had, moreover, received disquieting news from d'Erlon, dated on the previous afternoon, to the effect that he had failed to carry the peak of Atchiola, and had halted his troops. This was literally true. D'Erlon had been so much dismayed by Barnes's counter-attack that he became nervous about his right flank ; and, being none too confident about his left also, he never budged an inch during the whole of the 26th, but sent out futile reconnaissances towards Echalar on the one side, and the passes of Berdaritz and Ispégui on the other. Darmagnac did indeed penetrate as far down the valley as Ariscun, pushing his advanced guard on to Elizondo ; but, d'Erlon having ordered him to look to his left rather than to his front, he could do no more. The result of the day's work, therefore, was that Soult had six divisions massed together in the valley of the Erro and three on the heights of Maya, instead of three in the Erro, three in the Baztan, and three more either supporting the last-named or manœuvring farther westward towards Santesteban. His adversaries, however, were of little better spirit than d'Erlon. In the course of the day Cole had written to Wellington that he contemplated retirement upon Pamplona ; and Wellington had at once sent orders to Picton, as senior officer, that it was most necessary to check the enemy about Zubiri. This missive reached Picton too late, for by half-past six in the evening he had already decided, in conference with Cole, to fall back upon Pamplona, as there was no position short of it where he could hazard a stand against a superior force. In fact it seems by his own admission that he made no effort to bring his

troops into line with Cole's above the Erro, but resigned ^{1813.} himself from the first to retire. His baggage had July 26. already marched before sunset, and at eleven o'clock in the night he set his troops in motion southward, with Cole's division leading the way, having apparently no thought of anything but escape from the French. Well might Wellington say that his divisional generals when working under his eye were heroes but, apart from him, children.

By daybreak of the 27th Soult was aware that his July 27. opponents had decamped; and at five o'clock Reille received orders to move towards Pamplona by the east bank of the Arga, while Clausel with the artillery and cavalry massed in the rear of his column should follow the great road along the right bank. Thus Clausel's force, which had hitherto formed Soult's left, became the centre; and Reille's, which had formed the centre, became the left. The latter accordingly dropped down the valley of the Erro for a couple of miles beyond the village of that name, and then turned westward to the ascent of the ridge which divides it from the valley of Zubiri. The march along the crest of the ridge was slow and difficult, for the paths were exceedingly bad and narrow, nor could any guides be procured; hence Reille's column fell astern of Clausel's, which latter on arriving at Iroz became briskly engaged with Picton's rear-guard. Impatient to advance, Reille, when opposite Iturdoz, turned the heads of the divisions of Maucune and Lamartinière to the right, and sent them down into the valley of the Arga, directing Foy's division alone to follow the comb of the hill towards Huarte. There was reason for his impatience. The garrison of Pamplona had made a successful sortie; and O'Donnell, smitten with panic, had spiked some of his guns, destroyed his magazines, and, but for the timely arrival of Carlos d'España's corps, would have raised the blockade. Moreover, the right wing of the covering force seemed to be abandoning the fortress to its fate. Cole had already emerged from the mountains into the plain, and

1813. had passed Villaba, making for the high road to Vitoria ;
July 27. and the Third Division was on the very edge of the
• mountains at Huarte, hastening towards the same goal.
Two British divisions were turning tail. Small wonder
if Reille felt confident that all was going well with the
plans of Marshal Soult.

CHAPTER IX

THE Third Division was still tramping steadily southward, 1813. when Picton, while passing one of the Spanish blockading posts, suddenly awoke to the shameful fact that he was abandoning the valleys of the Ulzana and Arga, or in other words the passes of Baztan and Roncesvalles, almost without firing a shot. In fact he discovered that he was running away. At the point where he stood, Huarte, the two valleys were not more than a mile and a half apart, so that, if he turned and showed a front in the tangle of hills immediately to north-east of Pamplona, he could close both of them to the advancing French ; whereas if he retreated another step he would sacrifice Pamplona, San Sebastian, and all the fruits of the victory at Vitoria. His better heart prevailed. Facing about, he sent word to Cole to occupy a chain of heights which dominates both valleys from Oricain on the west to Arleta on the east, so as to form a first line, and stationed his own divisions in echelon to Cole's right rear, with his infantry between Huarte and the hill of Gorraiz, his artillery upon that hill itself, and one brigade of cavalry on the plain behind the infantry. On his left Morillo's Spaniards were extended from Huarte to Villaba, forming a second line to Cole ; and this second line was prolonged by the bulk of O'Donnell's blockading force along a rocky ridge that stretches westward from Villaba towards Berrioplano.

Cole, with a surer eye than Picton's, soon marked a more advantageous position a mile in front of that appointed for him. Here he discovered a height of immense natural strength. From the village of Sorauren

1813. in the valley of the Ulzana on the north the ground rises
July 27. south-eastward in a succession of waves, though in a single ridge, for a full mile, and then falls away east in two spurs to the villages of Arleta and Zabaldica in the valley of the Arga. The summit of this ridge, which I shall name Cole's ridge, lies about a mile south-east of Sorauren, and must be quite twelve hundred feet above the water; but the most striking feature about it is the deep combe, almost steep enough to be called a chasm, which separates it for the length of a full mile from the ridge next to northward, which I shall call Clausel's ridge. At the head or eastward end of this combe there is a narrow neck of higher ground which connects the two ridges; but to south of it they are again divided by another deep chasm which runs down to the valley of the Arga just below the village of Zabaldica. The descent from the summit to eastward is, however, broken immediately to north of the village of Arleta by a very curious conical hill, so deeply excavated about its base that, did not its bulk forbid such a supposition, one would almost conjecture it to have been thrown up by human hands. This hill, which I shall call Spanish Hill, was already occupied by two Spanish battalions of the blockading force, which were left there by Cole, together with a Portuguese battalion, to form the right of his line, the right flank being slightly thrown back so as to command the road to Huarte. Next to the left of the Spaniards came Anson's brigade, covering the highest part of the ground; and then in succession from right to left Campbell's Portuguese and Ross's brigade, the last-named of which formed the extreme left, resting on its left flank upon a chapel immediately overlooking Sorauren. Stubbs's Portuguese, attached to the Fourth Division, seem to have stood in rear of the centre of the line, and Byng's brigade was stationed at some distance behind Anson's as a reserve.

Clausel on his march down the valley of the Arga had likewise taken note of Cole's ridge, and on arriving at Zabaldica he pushed out a detachment to secure it.

His troops were promptly driven back by a charge of 1813. the Spaniards from the conical hill; whereupon he July 27. halted his column and turned its head to the right, so as to occupy the ridge immediately facing Cole's array. Accordingly the divisions of Taupin and Vandermaesen toiled up the slope to northward, crowned the height before nightfall, and pushed their advanced parties even into the village of Sorauren. Conroux's division at the same time opened a feeble attack against Spanish Hill, which, according to Clausel's account, it captured but was unable to hold; and a desultory fire of skirmishers was kept up in this quarter almost till nightfall. But beyond this Soult could accomplish nothing. He did indeed direct Foy to send out a reconnaissance towards Huarte; and in obedience to the command that general sent two regiments by Alzuza to Elcano, and on to the valley of the Egües, where they came upon Picton's main position, and saw the whole length of his line from Huarte to Gorraiz. A few cannon shots were fired, but a heavy shower put an abrupt end to an incipient skirmish, which was not renewed. The remainder of Reille's corps, as we have seen, had dropped into the valley of the Arga, from whence, having all the cavalry, artillery and encumbrances of the army, it could not without endless delay be brought forward. Foy's division bivouacked for the night on the hills to north of Alzuza, communicating on its right with Lamartinière's division, which lay on the left bank of the Arga about Iroz, and with Conroux's and Maucune's divisions halted about Zabaldica.

Wellington on this fateful morning had left Almanzoz early, following the valley of the Ulzana downwards to Sorauren, in order to learn the proceedings of Picton. So ill had his generals informed him of their movements and of those of the enemy, that the only orders which he had issued for the 27th were that the Sixth Division should march at daybreak down the valley of the Ulzana to Olagüe, and that Dalhousie should extend the Seventh Division northward to Oyeregui for the better

1813. protection of Hill's position at Almandoz. Not until
July 27. Wellington reached Ostiz had he an inkling of anything unusual ; when, encountering Long's brigade at this village, he learned that Picton had retired upon Huarte. Leaving Murray to stop all troops from descending the valley of the Ulzana until further orders, Wellington galloped at the top of his speed for Sorauren, and on reaching the bridge perceived the divisions of Taupin and Vandermaesen toiling over Clausel's ridge. Realising instantly that his troops in the valley of the Ulzana were cut off, he jumped from his saddle to the ground, and amid loud cries of "The French are coming ; the French are coming," wrote on the parapet his orders to Murray to turn the Sixth and Seventh Divisions from Ostiz by a by-road to Lizasso, and to direct Hill's division to march on the following night to Lanz. Lord Fitzroy Somerset, the only one of his staff who had kept up with him, spurred out of Sorauren with the despatch by one road as the French cavalry came in by another ; and Wellington, remounting, turned his horse to the forbidding slope of Cole's ridge, and galloped to the summit. By the track which he took he passed in rear of Ross's brigade ; but Campbell's Portuguese caught sight of him as he urged his sobbing horse up the ascent, and raised a shout of joy which was caught up by the whole line and swelled into a roar, as the familiar figure in the blue frock-coat raced on, and pulled up at last on the very highest point,¹ to stand erect and alone in full sight of both armies.

¹ The spot where Wellington stood is quite unmistakable, as any one who goes over the ground can see for himself. Soult's standpoint is almost as certain, for he would naturally have selected the most commanding eminence to view the whole situation. I can only give an idea of the ground by employing a very homely simile—that of a leg of mutton with one thick slice cut out—the French on one side of the cut, the Allies on the other, and Wellington and Soult upon the highest points on either side. There is a track leading to the summit from the road close to Sorauren which, it is safe to conjecture, was that followed by Wellington. The ascent is very steep, but Wellington always rode thoroughbred horses. No underbred horse would have galloped to the summit.

To right and left of him stretched the lines of blue-^{1813.}
clad Portuguese and scarlet English; before him yawned July 27.
the deep narrow combe, covered with grass and studded
with sparse bushes of box; over against him were
Clausel's columns, trudging on with the short springy
step which distinguishes the French infantry; and before
these last upon a high point, not less conspicuous than
that on which he stood himself, was a group of officers
adorned with gorgeous gold lace and fluttering plumes.
A spy, who served both sides, presently identified the
most prominent of this group as Soult, and Wellington
could divine from his gestures much of what he was
saying. It may be doubted whether the British General
uttered any such soliloquy as is ascribed to him by
Napier, to the effect that the sound of the cheers would
daunt Soult from making any attack until the morrow,
and so gain time for the Sixth Division to come up;
but certain it is that, though it was not yet noon, the
Marshal made no serious movement on that day. The
appearance of Cole's array had doubtless been a surprise
to him, and Wellington's dramatic entry had accentuated
that surprise, but the French plans were already going
awry. Reille, who ought to have been in the valley of
the Ulzana, was in the valley of the Arga; d'Erlon, who
should have been following Reille in the valley of the
Ulzana, had been neither seen nor heard of. As a
matter of fact, on the morning of the 27th d'Erlon had
moved Abbé's division from the pass of Maya to Le-
carroz, and Darmagnac's to the heights before Elizondo;
but, finding Hill in position at Irurita, had refrained
even from disturbing Sir Rowland's outposts. More-
over, whatever the force at Soult's disposal, the fact
remained that the position taken up by the Allies was
not less steep of access and, from its contracted front
of barely two miles from valley to valley, even more
formidable than that of Bussaco. Success was at best
problematical; and failure, owing to the defective
organisation of transport and supply, might be ruinous.

At four o'clock in the afternoon Wellington de-

1813. July 27. spatched orders for the Sixth Division to march at dawn of the 28th from Lizasso to Ollocarizqueta, about three miles north-west of Sorauren, and for the Seventh and Second Divisions to follow in the track of the Sixth as soon as possible. Pack, it may be mentioned, had duly reached Lizasso and halted there for the night of the 27th; and Dalhousie, receiving his instructions at Santesteban at seven in the evening, marched all night and came in likewise to Lizasso at noon of the 28th. Hill was unable to cross the pass of Velate until the 28th, and then only with great difficulty and at the sacrifice of two cannon, which fell over a precipice and were damaged beyond repair. At eight in the evening of the 27th, upon an alarm that twelve hundred French had crossed the river at Sorauren towards Lizasso, Wellington sent two thousand of O'Donnell's Spaniards to Ollocarizqueta so as to keep the road open; and he despatched orders to Pack that, if prevented by the enemy from following the road, he must make his way across country rather than fail to arrive at his destination. For the rest, though hoping to check the French before Pamplona, Wellington took every precaution for retreat to his left flank, so that with his right at Irurzun, his centre about Tolosa, and his left before San Sebastian, he might still cover the siege of the last-named fortress, even if obliged to give up the blockade of Pamplona. For this reason he had ordered the Light Division, which on the 27th was at Zubieta, to retire to Lecumberri, ready to take its place in the new line; and Murray had indicated to Hill roads by which he could bring his artillery to the same point from Lizasso in case of necessity.¹

In the evening Soult called his generals together and consulted them as to the operations for the morrow. All except Clausel, who had done his utmost to find outlets for deployment from the valley of the Ulzana, declared in favour of a frontal attack rather than a turning movement from the north, being doubtless influenced by the expectation of d'Erlon's arrival. Soult

¹ *Wellington Supp. Desp.* vii. 123-124; xiv. 260.

accordingly sent Conroux's division from the valley of 1813.
the Arga to that of the Ulzana, and entrusted the main July 27.
onset to the three divisions of Clausel's corps, which
were directed to assail the northern end of Cole's ridge
about the chapel of Sorauren. The divisions of Maucune
and Lamartinière were appointed at the same time to
make a diversion, the former against the neck which
connects Clausel's ridge with Cole's, the latter against
Spanish Hill, each holding one brigade in reserve. Foy,
reinforced by Pierre Soult's division of cavalry,¹ was
instructed to renew his demonstration on the river
Egües, but not to commit himself so deeply as to be
unable to regain Alzuza in case the main assault should
fail. Wellington on his side made no change in the
dispositions beyond reinforcing the Spaniards on Spanish
Hill with the Fortieth regiment from Anson's brigade,
and placing Campbell's Portuguese on the extreme left
by the chapel, with Ross's brigade immediately on their
right. Excluding the Sixth Division he could oppose
about sixteen thousand men to about thirty thousand of
the French.

Soult, according to his own account, spent the entire July 28.
morning in reconnaissance, and directed that no movement
should be made until one o'clock, when the columns of
Clausel and Reille were to advance simultaneously. His
inaction was extraordinary, for he was aware that rein-
forcements were on their way to the British, and that
every moment was precious. It may be that he was
awaiting news of d'Erlon ; but that general as usual was
not hurrying himself. On the morning of the 28th
d'Erlon at last brought forward Maransin's division to
Elizondo, and finding that Hill had retired, gave orders
to Darmagnac and Abbé to follow him over the pass of
Velate. D'Erlon claimed to have overtaken Hill's rear-
guard, and to have compelled him to abandon cannon and
waggons ; but it is certain that Sir Rowland's losses in
guns and material were due wholly to accident, and that

¹ Strengthened by one regiment of divisional cavalry, the 13th
Chasseurs, from Reille's corps.

1813. Ashworth, who covered the retreat of the Second Division with his Portuguese, saw no sign of any enemy. July 28. Indeed the head of d'Erlon's column did not reach Almandoz, some way short of the pass of Velate, until ten in the morning, whereas the head of Hill's entered Lizasso at half-past one,¹ and d'Erlon, who halted for the night at Lanz, did not even discover until the evening that Hill had left the valley of the Ulzana and turned eastward. But whatever Soult's reasons for delay, his apathy was amazing to Wellington, who, when Pack's division began to come upon the ground at half-past ten, wrote to Graham that he had no expectation of being attacked at all on that day.

As a matter of fact, Pack's arrival caused Clausel to begin the action somewhat prematurely. Warned by Soult that British reinforcements were coming down the valley of the Ulzana, Clausel had sent troops up that valley and over the crest of the hills which separate it from the valley of the Arga. He had, however, also taken the precaution to send a captain of engineers to watch the next valley to westward; and this officer presently reported that a column of seven to eight thousand men was marching parallel to the heights of San Cristobal and some way to north of them, with the evident intention of joining the Allied army. At about half-past eleven some troops of this column occupied a hill which commands Sorauren on the western side of the Ulzana river; and two battalions of them lined the hedges alongside the stream. As the western bank of the Ulzana commands the eastern along the whole length of the water from Sorauren to Villaba, this disposition ensured free access to the valley for the rest of Pack's division.

Half an hour later Pack's main body entered the mouth of the valley between Oricain and Villaba, formed up on the right bank of the river, and halted. At a quarter to one a squadron of British cavalry came

¹ See the letters of Dalhousie and Hill to Murray in *Supp. Desp. viii.* 142-143.

up from Villaba within half musket-shot of Sorauren ; 1813. whereupon the main body crossed the river and marched July 28. forward to within musket-shot of the same village, where the foremost troops deployed to cover the arrival of the rest. Clausel was embarrassed and perplexed. It was doubtful whether the soldiers which he had sent up the valley could be recalled in time for the appointed attack at one o'clock ; and meanwhile he was obliged to push forward Conroux's division, so as at once to fend Pack off from Sorauren, which was the one egress by which the divisions of Taupin and Vandermaesen could debouch to the assault of Cole's ridge, and to delay as far as possible the junction of the Sixth Division with Wellington's line of battle. Conroux, therefore, became hotly engaged at once, while Taupin and Vandermaesen formed their columns at the bottom of the combe ; the former on the French right, its objective being the chapel, the latter two hundred yards to Taupin's left. Finding that Conroux was committing himself too deeply in the valley and was suffering heavy loss, Clausel ordered him likewise to change direction to southward, and ascend the hill on the right of Taupin so as to turn the British left flank.

The whole of the slope below the British line was now covered with skirmishers, under cover of whose fire the three columns toiled up the choking ascent ; and so manfully did Taupin's soldiers bear themselves that they fought their way up to the chapel, in the face of a storm of bullets in front and flank, drove the 7th Caçadores from it, and mastered that low point of the position. But meanwhile Conroux's attack, ill-directed from the first, had been beaten back by a terrific fire on its front and both flanks from the Sixth Division and Campbell's brigade. The Caçadores rallied upon Ross's brigade, and the whole charging down upon Taupin's exhausted men swept them headlong from the ground that they had won. Nevertheless Taupin's second brigade, that of Béchaud, gallantly recovered itself and faced the hill once more ;

1813. while Vandermaesen's column, more and more dis-
July 28. ordered by the steepness of the ascent, crept steadily up towards the summit. Maucune, likewise, threw into the action two of his regiments, the 17th and 34th Light, which, descending from the topmost ridge of Clausel's hill, crossed the neck in two columns upon Vandermaesen's left. Still hoping for success at the sight of these troops, Clausel rallied Taupin's first brigade and Conroux's division, and sent them again up the hill ; but it was too late. The brave men of Béchaud, Vandermaesen and Maucune actually gained the crest of the British position, swept away the 10th Portuguese, which was on the left of Ross's brigade, and by uncovering Ross's flank compelled him also to retire. But Wellington brought up Anson's brigade at a running pace ; and the Twenty-seventh and Forty-eighth, after a desperate fight and three separate charges with the bayonet, drove the wearied French headlong to the bottom of the hill. Wellington then directed Madden's Portuguese to attack Sorauren ; but three of Conroux's battalions held the village stoutly, shooting down several men and horses of a battery which had approached too closely to the firing line ; and the attempt was presently abandoned.

On Soult's left, Gauthier's brigade of Lamartinière's division was appointed for the attack on Spanish Hill, which was opened by a single regiment, the 120th of the Line. The onset, being ill-directed, was repulsed ; but Gauthier presently renewed the fight with the 122nd as well as the 120th, and with them he reached the summit and overthrew the Spanish regiment El Praira. Then, however, he met the Fortieth, and after a few minutes' terrible duel at point-blank range, his men were driven down the slope with heavy loss. They rallied before they reached the foot of the hill, but, ere they could be reinforced, Soult gave orders for the action to cease. Still further to the left Foy's demonstration was confined to an absurd contest between the French cavalry with carbines and the Tenth Hussars with pistols, which

naturally was unfavourable to the Hussars until their comrades of the Eighteenth came up also with carbines and drove the enemy off. However, Foy flattered himself that he had paralysed the whole of the British cavalry and artillery, as well as a body of infantry outnumbering his own division, so that he at any rate found his day's work satisfactory.

He was called off, together with the rest of the French troops, at half-past four by Soult, nominally because, as the Marshal reported to Clarke, two fresh British divisions had come upon the scene (which was absolutely false), but really because the French attack had completely failed. It is true that a large proportion of Soult's troops had not been engaged, six out of eleven regiments in the divisions of Maucune and Lamartinière, and the whole of Foy's division, having hardly fired a shot ; but the losses of the rest had been very severe. Soult himself stated them at eighteen hundred killed and wounded ;¹ but Clausel confessed to about two thousand fallen in his three divisions alone, Maucune to six or seven hundred, and Gauthier to "fifty killed and several hundred wounded."² We shall be within the mark, therefore, in concluding that Soult's casualties amounted to three thousand ; and the figure can be accepted with the more certainty since we know that the officers who were slain or hurt numbered one hundred and fifty-one. The behaviour of the French seems to have been very unequal, as indeed is hinted by Clausel when he says that the troops in general showed bravery ; and undoubtedly the majority of the regiments must have displayed the most devoted courage. In the 32nd regiment of Conroux's division there fell nineteen officers ; in the 47th of Taupin's division twenty-four ; and in the

¹ Napier with his usual adulation of Soult accepts these figures as true, but, as my text shows, they are demonstrably false.

² Yet Soult had the effrontery to say, "L'affaire du 28me était sans consequence." *Arch. de la Guerre*. Soult to Clarke, 12th Aug. 1813.

1813. 34th Light of Maucune's division twenty-two. In July 28. Vandermaesen's division only thirteen officers fell altogether, which belies Clausel's statement that they maintained a most obstinate combat on the summit of the hill ; and it seems probable that, as usual, the heads of the French columns fought with the utmost gallantry, but that the rear dissolved and fled before coming up to the fighting line. On the side of the Allies the casualties are stated by Napier at twenty-six hundred,¹ which is probably correct, for the officers killed and wounded did not exceed one hundred and twenty-seven, seventy-six of them British and fifty-one Portuguese. The Seventh, Twenty-seventh and Forty-eighth were the British regiments which suffered most severely ; the Seventh having two hundred and thirteen casualties. The Portuguese losses were also heavy ; for their regiments, notably the 4th, 10th and 12th, behaved excellently, and took a highly distinguished share in the honours of the day.

Considering that the strength of the French was practically double that of the Allies, the action has been by some authorities considered one of the most honourable that is recorded of British troops ; and it is certain that the fighting was very severe, and that the Fourth Division displayed admirable tenacity. Of the stubbornness shown on both sides there are incidents narrated which have no parallel in other contests. Thus the officers of the French 59th, in Vandermaesen's division, are said to have seized the British officers by the collar in their impatience, and to have tried to drag them out of the ranks ; while in the assault of Spanish Hill they were seen to haul their weary soldiers up the ascent by their belts. This same weariness played a great part in the battle. The French, owing to the usual neglect of supplies and transport, were weak from sheer starvation. Many of them failed to reach the summit of the hill from absolute physical exhaustion,

¹ The casualties cannot be exactly ascertained, those of the 28th July being included with those of previous days.

and many, even when they arrived at the top, fell down, 1813. unable to move any farther. In truth, to one who has stood upon the ground, the surprising thing is not that the French should have been beaten, but that they should ever have had the strength, after climbing so steep an acclivity, to fight upon any terms at all.¹ July 28.

Throughout the 28th Wellington's staff were aware of the advance of d'Erlon down the valley of Baztan, but had no clear knowledge of the positions either of Hill or of Dalhousie. Indeed, they were under the impression that Hill was following immediately after Pack, and that Dalhousie was bringing up the rear. Wellington's great anxiety was lest d'Erlon should turn his left flank by way of Irurzun; and Murray despatched three successive orders in the afternoon with the object of echelonning the division that was nearest to Pack between Marcalain and Oricain, and halting the rearmost at Lizasso, so as to parry any such movement. By ten o'clock that night Murray was aware of the true position of affairs, and, being further apprised early on the 29th that d'Erlon appeared to be moving on Lizasso, he ordered Dalhousie back to that place to support Hill there, upon the understanding that, should d'Erlon continue to advance by the valley of Baztan, the Seventh Division should at once return to its appointed station on the left of the line at Sorauren. He also directed Alten to fall back to Irurzun and there to await further commands. Soult on his side had received on the 28th a report from d'Erlon announcing that three divisions were on his front about Irurita, which the Marshal found difficult to reconcile with the fact that the Sixth Division had repulsed Conroux's division at Sorauren; though he hoped that this timid colleague would at any

¹ The reports of Reille, Clausel and Soult upon this action (*Arch. de la Guerre*) are fairly full and are well summarised by Capt. Vidal de Lablache. On the English side the materials are meagre, consisting practically of Wellington's Despatches, upon which Napier's account, except for a few picturesque details, is manifestly founded.

1813. rate have moved on, as we know that d'Erlon did, later in the day.

July 29. On the morning of the 29th d'Erlon, having ascertained that there was only a rear-guard left in Hill's position of the previous evening, recommenced his march with two divisions down the valley of Baztan to Ostiz, where he received orders from Soult to halt and keep a sharp look-out to northward, where Maransin had also taken up a position at Lanz. By half-past three Wellington was informed as to d'Erlon's movement; and at half-past six he directed Dalhousie to be ready to fall into his place to the left (or north) of the Sixth Division; while Hill was to send his three Portuguese brigades to Marcalain, and keep his three British brigades at Lizasso, pushing his cavalry well forward towards Lanz and Olagüe, so as to alarm d'Erlon for his right flank and rear. For the rest, the day was spent by the British in hauling a battery up to the chapel of Sorauren, and posting two more so as to bring a cross-fire to bear on that village, besides a fourth on one of the highest points of Cole's ridge. The troops were in good spirits, though they had received no rations but rum on the previous evening. They were confident of success and yet on most cordial terms with their enemies. The working parties of both armies mingled together to bury the dead; and Highlanders and French soldiers were seen digging potatoes together in perfect amity.¹

On the French side the desperate but fruitless efforts of the previous day had given place to a reaction which was the more acute owing to want of food. In his report of the 28th to Clarke, Soult spoke of holding his position for some days to see what the Allies would do; but this was mere boasting, for he was bound to move towards the frontier of France to obtain supplies. He therefore tacitly abandoned the idea of relieving

¹ *Personal Narrative of a Private Soldier of the 42nd*, p. 197. The orders of Wellington and Murray are in *Supp. Desp.* viii. 143-152.

Pamplona ; but, having heard from d'Erlon that Villatte ^{1813.} was undertaking the passage of the Bidassoa, he assumed ^{July 29.} that the Reserve must have arrived about Andoain and Hernani, and laid his plans for relieving San Sebastian. Accordingly on the 29th Soult sent his artillery back by St. Jean Pied de Port to St. Jean de Luz, ordered supplies to be sent from Bayonne to Zubiri by the 30th, and to Lanz, through the route of Elizondo, by the 2nd of August, and made his dispositions for a march across the mountains upon San Sebastian. His idea was to direct his first movement northward upon Santesteban, so that on the 30th of July the entire army should be in the vicinity of Lizasso. From thence he designed to turn westward, either towards the main road from Pamplona to Tolosa, or rather more to the north towards Andoain and Hernani, where he hoped to regain touch with Villatte and with his supply-trains and artillery.

Accordingly d'Erlon was instructed to march from Ostiz with his three divisions of infantry and Treilhard's division of dragoons to the vicinity of Lizasso and there take position, occupying the roads leading to Pamplona in force, and pushing reconnaissances northward towards Doña Maria and south-westward towards Irurzun. So much for the head of the column, whose task was not difficult. There remained the more delicate business of drawing off the rear from before the face of the enemy, the masking of which movement was entrusted to Reille. His instructions were to occupy, and if necessary to defend, the ground held by the French on the 28th by echelonning his three divisions between Zabaldica and Sorauren ; and it was particularly enjoined upon him that the change of position must be carefully screened so that the Allies should perceive nothing of it. As Reille's battalions approached the valley of Baztan, they were to relieve those of Clausel, which would then march northward and dispose themselves between Etulain and Olagüe, ready either to continue their progress or in case of need to support

1813. Reille. Three days later Soult reported that he had
July 29. given Reille a subsequent order to retreat at once if
attacked ; but, according to the original instructions,
Reille was to follow Clausel at nightfall under cover of
the darkness, and to call off all troops left in the valley
of the Arga in the same direction. Moreover, from
the 30th onward that valley was to be abandoned as the
army's line of operations, which was to be henceforth
transferred to the valley of Baztan.

In the exercise of his discretion Reille decided to
relieve Maucune's division by Foy's, so as to enable
Maucune in turn to relieve Conroux's division, and to
transfer Lamartinière's division from its former place in
the centre to the left or eastern flank. Foy left the
July 30. heights of Alzuza at midnight, reached Zabaldica at one,
and scaling the hill came upon the rear of Maucune's
division, which, owing to the difficulty of executing its
flank movement in the dark, had made little progress.
Pushing the tail of Maucune's column¹ before him, Foy
massed his division upon the crest of Clausel's ridge,
while Lamartinière brought his men up to Foy's left.
But it was nearly six o'clock before Maucune's leading
files reached Sorauren, so that the bulk of Clausel's
troops were already in movement towards Ostiz, and
one brigade of Conroux's division still remained un-
relieved at the village. Broad daylight revealed to
Wellington Reille's half-completed manœuvre, which
was in fact a flank march across his front. The Allied
skirmishers at once swarmed out, and drove off the
French posts on the north side of the valley of the
Ulzana, after which, under cover of their guns, they
assaulted and took Sorauren. In such difficult cir-
cumstances the relief of Conroux's troops by Maucune's
was both difficult and costly ; and to secure his retreat
Maucune was obliged to recover the rearmost houses by
a counter-attack. At this moment, apparently at about
seven o'clock, the British cannonade on the village

¹ "Refoulant devant elle la queue de la division Maucune."
Foy's own expression—Girod de l'Ain, p. 221.

seems to have slackened, and Clausel rode forward to rejoin his leading divisions at Ostiz.

1813.
July 30.

But already Wellington had thought out and issued his order for a general attack. Picton was to lead his division up the valley of the Arga to turn the French position by its left. Cole was to hold Reille in front by a demonstration against Clausel's ridge, but not to press his attack until the movements against the enemy's flank had begun to take effect. Byng's brigade, the Sixth Division (now under command of Pakenham) and the Spaniards under O'Donnell, were to advance by the valley of the Ulzana. Dalhousie's division was to march along the heights parallel to and west of the valley of the Ulzana, but, like Cole, was not to attack except under advantageous conditions. Finally Hill was to direct his troops towards Lanz and Olagüe, regulating his movements by those of the enemy. The positions of both armies thus became extremely complicated, and it is difficult to say what was their front, their right or their left. Roughly speaking, Soult's force took the shape of the letter I, north and south, Clausel's corps marching in column along the valley of the Ulzana representing the down stroke ; Reille's corps, in position on Clausel's ridge, the serifs (or cross-bar) at the foot ; and d'Erlon's corps about Lizasso, the serifs at the head. Wellington's troops, to use the same rough simile, resembled the letter L drawn round the I—the down stroke representing the Second and Seventh Divisions, Byng's brigade and Sixth division ; the lateral stroke Cole's division ; and the serif, running upward from the end of the lateral stroke, Picton's division. Since Soult intended to turn westward upon reaching Lizasso, it is possible to treat the general front of his line of battle as lying toward the west, in which case d'Erlon's corps would form his right, Clausel's his centre, and Reille's his left ; and upon this assumption Wellington's line of battle would face to the east, Picton's and Cole's divisions forming his right, Byng's brigade, Pakenham's and Dalhousie's divisions and

1813. O'Donnell's Spaniards constituting his centre, and Hill's
July 30. division his left. In this sense the descriptions of the action that followed have for the most part been written, not, as it seems to me, without obscuring the purport of the movements upon both sides. Soult's march was essentially one of retreat; and it was only because he sought to disguise the fact from himself and from his master that he, and his admirers after him, have tried to distract attention from the most important point in any retreat, namely, the rear-guard.

As we have seen, the safe withdrawal of the rear-guard was delayed, first by the slow progress of Maucune's division in the dark, and later by the Allied attack upon Sorauren. Hence it was that Foy's division was compelled to remain halted upon the crest of Clausel's ridge, where a British battery, upon a high point of the opposite hill, opened fire upon it. "We did not want to fight," wrote Foy in his account of the affair, "and we were formed in masses under cannon-shot. We had been obliged to climb the heights so as to be ready to retire at the right moment, and we saw our flanks turned by the two valleys upon our right and left." Reille perceived the danger only when it was too late, and immediately lost his head. He made no effort to recall Maucune's division from the basin of Sorauren to the upper slopes of the ridge, nor to withdraw it by that line; and he left Foy for some time exposed to the British cannonade before he ordered him to fall back along the crest of the hill. Yet he was not without excuse, for by this time Wellington had given the order for a general advance, and the Allied columns were pouring down on all sides to the attack. Byng's brigade descended upon Sorauren from the chapel, while Madden's Portuguese assailed it by the road. Maucune's division, much shattered by the British cannon, strove desperately to hold them back. Clausel, for his part, had hardly started to join his leading troops than he perceived Inglis's brigade of the Seventh Division coming down from the heights on the west full upon

his left flank. Vandermaesen, whose division was marching in front of Conroux's in the centre of Clausel's column, at once faced it to the left, and sent troops up the western heights to support Conroux's flank-guard; but these were met on the crest by Inglis's brigade, which, after a severe fight, drove them down to the water towards Ostiz. Much troubled for the safety of Maucune, Reille sent him instructions to evacuate Sorauren and fall back to a defile in rear, and, when Maucune answered that this was impossible, he repeated the order to one brigade in person. But the unhappy French withdrew only to find themselves exposed to so heavy a fire that they ran back even up the choking ascent of Clausel's ridge to escape it.

On his right flank in the valley of the Arga Reille's dispositions were not more happy. As Picton opened his turning movement with caution, albeit with rapidity, Reille weakened Lamartinière's front by sending his first brigade to the top of Clausel's ridge, so as to protect the retreat of Foy, and kept his second brigade to oppose Wellington's Third Division. Two battalions of the 120th held Iroz stoutly for a time, until Picton turned their left, when the second brigade likewise was compelled to ascend Clausel's ridge and take refuge with its companion.¹ Picton's skirmishers, swarming on their flank as they moved, soon compelled both to retire, and proceeded to open their attack upon Foy. At about the same time the Fourth Division appeared on the crest of Clausel's hill, having advanced from Cole's ridge, completing the ring of fire round Maucune's ill-fated soldiers. The village of Sorauren was carried by Byng and the Portuguese, and Maucune's unlucky troops fled away in utter rout. Finding their retreat cut off, they swarmed up the side of Clausel's hill, followed by fragments of Clausel's two remaining divisions, a disorderly mass of some thousands of terrified men. Maucune's division had left in the

¹ Lamartinière's own report reverses the rôle of his two brigades, but otherwise it agrees in substance with Reille's.

1813. valley about eighteen hundred killed, wounded and July 30. prisoners.¹

Thus Soult's rear-guard had been outflanked both to right and left, and, since Clausel's corps had been as deeply engaged in the action as Reille's, it had suffered hardly less severely. Conroux's division had been as much cut up as Maucune's, and Vandermaesen's not less, indeed probably more, than Lamartinière's. Taupin's, which had been so roughly handled on the 28th, had been naturally selected by Clausel to lead the retreat; and its commander placed it, together with such other troops as he could rally, in position on the hills to the east of Ostiz, facing south, in the expectation that Reille's corps, retreating by the leading spur of Clausel's hill, would form on his left. For an hour and a half Taupin waited in vain, and then, seeing the Seventh Division advancing up the valley, he retired slowly, facing about from time to time to exchange shots with the British, first to Étulain, where he halted for three hours, and ultimately to Olagüe, where he regained touch with d'Erlon at Lizasso. It was nothing strange that Reille came not. After the dispersion of Maucune's division and the repulse of Lamartinière's, Foy was left upon the crest of Clausel's hill, encumbered by some thousands of stragglers from Clausel's corps, and with Cole advancing upon his front, Picton harassing his left flank, and every prospect that the Sixth Division might intercept his retreat. He retired hastily northward along the leading spur, with Cole and Picton after him. One of his own brigades and part of Lamartinière's division were nearly cut off, and he himself narrowly escaped being taken; but at about one o'clock he sank the hill to the village of Esain, and halted his people on the heights beyond the valley. Altogether there were ten or twelve thousand men, representing what remained of

¹ Maucune's own report states his loss at 1800 (*Arch. de la Guerre*, Marche de la 7^{me} division du 20 juillet au 3 août, 1813); but Vidal de Lablache gives the figures at 17 officers, 814 soldiers killed and wounded, 13 officers and 531 soldiers taken.

Reille's corps, mingled with stragglers from all three of 1813. Clausel's divisions, many of them wounded, half of July 30. them strayed from their regiments and marching every man for himself, one and all exhausted with fasting and with the heat of a burning sun, scared, shaken and demoralised.

In less than an hour the approach of Cole's division warned them to move ; and Reille gave orders to retire upon Lanz. The remains of Maucune's and Lamartinière's divisions followed the road in the valley and in the course of the evening came up with Clausel between Olagüe and Lizasso. Foy's division was the last to move, preceded by a mass of baggage and a huge mob of stragglers, and began to thread its way by a bad path through the coppice on the hillside. But it was constantly necessary for his troops to ascend the hill in order to drive off the skirmishers of the Allies ; and between these distractions and the aimless wandering of the lost men the column missed its way, and Foy found himself at Iragui in the valley of the Arga instead of in that of the Ulzana. The path was so narrow that to countermarch was impossible, and Foy decided to encamp where he stood ; but at seven o'clock Picton's division came near and he was obliged to move once more. Apprehending that, if he turned towards Lanz, he would find that way barred by the Allies, he marched at eight o'clock for Eugui and the track leading to the valley of Baigorri, by which, after vainly trying to find an outlet to westward, he returned on the 1st of August to St. Jean Pied de Port. A regiment of horse and a battalion which had formed Lamartinière's flank-guard in the valley of Roncesvalles escaped by the same line. Part of Gauthier's brigade, which had gone astray in following Foy, returned to Lanz, but, finding Reille no longer there, retired by the pass of Velate to Elizondo, and, after a brush with the Allies about that place, made their way safely by the pass of Maya to Ainhoa. Altogether, between strays of this kind, stragglers of all corps, and three thousand prisoners taken by the

1813. Allies, Soult's army was reduced by the strength of July 30. fully two divisions.

And where, it may be asked, was Soult throughout this day? Early in the morning he had left Zabaldica for Olabe, about a mile north of Sorauren, where he found, according to his own account, Clausel's leading divisions beginning their march to Étulain, and Conroux's division already relieved by Maucune's and preparing to follow them. He waited there during the first attack of the Allies upon Sorauren, satisfied himself that it had been vigorously repelled, and then, having information through English deserters that the Allied columns, which he knew to be in motion on the west, were marching on Lizasso, he decided that the opportunity was favourable for falling upon Hill's corps while it was standing in isolation. Soult therefore galloped away to d'Erlon, whom he found facing Hill's division, which was occupying an extended range of hills between Beunza and Marcalain. With Soult's approval d'Erlon then sent Darmagnac's division to make a false attack on the front, while Abbé's made for a hill on Sir Rowland's left which dominated the rest of the position. Both divisions became seriously engaged and suffered more than one repulse, until Abbé used his superior numbers to turn Hill's left. Thereupon the British general fell back in good order to the next range of hills between Marcalain and Béasain, and, being joined by Morillo's Spaniards and Campbell's Portuguese, held his own successfully till nightfall. And it was for this miserable tactical victory, by which he flattered himself that he had opened the road to San Sebastian, that Soult had neglected his rear-guard. It is absurd to say with Napier that the project was feasible, and that there was nothing to stop him. It would be as reasonable to argue that, because a forlorn hope has reached the summit of a breach, a fortress is therefore taken. All depends upon the force that follows the forlorn hope. If the storming columns come on in unbroken masses, success may be won; but if they are torn to tatters in

flanks and rear, lose a third of their numbers before 1813. they reach the glacié, and leave the remnant to struggle July 30. on rather in flight than in attack, then defeat is certain. And so it was in Soult's case. For a few short hours he plumed himself on his achievement, for at three in the afternoon he wrote to Reille that d'Erlon had beaten three English divisions (as a matter of fact only the Portuguese had been engaged), and ordered him to follow Clausel to Olagüe. Both of these generals had at the moment only a handful of beaten and discouraged troops under their hand, and could hardly have made them fight if they had tried. They arrived at Olagüe and Lizasso in the evening, and undeceived Soult; showing him plainly that the only course left to him was immediate retreat by the valley of Baztan.

This then was the position on the evening of the 30th. Soult's army, reduced in numbers by fully fifteen thousand men, with no fighting power except in d'Erlon's corps, lay about Olagüe and Lizasso, of course with no supplies. On the side of the Allies the casualties had reached some nineteen hundred, twelve hundred of which had fallen upon the Portuguese, who had borne the brunt of both actions. Hill, now reinforced to a strength of fifteen thousand, lay upon the left rear of the French about Béasain; Picton's advanced guard, at any rate, had reached Iragui full upon their right flank; and the main body was in touch with that of the French at Olagüe. It was difficult for Wellington to divine even approximately the meaning of the enemy's movements during the day, for he had seen bodies of them retreating towards Roncesvalles and Les Aldudes upon one side, and up to the valley of Baztan on the other; but he had concluded early in the day that the bulk of the French were withdrawing by the route last named, and made his dispositions accordingly. Picton therefore was ordered to follow the road up to the pass of Roncesvalles; and the Sixth Division together with Campbell's Portuguese was bidden to join them by way of Eugui, so as to protect the right flank of the army. The

1813. Fourth Division was appointed to take the place of the
 July 30. Sixth in the valley of Ulzana ; Hill, with O'Donnell's Spaniards in support, was to move towards Lanz and turn the northern flank of any position that the enemy might take up ; and Dalhousie, together with Morillo, was to proceed to the north of Hill and march, under Sir Rowland's command, upon the pass of Doña Maria. Lastly, Alten, of whom nothing had been heard since the 25th, had earlier in the day been ordered first to halt at Lecumberri and to hold his troops fresh for further movements, and afterwards to return without delay to Zubieta.¹

In his position about Lizasso Soult commanded the choice of two routes for his retreat : that of the main road by Lanz and the pass of Velate to Elizondo, which was far the better ; and that of the track leading by the pass of Doña Maria to Santesteban. He chose the latter, nominally because d'Erlon's troops were engaged too far to westward to be brought back to the pass of Velate, but possibly because he presumed that Wellington would move the bulk of his troops by the main
 July 31. road. At one o'clock in the morning of the 31st the French army started on its march, Soult leading the way with two divisions of cavalry and the train ; Reille's two division's following after them ; Clausel next to Reille ; and d'Erlon's corps in rear of all. Reille's troops, which had bivouacked about Olagüe, struck into the route at Lizasso, where Clausel and d'Erlon reported to him that the Allies were already pressing close on the rear-guard, and a staff-officer, who had been sent with a message to Lanz, acquainted him with their movement towards the pass of Velate. Much alarmed, Reille hustled aside the cavalry and vehicles that blocked his front, so as to make sure of gaining the pass before his enemy. Clausel followed with such speed as his disheartened troops could muster ; but progress was naturally slow, and d'Erlon's divisions were brought to a stand.

¹ The orders of 30th July are printed in *Supp. Desp.* viii. 152-154.

Thus it was that at about two o'clock Hill's and Dalhousie's columns came upon the French rear-guard —Abbé's division—drawn up in a wood a little to the north of Lizasso. William Stewart thereupon attacked Abbé in front, while Dalhousie turned his left; but the French general contrived to draw off his troops, though under the fire of Hill's guns, to the height where Darmagnac's and Maransin's divisions were arrayed. There he faced about, but, after twice repelling the onset of Stewart, retired on seeing that Dalhousie was outflanking him upon his left. Darmagnac's division then took up the duty of rear-guard; but a thick fog prevented further pursuit, very much to the relief of Soult, who had been greatly perturbed by the approach of the British from the pass of Velate. Reille's divisions had not reached the pass of Doña Maria until noon, when Soult had ordered the whole of them, excepting one brigade, to take the road to Elizondo; and later in the afternoon the Marshal had directed this remaining brigade to follow the same route. It was ten o'clock at night before d'Erlon's last regiments came into Santesteban, much fatigued but without serious loss.

The casualties of the Allies numbered something under four hundred, and it cannot be said that the day's operations were very satisfactory to them. Wellington in fact did not realise the true situation until the troops had been for some time in motion. He had been misled by false reports to the effect that the French troops to east of him were far more numerous than was really the case; and he actually ordered Hill to return to Lanz and take up his former position in the valley of the Ulzana. Murray, however, being present at the rear-guard action before Lizasso, took upon himself to adhere to the original instructions until the close of the combat, when he suffered Hill to return to Lizasso, leaving Dalhousie on the heights of Doña Maria. Wellington himself had descended into the valley of Baztan, expecting to meet the bulk of the French there; but he came upon no more than one of

1813. Maransin's battalions which had been left to guard a
July 31. large convoy at Elizondo. This luckless battalion was driven off with heavy loss by Byng, who captured the convoy; but at the close of the day's work Byng's brigade and the Fourth Division had not advanced beyond Irurita, where Wellington fixed his head-quarters. Of Picton and the Sixth Division on the right nothing had been heard, and nothing of Alten on the left, to whom at noon Wellington had despatched orders to head off the enemy at Santesteban or at Sumbilla, or at any rate to cut into his line of march at some point. Most unfortunately one of Alten's brigades, when marching for Lecumberri on the 28th, had lost its way, and after wandering about all night had found itself on the morning of the 29th not more than a mile or two from its starting-place. In the course of the day the entire division was with some difficulty assembled at Leiza, whence on the 30th it marched to Lecumberri, retreating by unhappy chance while the rest of the army advanced. Not until the afternoon of the 31st did Wellington's aide-de-camp ride "more dead than alive with fatigue" into Lecumberri,¹ bringing orders for the division to return by forced marches to the Bidassoa. However, a message had been despatched to Graham at eleven o'clock in the morning, bidding him also prepare to intercept the enemy's retreat, and yet another message to the same effect to Longa, so that there was still some hope of dealing the French a fatal blow.

Towards evening the situation of the enemy became clearer; and Wellington concluded that he had six of Soult's divisions before him at Santesteban, and that the remaining three were at Eugui, Roncesvalles, and other points to eastward. In substance this deduction was correct, for he could not possibly know that of the ten or twelve thousand troops with Foy fully one-third were a masterless mob, which Foy himself had tried in vain to rally, and had finally permitted

¹ Surtees, *Twenty-five Years in the Rifle Brigade*, p. 224.

to find their own way back to France. Upon this ^{1813.} view the recall of Hill was most unfortunate; and ^{July 31.} Wellington, fearing that Dalhousie might not be strong enough to maintain himself at Doña Maria, decided to send the Fourth Division to Santesteban to aid the Seventh Division, and to hold Byng's brigade in reserve until Hill could regain his position to the front.

Soult meanwhile had realised that by the occupation of Irurita his retreat by the pass of Maya was cut off, and that his only line of escape was by the gorge of the Bidassoa, or by the roughest of mountain paths.¹ At nightfall of the 31st he sent Reille to Sumbilla with Treilhard's division of dragoons, the wounded, and the train, directing him to make his infantry follow him during the night as soon as it was relieved on the Elizondo road. Arrived at his destination, Reille at ^{Aug. 1.} half-past two despatched the 118th Regiment² of Lamartinière's division from Sumbilla to occupy the bridge of Yanci, the point at which the road to Echalar diverges from the road to Vera. Behind the 118th followed Treilhard's dragoons, which were appointed to form a right flank-guard at Echalar; then the rest

¹ I have some doubts about Napier's story, though inspired and several times repeated by Wellington and confirmed by Larpent, that Soult was unaware of the proximity of the British, and but for the accidental capture of three British marauders would not have marched until daybreak. Napier's account is that four French gendarmes were seen first, riding carelessly up the valley, that presently the three marauders entered the valley and were captured by the gendarmes, and that half an hour afterwards the French drums beat to arms, and their columns began to move off. Now if all these events could be *seen*, it must have been still daylight, whereas all the French reports agree that the army did not begin to march until 1.30 A.M. Wellington himself says that the French were all quiet at midnight. Napier also says that Byng was in possession of the pass of Maya on 31st July; but Wellington's letters (*Supp. Desp.* viii. 162-163) show that Byng's brigade was at Irurita on the 1st of August.

² Reille says the 120th Regiment, but Lamartinière, who was more likely to know, the 118th.

1813. of Lamartinière's division ; then the wounded, carried Aug. 1. on the horses of one of Treilhard's regiments, and lastly Maucune's division. D'Erlon's corps marched after Reille's, as soon as the road was clear, with Soult at its head, and at Sumbilla took a path which led directly to Echalar, but, losing its way, plunged down into the narrow valley which was already choked with Reille's infantry. Great confusion ensued, in the midst of which Clausel's corps came upon the scene, following a track parallel to that taken by d'Erlon. Conroux's division was leading the way, with Taupin's next behind it, and Vandermaesen's in rear of all. Progress on the hillside was slow and spasmodic, and progress on the road there was none. At seven o'clock Cole's division overtook the rear-guard, and his skirmishers swarmed up to the top of the mountains along whose foot the French were marching. Vandermaesen thereupon turned his men also towards the summit, but they were outstripped by the British, who opened a sharp fire from the crest, to which the French, unable to deploy upon the lower spurs, could make no effective reply. Vandermaesen's men were compelled to retreat across precipitous ravines, with heavy loss and great exhaustion to the soldiers. At the entry into Sumbilla Clausel made shift to deploy two of Taupin's regiments, so as to cover the retreat of the rear-guard ; but the crowding in the streets of the village was such that Clausel was fain to lead his corps out of the valley towards the direct path to Echalar. Cole's skirmishers, however, had already reached the northern end of Sumbilla, and it cost Clausel's corps and Darmagnac's division an hour's fighting to push them aside, and to open the way across country to Echalar.

The head of the French column had fared no better than the rear. Towards seven o'clock in the morning the rear of Treilhard's dragoons came galloping back upon Reille and his staff on the road about two miles short of the bridge of Yanci. They could give no account of themselves except that they had received

the order to turn about ; and Reille, making his way ^{1813.} through them with the 2nd Light Infantry, found that ^{Aug. 1.} the panic had been caused by two companies of Spanish infantry which were occupying the left bank of the river above the bridge. Graham, not daring to move his own troops to that point lest Villatte should prove too strong for him, had delegated the duty to Longa ; and Longa in turn had entrusted it to one of his brigadiers, Barcenas. This officer, instead of taking his whole brigade to the spot, had sent only one battalion, of which two companies alone were actually in position to oppose the French. They were easily brushed aside by the 118th ; and Reille, after giving orders that the next French battalion which arrived should occupy the point of vantage from which the Spaniards had been displaced, rode back to Lamartinière's division. Thereupon the Spaniards returned to the crest of the hill a little farther down the river, again opened fire, and were not driven off for some time, during which the whole of the French column was brought to a standstill. Having cleared the passage, and stationed a flank-guard to prevent a repetition of the attack, Reille rode off to Echalar to superintend the arrangement of the bivouac for the night.

The retreat of the French then continued untroubled for a time ; but late in the evening the first brigade of the Light Division, after a march of forty miles, came down the left bank of the Bidassoa to Yanci, drove off Reille's flank-guard, and opened at short range a steady fire, constantly increasing as company after company deployed into line, along a great length of the French column. The confusion thereupon became frightful, for the French troops were pent in between the river on one side and slopes, in many places inaccessible, on the other. The cavalry spurred through the infantry in haste to escape ; the foot-soldiers, heedless of the bullets, upset their officers' baggage-waggons and plundered them ; and the luckless wounded men, of whom there were many carried in litters by their comrades,

1813. held up imploring hands for mercy. Lamartinière's
Aug. 1. division appears to have rushed back in panic. Maucune's, which had neither officers nor cartridges left, climbed the hill out of the road wherever they could, and dispersed. At last, after long delay, Abbé's division was brought forward, by which time the Spaniards had established themselves in considerable force on the bridge. They were driven off with some difficulty ; and Darmagnac's division, then taking up the duty of rear-guard, pushed a strong column across the bridge to hold Alten's troops at bay until the last of the French could be drawn off. Darkness put an end to the firing, and in the night Soult's army was at last assembled about Echalar ; Reille's infantry to north of the village, d'Erlon's on the track of Vera, Clausel's on the track to Sumbilla. Whole regiments had disbanded themselves. Maucune's division had not a thousand men in the ranks. The 1st Regiment of the Line in Vandermaesen's division was reduced, and that not by the British fire, to twenty-seven men. The French had lost nearly all their baggage and several hundred prisoners, and were left without food, without ammunition, without discipline, and without confidence.

Nevertheless the results of the day were, with good reason, unsatisfactory to Wellington, for the damage inflicted upon Soult should have been infinitely greater than it was. The British General did not learn of Soult's retreat until after six o'clock, probably not until eight o'clock at earliest, in the morning, when he rode into Santesteban and gave the following orders. Cole was to push on to Sumbilla, and if possible to Lesaca, followed by Dalhousie and Morillo ; Byng was to secure the pass of Maya, pushing his advanced posts to Urdax, and, if Hill should come up in time, to Maya ; Byng was to occupy the position of Ainhua ; the Sixth Division, of which Wellington had heard nothing, was to move up to Hill's right ; and, lastly, the Light Division was to move upon Yanci and Lesaca

from Zubieta. Evidently, therefore, Wellington counted 1813. upon Longa and Alten only to intercept the French Aug. 1. retreat. Barcnas doubtless showed weakness in not employing his whole brigade to hold the bridge of Yanci, instead of merely laying an ambuscade of one weak battalion one or two miles short of it; and Wellington was greatly incensed against him in consequence.¹ But Alten cannot have received any order except that of the previous day, which named Santesteban and Sumbilla as his objectives. He had been cut off from the army for some days, and can have known little of the circumstances. He can hardly be blamed, therefore, for obeying his instructions, and, indeed, deserves nothing but praise for the extraordinary efforts which brought his men to the scene of action at all.

The true reason for Soult's escape seems to lie in the false movement of retreat prescribed to Hill by Wellington on the 31st; for Murray had originally ordered the bulk of Hill's division to Velate, and a part of it to form up on the right of Dalhousie above Legasa, which would have relieved Wellington of all anxiety for the safety of the Seventh Division, and enabled Dalhousie to strike in earlier upon the flank of Soult's retreat. It is certain from his own letters that Wellington at six o'clock on the morning of the 1st of August was still doubtful about pressing upon the enemy before him, and apprehensive of trouble from the three French divisions which he conceived to be on his right. As a matter of fact, Foy did send down reconnoitring parties from the pass of Berdaritz towards Elizondo in the morning of the 1st of August, and actually marched at nine o'clock towards Errazu to reach the pass of Maya, but desisted upon perceiving in the valley below a body of British cavalry, which could have arrived at the pass before him. This might seem to justify Wellington's precaution in throwing out the Third and Sixth Divisions as his right flank-guard; but, as the event was to prove, these two divisions were utterly

¹ *Wellington Desp.* To Dumouriez, 16th Aug. 1813.

1813. thrown away upon the day of decision. The same false
Aug. 1. movement accounts for the delay in sending Byng's
brigade and other troops forward to the pass of Maya
and beyond it, so as to intercept Soult's retreat at the
Nivelle, a design which was certainly within the scope
of Wellington's plans. But a mountain campaign is
essentially a blind affair, and many things are obscure
to a commander at the moment which seem very clear
when reviewed upon paper a hundred years after the
event.

At the close of the day Alten was at Yanci, Cole
between Yanci and Sumbilla, Dalhousie between Sum-
billa and Santesteban, at which latter village Wellington
had fixed his head-quarters, and Hill near the pass of
Maya. Soult's intention was to extend his right in the
direction of La Rhune, on the other side of which lay
Villatte's Reserve, and his left towards Zugarramurdi.
The road by Vera being no longer open to him, he
moved before daylight to a position between Echalar
and Sare. There Vandermaesen's division was extended
from Echalar along the crest of the hill north-eastward ;
Conroux's next to it on the frontier about Les Palom-
bières ; and Taupin's a little to north of the frontier,
connecting the two aforesaid divisions on one side with
Reille's troops, which lay about the Pic d'Ibantelly,
and on the other with d'Erlon's about the Pic de
Sayberry. The formation was thus that of a double
echelon from the centre, which was formed by Clausel's
corps astride of the pass of Echalar, with Reille's
to the right rear and d'Erlon's to the left rear. To
oust Soult from this position Wellington directed
Alten's division to move over the bridge of Yanci to
Lesaca, and thence to the heights of Santa Barbara, so
as to turn Clausel's right, while the Fourth and Seventh
Divisions advanced upon Echalar, Cole likewise by the
bridge of Yanci against the front, and Dalhousie from
Sumbilla to turn Soult's left flank.

The morning broke with dense fog ; and, as it hap-
pened, Barnes's brigade of the Seventh Division was the

first to come into contact with the enemy. Though alone ^{1813.} and unsupported, it was at once launched to the attack ^{Aug. 2.} by its intrepid leader against the divisions of Conroux and Vandermaesen, which outnumbered it by four to one. A lively action followed ; but, as Clausel confessed, there was no spirit in the French on that day. He did all that a gallant and skilful leader could do, but Conroux's soldiers soon gave way from want of cartridges ; and Vandermaesen's, who relieved them, after checking the British for a moment, broke their ranks likewise, both running to the shelter of Taupin's division in rear, where they were rallied. Meanwhile Kempt's brigade of the Light Division was swarming up the steep ascent to Ibantelly ; and here also the resistance was miserable. The French soldiers took advantage of the fog to slink away, and, though Reille flew at several of them in furious wrath, he could not make them stand. An officer of the Rifles has left a record that this was "the most gentleman-like day's fighting that he ever experienced."¹ With loud shouts nine companies of the Rifles and Forty-third won their way to the summit ; and Reille, unable to see owing to the fog, decided to retreat. At half-past four Conroux's division reached Sare ; the rest of Clausel's corps and the whole of Reille's division followed it ; d'Erlon fell back to Ainhoa ; and the highest ridge of the Pyrenees had been won at a cost of under four hundred killed and wounded.

In the course of the following days the French army took up its former positions : the centre at La Rhune, the right on the sea, the left at Mondarrain. Reille's head-quarters were at St. Jean de Luz, Clausel's at Sare, d'Erlon's at Ainhoa, and Foy, who had made his way down to Cambo, was stationed at St. Jean Pied de Port. To all intent Wellington followed this example, though later he altered the distribution of his divisions owing to the heavy losses suffered by the Second and Fourth. Hill was sent to Aldudes and Roncesvalles ; Picton

¹ Kincaid.

1813, with the Third and Sixth Divisions filled his place in Aug. the valley of Baztan and the pass of Maya; and La Bisbal took up the advanced posts at Echalar, relieving Cole's division, which was held in reserve on the left. The Seventh Division returned to its former station, and the Light Division remained about Lesaca, where Wellington fixed his head-quarters.

So ended Soult's counter-offensive movement for the relief of San Sebastian and Pamplona, in utter failure and an admitted loss of over thirteen thousand killed, wounded and prisoners.¹ He laid the blame upon his troops first, and next upon his subordinate generals. "I was strangely mistaken," he wrote to Clarke, "when I told you that the spirit of the troops was good and that they would do their duty. I confused this sentiment with that of the shame which they felt at the memory of Vitoria. They showed some vigour at the outset, but no staying power. . . . I have seen nothing like it since the levies of 1792, . . . a general told me to-day that, as they approached Pamplona, the soldiers were saying that they would show little fight, as they would sooner be brought back to the frontier than enter the heart of Spain." He complained that weaponless men, on being questioned, replied that the enemy had taken their arms, and, further, that wounded men always left their muskets behind them, as also did the

	1 Officers.			Men.			
	Killed.	Wounded.	Prisoners.	Killed.	Wounded.	Prisoners.	
<i>Right Wing, Reille—</i>							
Foy's Division . . .	6	9	...	78	393	69	555
Maucune's Division .	14	27	25	789	500	1,102	2,457
Lamartinière's Division	10	16	3	79	657	216	981
<i>Centre, d'Erlon—</i>							
Darmagnac's Division	13	65	1	191	1,925	30	2,225
Abbé's Division . .	9	21	1	130	560	29	750
Maransin's Division .	11	34	...	105	783	126	1,059
<i>Left Wing, Clausel—</i>							
Conroux's Division .	16	35	12	145	1,432	747	2,387
Vandermaesen's Div.	16	30	2	153	978	301	1,480
Taupin's Division . .	6	38	...	125	1,007	26	1,202
1st Cavalry Division .	...	2	1	10	25	16	54
2nd Cavalry Division	...	2	1	12	33	19	67
Total . . .	101	277	45	1,807	8,268	2,665	13,163

Return in *Archives de la Guerre*.

men who helped them to leave the field. "Demoralisa- 1813.
tion could hardly go further," was his comment; Aug.
though by a strange irony the victorious Wellington
was making exactly the same complaint of his own
wounded. The Marshal shot three men and arrested
over one hundred more for throwing away their arms,
and altogether vented his displeasure with a severity
which aroused bitter resentment. "Who was it," the
soldiers asked, "who made frontal attacks upon pre-
cipitous positions? Who was it that left the rear-guard
to be cut to pieces at Sorauren?" Soult was right in
saying that his troops had shown dash at the outset,
for nothing could exceed their exertions on the 28th of
July; but it was too much to ask staying power of
them after such heart-breaking work.

In the case of his generals his censure was equally
indiscriminate. D'Erlon deserved all that he received,
and it was not a little; not less so did Villatte, who
had remained inactive with his force on either side of
La Rhune, never attempting to intervene during the
contest of Maya on the 23rd of July, nor to advance on
the 26th, nor to trouble Graham at any time, nor to
help Soult during his retreat on the 1st of August. But
Reille, Clausel and the divisional commanders had never
failed their chief, and merited from him eulogy rather
than reproach. The real day of disaster to the French
was the 30th of July; and no volume of specious argu-
ment can do away with the fact that, on that occasion,
Soult removed himself from the post of difficulty and
danger, in order to gain a trivial and unprofitable
triumph, leaving his lieutenants to extricate themselves
from a most perilous situation as best they could. In
such circumstances a general who complains, as did
Soult, that he could not always be with his subordinates
to show them what to do, can expect from posterity
neither sympathy nor respect.

The loss of the Allies, exclusive of the Spaniards,
during the thirteen days' operations was as nearly as
possible seven thousand one hundred killed, wounded

1813. and taken or missing, just over five thousand being Aug. British and German, and the remainder Portuguese. The Fourth Division and Barnes's brigade of the Seventh Division were the heroes of the fights, which were commemorated on the colours under the name of the Pyrenees ; and Wellington wrote of their services with a warmth which was unusual in him. "It is impossible to describe the enthusiastic bravery of the Fourth Division. . . . In my life I never saw such an attack as was made by General Barnes's brigade upon the enemy above Echalar . . . it is impossible that I can extol too highly the conduct of General Barnes and these brave troops, which was the admiration of all who witnessed it." These later exploits somewhat threw into the shade the noble behaviour of Stewart's division at the pass of Maya, which, however, is no less deserving of praise. Taken altogether, the British soldier has seldom shown himself to greater advantage than during this eventful fortnight.

Nevertheless his old defects were still apparent. There was, oddly enough, a great deal of desertion at this time, and not a little marauding, with disgraceful results. "What do you think," wrote Wellington, "of seventy or eighty of our soldiers having wandered from their regiments during the late operations, and having surrendered themselves to some of the peasantry, who accompanied the French army and whom they ought (*sic*) and would at other times have eaten up?" Such incidents as these help one to understand Wellington's occasional violent outbursts against the character of his troops, for they seem to indicate that the task of controlling the British soldier was in some respects hopeless. To attribute such lapses, as Napier does by implication, "to corrupt aristocratic influence," is merely childish. The truth seems to be rather that, owing to the rigidity of regimental discipline, many men in the Peninsula were always glad to escape from the eye of their officers, but that, the moment they were separated from them, they became utterly helpless.

Only this is certain, that when ranked on the battlefield 1813. they were invincible.¹

¹ The authorities for the battles of the Pyrenees are on the British side singularly few and meagre. Napier's account is practically the only connected one, and it is built not a little upon Wellington's despatches. There is nothing of importance in the Wellington MSS.; and regimental narratives are scanty and worthless. On the French side the reports of Reille, Clausel, d'Erlon, Maucune, Lamartinière and Darmagnac in *Archives de la Guerre* are very full and valuable; and the pith of the whole of them, as also of Soult's letters and other French correspondence, is admirably given by Capt. Vidal de Lablache. Only with the original documents before one can the thoroughness of this officer's work be appreciated.

CHAPTER X

1813. RETURNING now to the war in America, let us recall the position at the close of 1812. The Americans, it will be remembered, instead of concentrating all their efforts upon the capture of Kingston and of Montreal, so as to sever Upper from Lower Canada and threaten Quebec, had squandered their strength in petty operations about Detroit and Niagara, and had been handsomely beaten at all points ; redeeming their mistake only at the close of the year by sending Commodore Chauncey to build a superior fleet on Lake Ontario. Nevertheless the party that favoured war, though mortified, was not discouraged. Madison was re-elected President at the end of the year ; and the sanguine found consolation in the retreat of Wellington from Madrid and in Napoleon's victory at Borodino.

The spring of 1813 brought no change in the general position. General Harrison remained with one American force on the Maumee, faced by Proctor on the Detroit River ; British and Americans still glared at each other across the rapid current of the Niagara ; and Dearborn still reposed near the head of Lake Champlain under the eye of Prevost's detachments. Moreover, the directors of the American operations seemed to have learned little wisdom from experience ; and even Commodore Chauncey himself, while advocating an early attack on and capture of Kingston, could foresee no further result from that operation than American ascendancy on Lake Ontario, failing to realise that it would also necessarily throw all Upper Canada into American hands. Early

in the year intelligence came to the American head-^{1813.}quarters that Kingston had been reinforced and that Prevost had arrived there in person ; whereupon Dearborn took fright lest the British should be meditating an attack upon Sackett's Harbour. As a matter of fact Prevost did pay a flying visit to the posts in Upper Canada in February, and had ordered, as shall Feb. presently be seen, reinforcements to Kingston ; but Dearborn's apprehensive eye saw danger where as yet there was none, and inspired his superiors at Washington with his own alarms. The orders given to him, therefore, were to assemble four thousand men at Sackett's Harbour and three thousand at Buffalo ; the former force to attack in succession Kingston and York, with the help of Chauncey's fleet, and then in combination with the troops at Buffalo to assail the British frontier at Niagara—or in other words, as it has been aptly expressed, to begin to fell the tree by lopping off its branches.

On the British side the Admiralty, warned by the disasters which had befallen English frigates, and encouraged by the failure of France in Russia, increased the naval force on the American coast, especially in the matter of ships of the line, and in the course of the spring established an effective blockade from the mouth of the Mississippi almost to Rhode Island. The outlets of the Chesapeake and Delaware above all were strictly watched, the war having been brought on by the middle and southern states ; while the ports of New England, where the conflict was unpopular, were for the most part left open. This was the measure which in due time reduced America to exhaustion ; but the process, being gradual, could not produce its effect at once. For more immediate service the Secretary of State had promised in December to send three battalions at once to Bermuda,¹ to proceed from thence to the St. Lawrence as soon as the river should be open ; and Prevost was

. ¹ 13th ; 2/41st ; 98th.

1813. thus enabled to send a substantial reinforcement¹ to Sheaffe at Kingston for the strengthening of the posts at Niagara and Detroit.

All, however, turned upon the naval command of the Lakes, and here the situation was less promising. On Lake Ontario the British had two ships at York, and two more, besides two on the stocks, at Kingston ; whereas the Americans had eight vessels in all, many of them trifling in size, but the two largest of them superior to the two largest of the British. On Lake Erie the British had three vessels afloat and three more building ; the Americans had but one afloat, but on the other hand they had Lieutenant Perry, an officer of admirable skill and energy, in command at Erie, who was labouring with his whole soul to increase his squadron. The Americans too, having far larger resources both in material and population close at hand, enjoyed an immense advantage over the British in the matter of shipbuilding. Lastly, the British were much embarrassed by dearth of seamen and of officers. In March one of Prevost's staff reported that on Lake Ontario there was not a man fit to command a man-of-war, and that additional officers also were needed. The Admiralty had promised to send out a naval captain to take charge of the naval force, besides a certain number of sailors and artificers ; but even so the Americans, particularly after the blockade became effectual and great part of their merchant shipping was laid up, could always supply far better crews than their adversaries.²

The campaign opened with an attack upon one of the foremost American posts upon the St. Lawrence at Ogdensburg, from whence the enemy had made repeated nocturnal depredations upon the surrounding country.

¹ Half co. of Artillery ; 1/8th ; 6 cos. 104th ; 4 cos. Canadian Voltigeurs. The 104th had arrived in New Brunswick late in 1812 ; and this detachment had marched overland to Quebec.

² Prevost to Sec. of State, 17th, 19th March, 2nd April 1813 ; with enclosures.

The enterprise on its small scale was completely suc-^{1813.}cessful, and resulted after a sharp fight in the capture of seventy-four prisoners, and the taking or destruction of eleven guns, four armed vessels and a quantity of arms and stores.¹ This, however, was but an isolated affair ; and the serious business of the campaign began in April with the first of the operations prescribed to Dearborn. By the 19th of that month Sackett's Harbour was clear of ice ; and on the 27th, after being driven back once ^{April 27.}by heavy weather, Chauncey's squadron with eighteen hundred troops on board appeared before York. Sheaffe was here in command of four companies of regular and fencible troops, besides militia and dockyard workmen, in all about six hundred men ; and he had several hours' warning of the enemy's approach. The Americans landed to the west of the town ; and Sheaffe, having no defences except a ruined fort and five guns (of which three had no trunnions), detached two companies of the Eighth and a company of the Newfoundland regiment—together about two hundred and fifty strong—about two hundred militia and a handful of Indians to hold the enemy in check, while he destroyed the public stores and prepared for a retreat.

It should seem that Captain McNeill of the Eighth, upon ascertaining the point of landing, drew up his men in full view of the American ships and at half range of cannon-shot, with the natural result that an American broadside mowed down half of his men and killed the Captain himself. The remainder retired into a wood behind the shore, and with their comrades resisted for a long time most desperately and gallantly, until driven back by superior numbers upon the fort. The Americans swarmed after them but were checked by the blowing up of the magazine, which made havoc both among assailants and defenders. Under cover of this explosion, accidental or intentional, Sheaffe brought off most of the

¹ The troops engaged were detachments of the R.A., 8th, Glen-garry Fencibles, Newfoundland Regiment, and Militia ; and their losses were 8 men killed, 8 officers and 44 men wounded.

1813. survivors of his force after an action of eight hours.
April 27. Of his regular troops sixty-two were killed, thirty-four wounded and saved, forty-two wounded and prisoners, seventeen missing or captured unhurt. The Eighth, out of just under two hundred men, lost forty-five killed and forty-nine wounded, and the Newfoundland regiment, out of one weak company, twelve killed and twenty wounded, but only four unwounded prisoners. The militia, who were left to surrender the town, laid down their arms without disgrace, to the number of two hundred and sixty. Altogether it was not a discreditable little fight, though beyond doubt McNeill sacrificed many lives by his wanton and foolish defiance of the enemy's guns. The American loss exceeded three hundred, their commander, General Pike, being among those who perished through the explosion.

Upon entering into possession of York, which, though little more than a village, was the capital of the province, the American troops took leave of all control. Contrary to the articles of capitulation, the public buildings and all the records were burned, the church was robbed, the public library pillaged to the last book, and much private property plundered and destroyed. Too much must not be made of excesses to which all troops have at times given way ; but it is less pleasant to learn that the American rank and file subjected the unfortunate inhabitants in cold blood to every kind of insult as well as to depredation.¹ Insolent crowing is the one thing which the weaker party can never forgive in an enemy ; and the nation which indulges in it must look for bitter reprisals.

One ship only, a small schooner, was taken at York, and another on the stocks was destroyed, yet Chauncey flattered himself that he had dealt the British a blow from which they could not recover, and that his next stroke would accomplish the conquest of Upper Canada. Accordingly, after three days spent in the destruction or loading of the captured stores, the American

¹ Major Allan of the Militia to Sheaffe. 2nd May 1813.

armament evacuated York on the 1st of May with in- 1813.
tent to sail to Fort Niagara, but owing to foul winds May 1.
did not reach it until the 8th. Then, on account of the May 8.
sickliness of the troops, who were much crowded in the
ships, it was decided to defer the attack and return to
Sackett's Harbour. A few days later Chauncey sent a
flag of truce into Kingston, and, after hearing the report
of the officer who carried it, decided to remain himself
for the present at Sackett's Harbour, ask for reinforce-
ments, and take charge of its defence. He was not
wrong, for Prevost had again arrived there, bringing
with him Captain Sir James Yeo, a brilliant young
officer of the Navy, who had reached Quebec from
England on the 5th with a small body of British sailors.
Four ships of strength were awaiting his orders—two
of the original squadron, one which had fortunately
sailed over from York just before the American attack,
and a fourth newly built but ready for service ; besides
which a fifth was on the stocks. Moreover, reckoning
on fresh reinforcements from Europe, Prevost had
ordered a thousand to eleven hundred troops to Upper
Canada ;¹ so that there was a formidable force both
afloat and ashore to contest the mastery of the Lake
with the Americans.²

However, reinforcements having meanwhile arrived
at Sackett's Harbour, the first division of the American
armament sailed again for Niagara on the 20th, and May 20.
disembarked its troops next day in rear of that fort.
On the 25th Chauncey arrived with a second division,
making up a total of six to seven thousand troops ; and
after a day spent in reconnaissance, Dearborn decided to
attack at dawn of the 27th. The British force at Fort May 27.
George numbered about eleven hundred regular troops
of all ranks,³ and three hundred militia, under command

¹ 1 troop of Canadian dragoons ; half co. R.A. ; 1/1st ; 4 cos. grenadiers.

² Mahan, *War of 1812*, ii. 37-38. Prevost to Sec. of State, 18th May 1813 (2 letters).

³ R.A. (with some men of the 41st for gunners) ; 5 cos. 8th ; detachments Glengarry and Newfoundland regiments.

1813. of Brigadier-general Vincent. The fort itself carried
May 27. four heavy cannon, which had been captured at Detroit ;
and a fifth had been mounted *en barbette* about half a
mile below it. The British force was therefore con-
siderably overmatched, but Vincent none the less deter-
mined to resist to the utmost.

At daybreak a number of flat-bottomed boats, covered
by the guns of the American ships of war, were seen
making for the shore of the lake almost half a mile
west of the mouth of the river ; and at the same time
Fort Niagara opened fire upon Fort George. The
cannonade was interrupted for a time by a heavy fog,
but, when that lifted, three schooners took up a position
in the river and, in conjunction with the ships on the
lake, swept the low ground about Fort George with a
cross-fire. The single gun mounted towards the lake
was soon silenced, and the village of Newark, being in-
terposed between Fort George and the lake, prevented
the cannon of the fort from being brought to bear in
this direction. Vincent drew out every man that he
could spare, leaving only fifty regulars and eighty
militia to defend the fort, and divided his force into
three small columns, with the Glengarry and Newfound-
land men, aided by a few Indians, in advance. These
brave fellows, after trying in vain to resist the landing,
were driven back by the storm of cannon-shot upon
their supports ; but rallying on these—about three
hundred and twenty of the Eighth and half as many
militia—they faced about in a patch of brushwood, and,
always under the cross-fire of artillery, strove desperately
to stem the enemy's advance. The effort was hopeless ;
and, after suffering very heavy loss, Vincent retreated
in perfect order southward to St. David's and thence
westward to Beaver Dam. Before doing so he sent
orders to draw off the troops from Fort George ; but
through some miscarriage or mistake they were left
behind, and so fell into the enemy's hands, being the
only unwounded prisoners taken by them that day. The
garrisons of Chippewa and Fort Erie, being summoned

in time, joined the main body safely at Beaver Dam ^{1813.} that night; and on the following day Vincent continued his retreat unmolested to Forty Mile Creek (the modern Grimsby), finally halting on the 29th at ^{May 29.} Burlington Heights (the modern Hamilton), where he turned with some sixteen hundred men and stood at bay.

This was a spirited little fight, most creditable to the troops but not so to their commander. The detachments of the Eighth, Glengarry, Newfoundland and Militia, together under six hundred strong, lost no fewer than three hundred and ninety of all ranks killed and wounded, the Eighth alone having two hundred and two casualties. Yet this slaughter was absolutely purposeless. Vincent must have known that no possible object could be gained by pushing his men into a fight against four times their numbers under a cross-fire of artillery; and Fort George might just as well have been abandoned at the cost of twenty men as of four hundred, particularly as the number of British soldiers in the whole country was very small. But, whether owing to the insolence of American speakers in Congress, or to contempt for the American troops—still very raw—in the field, British officers appear to have made it a point of honour never to retire without resisting to the utmost, or in other words without sacrificing valuable troops for a purely sentimental object. However, on the 2nd of ^{June 2.} June Vincent reported his men to be in great spirits, and anxious for an order to return to Fort George; and, though the enemy had pushed an advanced guard of four hundred horse and foot to Fifteen Mile Creek, with two thousand more at Twelve Mile Creek, he felt confident that they would not dare to attack him.¹

Meanwhile, upon the night after the American landing at Fort George,² Prevost, with the object of making ^{May 22.}

¹ Vincent to Prevost, 2nd June; in Prevost to Sec. of State, 6th June 1813.

² There is some confusion as to the date. Prevost in his letter to Bathurst of 1st June says that he arrived off Sackett's Harbour

1813. a diversion, embarked between seven and eight hundred
May 28. men¹ from Kingston upon five men-of-war, and sailed
for Sackett's Harbour. The time was not unpropitious, for at the moment there were only two men-of-war and four hundred troops in the place.² Light and baffling winds, however, prevented the armament from drawing close to the harbour until evening of the 28th, and in the meantime the American commander, Colonel Jacob Brown, had time to summon to him five hundred militia. Sackett's Harbour itself lies on the south side of a bay named Black River Bay, which runs from south-west to north-east out of Lake Ontario; the haven being formed by a narrow peninsula which juts out for some distance in a north-westerly direction, and then throws a long narrow spit to the eastward. Within the space thus enclosed is the anchorage; and upon the spit, called Navy Point, was the naval establishment. On the shore over against Navy Point were situated in succession from north-east to south-west a work called Fort Volunteer, a battery of three guns and a blockhouse; and at the north-eastern angle of the peninsula stood another work, enclosing a blockhouse, named Fort Tompkins. At the north-western corner of the peninsula lies Horse Island, connected with the mainland by a fordable causeway or neck, which offered a convenient point for disembarkation, and had been in fact chosen

at daybreak of the 27th, and this date, though quite irreconcilable with the rest of the letter, has been accepted by Capt. Mahan and Kingsford. Nevertheless 27th is obviously a slip of the pen for 28th, for Prevost says that he did not order the troops to embark until he had heard that Fort George had been cannonaded for 24 hours, and the cannonade of Fort George began at 4 A.M. of the 27th. It is very plain, therefore, that the expedition did not sail until the late hours of the 27th or the earliest of the 28th. The *Life of Sir G. Prevost* says that it sailed in the night of the 27th, which is doubtless correct.

¹ 1st Royal Scots; 2 cos. 8th; 4 cos. 104th; 2 cos. Canadian Voltigeurs; 1 co. Glengarry L.I.; R.A. with 2 guns.

² So say Capt. Mahan and *History of the War* (New York, 1815), a very partial narrative; but the American General Wilkinson (quoted by Kingsford, viii. 274) states the number of regulars at 787.

by Colonel Baynes, who was in command of the landing party, for that purpose. 1813.
May 28.

Accordingly at ten o'clock on the night of the 28th the boats were assembled round the fleet, and soon afterwards they pulled off, with a gunboat in advance. Brown, fully prepared for the attack and divining its probable direction, drew up his militia in first line at the end of the neck, holding his regular troops in reserve in second line. Baynes meanwhile led his boats forward in the order which the troops were to assume when landed, and successfully threw his men ashore upon Horse Island. This done he launched the grenadier-company of the Hundredth against the militia, which with one field-gun occupied the farther end of the causeway. Though the passage was but four feet broad, in many places under water, and two hundred yards long, the grenadiers fell upon the militia before they could fire more than one volley from their muskets or one round from their gun, captured the field-piece and scattered the militiamen in all directions. The rest of the force then came up, and separating into two columns pressed on into the woods, which were alive with the fire of the American regulars. The British gunboats poured their shot blindly into the trees; but the Americans resisted stoutly and were only dislodged by the bayonet, when they fled in disorder to their blockhouse. In the confusion an American officer, thinking that all was lost, set fire to the navy-yard, and to the outward eye the success of the British seemed to be complete. As a matter of fact they had come to the end of their resources. They needed heavier ordnance than field-pieces or the light carronades in the gunboats to produce any impression upon the blockhouse and forts; and failure of wind prevented the men-of-war from taking any part in the action. Prevost therefore called his men off and abandoned the enterprise, enabling the Americans to extinguish the flames in the navy-yard before any great damage had been done. His losses amounted to forty-eight of all ranks killed and two

1813. hundred and twenty-one wounded, of which latter a few
May 28. fell into the enemy's hands. The casualties of the enemy were probably rather more numerous, for Prevost brought away with him one hundred and fifty prisoners, besides three guns.

Frantic vituperation was heaped upon Prevost for his conduct upon this day ; and it is still represented that he stopped his troops while they were rushing in upon the flood-tide of victory. It must, however, be admitted that his position was extremely difficult. More than one-third of his men had fallen ; and, though the bulk of his enemy appears to have been completely beaten, it is more than doubtful whether, without heavy artillery,¹ scaling ladders or appliances of any kind, he could have stormed the strongly stockaded works, possession of which would alone have made him master of Sackett's Harbour. It must be remembered too that the naval yard was seen to be in flames, and that the destruction of the stores and the ships on the stocks was, after all, the principal object of the attack. Further, it must be admitted that luck was against him, light winds having in the first place given the enemy twenty-four hours in which to gather reinforcements, and, in the second, prevented the heavy guns of the ships from coming into action. The American commander, Brown, a brave and capable officer, declared that unless Prevost had retreated when he did, not a man of his force would have returned to Kingston ; and on the whole it seems to me that the British commander had no alternative other than retreat.

Yet the enterprise was worth attempting ; and it appears to me unjust to characterise it, in the words of a judicial American historian,² as irresolute. Doubtless Prevost would have done better to employ a

¹ "Surely," says Mr. Kingsford, "heavy guns could have been brought up from the ships and the place battered down." But ships' guns, unless mounted on travelling carriages, are not so easily moved.

² Capt. Mahan.

larger force ; but this was impossible for him except at 1813. the cost of long delay; and the essence of the whole May 28. operation was to fall swiftly upon the American naval base, while the bulk of the American troops were employed at Niagara. But an attack which costs the assailants more than a third of their numbers, and is only abandoned because an essential part of the plan—naval co-operation—fails unavoidably through no fault of the commander, can hardly be called irresolute. The conduct of the British was superb, as their losses sufficiently show;¹ but credit is due also to the American regular troops, who must have turned their advantages in forest-fighting to good account and maintained the struggle stubbornly and well.

The result of the operations so far was that, on the one side, the capture of Fort George had prevented the British ship *Queen Charlotte* from taking supplies from that dépôt to Amherstburg ; and that, on the other, the fitting out of the new American ship at Sackett's Harbour had been delayed for three weeks. But more than this, Chauncey was considerably discouraged. He had altogether fourteen vessels, mounting sixty-two guns ; while Yeo had thirteen, including six gunboats, mounting one hundred and six guns ; yet although the ordnance on the gunboats was paltry, he allowed Yeo to sail unmolested on the 3rd of June 3. June with stores, supplies and reinforcements for Vincent.²

Meanwhile Vincent had taken his own measures for ridding himself of his enemy. His position at Burlington Heights, though strong, was too much extended for a force which, after calling in a small detachment from

¹ *E.g. :*

8th (2 cos.) .	5	killed,	6	officers,	70	men wounded.
100th (1 co.) .	6	„	0	„	23	„
104th (4 cos.) .	22	„	7	„	62	„
Glengarry L.I. (1 co.)	6	„	2	„	18	„

² Flank companies of 104th, and a detachment of the Glengarry L.I.

1813. Fort Erie, did not exceed eighteen hundred of all ranks;
June. and his information indicated that the Americans were closing in upon him not only in his front, but on his right flank by land and on his left by water. His position was the more critical inasmuch as he was short both of supplies and of ammunition, and in the event of mishap had no line of retreat except to York, while his abandonment of Burlington Heights would yield to the enemy the British line of communication by land with Detroit. The central column of the enemy, consisting of two brigades of infantry, a detachment of dragoons and eight or nine guns, in all between three and four thousand men, reached Stony Creek, about seven miles from his camp, on the 5th of June. There it was reconnoitred by Colonel Harvey of Vincent's staff, who upon his return recommended a night attack. Accordingly at half-past eleven detachments of the Eighth and Forty-ninth, together nearly eight hundred of all ranks, marched off into the darkness, and by two o'clock in
June 6. the morning of the 6th the whole had arrived unperceived within three hundred yards of the enemy's camp. The outlying sentries were bayoneted "in the quietest manner," to use Harvey's own words; but, in spite of strict orders to the contrary, the men began shouting and firing before they were deployed for the attack, and the enemy, springing to their arms, opened fire. Thereupon Major Plenderleath of the Forty-ninth appears to have dashed forward at once against the American guns; and a confused combat ensued in the darkness, both sides firing indiscriminately upon friends and foes, with the result that after about an hour's affray the Americans withdrew, leaving Generals Winder and Chandler, and over one hundred and twenty more officers and men, together with four pieces of cannon, in the hands of the British. Harvey, who was in charge of the attack, called off his troops before daylight should reveal the paucity of their numbers; but some fifty soldiers, either not hearing or disobeying the order to retire, fell into the enemy's hands. The cost to Vincent

of the whole operation was just over two hundred of 1813. all ranks killed, wounded and missing.¹

The affair was less successful and more costly than it should have been, but, thanks to the good luck which had thrown the American commander and his second into Vincent's hands, it was sufficient. Their successor at once retreated to Forty Mile Creek, embarking his wounded on the flotilla of boats which carried his supplies and baggage on the lake. On the 8th of June, June 8. however, Yeo's squadron came upon the scene, and his gunboats began to bombard the enemy's camp, while two companies of the Eighth were disembarked to assail it by land. Thereupon the Americans again retreated, leaving a quantity of stores behind them, burned Fort Erie on the 9th, and, withdrawing all detachments in June 9. the strait, concentrated their force about Fort George. Yeo cruised along the south coast of Lake Ontario, capturing vessels and destroying or appropriating quantities of stores. Vincent, having received his reinforcements from the Commodore, prepared to take the offensive, pushing his advanced parties forward to about Twenty Mile Creek, Ten Mile Creek, and Beaver Dam, the latter post being under command of Lieutenant Fitzgibbon of the Forty-ninth. On the 23rd of June June 23. an American detachment of nearly six hundred men under Colonel Boerstler was pushed forward against the place last named, but was ambushed by Indians early on the morning of the 24th, and after three hours' confused June 24. fighting was awed into surrender by a judicious movement of Fitzgibbon's detachment across its line of retreat. From that moment the American army of Niagara was paralysed, the War Department having given orders that nothing more was to be attempted until naval superiority should have been established on Lake Ontario. So fruitful had been Vincent's bold assumption of the offensive by Harvey's advice at Stony Creek.

¹ Killed, 1 officer, 22 men; wounded, 12 officers, 124 men; missing, 55 men. Total, 214.

1813. Naval superiority, however, was very shortly about
June 12. to assert itself, for on the 12th of June the vessel which had been saved from the flames a fortnight earlier, was launched by the Americans at Sackett's Harbour and named the *General Pike*. Armed, as she was to be, with twenty-six long twenty-four-pounders, she would be a match in certain circumstances for the entire British squadron combined, every ship of which mounted only the short cannon known as carronades, which had not half the range of the long guns. Yeo accordingly conceived a second plan for surprising a part of Chauncey's squadron by land with about seven hundred men, one-third of them soldiers of the Royal Scots and Hundredth Foot, and the remainder blue-jackets. He had advanced to within ten miles of Sackett's Harbour unperceived, and had lain hidden for twenty-four hours in the forest intending to make a night attack, when by the information of two deserters of the Newfoundland regiment the enemy was set on the alert, and the project was perforce abandoned. This happened at the very end of June; and Prevost, who conceived the British to be already inferior on the water, decided that he too would abstain from any offensive movement about Niagara until British naval ascendancy should be assured.

Thus both sides practically abjured all enterprise in the field, and concentrated all their efforts on their dockyards. Though the true issue of the entire campaign undoubtedly turned upon the naval operations, it may be questioned whether either side were right in pursuing this policy. It was demoralising for the Americans to sit still about Fort George, while an enemy of much inferior force lay unentrenched within five miles of them; but it would have been far more demoralising if Prevost had taken advantage of their late discomfiture to keep them in constant alarm. The occupation of Fort George was in itself a serious inconvenience, since it interrupted the British communications by land with Lake Erie; and the arrival of the Thirteenth Foot,

seven hundred strong, at Quebec from the West Indies ¹⁸¹³. at the end of June might well have heartened Prevost to an energetic offensive. There was, as he confessed, little fear of an attack by Lake Champlain, and the less since some of the enemy's armed vessels had been recently on the St. Lawrence. Of course the expulsion of the Americans from Niagara would not hurt Chauncey, yet it was likely to weaken his nerve, which was already shaken by the mishaps which had lately befallen the American army, and to set the military commander quarrelling with him. But there are very few men who are qualified to direct the joint operations of a squadron and an army, and unfortunately Prevost was not one of them. Supremacy on Lake Ontario was the Navy's business; let the Navy look to it first, and the military operations would follow afterwards; if the Navy were slow, let it be hurried. Such were the principles which he cherished only too faithfully to the end of the war.

His conduct was the more blameworthy inasmuch as the Admiralty, by sending ships enough to blockade the American ports and harry their coasting trade, was rapidly bringing home to the United States the true meaning of war. To emphasise the lesson the British Government had despatched a special squadron under Sir John Warren, together with a small body of troops under Sir Sidney Beckwith, with orders to harry the American coast at large by constant descents. This armament sailed by way of Bermuda, where Beckwith exchanged a detachment of inferior troops against an equal number of men admirably trained by Colonel Charles Napier, and shortly afterwards sailed for the American shore with twenty-three hundred men organised into two brigades.¹ The operations of this force were so trifling that they may as well be dismissed at once. They consisted of no more than a raid upon June 22.

¹ The force with which Beckwith sailed from England was 2434 marines, a detachment of 300 of the 103rd (mostly bad characters), and 2 independent companies of French deserters. At Bermuda he organised the force as follows :

1813. Hampton Roads and the destruction of a small American detachment at Hampton itself, and of two abortive raids
- June 26. in other quarters, ending in the removal of the whole force to Nova Scotia in September. There were three commanders, Admiral Cockburn, Admiral Warren and General Beckwith; of whom Cockburn, an excellent sailor, tried to be a general, and Beckwith, an admirable soldier, attempted to play the admiral. The most noteworthy feature of the operations, was that fifty men or the foreign independent companies committed to Beckwith's command deserted as soon as they were ashore, and the rest committed shameful atrocities. Many officers, indeed, in both services had relations in America, and hated the duty of destroying property which might belong to them.¹ Nevertheless the diversion was a useful one, and Prevost should have shown greater vigour in taking advantage of it. Every military success was bound to react not only upon the American Government and the American army, but upon the American navy also, making the sailors ask themselves for what object they risked their lives on the water if the soldiers were always beaten on land. On the contrary, Prevost was disposed rather to promote the like divisions in his own force, by keeping the troops inactive until the squadron should have prepared the way for them.
- July 20. On the 20th of July the *General Pike* was ready for service, and on the following day Chauncey sailed out of
- July 27. Sackett's Harbour, arriving off Niagara on the 27th. After a fruitless attempt, in conjunction with the army,

Charles Napier's Brigade : R.M.A.	5	officers, 76	n.c.o. and men.
2nd Batt. Marines	30	"	72
102nd	13	"	310
1st Independent Company . .	5	"	149
Lieut-Col. Williams's Brigade : R.M.A.	5	"	72
Rocket Battery R.A. . . .	2	"	49
1st Batt. Marines	31	"	730
2nd Independent Company . .	5	"	148
Total	96	"	2235

¹ Beckwith to Sec. of State, June 3rd, 28th, 1813; see also Napier's *Life of Sir Charles Napier*, i. 212-226.

against the rear of Vincent's position at Burlington 1813. Heights, he returned to Niagara, where at daybreak of the 7th of August Yeo appeared with his whole force, namely, the *Wolfe* and *Royal George*, ships; *Melville* and *Moir*, brigs; *Sir Sidney Smith* and *Beresford*, schooners; the largest mounting twenty-three and the smallest twelve guns. Chauncey on his side had the *General Pike* of twenty-six guns, the *Madison* of twenty-four, the *Oneida* of eighteen, and sixteen small schooners, the largest of which carried ten guns and the smallest one or two. The great bulk of the British cannon were of short range; the great bulk of the American of long range; and, since each commander was anxious above all things not to allow his rival to gain supremacy, neither was willing to engage except under the conditions that favoured himself. Accordingly the fleets manœuvred for four days without further result than the capsizing of two of the American schooners in a squall; but on the night of the 10th they at last came Aug. 10. into action, and Yeo succeeded in capturing two more of the schooners. On the 13th Chauncey returned to Aug. 13. Sackett's Harbour to revictual, and owing to heavy weather and other causes it was nearly a month before Sept. 7. the two fleets met again, only to part once more after four or five days of manœuvring without any approach to a decisive result.

Prevost's irritation was extreme. Ignoring the fact that the American ordnance gave Chauncey an advantage practically equivalent to that of a man who fights with a rifle against an enemy armed with a weapon of smooth bore, he expected Yeo to make short work of his adversary, so as not only to permit the army to resume operations, but to strengthen the fleet on Lake Erie with some of his seamen. Yet the Commodore had really no alternative. "I assure you, Sir," he wrote to the Admiralty, "that the great advantage the enemy have over me from their big twenty-four-pounders almost precludes the possibility of success unless we can force them to close action, which they ever

1813. have avoided with the most studious circumspection.”¹

It would have been more profitable if Prevost, instead of blaming the Navy for its inability to achieve the impossible, had done his best to reopen the communication with Lake Erie which the Americans had closed by the capture of Fort George.

The consequences of the long inaction on Lake Ontario soon showed itself. Ever since March Lieutenant Oliver Perry had been working with admirable energy at Fort Erie, not only to build and fit out a squadron which should ensure the command of the lake, but to procure a garrison and throw up works which should protect the vessels while still under construction. He met with no great support, for he could obtain only four small guns and five hundred militia; and it might have occurred to General Proctor that it would be well to spoil such a nest of possible mischief before the brood should be hatched. Proctor, however, was flying, as he thought, at higher game. After the defeat of General Winchester in January General Harrison had reorganised his army and built a fort, named Fort Meigs, behind the rapids of the Maumee as an advanced base for operations against Detroit. There he lay with some thirteen hundred men, awaiting the arrival of as many more under General Clay, when Proctor conceived the project of assailing the fort before Clay's reinforcements could come up.

April 23. Accordingly on the 23rd of April he embarked at Amherstburg something over one thousand men of all ranks, half of them militia, and four hundred of the remainder taken from the Forty-first, together with a few heavy guns which had been captured at Detroit. On

April 27. the 27th he landed on the north bank of the Maumee and encamped a mile and a half below Fort Meigs, which was situated on the southern bank. Here he was joined by some twelve hundred Indians under Tecumseh; but heavy rains impeded the transport of the guns, and it

¹ Prevost to Sec. of State, 22nd Sept. 1813. The quotation from Yeo's report is given by Captain Mahan (ii. 108).

was only on the 1st and 2nd of May that his first ^{1813.} batteries opened fire from the north bank. The result ^{May 1-2.} was trifling ; and the fire of a third battery, completed twenty-four hours later on the south bank, was little more effective, while at the same time exposing the flank companies of the Forty-first, which had been detached to guard it, to the risk of destruction in detail. Harrison was not slow to detect this blunder, and hearing at midnight of the 4th that Clay's reinforcement ^{May 4.} was within two hours' march of the fort, he directed that officer to land eight hundred men on the north bank of the river, carry the two batteries on that side, spike the guns, and then cross the river to join the rest of the force at Fort Meigs.

At the outset the movement was perfectly successful. Clay's left-hand column made a rush at the batteries at nine o'clock in the morning, and, finding them unguarded, mastered them at once ; but, instead of spiking the guns and returning to their boats, the men remained where they were. A counter-attack by three companies of the Forty-first soon drove them from the captured works into the forest, where the Indians fell upon them and routed them completely. Simultaneously with Clay's attack Harrison made a sortie from the fort, surprised a party of the Forty-first and took nearly fifty of them prisoners ; but the remainder—reinforced by a few militia and Indians—retook the guns and drove the enemy back with loss into their entrenchments. Altogether between four and five hundred American prisoners were taken, and some forty, despite all attempts of their escort to protect them, were massacred by the Indians. Proctor's loss did not exceed sixty-one killed or wounded and forty prisoners, which last were immediately recovered by exchange.

So far the action was a success, though it was most discreditable to Proctor that his troops on both sides of the river should have been taken by surprise. The guns on the north bank, having been imperfectly spiked by the Americans, renewed their fire ; and a display of

1813. the white flag by Harrison flattered Proctor with the hope that he contemplated surrender. The crafty American, however, only wished to suspend hostilities long enough to enable him to secure the boats with supplies and stores, which had accompanied Clay ; and having accomplished this he resumed his defiance. The Indians now began to desert in hundreds. Half of the Canadian militia deserted also, and the remainder declared their determination to return home likewise. Very unwillingly Proctor found himself compelled to
- May 14. raise the siege, and by the 14th of May he was again at Amherstburg, having brought off all his guns and stores, but accomplished little towards the salvation of the western settlement. Looking to the general conduct of the expedition it cannot be said that he deserved success.

His position was now become exceedingly unpleasant. His force, owing to the disappearance of the militia, was reduced to a handful of men, and reinforcements, consisting of the remainder of the Forty-first which had been long promised by Prevost, had not yet reached him. He was in want of camp-equipage, of money, clothing, ammunition and flesh ; and the Indians, but meagrely supplied with food, arms and presents, were beginning to waver in their allegiance. In the middle of June he was somewhat cheered by the arrival of Captain Barclay of the Royal Navy to take command of the British squadron on Lake Erie ; but that officer brought only a handful of sailors with him ; and the great need of the extreme west was men. Throughout the month of June Proctor waited in vain for more regular soldiers who never came. Prevost had ordered Vincent to detach men to Proctor's assistance ; but Vincent, having already a superior force of Americans before him at Fort George, was naturally unwilling to weaken himself. Barclay was equally unfortunate, for Yeo dreaded parting with any of his small body of trained sailors in the presence of Chauncey. In fact there were not men enough to defend the whole of Canada, except against so unmilitary a

nation as the Americans; and even then the little 1813. detachments of British troops required handling by a master in order to ensure success.

Early in July Proctor began to realise that he had July. struck his blow in the wrong quarter, and that he ought to have destroyed the enemy's naval station at Fort Erie. "It could easily have been done a short time since," he wrote, "it will now be a work of difficulty . . . I would not willingly attack it without the whole of the first battalion of the Forty-first. . . . It is not too late if they were sent at once to Long Point," on the northern shore of the lake.¹ Barclay on his side renewed his entreaties for seamen, artificers and stores of all kinds. He had a new ship, the *Detroit*, nearly ready for launching, but no means of manning and equipping her; while the crews of the six ships which composed the remainder of the squadron were of the most heterogeneous description—Newfoundland soldiers, British soldiers, undisciplined Canadian boatmen, who knew not a word of English—everything in fact except sailors.² Prevost answered by pressing de Rottenburg, who was now in command at Niagara, to send up the remainder of the first battalion of the Forty-first, promising also to despatch the second battalion besides small detachments of the Royal Scots and Hundred and Fourth. At last in the middle of July a hundred men of the Forty-first arrived at Long Point; but de

¹ Proctor to Prevost and M'Donall, 4th July 1813.

² List of the Erie Fleet:

	Guns.	Canadians.	Newfound- land Regt.	Forty- first.	Total.
<i>Queen Charlotte</i> , ship,	16	40	25	45	110
<i>Lady Prevost</i> , schooner,	12	30	10	36	76
<i>General Hunter</i> , brig,	6	20	4	15	39
<i>Erie</i> , schooner,	2	6	4	5	15
<i>Little Belt</i> , sloop,	3	6	4	5	15
<i>Chippewa</i> , schooner,	2				

Prevost to Sec. of State, 20th July 1813.

The list in James's *Naval War between Great Britain and the United States* gives the *Hunter* 10 guns; but this refers to a later period.

1813. Rottenburg declined to part with more troops, preferring to inform Proctor of the arrangements made for his retreat in case of a naval disaster on Lake Erie. Proctor wrote bitterly that no doubt Prevost intended to help him, but that his good intentions were unavailing. "Had the force ordered been sent to me I could have taken Presqu'ile (Erie), thus securing the command of the Lake. . . . If the command be lost it will be difficult to recover it." He could only order Barclay to pick up the reinforcement at Long Point, and to proceed to the blockade of the enemy's naval base.

With a force depleted by the necessity of supplying Barclay with crews, Proctor was left mainly dependent on the Indians, who now proposed a second attack upon Fort Meigs. The design, said to have been framed by Tecumseh himself, was to decoy part of the garrison into the forest by opening a heavy fire, and to fall upon its rear as soon as it was safely entangled in the trees; whereupon the British, who were to be concealed near the fort, would endeavour to storm it by surprise. Proctor consented to this flimsy stratagem against his better judgment, as he admitted; and accordingly towards the end of July he sailed for the Maumee with four hundred of the Forty-first and a few field-guns. Tecumseh's plan failed completely; most of the Indians returned to their homes; and Proctor, in order to keep the remnant with him, re-embarked his troops for an attack upon Fort Stephenson, the American post at Sandusky. Moving up the river in boats, he opened

Aug. 1. his attack on the evening of the 1st of August with an ineffectual bombardment; and on the evening of the

Aug. 2. 2nd, yielding once more to the importunity of the Indians, he delivered an assault.

The garrison of the place numbered no more than one hundred and sixty men with a single field-gun; but it was situated in a strong position on the lip of a deep wooded ravine, the whole being surrounded by a stockade and by an external ditch eight feet wide and as many

deep. The assault was to have been delivered at two ^{1813.} different points, the one being entrusted to the Indians ^{Aug. 2.} and the other to the Forty-first; but neither scaling-ladders nor fascines were provided to facilitate the passage of the ditch; wherefore, though the British made their way gallantly to the bottom of it under a heavy fire, they could advance no farther, and were shot down at leisure by the Americans. The Indians never fell on at all; and after two hours of fruitless endeavour Proctor drew off his men under cover of darkness, and, leaving the greater number of his killed and wounded—ninety-six in all—behind him, returned to the mouth of the Detroit River. The action was highly creditable to the young officer, Major Croghan, who commanded the garrison, and much the reverse to Proctor. It is difficult, perhaps, to blame a man who in so desperate a position endeavoured to conciliate his only allies, the Indians, by a desperate venture; but a commander can never be excused, least of all in a dangerous enterprise, for neglecting the most elementary means of obtaining success. His situation was doubtless trying and discouraging to the last degree; but it is very evident that Proctor had lost his temper, patience and hope, looked upon himself as sacrificed to the welfare of de Rottenburg, and was disposed to drift carelessly in what direction soever the eddies of circumstance might guide him.

Meanwhile, on the very day of the failure before Fort Stephenson, Perry had begun the most difficult and dangerous operation of bringing his vessels from their anchorage through a very shallow channel into deep water. To effect this he was obliged not only to take out the guns from the larger ships, but to lift them over the bar with floats; and it was not until the evening of the 4th that Perry could report the entire ^{Aug. 4.} squadron as safe in deep water. On the same day Barclay returned to the blockade and found himself too late. His new ship, the *Detroit*, had been launched, but was still unready for service; and he was obliged

1813. to return in all haste to fit her out. By one shift and another she was within the next three weeks masted and equipped, and by the disarming of Fort Amherstburg she was furnished with nineteen guns of four different calibres.¹ But she still needed to be manned, and it was difficult to say where a crew could be found for her, for there were only twenty-five British seamen on Lake Erie. Perry himself had been nearly as much embarrassed for sailors as was Barclay, for Chauncey, like Yeo, was unwilling to spare any of his own; and in fact Perry had taken the water with no more than three hundred, including a proportion of landsmen, out of a proper complement of seven hundred and forty. On Aug. 10. the 10th of August, however, he received a reinforcement of one hundred seamen, and established his head-quarters at Put-in Bay, about thirty miles to south of the mouth of the Detroit, from which point he made frequent reconnaissances of the British squadron at Amherstburg. Barclay was naturally in no condition to meet him; and Proctor stated the case fairly when he informed Prevost that, so long as Barclay was without seamen, he ought to avoid the enemy.

This, however, signified that for the time the naval command of Lake Erie was yielded to the Americans, a very serious matter. Prevost, in order to be nearer at hand to help Proctor, moved his head-quarters during the third week in July to the Niagara frontier; but he acknowledged that he could do little to remedy the most threatening danger of all, namely the interception of Proctor's supplies. For the white troops alone enough might with great exertion have been transported by land; but the Indians, some fourteen thousand men, women and children, also required feeding; and the victualling of such a multitude was possible only if there were free transit for British shipping from Long Point Sept. 5. to the river Detroit. By the 5th of September the situation had become alarming, for there was only from

¹ Proctor wrote to Prevost on the 26th of August that all his ordnance, except his field-guns, was on the fleet.

two to three days' flour left, and Proctor's commissary ^{1813.} was in despair. For three more days Barclay waited anxiously for the arrival of forty or sixty seamen, whom Prevost on the 22nd of August had reported to be on their way to Kingston; but a sudden movement of the enemy, presently to be narrated, upon Sackett's Harbour caused the Commander-in-Chief to return hastily eastward, and the waiting was in vain.

On the 9th, when his crews had already been for some ^{Sept. 9.} time on half-rations, Barclay, with Proctor's approval, sailed out to meet Perry. Each squadron had two large ships, and one intermediate vessel; but of lighter craft the British numbered only three against six, while the American ships, though themselves undermanned, carried rather more men, and an infinitely larger proportion of trained seamen.¹ Barclay's one hope was that the ordnance of his flag-ship the *Detroit*, being composed almost entirely of guns of long range, might give him the advantage over the two larger American vessels, both of which were armed mainly with carronades. But on the other hand the American small craft carried without exception heavy guns of long range, which made one of them more than a match for all three of the British. Moreover, the matches and tubes in store at Amherstburg were so defective that the only means of discharging the British guns was to fire a pistol into the vent. Just before morning of the 10th the two ^{Sept. 10.} squadrons met; and after a very severe action of nearly three hours' duration the entire British squadron was captured. The result was due chiefly to the skill and daring of Perry, without which his superiority of force would have been useless. Even as things were, the *Lawrence*, his flag-ship, was so much shattered that he

¹ Barclay indeed had only 50 seamen in a total complement of 440; the balance being made up of 250 soldiers and 140 Canadians, who could not even understand English. Perry had nominally 532 men; but it is stated that not more than 416 were fit for duty; in which case the number (allowing for a little sickness on the British side) would be about equal.

1813. was obliged to shift his flag to the *Niagara*, and to leave
Sept. 10. the *Lawrence* to surrender ; and his losses, though far smaller in proportion to his strength than those of the British, who had one hundred and thirty-five killed and wounded,¹ were little fewer than those of his adversary. But fortune sided against Barclay throughout. A sudden shift of wind transferred the weather-gauge from him to his adversary just before the action began, and deprived him of the advantage of choosing his own range for his cannon. He was very severely wounded, and every one of his naval officers was disabled or killed. He did all that a brave and skilful seaman could do, and worthily upheld the honour of the service.

Prevost, on receiving news of the disaster on the
Sept. 22. 22nd, ordered Proctor to retire at once to the Thames, and directed de Rottenburg to move forward his division to meet him and carry him supplies. Proctor of his own accord, before he received these instructions, made up his mind that he must destroy Forts Amherstburg and Detroit, and retreat ; but, considering that his supplies had been cut off and that he had lost a third of his men and the whole of his guns in Barclay's squadron, he appears to have been amazingly dilatory in his proceedings. He must have cherished some idea of
Sept. 15. checking the Americans, for he wrote on the 15th that he still had hopes of "making them uncomfortable." Be that as it may, it was not until the 18th that he announced his intentions to the Indians, who only with much reluctance yielded to his wishes, and not until
Sept. 24. the 24th² that, having sent his baggage before him, he finally marched from Amherstburg northward to Sandwich, whence, having picked up the garrison of Detroit,

¹ 27 killed and 96 wounded, of which 22 killed and 61 wounded belonged to the *Lawrence*.

² As Sir C. Lucas points out (*War of 1812*, p. 119), there is great confusion about the dates ; but the Americans certainly crossed to Amherstburg on the 27th, which Richardson says was the third day after the British left it. On the other hand the charges against Proctor set forth that he did not really begin his retreat till the evening of the 27th.

he on the 27th turned eastward towards the Thames. 1813. Even then his movements seem to have been something more than slow, for his force took more than a week to reach that river, halting on the 1st of October at a Oct. 1. hamlet about fifteen miles from its mouth.

The Americans, meanwhile, had crossed the lake on the 27th, and occupied the ruins of the two forts ; and at last on the 2nd of October General Harrison marched Oct. 2. from Sandwich with from three to five thousand men in pursuit of Proctor. All through that day the British commander remained stationary ; but on the 3rd, on Oct. 3. learning of Harrison's advance, he resumed his retreat up the Thames, crossed it, and on the afternoon of the 5th Oct. 5. halted at a point about two miles short of a missionary settlement known as Moravian Town. Harrison, for his part, had found every inducement to hasten his march. The bridges over the tributary creeks on the lower reaches of the Thames had been left intact by Proctor. A small party of British was captured in the act of destroying one of them on the evening of the 3rd ; and from that moment derelict boats and abandoned stores quickened both the zeal and the speed of the pursuers. On the morning of the 5th Harrison took two vessels loaded with stores and ammunition, together with the greater number of the party, one hundred and fifty strong, which formed their guard. At noon he passed his force across the river in such small craft as he could find ; and his mounted men pressed on, carrying infantry on their horses behind them. Another ten miles brought the Americans face to face with the remains of Proctor's detachment drawn up in a position astride of the road.

The remnant now left to Proctor counted about four hundred white troops, chiefly of the Forty-first, and a rather larger number of Indians, the whole numbering, perhaps, one-fourth of the strength of their opponents. But unfortunately numerical inferiority was not the only defect on the British side, for the men were also thoroughly demoralised. During

1813. the retreat they had formed the conviction, which
Oct. 5. unhappily appears to have been justified, that their commander was more anxious for the safety of his family and his private property than of his troops. From beginning to end Proctor was always with the advanced parties, never with the rear-guard. At Moravian Town there was an excellent position on a small open plain, where the front was covered by a wooded ravine, the left flank secured by the river, and the right by a thick forest admirably adapted to the tactics of the Indians. This position it had been intended to entrench; and Proctor had actually visited it on the 3rd and placed all of his few field-guns, except one, upon it. The difficult access by the ravine would have checked the mounted infantry, over one thousand strong, which formed the most formidable part of Harrison's force. But, whether to secure the retreat of his family, or for whatever reason, Proctor kept his men for two hours in their original halting-place, two miles from Moravian Town. Here their flanks were indeed protected by the river on their left and a marsh on their right, but the main body was withdrawn into a wood not dense enough to prevent practised horsemen from moving swiftly within it, yet sufficiently dark to make the scarlet uniforms of the British conspicuous, and to allow their enemy to approach within twenty yards of them unperceived. Moreover, no orders were given as to the disposition of the troops in the event of an attack.

Thus it came about that when the alarm was sounded the Forty-first, who were sitting at their ease on logs and fallen trees, were hustled into line without order or method. Two companies were then suddenly withdrawn to form a second line two hundred yards in rear of the first; and Proctor's solitary gun was placed on the road alongside the river under escort of a handful of Canadian dragoons, at a point where nothing was visible at a greater range than fifty yards from the muzzle. Moreover, as though this were not folly

enough, no ammunition had been brought up for the 1813.
gun. Harrison, having a force of over three thousand Oct. 5.
men, decided to post his infantry so as to check any
attack of the Indians on his left flank, and launched his
mounted infantry straight upon the first line of the
Forty-first. These received them with two volleys,
but, being in extended order, were ridden down at
once; and the greater number then laid down their
arms without further resistance. A few fled to the
shelter of the reserve, which was likewise overpowered
after firing two volleys; and the mounted infantry
then wheeled upon the flank of the Indians, while the
American foot engaged them in front. For a short
time the Indians resisted bravely until discouraged by
the fall of their leader Tecumseh, when they also broke
and fled. Proctor galloped away immediately after the
defeat of the first line, and, though hard pressed by
the mounted Americans, succeeded in making his
escape. A few of the Canadians rode with him, and
one officer and some fifty men of the Forty-first
contrived also to elude pursuit in the woods. The
remainder of the Europeans were captured;¹ no more
than forty-eight of them having fallen under the
American bullets. The American loss did not exceed
seven killed and twenty-two wounded.

Though the numerical superiority of the Americans
over Proctor's whole force was at least three to one,
this was a very disgraceful defeat. Proctor laid the
blame on the troops, and Prevost issued a general
order of scathing reprobation upon all concerned; but
there could be little doubt who was really responsible
for the disaster. After long but inevitable delay
Proctor was tried by court-martial at Montreal in
December 1814, and was found guilty of carelessness in
conducting the retreat, of neglect in omitting to take

¹ Harrison in his despatch claims to have taken 601 regular
British troops prisoners. This, however, comprehends all prisoners
taken both in the pursuit and in the action, including at least 170
sick.

1813. up the position at Moravian Town, and of making defective dispositions to receive the American attack ; but in consideration of his previous services he was sentenced only to a public reprimand and to suspension from rank and pay for six months. The Horse Guards, however, thought with justice that the court had been too lenient, and, being unable to reassemble it, issued a general order, which was read at the head of every regiment in the Army, reprimanding Proctor in terms so severe as to brand him with indelible dishonour. The truth is that he was a bad and incompetent officer, who had been saved many times from the consequences of his own incapacity by the Forty-first, and in return for their good service had so mishandled the regiment that they would work for him no longer. Had he been tried by the court which tried Whitelocke, he would certainly have been cashiered.¹

Thus the Americans, after two campaigns, succeeded at last in driving the British from Lake Erie, though a British garrison still held Mackinaw and, as shall be told in place, managed to retain it until the end of the war. Vincent, who was in temporary charge of the troops about Niagara, heard of the action at Moravian Town on the 8th of October, and at once concentrated every man under his orders at Burlington Heights. De Rottenburg, who was on his way to Kingston, receiving exaggerated news of the mishap, sent Vincent instructions to destroy all stores and to fall back to Kingston, if he thought himself too weak to meet the superior force of the enemy. These instructions were confirmed by Prevost, who had likewise been deceived by the narrative of a fugitive officer, but were countermanded on the 1st of November in time to prevent Vincent from moving out of his position. As a matter of fact Harrison had not followed up his victory, but had retired, not a little harassed by the Indians as he

¹ I have drawn the account of the action of Moravian Town chiefly from Richardson's *War of 1812* and Coffin's *1812*. Both give the narratives of eye-witnesses.

went, to Detroit, where he found fresh orders awaiting him from head-quarters. 1813.

In truth the American Government was meditating a great stroke upon Kingston and Montreal, having been guided towards this very sound decision by the advice of Mr Armstrong, the Secretary for War. For some time past it had been resolved to concentrate at Sackett's Harbour all the troops from Niagara, except the garrisons of Forts George and Niagara on either side of the river; and it was now determined to add to these also part of Harrison's victorious force from the Thames. A new commander-in-chief, General Wilkinson, had lately superseded Dearborn; Armstrong himself had taken up his residence in Sackett's Harbour at the beginning of September; and on the 19th Chauncey sailed to Niagara with his Sept. 19. squadron to protect the embarkation of three thousand soldiers. Before these operations could be completed, the American commander heard that Yeo with his squadron was at York, and sailed out to meet him. On the 28th the two fleets met and parted after Sept. 28. an indecisive action, Chauncey returning to Niagara, while Yeo anchored at the head of the lake under Burlington Heights. By the 2nd of October the last of the American transports had sailed from Sackett's Harbour; and Chauncey, upon false information that Yeo had again sailed eastward, ran down the lake to cover the landing of the troops, capturing on the way six small vessels that were carrying reinforcements from York to Kingston. These were in fact part of two regiments which had sailed with de Rottenburg on the 2nd of October, and of which he brought the bulk safely into Kingston on the 16th. A week later Perry's Oct. 24. squadron carried thirteen hundred of Harrison's men to Niagara; and the American preparations were complete.

Now, however, Armstrong abandoned the attack upon Kingston, doubting the success of the enterprise since the garrison had been so materially strengthened, and resolved to throw all his force against Montreal.

1813. General Wade Hampton, who commanded the army of
Oct. Lake Champlain, was already at Chateaugai on the
river of the same name, with four thousand effective
infantry and a well-appointed train; and from this
centre roads ran north-east to the junction of the river
with the St. Lawrence, ten miles above Montreal, and
westward to St. Regis, fifty miles higher up the St.
Lawrence. The season was so far advanced as to
admit of no delay; and it was therefore arranged that
Wilkinson's force should sail to Grenadier Island, near
the outlet of Lake Ontario into the river, drop down
the St. Lawrence by water, effect its junction with
Hampton's at some unknown point, and then proceed
to the attack. Chauncey was of course called upon to
accompany Wilkinson, enter the St. Lawrence with his
squadron, and leave Sackett's Harbour, denuded of all
but a very weak garrison, to take its chance. If the
British succeeded in beating either of the two columns
before they could unite, the enterprise was bound to
fail; and if, as Chauncey feared, Yeo chose to attack
Sackett's Harbour while the American squadron was in
the river, there was every prospect that the American
naval base would be destroyed. Altogether the great
plan, originally conceived upon perfectly sound prin-
ciples, had degenerated into something radically vicious.

The American generals were at great pains to make
Oct. 21. the worst of a bad design. On the 21st Hampton
broke up his camp, and marched down the Chateaugai.
Having driven in a picquet of Canadian militia at the
junction of the Outard and Chateaugai rivers on the
Oct. 22. 22nd, he halted there for three days to repair the road
and bring forward his artillery. This done he opened
a line of communication with Ogdensburg, about eighty-
five miles up the St. Lawrence, so as to keep in touch
with Wilkinson, and matured his scheme for an attack
upon Prevost's advanced posts. According to his
information there was nothing on his immediate front
but three hundred Canadian fencibles and voltigeurs,
with a party of Indians, under Lieutenant-colonel de

Salabery ; and he therefore arranged that his main body ^{1813.} should advance down the left bank of the Chateaugai to the forest where de Salabery was known to be lying, and engage him in front, while a detached column under Colonel Purdy was to move down the right bank, seize a ford some ten miles down, and recross in rear of him. Purdy marched on the night of the 25th, and was no sooner gone past recall than a ^{Oct. 25.} messenger came in from Wilkinson to say that it was impossible for him yet to co-operate in the movement. However it was now too late to countermand it, and on the 26th Hampton advanced at the head of his main ^{Oct. 26.} body.

Between ten and eleven o'clock in the morning both columns were perceived by de Salabery's scouts, though Purdy's, having lost its way in the forest, was still far in rear. Prevost, having warning of the American advance, had summoned a newly raised battalion under Lieutenant-colonel Macdonell from Kingston to the Chateaugai ; and that able and energetic officer, by great exertions and at considerable risk, had carried his men down the St. Lawrence by water in the teeth of a gale, and brought them up through the forest to the rendezvous by the morning of the 25th. De Salabery for his part knew his work, and had taken every precaution. He had selected a point on the road about six miles above the confluence of the Chateaugai with the St. Lawrence, where his left was protected by the former river, and his right covered by ravines, which he had further strengthened by abatis. The weak point of the position was the ford already mentioned, in its rear ; but to secure this Macdonell had hidden his battalions at its outlet on the left bank, sending also, with excellent judgment, a detached company across the river to the right bank. Purdy's three battalions blundering down to the ford early in the afternoon were staggered by a sudden volley at close range from Macdonell's men. They appear to have rallied, however, and to have fought fairly well for a time ; but Macdonell's

1813. company being reinforced by another, which engaged
Oct. 26. them from a different direction, the Americans became flurried with the noise and smoke, and began a furious fight among themselves. Thereupon the Canadians quietly slipped back over the ford to the left bank, leaving the Americans to settle their differences in their own way. Simultaneously, upon hearing the sound of musketry, Hampton launched his infantry forward against de Salabery's abatis, and succeeded in driving the voltigeurs from an advanced work ; but Macdonell, seeing that there was no occasion for his men to wait longer by the ford, came up to de Salabery's support, and Hampton, on hearing the cheers of the approaching Canadians, hesitated to press the attack. Soon afterwards he learnt of the utter discomfiture of Purdy's column, and calling off his soldiers, retreated.

The whole affair was little more than a short skirmish. Not above four hundred Canadians were engaged, and their losses did not exceed twenty killed and wounded. The American loss, though heavier, was still trifling in proportion to their numbers. Yet the action was sufficient to turn Hampton back in discouragement and despair. And let it be noted that this was wholly a Canadian victory. No Englishman was present except the General and his staff ; and Prevost bore eloquent testimony to the skill of the Canadian officers and to the steadiness and gallantry of the men.

Thus one of the invading columns had been successfully stopped ; and the other was destined to give little more trouble than the first. After many delays owing to rough weather Wilkinson's troops were assembled at Grenadier Island by the end of October, and on the 1st of November they began to descend the river by detachments to French Creek, Chauncey bringing his squadron forward to fend off that of Yeo. As French Creek was a point which might well indicate an attack upon Kingston, de Rottenburg made no movement ; but on
Nov. 5. the night of the 5th the Americans, being all concentrated, began their passage down the river ; and

Wilkinson on the following night wrote to Hampton ^{1813.} to announce his coming, and to order that the two columns should unite at St. Regis. Hampton received the letter on the night of the 7th, and answered in a ^{Nov. 7.} lugubrious strain, setting forth the fatigue, sickliness and discouragement of his troops, also his want of supplies, and intimating that, in his view, he should afford his colleague better help by retiring to the main dépôt at Plattsburg, and threatening the flank of the British from that point. Moreover, though junior to Wilkinson, he not only expressed his opinion but acted upon it, for on the 11th he calmly turned his back on ^{Nov. 11.} St. Regis, and marched back to Lake Champlain, leaving his colleague to shift for himself. Unaware of this proceeding, Wilkinson continued his movement down the river, landing his troops at Ogdensburg, and sending the boats down by night with muffled oars, so as to avoid the guns of a small British fort at Prescott.¹ On ^{Nov. 6.} the following morning he re-embarked his army, setting ^{Nov. 7.} some twelve hundred men ashore on the Canadian bank to sweep away any opposition; and on the 9th the ^{Nov. 9.} whole armament reached the head of the Long Sault rapids, at the foot of which, nine miles below, lay the appointed rendezvous of St. Regis.

But meanwhile de Rottenburg had not been idle. No sooner was he assured of the true intention of Wilkinson than, pursuant to Prevost's orders, he sent from Kingston a detachment of the Forty-ninth and Eighty-ninth, in all about six hundred men with two guns, under Lieutenant-colonel Morrison, to hang upon the American rear; the whole being escorted by a small flotilla of gun-boats under Captain Mulcaster. On the 8th they picked up two more companies of the Forty-ninth and a few Canadians—in all about two hundred men—with another field-gun, and on the 9th continued their march, the soldiers by land and the sailors by

¹ According to Prevost's despatch the flotilla was observed and cannonaded from Prescott; but little harm appears to have been done.

1813. water, finally gaining contact with the enemy at the head of the rapids on the 10th. The movements of Wilkinson had not, in fact, been speedy. He had landed General Brown with about two thousand men on the Canadian shore, and then had advanced down the
- Nov. 10. bank on the 10th ; but at the foot of the rapids, on the Canadian side, was the little town of Cornwall, held by a small party of militia under an officer of the Forty-ninth, who broke down the bridges, skirmished with the advanced guard, and made himself generally so obstructive that Brown was unable to report that the rapids
- Nov. 11. were clear of the enemy until the 11th. Meanwhile, Wilkinson, painfully aware that a British force was following him and "teasing his rear" (to use his own expression), landed about eighteen hundred more men under General Boyd on the Canadian shore. On the morning of the 11th he received the welcome message from Brown, and gave the order for his boats to shoot the rapids. He had hardly done so before Mulcaster's gun-boats opened fire upon the flotilla, while Boyd reported from the shore that the British troops were pressing in upon his rear-guard. To this Wilkinson replied, as was natural and right, that Boyd must turn and attack the British at once.

Morrison, observing Boyd's preparations, took up a position near Chrystler's Farm, a building about thirty-five miles above Cornwall, occupying about seven hundred yards of open ground between the river, which protected his right, and a pine-wood, on which he rested his left. With good judgment he formed his little force in an echelon of three divisions. The flank companies of the Forty-ninth with one gun were in advance on the right ; three companies of the Eighty-ninth with another gun, stationed to the left rear of these flank companies, formed the centre ; and the main body with a third gun stood in the left rear of all, with the Indians and Canadians concealed in the wood. Boyd, whose strength was just about double that of Morrison—eighteen hundred against nine hundred—attacked first the left flank of

the British, but was promptly repulsed by the wheel of 1813. Morrison's centre division upon his left flank. He Nov. 11. then directed fresh troops against the right flank of the British, but was again repelled in the same fashion; whereupon Morrison took the offensive, and fairly drove the Americans back in disorder, capturing one of their guns. The action was stubbornly contested for two hours, and cost the British twenty-two killed, one hundred and forty-seven wounded, and twelve missing; the Forty-ninth—a mere fragment of a battalion—having sixty-three casualties. Of the Americans over three hundred were killed and wounded, and over one hundred taken prisoners. At the close of the engagement Morrison occupied Boyd's original position, and the American infantry pursued its way down the river, the infantry in boats, the cavalry and artillery by land, with the British still hanging closely to their skirts.

On the following day the American flotilla passed Nov. 12. down the rapids; and Wilkinson, arrived at Cornwall, received Hampton's letter announcing his retreat to Plattsburg. Outwardly very indignant, Wilkinson submitted the situation to a Council of War, which agreed that it was expedient to abandon the advance upon Montreal for the present; and in accordance with this resolution he transferred his army on the 13th Nov. 13. to the American shore, and entrenched himself for the winter at French Mills on the Salmon River, about eight miles east of St. Regis. As to the impropriety, to say the least, of Hampton's conduct, there can hardly be two opinions; but to judge from the alacrity with which Wilkinson seized the pretext for abruptly ending the operations, he was probably very grateful in his secret heart to Hampton for supplying him with it. The truth is that as military leaders both men were equally incompetent.

Thus ridiculously terminated the American invasion of Lower Canada. Chauncey's squadron returned unmolested to its base on the 11th, and from thence sailed to Niagara in order to bring to Sackett's Harbour

1813. the detachment of Harrison's army which had been landed on the peninsula by Perry. This was accomplished by the 21st; and by the first week in December frost compelled both naval squadrons to be laid up for the winter. The whole campaign of 1813 seemed to be finished; but, as the Americans presently discovered, the end was not yet. Upon the removal of Harrison's troops from Niagara that general, never doubting that Wilkinson would advance triumphantly to Montreal, instructed his successor, Brigadier M'Clure, that the bulk of the British troops would be concentrated at Kingston, with no doubt a garrison at York, but with no outpost farther to the west, excepting possibly a small detachment at Burlington Heights. Herein Harrison was deceived, for, though de Rottenburg had withdrawn from Vincent the Forty-ninth, he had left with him the Hundredth Foot besides the relics of the Forty-first which had escaped from Moravian Town; and Vincent had no intention of retiring. Ignorant of Vincent's strength, M'Clure remained at Twenty Mile Creek with about a thousand militia, who, as the time of their service approached its end, took leave of all semblance of discipline, robbed and plundered in all directions, and, by their commander's own admission, became utterly ungovernable. At the end of November, however, Vincent sent forward a detachment under Colonel Murray, which pushed the Americans steadily back into Fort George; and at length on the 9th of December the whole of the militiamen dispersed to their homes, leaving M'Clure with no more than sixty regular troops and forty volunteers. On the night of the 10th, therefore, he evacuated Fort George, and presently retired with his guns and stores across the river to Fort Niagara. But he could not execute even this simple manœuvre without first burning from mere wantonness the village of Newark, and driving four hundred women and children from their homes into the snows of a Canadian winter.
- Dec. 12. On the 12th Murray occupied Fort George; and a

few days later the command in Upper Canada was taken ^{1813.} over by Lieutenant-general Gordon Drummond, who had just arrived from England. He was an officer who had seen campaigns in the West Indies and in Egypt, and had already served for three years on the staff in Canada. Upon arrival in his government on the 13th ^{Dec. 13.} he at once proceeded to Fort George, where Murray laid before him a plan for an attack upon Fort Niagara. This plan he approved ; and, there being but two boats on the spot, several more were brought overland with incredible labour from Burlington Bay, and successfully launched on the Niagara River. The grenadier company of the Royal Scots, the flank companies of the Forty-first, and the whole of the Hundredth,¹ together with a small detachment of artillery—in all rather over one thousand of all ranks—were placed under Murray's command, who took them over the water on the night of the 18th, and landed about three miles above the ^{Dec. 18.} fort. Two outlying picquets of the Americans were surprised and bayoneted to a man before they could give the alarm ; the sentries on the glacis were likewise surprised, and the password was extorted from them ; and at five o'clock on the morning of the 19th the little ^{Dec. 19.} detachment without firing a shot fell upon the fort, the main body rushing in by the main gate when it was opened for relief of the guard, while a small party escalated the eastern demi-bastion. In half an hour the British were in possession of the place at the cost of no more than six killed and five wounded. Sixty-five of the Americans were killed, and three hundred and fifty-eight of all ranks taken prisoners, of whom fourteen only were wounded. Twenty-seven guns and large quantities of arms, ammunition, stores and clothing fell also into the hands of Drummond, a very acceptable capture at the opening of a winter campaign.

On the same day Drummond followed up his success

¹ Drummond's account says that only the flank companies of the 100th were present ; but Murray's report shows that the whole regiment took part in the attack.

1813. by detaching the rest of the Royal Scots and the Forty-
Dec. 19. first, in company with a large number of Indians, under Major-general Riall,¹ against the American fort at Lewiston, which was abandoned by the enemy on their approach, together with two guns and a quantity of provisions. Lewiston itself, Fort Schlosser, and several other villages were burned in revenge for the wanton destruction of Newark ; and Riall continued his march up the river to within ten miles of Buffalo, where, being stopped by a broken bridge, he recrossed the river to Queenston. M'Clure, who had by chance shifted his quarters to Buffalo just before the storm of Fort Niagara, wrote a wild letter about the "horrid slaughter" on this occasion, but reported that he had called out the militia and that Buffalo was safe.

Very fortunately for him he was now relieved of his command by Major-general Hall, or he would speedily have found out his mistake. Drummond, always energetic and stimulated to redoubled activity by the out-
Dec. 28. rages of M'Clure's militiamen, on the 28th moved his head-quarters up the river to Chippewa ; and on
Dec. 29. the night of the 29th he sent Riall again across the water with about eleven hundred white troops² and four hundred Indians to attack the American posts at Black Rock and Buffalo. By midnight all, except four hundred of the Royal Scots, had disembarked two miles below Black Rock ; and the leading company presently surprised an American picquet, capturing most of the men and securing the bridge, which had been prepared for destruction, over a creek that barred the way. As soon as Riall's party had been safely disembarked, the Royal Scots began to drag their boats upstream to the foot of the rapids below Fort Erie, intending to cross from that point, land in rear of the enemy's position and cut off their retreat. Unfortunately, owing to the darkness,

¹ This officer also had just arrived from England.

² Royal Scots, 370 ; 4 cos. 8th, 240 ; 41st, 250 ; light cos. 89th, 55 ; grenadier cos. 100th, 50 ; militia volunteers, 50. Total, 1025 ; rank and file, say 1100 of all ranks

the boats were brought up to a shallow beach, where ^{1813.} they grounded, and the enemy discovering them opened ^{Dec. 29.} a heavy fire. Five field-guns posted by Drummond on the Canadian side promptly answered them, but with no great effect; and, though by great exertions the boats were shoved off, it was daylight before the Royal Scots reached the American shore, having suffered not a little both from musketry and cannonade while stationary and on passage.

Quickened by the sound of the firing, Riall left two companies to guard the captured bridge and advanced with all haste upon Black Rock. The Americans were strongly posted, and a few brave disciplined men among them defended their entrenchments with obstinacy for a time; but at length they were driven from their batteries and pursued to Buffalo, where they attempted to make another stand. Their efforts were in vain; and presently the whole broke and fled into the forest, leaving altogether eight guns, heavy and light, in the hands of the British. Three vessels of the lake-squadron were found ashore just below the town, and were burned. Buffalo was burned likewise with all its stores, there being no means of removing them. Black Rock was burned, and every remaining American settlement on the river was destroyed. The whole of the frontier, in fact, was laid in ashes as reprisal for the burning of Newark. The operations cost the British ninety-eight killed and wounded, more than half of whom belonged to the Royal Scots. The loss of the Americans can hardly have been less, and they left one hundred and thirty prisoners in Riall's hands. They acknowledged that they had two thousand men present; but two-thirds of these were militiamen who made no effort to stand by their gallant comrades of the regular army. This sufficiently accounts for the weakness of the American resistance.

Drummond now placed his troops in winter quarters; and the campaign of 1813, chequered by many vicissitudes, came to an end. The only substantial gain to

1813. the Americans was the destruction of Barclay's fleet on Lake Erie ; for the British had reconquered the lost peninsula of Niagara, and indeed they held Fort Niagara, on American territory, for the rest of the war. The appearance of Drummond in fact came as a welcome change after the wretched mediocrity of leadership which for the most part had impartially characterised both sides ; and it is more than ever evident that, if Brock had been spared, the American operations in the west would have been one long series of disgraces, which even the gallantry and enterprise of Perry would have been unable to avert. The destruction of Newark by M'Clure and the reprisals which inevitably followed upon it were most unfortunate incidents which greatly embittered the contest, and all the more because of Drummond's acknowledgment that, in spite of all his endeavours, he was powerless to prevent some shameful outrages by Indians. The Americans of course had no one but themselves to thank for this. The Indians had suffered many injuries from them, and had many cruel wrongs to avenge. It was impossible for the tribes to remain neutral ; and it was practically certain that they would favour the British, whom they liked, rather than the Americans, whom they hated. The Government of the United States should have considered all this before invading Canada, but young democracies are always thoughtless, especially when greed of territory is in question. If, as they had expected and indeed as they ought, the Americans had marched into Quebec within two months of the declaration of war, the Indians would have given little trouble, and would have hastened to make their peace with the victors. As things were, the American troops and leaders, with some few brilliant exceptions, proved themselves so contemptible that in two full years they accomplished absolutely nothing. The Indians as the allies of the more successful party had the advantage of avenging themselves upon their enemies, and naturally would not be hindered from seizing it, while the Americans, as naturally, fiercely

resented the sufferings of their kith and kin at the hands 1813. of savages.

In truth war, an ugly thing at the best of times, is rarely so inhuman as when waged by amateurs. It is difficult enough to keep disciplined men in hand when flushed by victory or discouraged by defeat ; but with undisciplined men and untrained leaders the task is impossible. Under generals so helpless, nerveless and shiftless as Dearborn, Wilkinson, Hampton and M'Clure the American militiaman, with all the material in him to make a grand fighting man, became too often a skulking marauder ; while more competent officers were paralysed because the troops entrusted to them were a mere rabble. The officers, where they did not fall to the same level as their men, found vent for their feelings in the exchange of recrimination ; and the men indemnified themselves for the discomfort of service by plunder and wanton destruction of property. Reprisals followed as a natural consequence, and the unfortunate settlers blamed the Indians, the British and their own generals for what was really the fault of the American Government or, more truly, of the ignorant democracy which inspired its action. But democracies, whether American or British, have short memories, and no love for the lessons of history. The only quality that never fails them is conceit, and the only teacher that can prevail with them is disaster.

CHAPTER XI

1813. OUR last sight of Wellington was at the close of the battles of the Pyrenees. No little reproach has been cast upon him for halting abruptly on the 2nd of August instead of pressing Soult to the utmost. The very feeble resistance opposed to his attack on the positions of Echalar and Ibantelly would seem to show that the French were to all intent at his mercy, though it is true that Villatte's Reserve and Foy's division were still fresh and unbeaten troops. Wellington's mistrust of the European situation, however, made him shrink from pushing his success any further. He knew only of the prolongation of the armistice of Pleischwitz, nothing of its causes nor of the secret designs of Austria; and he concluded that the Great Powers were at variance among themselves, that Napoleon would succeed in detaching one or other of them to his side, that the others would come to terms, and that in a few weeks he would have the Emperor and the whole French army from North Germany upon his hands. This was his ultimate reason for caution, and it reacted very strongly upon his proximate motives, which were as follows. First, it was dangerous to advance into France until all the Spanish fortresses had been recovered, otherwise communication with the interior of Spain might become impossible. Secondly, it was useless for him to cross the French frontier unless he was in a position to reduce the French fortresses that stood in his way, and to establish himself permanently upon French soil. This was no easy matter. In France every man was a soldier, and there was abundance of

experienced officers to lead them. Wellington's own 1813. army had deteriorated, as every army must deteriorate, after much hard marching and hard fighting. Its numbers were diminished, its shoes were worn out, its ammunition was exhausted; and it needed time both for recuperation and for re-equipment. Lastly, so serious an enterprise as the invasion of France could not be undertaken before magazines of supplies and stores had been accumulated.

All of these considerations were highly characteristic of the man, and not lightly to be overlooked; yet they hardly seem to excuse Wellington's deliberate abstention from continuing the pursuit for at any rate a few days more. The mob of starving isolated soldiers, who followed Foy's column, had fallen eagerly to the pillage of their own countrymen, carrying panic and consternation with them. The torrent of the wounded had flowed northward even to Orthez and beyond it, spreading terror still wider. No fewer than eight thousand stragglers rejoined their colours during the first fortnight of August, some hundreds of which at least might certainly have been captured; and the bare fact of keeping the beaten army on the move would have thrown hundreds, if not thousands, more into the hands of the Allies. I strongly suspect that in his inmost heart Wellington dreaded lest his army, if led straight into France after such a fortnight of fatigue and hardship, would have disbanded itself in search of drink and plunder. Already desertion was terrible, and every symptom pointed to the conclusion that, for the present, the army was sated with hard work.¹

Wellington therefore turned his attention entirely to the siege of San Sebastian, which, having been already suspended for a fortnight during the late fighting, was now delayed for over a fortnight longer, because the battering-train had not arrived from England. During this interval his force received a welcome addition

¹ *Wellington Desp.* To Bathurst, 8th, 9th, 11th, 14th, 18th Aug. 1813.

1813. through the arrival of the First Brigade of Guards from Oporto, where the epidemic of sickness had at last left them, and of a new brigade from England, consisting of the Seventy-sixth, Eighty-fourth and Eighty-fifth, which was placed under the command of Lord Aylmer.¹ At
- Aug. 19. last on the 19th of August the ordnance transports arrived, though, owing to the extreme inefficiency of the Ordnance Department at this time, they came with an insufficient quantity of shot; but all defects were made good by a further fleet of transports which came in on the 23rd. All was now in train for vigorous prosecution of the siege except in the matter of the naval blockade, which, as Wellington bitterly complained, was only nominal; the naval force on the station being so weak that the coast was practically open to the French shipping, while British transports were constantly delayed for want of convoy.²
- Aug. 22. However, on the 22nd the work was resumed in earnest. Two new batteries were constructed on the height of St. Bartholomew; other existing batteries were enlarged; and by the 26th fifteen pieces had been mounted on the left attack and forty-eight on the right attack, which opened fire on the same day under the eye of Wellington himself. In the night a new battery was begun three hundred yards from the eastern bastion of the landward front; and, in order to make good the failure of the Navy, the island of Santa Clara was captured by surprise, which furnished a fitting site for another battery to enfilade the defences
- Aug. 27. of the Castle. On the night of the 27th Rey made a sortie, which was at once repulsed; and the fire of the besieged became feeble under the tremendous cannon-

¹ The Guards marched into Oyarzun on the 18th Aug. Aylmer's brigade must have arrived between the 15th Aug. and 1st Sept., for Graham sent for it to keep order in San Sebastian on the 1st Sept. (*Supp. Desp.* viii. 217). It was the 2nd battalion of the 84th which is in question. The 76th and 85th had only one battalion each.

² *Wellington Desp.* To Bathurst, 19th Aug.; to Graham, 20th Aug.; to Melville, 21st Aug. 1813.

ade of the Allies. But the brave garrison still stood stoutly to its guns; and a false attack made by Graham on the 29th-30th, in the hope of inducing the defenders to fire their mines, failed of its object. By the afternoon of the 30th the south face of the eastern bastion of the horn-work had been laid open for half its length; the bastion of St. Jean had been completely swept away; and from that point for over two hundred and fifty yards northward the eastern front of the place presented almost one continuous breach, the larger part of which lay between the two towers, with a smaller gap some eighty yards farther to the north. At two o'clock in the morning of the 31st the besiegers sprang three mines, which overthrew the sea-wall along the eastern face of the horn-work's eastern bastion; and the craters formed by the explosion, being connected by gabions, made a convenient passage for the storming columns to issue from the trenches. Accordingly at eleven o'clock the order was given for the assault.

Upon the renewal of the siege the spirit of discontent which had animated the Fifth Division since the failure of the first attack had by no means disappeared; and Wellington wrote both to Graham and to Bathurst in strong condemnation of it. "I am afraid"—so he expressed himself to Bathurst—"that I shall be obliged to disgrace the Fifth Division. I understand that the General and superior officers were so indiscreet as to talk before their men of the impossibility of success, and that they still continue the conversation. But I have hinted to them that I shall make them continue the operations of the siege, and bring other troops to storm the place when it is ready to be stormed, who will not find success impossible." In fulfilment of this threat Wellington called for forty volunteers from each battalion of the First, Fourth and Light Divisions "to show the Fifth Division how to mount a breach"; and seven hundred and fifty men thus obtained were sent down to San Sebastian. Leith, who had just resumed command of the Fifth Division, was naturally furious.

1813. He would not let the newcomers lead the assault ; but, Aug. 31. extending part of them along the trenches to keep down the fire of the horn-work, and massing the rest in reserve, committed the dangerous duty to a thousand men of Robinson's brigade, consisting of the Fourth, Forty-seventh and Fifty-ninth. These were divided into two columns, of which the right column was to ascend the old breach between the two towers, and the left that of the bastion of St. Jean. It was obvious that such an arrangement would expose the stormers to a shower of musketry from the horn-work, as they passed along the strand ; but Rey, not content with retrenching the original breaches, had built of ruined masonry and paving stones a very thick wall, fifteen feet high, extending along the first street parallel to the strand, from the northern end or the lesser breach to the landward front of the main fortress ; and it was apparently in the hope of turning this new line of defence that Graham's plan had been designed.

The batteries of the besiegers were unable to open fire before eight o'clock owing to dense fog, but from that hour until eleven they rained projectiles upon the dilapidated city. The French gunners were all standing by their pieces ; the extremities of the breaches were held by the voltigeur and grenadier companies ; the interior wall was lined by other troops ; and in the horn-work the defenders were drawn up to repel any attack upon the eastern demi-bastion. At eleven o'clock the signal was given. The forlorn hope, under Lieutenant Macguire of the Fourth, ran at the top of their speed down the strand ; and immediately after them a serjeant and twelve men leaped upon the covered way to cut the saucisson of a mine under the sea-wall of the eastern demi-bastion. Startled by their unexpected appearance, the French fired the mine prematurely and brought down the wall with a crash, burying the serjeant and his heroic little party, though doing little damage to the main column, the bulk of which had not reached the area of explosion. But the French on the landward front of the demi-bastion, seeing the stormers

pass by them, hastened to the eastern front and poured ^{1813.} a hail of musketry into their rear ; while the batteries ^{Aug. 31.} on Monte Orgullo and the bastion of St. Elmo showered grape and shell upon their front. None the less the forlorn hope rushed on, swept over the body of Macguire, who had fallen at the foot of the great breach, up to the summit, and there stopped. Below them was a sheer drop of sixteen feet, then a mass of obstacles of every conceivable nature, and beyond these the retrenchment wall, belching bullets from a hundred loopholes. In vain the stormers sought means to pass the gulf before them. They were shot down by scores ; and at last they fell back to the foot of the breach, where they were sheltered indeed from the musketry of the internal wall, but were still tormented by sharp-shooters from various points of vantage.

At the bastion of St. Jean the assailants fared no better. Two guns in the cavalier bastion of the landward front and a line of grenadiers behind a traverse, not more than fifteen yards from the breach, scourged their left flank ; while other infantry and a four-pounder in the horn-work wrought havoc in their rear. Graham continued to feed both attacks steadily from the trenches, sending first the reserve of Robinson's brigade, then Hay's brigade, excepting one wing of the Ninth,¹ and finally the volunteers of the First and Light Divisions, who had from the beginning been clamouring to be let loose. But for all their efforts these last could accomplish no more than their despised comrades ; and, after over an hour of desperate endeavour and the fall of many hundreds of brave men, the capture of San Sebastian seemed to be as remote as ever.²

¹ Graham's account is that Hay's brigade did not move out of the trenches until after the cannonade mentioned below ; but I have preferred that of Napier, which is confirmed, for what they are worth, by the historians of the 43rd and 52nd.

² Such is the account of Jones. Belmas gives the time at three hours, which is implicitly accepted by Napier. Cooke, who was a cool spectator, and may have had his watch in hand, allows no more than one hour ; and Graham in effect confirms him by saying that the troops broke into the town after the assault had lasted two hours.

1813. Unmoved by the carnage, Graham decided to transfer the attack to the horn-work, and turned every one of the fifty guns mounted on the Chofre Hills upon the high curtain that divided it from the body of the fortress. The storm of shot, passing over the heads of the British at the foot of the breach, caused at first a cry to retire ; but this was soon stilled, and some of the Light Division seized the opportunity to effect a lodgment in some ruined houses to the right of the great breach. Meanwhile the effect of the concentration of fire was terrific, the traverses being broken down, and the French troops, who lined the parapet, torn to pieces. For half an hour the cannonade continued ; when the assailants again mounted the two southern breaches, while the 13th and part of the 24th Portuguese forded the Urumea and advanced upon the most northerly breach. The water was waist-deep and the guns of the Castle and of St. Elmo ploughed great gaps in the column as it advanced ; but these brave men pressed on undismayed, and on reaching the shore parted right and left, the 13th to the northern breach and the 24th to the great breach between the two towers.

Thus reinforced the British renewed their attack with undiminished fury ; while a party of the Eighty-fifth regiment embarked in boats and hovered around Monte Orgullo as if threatening an assault at that point. But neither this diversion nor the heroic constancy of the assailants at the breaches were of avail. The tide was rising and the failure of the attack seemed to be certain when, by some accident, a quantity of ammunition accumulated by the French behind the southern end of the great breach became kindled and, blowing up with a succession of loud explosions, sent scores of French grenadiers flying into the air.¹ The defenders were

¹ It is difficult to define the area of these explosions. Cooke, a disinterested spectator, says "to the right (south) of the great breach." Belmas says "near the breach" without further particulars. Jones says "along the ramparts." Burgoyne says "along the interior of the breach." I take it that the area of destruction must have covered

thrown into confusion. They abandoned at once the ravelin and the eastern demi-bastion of the horn-work, upon which the British immediately directed their efforts; and though the besieged gallantly rallied behind the high curtain, they were borne down by the superior numbers of Hay's brigade. At the great breach the internal wall was likewise abandoned, leaving free ingress to the stormers; and when the Portuguese broke in likewise at the lesser breach, Rey realised that the fortress was lost. He therefore withdrew such men as were left to him to Monte Orgullo, still fighting valiantly to save as many as possible, and preserving to the last the convent of Sta. Theresa at the foot of the hill.

Leith, Robinson and Oswald had all of them been wounded; and, owing to the fall of many officers and the general confusion inseparable from an assault, the Allies penetrated into the town rather as a mob than as a body of disciplined men. Hardly had the French been expelled when a thunderstorm of appalling violence broke over San Sebastian, increasing the disorder; and therewith the troops seem to have turned at once not only to riot and pillage but to unparalleled excesses of barbarity and violence. The efforts of the officers to restore order were quelled by showers of bullets; and one Portuguese adjutant, who interposed to prevent some atrocity, was deliberately and in cold blood executed in the market-place by some ruffianly British soldiers. The horrors of Badajoz seem to have paled before those of San Sebastian; and it is difficult to say where they would have ended, had not a fire, kindled either by design of the French or by the explosions, fairly driven the troops out of the place.

It is impossible to excuse such conduct, but not difficult to account for it. The Fifth Division had been

most of the angle between the line of the ramparts from the cavalier to the tower of Las Miguetas, and a straight line drawn between these two latter points. Both Jones and Belmas attribute the explosion to the British cannonade, but Cooke's evidence seems to be decisive against them.

1813. held up to obloquy as men afraid to mount a breach. In
Aug. 31. Robinson's brigade no fewer than eight hundred and seventy-two had fallen in the course of the siege, of whom two hundred and seventy-eight belonged to the Fourth, two hundred and fifty-two to the Forty-seventh, and three hundred and fifty-two to the Fifty-ninth; and their actual loss in the assault, where they had about fourteen hundred of all ranks engaged, amounted to six hundred and eighty, of whom two hundred and sixty-one belonged to the Fourth alone. Hay's brigade had suffered less severely, but even so the casualties of the Royal Scots numbered one hundred and ninety-four, of the Ninth one hundred and sixty-six, and of the Thirty-eighth one hundred and thirty-two. With eighty-nine of their officers dead and disabled,¹ and with the memory of what they conceived to be a great wrong rankling in their hearts, it is not surprising that the survivors of these six battalions took leave of all discipline. The volunteers, excepting those of the brigade of Guards, escaped far more lightly; but small detachments of fifty men easily miss their one officer, and missing him will decline to obey any other. Hence it is probable that they were the worst offenders of all; and indeed Graham testifies that they were least under control of all the troops engaged.² It must be added that the Portuguese took their due share in outrage, having no love for the Spaniards and a bad example before them. Hay and other superior officers seem to have striven manfully to punish the marauders, not altogether without success;³ but, whether owing to the fire or to whatever cause, it seems certain that, for at least two days, authority vanished in San Sebastian.

Altogether the capture of the fortress, excluding Monte Orgullo, cost the Allies fifty days of time and over thirty-seven hundred killed and wounded of all

¹ Wellington (*Desp.*, to Bathurst, 8th Oct. 1833) stated that of about 250 officers, who mounted the breaches, 170 had fallen.

² *Supp. Desp.* viii. 217.

³ *Ibid.* viii. 309-314.

ranks,¹ rather over twenty-four hundred being British 1813. and the remainder Portuguese. So costly a price for a Aug. 31. third-class stronghold is sufficient to condemn the conduct of the siege, and to justify the dissatisfaction, though not to excuse the open murmurings, of the Fifth Division. Burgoyne, after the discovery on the 22nd of July of the aqueduct leading to the ditch of the horn-work, thought that the attack should have been transferred at once to the landward front, and that the horn-work itself should have been carried first of all, under feint of an attack upon the body of the place. Jones, after the event, came to precisely the same conclusion, and reckoned that under such treatment the fortress would have fallen within fourteen days. In exoneration of Fletcher, the chief engineer, who was killed on the day of the assault, and possibly also of Major Smith, who actually suggested the plan of the attack, Jones pleads that, considering the very small means of ordnance and ammunition at their disposal, nothing better could have been done. But against this there is Burgoyne's opinion, recorded above, that the place could have been easily taken, even under existing conditions, if affairs had been differently managed. Account must also be taken of the very significant fact that until the British guns (whether by Graham's or Dickson's order) were turned upon the high curtain, no progress whatever was made with the assault; whereas Wellington's idea, if not indeed his order, was to effect a lodgment in the bastion of St. Jean and the tower of Las

¹ *Wellington Desp.* (a compressed return) gives the number at 1716 British and 787 Portuguese. Total, 2503. But the return of losses from 28th to 31st Aug. shows 1710 casualties for the British alone, and those from 21st to 27th July, 702 for the British alone. Total, 2412. Evidently, therefore, the figures in *Wellington Desp.* are for 28th-31st Aug. only. The Portuguese loss for 21st-27th July was 576, which added to 787 makes 1363. The loss of the Allies would therefore be 2412+1363, or 3775. Jones's figure of 3770 is therefore the correct one. Belmas, quoting from some return which purports to emanate from Graham, gives the loss of the Allies at 2496 from 28th July to 31st Aug., and 2573 from 31st Aug. to 1st Sept., but this is absurd.

1813. Miguetas.¹ The inevitable conclusion is that the
Aug. 31. operations of the leaguer were misconducted, and that
hundreds of lives were squandered to no purpose whatever.

On the morning of the assault Rey's garrison, which had been reinforced from time to time during the siege, numbered about twenty-five hundred men. When he retired into the Castle he had still twelve hundred and eighty, but was encumbered by four hundred prisoners and nearly as many wounded; and he had only seven guns fit for action on the landward side. It is true that the steep rocky sides of Monte Orgullo almost forbade an assault, while the masonry of its buildings was so massive as to defy much battering; but there was little shelter for the troops on the summit, and consequently every prospect that the citadel could be reduced by bombardment. Accordingly a vigorous fire was kept up from mortars and howitzers during the first week of September, while two new batteries were constructing, one of three guns near the south-west angle of the horn-work, and one within the horn-work itself. Fire
Sept. 8. was opened on the 8th from sixty pieces, silencing the French guns almost immediately; and, after two hours' endurance of a terrific cannonade, Rey hoisted the white flag. He had done all that was possible for man to do and had made a noble defence, justly winning for his heroic garrison the honours of war and for his officers the right to retain their swords. Indeed, when his commissioner came out to arrange the terms of capitulation, Graham is said to have handed him a pen and bidden him write them himself. The number of all ranks who surrendered with the Castle was eighteen hundred and sixty, of whom four hundred and eighty were in hospital disabled; and in addition to these six hundred and seventy prisoners were taken on the 31st. Up to the 22nd of August the garrison had lost eight hundred and fifty killed and wounded, so that

¹ *Wellington Desp.*, to Graham, 23rd Aug.; and see the opening words of Graham's report of 1st Sept. 1813.

altogether the siege may be said to have cost the French 1813. three thousand men. The greatest sufferers of all were the inhabitants, for the town was totally consumed by fire. Of six hundred houses not a dozen were left standing, and it was reckoned that, apart from those who had perished during the leaguer, fifteen hundred families were left homeless and penniless. Altogether San Sebastian is the name that carries with it the most unpleasant associations of the Peninsular War.

Upon the very day of Graham's successful assault, Aug. 31. Soult made his last attempt to succour the doomed fortress. His orders bade him always to maintain the offensive; and within ten days of the heavy defeats about Sorauren he still talked of an advance, whatever the odds against him, as soon as the cannon of the besiegers should inform him that they had renewed their attack. This was mere vain boasting. He had some forty thousand men at his disposal, but they were discouraged and demoralised; and, even had their spirit been of the best, he had no means of feeding them. So defective were the means and the organisation of his commissariat that, though half of his artillery-teams were permanently employed in the transport of victuals, he could not give his troops regular rations even in their cantonments; and, to add to his difficulties, the dearth of forage was such that he could hardly keep his horses alive. To collect even two days' supplies, much less four, was beyond his power; and he could not hope to live on the barren country of the Pyrenees. The utmost that he could do therefore for the present was to reorganise his army, relegating the battalions that had suffered most severely to the reserve, and replacing them by others drawn from Villatte's corps.¹

He also slightly modified his dispositions, which on

¹ Maucune received from Villatte the 10th Light, 1/101st, 1 and 2/105th Line, and from France the 3rd Line. Vandermaesen received from Villatte the 1/4th Light, 1 and 3/40th. Villatte took over from Maucune the 34th Light, 66th, 82nd, 86th Line; and from Vandermaesen the 1st Line and 25th Light.

1813. the 17th of August were as follows: Foy's division Aug. was spread round St. Jean Pied de Port from the Venta d'Orisson on the south-east to Arneguy on the south and St. Étienne de Baigorri on the west. Of d'Erlon's corps, Darmagnac's and Maransin's divisions were behind Ainhua, resting their left on Mondarrain, which had been fortified, while Abbé's was north of Urdax with a post at Zugarramurdi. Of Clausel's corps, Conroux's and Vandermaesen's divisions were encamped just to south of Sare, with posts on the road to Vera, and Taupin's to the north of Sare on the road to Ascain, where were Soult's head-quarters. Of Reille's corps, Lamartinière's division was on the heights of La Bayonnette about two miles north of Vera, with its right resting on La Rhune, and the left at Biriattou, Maucune's to west of it between Biriattou and Hendaye; and Villatte's Reserve on the heights that run from Ascain northward to Serres.

Wellington, never doubting of another French attack, had since the first of August taken the precaution to fortify the line which covered the blockading forces at Pamplona. On the right Hill had been authorised to throw up works for cannon at Lindux and Altobiscar; and in the centre an engineer had been sent to Picton to advise as to the defence of the Baztan and the pass of Maya. On the left Wellington judged that the space between Oyarzun and the Bidassoa could not be made too strong; and accordingly under his personal direction a triple line of field-works was thrown up. The first was on the rugged mountain of San Marcial, immediately below which the main road ran for nearly a mile, pent in between its lower slopes and the Bidassoa. This commanding height, formidable by nature, was further strengthened by abatis and epaulments. The second line was carried from the northern end of the ridge of Jaizquibal, which borders the sea, through Fuenterrabia and Irun to the western slopes of Mount Aya—the Mount of the Three Crowns; the great road to the south being commanded by a redoubt about

a mile and a half from Irun. The third line was ^{1813.} formed by the heights of Oyarzun. The key of the ^{Aug.} whole position was San Marcial, which dominated alike the road leading from Irun to Oyarzun and Hernani on the west, and that leading from Irun to Vera on the north.

Soult had no choice but to attack this fortified space on Wellington's left. To move by his left from St. Jean Pied de Port he would have needed fifty thousand men—twenty thousand to guard the line of the Bidassoa, and thirty thousand to advance—and he had in all but forty thousand. The centre between the pass of Maya and Vera he could hardly hope to penetrate, since the Allies were on both banks of the Bidassoa; and, on ground where he could bring forward neither cavalry nor artillery, he could take little advantage of a victory, even should he gain one. His first proposal therefore was to advance simultaneously by Vera and Fuenterrabia; throwing the corps of Clausel and d'Erlon across the Bidassoa at Vera, whence they would ascend a spur of Mount Aya, turn its southern slope and drop down upon Oyarzun; while Reille should at the same time force the passage of the Bidassoa, carry Irun and the camp of San Marcial and, advancing along the northern slope of Mount Aya, join hands with the two corps of the left and force Graham's covering position at Hernani. Recognising, however, that the Allies were in possession of the passes of Maya, of Echalar, the entire valley of the Baztan and the valley of Baigorri, and that they were not likely to sit still with so many roads of ingress into France open to them, Soult was obliged to modify his plan. He decided, then, to hold back d'Erlon's corps so as to contain the Allied centre and right, giving him orders not to join the main body of the army unless he should see the troops over against him march off. The reopening of the besiegers' fire before San Sebastian on the 27th quickened Soult to action. From want of forage he could not bring forward his cavalry at all, nor his artillery beyond the first

1813. position for attack ; and the dearth of supplies was so well known that the troops began to grumble directly that they were set in motion. "What was the use," they said, "of their forcing their way to San Sebastian to-day, if they must return from it to-morrow on pain of starvation?" With the odds everywhere against him, Soult was not to be deterred from obeying the Emperor's orders, and doing his best to save San Sebastian ; and it is impossible not to admire his moral courage.

On the 28th and 29th of August his army began to assemble before its appointed stations, after some change in the composition of the corps. Reille with the divisions of Maucune, Lamartinière and Villatte was stationed on the Bidassoa ; Clausel with those of Taupin, Vandermaesen, Darmagnac and Maransin on the northern slope of La Bayonnette ; d'Erlon with Conroux's division at Sare, Abbé's at Ainhoa, and Foy's, which had left a thousand men to guard St. Jean Pied de Port, at Espelette. The river had been sounded. Two deep fords had been found between Fuenterrabia and Hendaye, two more near the ruined bridge of Béhobie ; and above the bridge to Biriattou there was low water everywhere, though between Biriattou and Vera there was but one really good ford, that of Endarlaza, less than two miles below the village of that name. On the night of the 28th forty guns were placed in position between the fords of Biriattou and Hendaye to play on the northern slope of San Marcial, the great road from Irun and the mouth of the Bidassoa ; for Soult depended for success chiefly upon Reille. That general's first objective was to be the Spanish camp at San Marcial. This taken, he was to leave there a strong reserve to repel any counter-attack, and lead the rest of his force to the spur of Mount Aya, which trends down to Oyarzun. His advance along the northern slope of Mount Aya was designed at once to cover the laying of two bridges, the one at Biriattou and the other below it, and to open the great road to the advance of a brigade of cavalry

and two batteries of horse-artillery, which were held in 1813. reserve between Urrugne and Béhobie. On the 29th Aug. 29. Soult fixed his head-quarters at St. Jean de Luz, being still undetermined whether to make his attack on the 30th or on the 31st; but at half-past two in the morning of the former day he definitely deferred the attack till the 31st. The delay was in the circumstances remarkable, for Soult was aware, through Clausel's reports, that Wellington was strengthening his force upon Mount Aya; but the Marshal, instead of anticipating his enemy's precautions, contented himself with moving Foy's division to St. Jean de Luz as a further reinforcement to Reille's column.

{ On the side of the Allies the heights of San Marcial and the town of Irun were occupied by three divisions of the 4th Spanish army, numbering about six thousand men, under General Freire, with Howard's and Aylmer's British brigades in support upon their left, and Longa's division in rear of the right. To assure the safety of the position still further, Wellington on the 30th and 31st moved two British brigades of Cole's division to Longa's right rear, and stationed Miller's Portuguese brigade far out on Longa's right front to watch the ford of Endarlaza and the bridge of Vera. Still farther to the right Inglis's brigade of the Seventh Division was ordered to the vicinity of Lesaca on the 30th, while the Light Division, extended along the hill of Santa Barbara from Ibantelly to the river, threatened the flank of Clausel's advance to Vera. Dalhousie, Colville and Hill were directed to make demonstrations on their front without committing themselves to any action, so as to trouble Soult with the apprehension of a counter-attack upon his left.

Under cover of a dense fog Clausel brought forward Aug. 31. his divisions before daylight, and massed them in the valley above Vera; Taupin's on the right, Darmagnac's in the centre, Vandermaesen's on the left and Maransin's in reserve. At half-past five Kempt, who was in temporary command of the Light Division, reported

1813. the French advance, necessarily in vague terms, to Aug. 31. head-quarters; but at seven o'clock the fog cleared away, and revealed to each side the proceedings of the other. At that hour Wellington, who was himself at Lesaca, ordered Inglis to join Miller's Portuguese above Salain de Lesaca, and sent word to Dalhousie to move the rest of his division towards the same point as soon as Picton should relieve him at Echalar. Kempt was at about the same time instructed to support Inglis, either by a direct attack upon Vera, or by joining him on the left bank of the Bidassoa, at his discretion; taking care, however, not to abandon the height of Santa Barbara until his troops should have been replaced by the Spaniards of General Giron. Clausel, observing the position of Kempt, decided that he must hold a force in reserve to resist a possible attack, and kept back Vandermesen's and Maransin's divisions, while those of Darmagnac and Taupin made their way to the Bidassoa, the former to cross at Salain de Lesaca and the latter below Endarlaza. Two batteries on the lower ranges of the French position played heavily on the fords and upon Vera to protect their passage of the stream; and the picquets of the Light Division presently retired from the village, holding only a group of fortified houses on the left bank opposite the egress from the bridge.

Though the water at both fords was no more than a foot deep, it was eight o'clock before Inglis's outposts on the left bank were driven back, when a sharp engagement began between the skirmishers of both sides. At ten the head of Darmagnac's column engaged Inglis in his main position, and after an hour of hot work the British brigadier, seeing that the French were likely to envelop his left flank, fell back, still fighting, to a new position on the right rear of Cole. His losses amounted to nearly three hundred killed and wounded, over two-thirds of them being British; the Fifty-first, which covered the retreat, suffering more heavily than any other battalion. But this last retirement brought his

brigade practically into Wellington's main line of 1813. battle; and Clausel, upon reviewing the situation, Aug. 31. thought it imprudent to press his attack further until Reille should have carried the heights of San Marcial. The bulk of the Light Division was still massed upon the heights of Santa Barbara, inactive, it is true, for Wellington had ordered Kempt not to commit his troops to any general engagement, but none the less a standing menace and danger; while two battalions of the second brigade¹ had crossed the Bidassoa by the bridge of Lesaca, and had occupied the village and a post beyond it, so as to secure communications between Inglis's brigade and Santa Barbara. For all that Clausel knew, therefore, the Allied troops in the last-named position and at Echalar were only biding their time to make a general attack upon his left flank and rear. Accordingly, though his skirmishers continued to maintain a lively fire, he halted the bulk of the divisions of Darmagnac and Taupin by a wood half-way up the slope of Mount Aya, from which point the former could either pursue its way to Oyarzun, or fall back to Vera to meet any movement by Kempt.

On Reille's side Lamartinière's division marched a little before daybreak, crossed the river by the three fords of Biriadou and seized the wooded terrace on the opposite bank. Maucune's division followed it, and Villatte's was ordered to pass the stream lower down, as soon as the tide should permit, in order to cover the laying of the bridges. The attack opened by the advance of Lamartinière's division against the Spanish left, and of Pinoteau's brigade against their right; Maucune's other brigade being held in reserve. The ground was extremely steep and broken by brushwood; and whether from this cause, or (as Soult hints) owing to mishandling by the superior officers, the assailing troops swarmed up the ascent as a disorderly mass, no

¹ 43rd and 1/95th. Napier says that the whole brigade crossed the river; but Surtees (*Twenty-five Years in the Rifle Brigade*, p. 235) says expressly that his own battalion, 3/95th, did not cross the river.

1813. part of them being held together to serve as a support
Aug. 31. to the rest. When they had climbed two-thirds of the distance to the summit, the Spaniards met them by a general charge, which swept them headlong to the foot of the hill. Here the French were rallied and the attack was renewed, Joseph's body-guard under General Guy being brought up from Villatte's division to the right of Lamartinière, so as to menace more formidably the Spanish left. Guy appears to have led his men with skill and determination, for he gained the ridge next below the summit; and the Spaniards at that point began to waver. The Eighty-fifth from Aylmer's brigade came forward in support; but Freire in alarm sent an aide-de-camp to Wellington to beg for the whole of Cole's division. As the messenger reached the British General, the Spaniards delivered their second counter-attack upon Lamartinière and Pinoteau, and rolled them for the second time to the foot of the hill; whereupon Wellington, pointing to the disordered masses by the river, answered that General Freire had already won his victory, and should keep all the honour of it for his own countrymen only. This was no exaggeration. Lamartinière had lost over sixteen hundred officers and men; and after this second repulse his troops, giving way to panic, rushed headlong into the river. The engineers in charge of the pontoon-bridges broke them up to rescue their drowning comrades; and some of the boats were so much overloaded by the fugitives that they subsided gunwale under and sank. Only after the lapse of several hours, by the confession of Soult himself, could the troops be rallied, and then it was evident that there was no spirit left in them.

Farther to the east Wellington's diversions were entirely successful. Giron's main body engaged Conroux at Sare, feebly indeed but sufficiently; while the Portuguese brigades of the Sixth and Seventh Divisions fell upon Abbé at Zugarramurdi, drove him from that place and from Urdax, where they burned his camp, and

forced him back to Ainhoa. Dalhousie, who, as we ^{1813.} have seen, had received orders in the morning to move ^{Aug. 31.} his second British brigade to Lesaca, thought it imprudent to do so, and quite unnecessarily detained it to support the Portuguese until four in the afternoon. However, the French officer commanding the post of Mondarrain was even more nervous than Dalhousie, and raised a false alarm of the advance of the Allies in that quarter also. Altogether there was some perturbation on the French left until noon, when d'Erlon, who had at the outset sent in a depressing account of Abbé's retreat to Ainhoa, realised that he was not seriously threatened, and reported in that sense to Soult.

This second message, together with that of Clausel, reached the Marshal at the same moment. According to his own account Soult was bringing forward the divisions of Foy and Villatte to renew the attack upon San Marcial when these reports reached him, and caused him to divert Foy from Croix des Bouquets to Serres in order to reinforce d'Erlon. He also stated that he kept the divisions of Lamartinière, Maucune and Villatte on the left bank of the Bidassoa until nightfall, and then withdrew them to Urrugne. All this is untrue. Reille's troops, beaten and demoralised, crossed the river, as has been told, in panic ; and Soult had no idea of renewing the attack at all. But he wished to conceal the disastrous repulse that had taken place under his eyes, and therefore pretended that he would have pursued his plan and carried San Marcial, but for the danger that menaced his left. As a matter of fact all fighting was broken off by a storm of peculiar violence which tore branches from the trees in all directions, turned every trickle into a torrent, and swelled the Bidassoa into an impassable flood. The tempest had been raging for an hour, when Clausel received at five o'clock Soult's order to retreat ; and, by the time that he reached the fords with Darmagnac's, Taupin's and Vandermaesen's divisions, there was more than six feet of water running over them. He was therefore obliged

1813. to halt for the night on the left bank of the river, and
Sept. 1. early in the morning of the 1st of September to make
for the bridge of Vera.

At half-past two Vandermaesen's advanced guard reached this bridge, and found two sentries posted upon it from a picquet of the Ninety-fifth, which occupied the loopholed houses, already mentioned, on the skirts of the village. These sentries discharged their rifles to give the alarm; but, the priming being wet owing to the heavy rain, the pieces missed fire and both men were bayoneted. Captain Cadoux, who commanded the party of Rifles, was, however, on the alert, and drove back the head of Vandermaesen's column, which was brought completely to a stand. Skerrett, being apprised of the state of affairs, sent orders for the post to be evacuated; but Cadoux refused to obey, and rightly, for he was master of the situation; his own men being able under shelter of their roof to maintain a regular fire, whereas the French muskets were in great measure disabled by the rain. Vandermaesen was obliged to organise a regular attack upon the houses, which continued for an hour without the slightest success, and ultimately cost him his life. The Rifles had not lost a single man except the two sentries, and were holding their own perfectly when Cadoux received a second and peremptory message from Skerrett to evacuate the post. He obeyed, observing that few of his party would reach camp. As they withdrew, the day broke; and they were exposed to a cruel fire not only from Vandermaesen's troops but from Clausel's guns on the heights above Vera. Cadoux and sixteen men were killed; the three remaining officers and forty-three more men were wounded; and the French obtained a free passage across the bridge.

Then too late Skerrett sent up another company and some Portuguese troops, which were probably intended only to help the withdrawal of Cadoux, being too weak to effect anything when once the French had passed to the right bank of the stream. Had he sent his entire

brigade, it is likely that the whole of Clausel's force ^{1813.} might have been cut off. It must be said in Skerrett's Sept. 1. defence that Maransin's division was lying on the isolated hill of Alzate Real, less than a mile away, though, whether owing to the storm or to whatever cause, it took not the slightest notice of the combat by the village. But a more enterprising officer would undoubtedly have endeavoured to intercept Clausel, whatever the enemy's apparent superiority in numbers; for the other brigade of the Light Division and two brigades of the Seventh Division were at Lesaca, not more than two miles by road from the heights of Santa Barbara, and therefore near enough to give support. Perhaps, however, it is safer not to dogmatise as to what could or could not have been done on so wild and terrible a night of wind and rain.

The total loss of the French in these two days amounted to just over thirty-eight hundred of all ranks, including three hundred and fifty prisoners; nearly half of the casualties falling upon Lamartinière's division.¹ The number of officers who fell was so noticeably disproportionate to that of the men as to engage Soult's attention even during the action. There were, he reports, battalions in which one officer to every

¹ The original return gives the total casualties at 3637, which figure is accepted by Capt. Vidal de Lablache. But the columns have been wrongly cast up.

Corps.	Killed.		Wounded.		Prisoners.		Total
	Off.	Men.	Off.	Men.	Off.	Men.	
Maucune's Div.	2	35	11	224		43	315
Lamartinière's "	12	176	73	1223		159	1643
Darmagnac's "	2	40	17	344		3	406
Abbé's "	3	47	9	265		1	325
Vandermaesen's "	1	41	5	180		4	231
Taupin's "	2	23	9	254		128	416
Villatte's "	7	69	23	335	1	18	453
Artillery . .		7		12			19
	29	438	147	2837	1	356	3808

1813. eight men was disabled, and others in which only two
 Sept. 1. or three officers were left standing, though five-sixths of
 the men were still unhurt; and he attributed that fact
 to the sharp-shooters of the Sixtieth which were attached
 to each division (except the Light Division) of the
 British Army.¹ Considering that only one brigade of
 British troops was seriously engaged during the day,
 this reasoning was sufficiently absurd. The true cause
 beyond doubt was that the men would not follow their
 officers, who sacrificed themselves nobly in the efforts to
 bring the soldiers forward. Vandermaesen was killed
 outright; Lamartinière was stricken to the death; the
 brigadiers Menne, Rémond and Guy were wounded;
 two colonels were killed, four more and five battalion-
 commanders were hurt; all of which points to back-
 wardness and discouragement among the rank and file.
 The casualties of the Allies just exceeded twenty-six
 hundred,² those of the Spaniards being four times as
 great as those of the British, and thrice as great as those
 of the Portuguese. The behaviour of Freire's troops
 was the more creditable inasmuch as they were abso-
 lutely starving, owing to the neglect of the Spanish
 Government.³ The Portuguese suffered chiefly in their
 engagement with Abbé, when they were so eager that
 they could not be held back. Altogether the day
 marked an epoch in the history of the war when, for
 the first time since they had fought in company with
 the red-coats, the Spaniards bore the brunt of the
 action, and handsomely defeated an enemy who for
 many years had ridden rough-shod over their regular
 armies. From this day forward Soult accepted the bitter
 truth that he must be content to stand on the defensive.

At this point, therefore, it will be convenient to

¹ *Arch. Nationales.* Soult to Clarke. 1st Sept. 1813.

² British killed, 51; Wounded, 334; Missing, 32; Total, 417.
 Portuguese „ 88; „ 388; „ 53; „ 529.
 Spaniards „ 261; „ 1347; „ 71; „ 1679.

400	2069	156
		2625

³ See Freire's letter in *Supp. Desp.* viii. 222.

return to the course of events on the east coast of Spain 1813. and in Europe at large, and to observe their reaction upon events in the Pyrenees. In the middle of July, it will be remembered, Bentinck had decided to march northward from Valencia, and to besiege Tarragona. He therefore assigned to Elio's army the duty of blockading the French garrisons in Murviedro, Peniscola, Morella and Tortosa, and, advancing with the rest of his troops along the coast, reached Vinaroz with his First Division on the 21st of July. From thence he pushed out a detachment to cover the formation of a bridge over the Ebro at Amposta; but, hearing that Suchet intended to blow up the fortifications of Tarragona at July 22. once, he embarked the First Division under General William Clinton to stand off the fortress and to occupy it if it should be abandoned by the French. Clinton, upon entering Tarragona Bay on the 24th, perceived July 24. masses of troops and baggage leaving the city, and two openings making in two of the bastions; but he noticed also that another bastion was under repair, and, having information that the French in Tortosa were about to be withdrawn, he landed his troops and occupied the pass of Balaguer, so as to cut off this garrison from Suchet's main body.

Two days later the rest of Bentinck's force began July 26. the passage of the Ebro; a long and tedious proceeding, for the river was three hundred yards broad, and materials for a flying bridge were not easily collected. However, by the 29th the last of the July 29. regiments had crossed, and on that night the First Division pushed on to the heights above Tarragona and took up a position undetected by the enemy. On the 31st the rest of the army came up, and was so July 31. disposed as to prevent the withdrawal of the garrison; but, on learning that the bulk of Suchet's army was still within a day's march, Bentinck did not venture to land his heavy guns, and was fain to halt and await further events. On the 3rd of August he was joined by del Parque's corps, and on the 11th by Sarsfield's Aug. 11.

1813. division of Elio's army ; but Suchet, having summoned Decaen to join him with eight thousand men at Villafranca, advanced in force on the 15th, and Bentinck, unwilling to risk a battle with the motley and heterogeneous host under his command, fell back to Cambrills. Delivered from all possibility of interference, Suchet blew up the fortifications of Tarragona on the night of Aug. 18. the 18th, and retired first to Villafranca and presently to the line of the Llobregat.

Bentinck, who immediately upon his retreat had proposed to himself the siege of Tortosa, at once resumed his forward movement ; and heartened by reports that a part, if not all, of the French force in Catalonia was marching back to France, decided to advance as far into that province as the enemy would permit him, and to commit the reduction of Tortosa to del Parque. He soon discovered, however, that it would take the Spaniards weeks to collect supplies sufficient for a beleaguering force : and, since he had orders from Wellington to send del Parque's troops at once to Tudela, if Suchet should detach any part of his army to France or to Soult,¹ he despatched the Spanish General to the appointed destination. Meanwhile Bentinck moved up himself with the Anglo-Sicilian Sept. 5. troops to Villafranca, and, relying always upon repeated Spanish reports of the diminution of Suchet's strength, Sept. 12. pushed forward on the 12th a party of twelve hundred men ² under Colonel Adam to the pass of Ordal, a strong post some ten miles in advance on the road to Barcelona.

As a matter of fact, Soult had urged that the armies of Aragon and Catalonia should unite themselves to his own army at Pau or Tarbes on the French side of the Pyrenees ; but Clarke, on the contrary, directed Suchet to hold back his enemy as far as possible from the French frontier ; and Suchet, who was not disposed to

¹ *Wellington Desp.* To Bentinck, 14th Aug. 1813.

² This party consisted of 2/27th, the Calabrese Free Corps, light companies of 4th K.G.L. and of de Roll's, and Arabin's battery of Royal Artillery.

part with his independence of command, found plenty ^{1813.} of good reasons for staying where he was. That he ought to have joined Soult by one route or another there can be no doubt. Bentinck could not have followed him from want of transport; and the loss of a few garrisons was but dust in the balance against the prospect of thrusting back the main army of the Allies in Navarre. Moreover, if Soult were driven out of Spain, it was absurd to suppose that Suchet's army would not soon be compelled to follow him. Beyond question Bentinck took these considerations into account when listening to the Spanish tales of Suchet's evacuation of the Peninsula, and he cannot be held blameworthy for doing so. But the truth is that Lord William's heart was not in his work, for recent occurrences in Palermo had revived his hopes that he might yet return to his beloved projects for the liberation of Italy.¹

The Queen of Naples had embarked for Zante on the 14th of June; but her removal had not eased the friction between the Sicilian Government and the British commander-in-chief in Sicily. Within a month General Macfarlane was obliged to confess that he met with greater obstruction under the new order of things than ever before. The Sicilians, from the highest to the lowest, evinced an insuperable distaste for the military profession; and the Legislature found its local quarrels far more interesting than the operations of war. There were riots in Palermo, "due to the imbecility of the Government and the licentious conduct of the Commons," which were only put down by firing upon the mob. "The new constitution," added Macfarlane, "is on the brink of destruction, and nothing can save Sicily but a single strong British authority." The climax came on the 25th of August, when both Houses of the Sicilian Parliament passed a resolution that a deputation should be sent to England to complain of the British generals in Sicily. All of these things were

¹ *Wellington MSS.*, Bentinck to Wellington, 1st, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 27th Aug. 1813.

1813. reported to Bentinck, who, not a little disturbed over the failure of his first efforts at liberty-mongering, informed Wellington that he should return to Palermo as soon as possible, and place Clinton in command until he could send Macfarlane to relieve him. Having reason to feel sure that Suchet had detached certainly ten thousand, and possibly fifteen thousand men, he judged that there would be little danger attending the situation in Catalonia.¹

Bentinck was destined to be rudely undeceived. In Sept. 12. the evening of the 12th he reinforced Adam's detachment at Ordal with three Spanish battalions and a Spanish squadron, but for some trifling cause deferred bringing up the bulk of his troops within supporting distance. After making personal reconnaissance of the country beyond the pass, he decided, upon his own observation and the reports of his intelligencers, that the advanced party of some thirty-five hundred men was safe; and, having informed Adam accordingly, returned to his head-quarters at Villafranca. The position of Ordal was extremely strong. Before it ran a very deep and impracticable ravine, spanned by a single bridge, from whence the road wound up rugged heights, dominated by three old ruined Spanish redoubts, which had been erected on commanding points. The only road by which the position could be turned was that which ran from Martorell by St. Saturnino de Noya to Villafranca; and this Bentinck had sealed up with a strong detachment of Eroles's Catalans. In Adam's array the Twenty-seventh held the right of the line, less two companies, which, together with the rifle-companies of de Roll's, the 4th line battalion of the German Legion and six guns of the Royal Artillery, were ensconced in the lowest of the redoubts, immediately to the left of the Twenty-seventh. In the centre and on the left of the redoubt were Sarsfield's three Spanish

¹ Macfarlane to Sec. of State (enclosing copies of letters to Bentinck), 14th, 21st July, 7th Aug.; Murray to same, 28th Aug. 1813; *Wellington Supp. Desp.* viii. 219.

battalions, and on the left of all the Calabrese Free Corps under the command of Colonel Carey.

1813.
Sept. 12.

The advance of this detachment, which was but the vanguard of Bentinck's entire force, did not escape the eye of Suchet. In the evening of the 12th he assembled Habert's and Harispe's divisions, from seven to eight thousand men strong,¹ and his cavalry, perhaps two thousand sabres, at the bridge of Molins del Rey ; and at eight o'clock he marched off to the attack, at the same time directing Decaen, with one division of the Army of Catalonia and Severoli's Italians, to turn the Allied position by San Saturnino. At about eleven o'clock the head of Suchet's column, having passed the bridge, was discovered by a patrol of Spanish horse, which was driven back by the fire of the French guns ; and General Mesclop then pushed forward the voltigeurs of the 7th, with the rest of the regiment in support, against the front of the lowest redoubt, while the 44th moved round to take it in flank. The British were lying by their arms in order of battle, and were not taken by surprise ; but it should seem that Adam's dispositions took no account of the defence of the bridge, which was passed by the enemy unmolested.

About midnight the French guns unlimbered and opened fire ; the French sharp-shooters swarmed forward under protection of the cannonade, with heavy columns following in their rear ; and the fight at once became sharp and strenuous. Almost at the outset Adam was so severely wounded that he was obliged to leave the field, and the command devolved upon Colonel Reeves of the Twenty-seventh. The lowest redoubt was most obstinately defended ; and, when at last the little garrison was driven from it with ranks sadly thinned, they rallied in the ruins of a second redoubt in rear of the first, and in conjunction with the Spaniards charged down and retook the lost stronghold from their assailants. A second time the French, by

¹ I can find no return of the Army of Aragon later than the 16th of June, from which these numbers are taken.

1813. great efforts, mastered the lowest redoubt, and a second
Sept. 13. time they were expelled ; but meanwhile the Spaniards had given way for a moment in the centre, and Reeves ordered Captain Arabin to withdraw the guns. The word was hardly out of his mouth before he too fell wounded ; the next senior officer, Colonel Carey, was far away on the left, and the Allies were left for a time without a commander. In a few minutes the Spaniards rallied. Arabin brought up his guns to their assistance, and Sarsfield's gallant battalions, charging with the bayonet, bore back the victorious French, and renewed the combat with unabated spirit.

On the right the Twenty-seventh, assailed in front and tormented by sharp-shooters in flank and rear, stood indomitably, though eight officers and nearly half the men of the battalion had fallen killed and wounded. So for two hours the struggle continued, when Carey at last came up and, hearing that the right flank of the Twenty-seventh was turned, sent Captain Müller of de Roll's, who had hitherto commanded the garrison of the redoubt, to reinforce that battalion, while he himself, with his Calabrese, fell upon the right flank of the French attacking column. Carey had come, through no fault of his own, too late. Müller attempted to stay the turning movement, but was overpowered ; and, though he succeeded in occupying a hill in rear with a party of the Twenty-seventh in order to cover the retreat, many of the men, bewildered by the darkness, refused to leave the road and join him. The redoubt succumbed to a third assault ; the Spaniards, overpowered by numbers, had already given way after a very brave and tenacious resistance ; and Arabin withdrew his guns under the protection of fifty Spanish horse and twelve men, who were all that survived of the escorting company of the Twenty-seventh. For half an hour he was unmolested, but, as he was passing over a causeway, the French hussars came up, and the Spanish troopers galloping past the guns in wild confusion prevented them from being unlimbered. All four pieces were

consequently captured, though Arabin and most of his 1813. men escaped. Müller, holding his soldiers together as Sept. 13. best he could, managed to draw them into the woods before daybreak, and, thus evading further pursuit, re-joined Bentinck's first division at two o'clock in the afternoon with no more than seventy utterly exhausted men. Carey retired towards San Saturnino, which Eroles had successfully held against an attack by Decaen; but he was assailed by the French while crossing the river before Villafranca, and was driven southward. However, he contrived to reach the coast unperceived, and to embark his troops without very serious loss on the night of the 13th.

Suchet, having carried the pass, had continued his march upon Villafranca, where he saw from a distance Bentinck's army drawn up in order of battle in three lines behind a ravine. He then halted to allow time for Decaen to come up; but Eroles had done his work well, and Decaen was still far away when Bentinck gave the order to retreat. Suchet then pushed forward his horse-artillery and cavalry, which overtook the British rear-guard, while the main body was crossing a ravine. Here the pursuers were charged by the Brunswick Hussars and Twentieth Light Dragoons under Lord Frederick Bentinck and very roughly handled, Bentinck himself wounding the French brigadier Meyer in single combat. Rallying upon their reinforcements the French horse returned to the attack, but were effectually stopped by the fire of the Tenth Foot and of a couple of guns; and at Vendrell Suchet called off his troops.

The casualties of the Allies in this pursuit just exceeded one hundred, of which thirty-six fell upon the Twentieth Light Dragoons and fifty-three upon the Brunswick Hussars. In the action at the pass of Ordal the losses were far more severe, amounting to four hundred and fifty-seven killed, wounded and taken in Bentinck's force alone, exclusive of the Spaniards, of whom there fell probably as many again. Of the Twenty-seventh, a weak battalion, one hundred and

1813. ninety-four were slain or hurt and sixty-eight captured
Sept. 13. unharmed. Of the rifle-company of the 4th battalion of the Legion no fewer than twenty-five were killed and eleven wounded ; and of de Roll's rifle-company nineteen were killed, nine wounded and twenty-two taken. Many more prisoners fell into the hands of the French at the first ; and scores, if not hundreds, of stragglers must have been left behind during the retreat. But the darkness enabled most of the former to steal away ; and the great majority of the exhausted men were able to rejoin the army under cover of the woods ; otherwise but few of Adam's force would have escaped. The casualties of the French in the attack on the heights of Ordal are unknown, but must have been heavy, and in the pursuit they were more than double those of the British, amounting to two hundred and seventy-one men and eighty-three horses.¹ Altogether both sides did their duty, and the losses of the British, Germans and Swiss sufficiently attest the constancy and steadfastness of their defence.

As to the responsibility for the mishap, Bentinck must take the blame for leaving a small detachment in isolation within a few hours' march of the enemy's main body. He confessed that he had been deceived by false reports of the return of a great part of Suchet's army to France, but this is hardly a valid excuse for dispositions which were in principle unsound. He also wrote that, though he could find no fault in those who had defended the position, the enemy ought not to have been able to force it ; which seems tacitly to impugn

¹ These are the casualties stated by Suchet. Napier accepts them, practically, as the casualties both for the action and the pursuit ; that is to say, for three hours' hard fighting on the part of the infantry, and an unsuccessful pursuit by the cavalry. This I find incredible. Suchet after the action lamented that two of his old regiments, the 7th and 44th, of Harispe's division, were reduced to 700 and 800 men respectively. On the 15th of June, the latest date of which I can find a return, they numbered 1282 and 1157, and they had not been engaged since. See Vidal de Lablache, i. 441.

the conduct of Adam. Napier has summed up the character of this officer by the terse sentence, "that who-
ever relies on the capacity of Sir Frederick Adam either in peace or war will be disappointed"; but this criticism was plainly dictated by personal animosity arising out of a matter utterly unconnected with the campaigns in the Peninsula.¹ It is difficult without study on the spot of the ground (which, unfortunately, is unknown to me, and was equally unknown to Napier) to pass judgment upon Adam's arrangements for defence. If the bridge over the ravine on his front were within easy distance of his main position, his neglect to occupy or barricade it and to make it the pivot of his defence must be condemned as unpardonable. But it must be remembered that Bentinck himself was present on the heights of Ordal on the evening of the 12th, and that he did not call Adam's attention to the bridge. Apparently Adam himself did not reach his station until the evening, and then with eleven hundred men only; and it may be presumed that he made his preliminary dispositions for defence with that number alone. Later on, when there cannot have been much daylight left for the movements of troops, over two thousand Spaniards came up to reinforce him; but whether he was aware that they were coming, or whether, as seems natural, he expected the whole army to follow them, we have no information to tell us. Bentinck must have been a little uneasy and conscious that he was doing wrong, otherwise he would never have brought forward the Spaniards, and assured Adam—which he had hardly the right to do—that he was safe.

Napier furthermore blames Adam for sending out no cavalry patrols beyond the bridge; and this omission must be held to deserve all his censure. Yet another

¹ Adam, as High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, fell bitterly at variance with Charles Napier, the brother of the historian, who was his subordinate in Cephallonia. If any man presumed to differ with this sacred brother, that fact was sufficient to damn him in William Napier's eyes.

1813. of Napier's criticisms is that Carey's Calabrese were ex-
Sept. 13. tended so far on the Allied left that they could take no part in the action, and yet could not retreat without great difficulty. But Carey's own report is that, before the engagement began, his regiment had been shifted from the extreme left "more to the right by the site of an old fort," which shows that Adam had taken the precaution to contract his line. Moreover Carey did take part in the action, though late, and, but for the early fall of Adam and Reeves, he would probably have been summoned to enter the fight much earlier. His retreat, too, was not more difficult than that of the rest of the force. Adam's troops were followed up and harassed from the first. Carey's column was unmolested until he had nearly reached Villafranca, some hours after daylight; and even then he managed to draw it off with the loss of no more than fifty stragglers and one wounded man. Lastly, it must be borne in mind that we have not Adam's own side of the story. He was shot down almost immediately, and it is to his speedy fall, followed very quickly by that of Reeves, that Bentinck attributed his defeat. Upon the whole, it seems to me that Lord William was at least as much to blame as was Adam for the reverse of Ordal.

As to Suchet, Napier's criticism is far more convincing. In his memoirs the Marshal represents that he set out only to take the position occupied by Bentinck's advanced guard and by the divisions of Sarsfield and Whittingham; and, to make the enterprise the more creditable, he magnifies the ruined redoubts above Ordal into an entrenched camp. In reality he could not have known that he might not meet Bentinck's whole army on the heights of Ordal, and it was a mere chance that he did not. Yet Suchet did not hesitate to march in two columns with no lateral communication between them, and thus expose each to be beaten in detail. If he had found Bentinck's entire host arrayed with Adam, he would have committed his two divisions to an attack in which they were certain to be defeated;

and, if he had had the hardihood to pass all his battalions 1813. across the bridge, they would have been left practically Sept. 13. without possibility of retreat except across that narrow defile and would have been probably annihilated. It would then have been open to Bentinck to march with a superior force against Decaen; and both French columns could thus hardly have escaped a great disaster. "Suchet I never was opposed to," said Wellington many years after, "but from what I heard I did not think very highly of him."¹

Nevertheless the reverse at Ordal gave Wellington for the moment serious anxiety, for he dreaded an offensive movement on Suchet's part across the Ebro into Valencia. Moreover, Bentinck had warned him that he was about to return to Sicily immediately, and that William Clinton was extremely unwilling to succeed him in command of the army; so that the Anglo-Sicilian forces, without transport and without a leader, seemed unlikely to fulfil their duty of giving employment to the French armies of Catalonia and Aragon. "The situation is a very difficult one," Wellington wrote to Bathurst on the 25th of September, "and I must either relieve that point (the east coast of Spain) entirely by marching the army into France, or go there myself." Bentinck, to his credit, decided at once not to leave Spain so long as Suchet might maintain an offensive attitude, and busied himself in repairing the fortifications of Tarragona. But, when he learned that the Marshal had again retired to the Llobregat, he sailed for Palermo on the 22nd, and will be seen by us in Sept. 22. Spain no more. William Clinton, now commander-in-chief in his own despitte, could think of no better employment for himself and his troops than to ply the

¹ The reports of Capt. Arabin, Col. Carey, Capt. Müller and Capt. Waldron (who took the 27th out of action) are in the *Wellington MSS.*, enclosed in Bentinck's letter to Wellington of 15th Sept. 1813. They, together with Suchet's *Mémoires* and Napier's narrative, are the only authorities that I know of the combat of Ordal. The French side of the story is given with his usual ability by Capt. Vidal de Lablache.

1813, spade diligently at Tarragona, and sit still. Affairs were going ill on the east coast, for the Spaniards could neither blockade the isolated French garrisons effectively, nor supply their troops in the field, nor make sufficient arrangements for permanent communication over the broad stream of the Ebro. Wellington had hinted in his last letter to Bentinck that the siege of Tortosa would be a useful operation for the army on the east coast; but Clinton was unenterprising as well as self-distrustful, and he pleaded with justice that he had neither transport for an advance, nor any sure bridge over the Ebro in case he should be compelled to retreat. The utmost, therefore, that could be expected of the Anglo-Sicilian troops was that they should check Suchet at Tarragona, should he venture again to strike southward, while Copons with his Catalonians could fall upon his right or western flank.

Some such return to the offensive by the Duke of Albufera seems to have been apprehended by Wellington even till the month of November; yet, as a matter of fact, the Marshal was by no means comfortable about his own position. The Army of Aragon upon its return to the Llobregat from the combat of Ordal numbered little more than eleven thousand men; but it was doubtful whether even this small force could be fed for many more weeks in that quarter. The Army of Catalonia could spare soldiers enough to make up the field-army to a strength of sixteen thousand, but no more; and with such numbers a forward movement to rescue the beleaguered garrisons in the south could not be otherwise than most hazardous. Yet the only alternative to such an enterprise was gradual retreat towards the French frontier; and Copons, by taking up a position in the mountains about Vich, constantly menaced Suchet's line of communication. Copons, in fact, though difficult, touchy and disinclined, after his experience with Murray, to work kindly with the British, was both active and able. He had none of the resources and nothing of the organisation that is

necessary for a mobile column, his base being a mere mountainous district where he lived from hand to mouth ; but he was vigilant to observe and swift to pounce upon any weak point of his enemy, and from his central position kept the French detachments, both north of him at Puigcerda and south of him on the Llobregat, in constant alarm.

Lastly, it must be noticed that Suchet was by no means happy in his relations with Soult. The latter, when meeting his colleague at Valencia in the autumn of 1812, had shown undue eagerness to strengthen the Army of the South at the expense of the Army of Catalonia, and Suchet had not forgotten it. Suchet also thought that he perceived unfaithful dealing in a wild project communicated to him by Soult on the 10th of August, wherein it was proposed that Soult's army should advance upon Pamplona by way of Jaca, and that Suchet's troops should co-operate by a simultaneous march by Lerida and Huesca upon the same point. The risk, indeed, seemed to the Duke of Albufera so great that he treated the proposal almost as a personal affront. Compelled perforce to abandon this scheme, Soult on the 2nd of September broached another, to the effect that Suchet should unite the Armies of Catalonia and Aragon with Soult's own forces about Pau and Tarbes, re-invade Aragon by the pass of Somport, and then strike either southward upon Zaragoza or westward upon Navarre. To this Suchet objected that the first duty prescribed to the Army of Catalonia was to guard the French frontier, and that guns could hardly be brought over a pass where there was no regular road, five thousand feet above the sea, in the month of October, without encountering almost insurmountable obstacles from snow and bad weather. However, to avoid any appearance of disloyalty, he submitted a counter-project, namely, that after obtaining the Emperor's leave to withdraw the frontier-guards, he should advance with thirty thousand men, drive Copons from the mountains, force the Anglo-Sicilian

1813. troops to retire behind the Ebro or to re-embark, and then return by Lerida to the Gallego and join Soult, who should meanwhile have reached that river by the pass of Somport.

This plan was accepted by Soult, and transmitted for approval to Napoleon, who was too much absorbed by his own campaign to give any attention to another ; and meanwhile Clarke saw grave objections to the massing of the French army, even for a short time, upon French soil. According to all traditions of the Revolution and Empire, French soldiers had been brought up to live on the enemy's country, and there was much reason to fear that they had learned their lesson too well, and from force of habit would treat their native land as an enemy's. But the fact is that both Minister and Marshals put forward their projects, counter-projects and criticisms merely to make a display of zeal and activity, each one of them being anxious less for the general weal than for his personal standing in the Emperor's good opinion. A harsher comment upon the Napoleonic system it would be difficult to find ; yet such was the magic of the great Captain's power and influence that the right word spoken by him, even at a distance, in some flash of insight might have combined all his forces in Spain under a single leader for a single purpose, and undone, at any rate for a time, much of the work already accomplished by the Allies. It is no matter for surprise, therefore, that Wellington was much worried by the course of affairs on the East Coast.¹

But the star of Napoleon was now steadily on the decline. After the declaration of war by Austria he had committed the blunders of endeavouring to hold too forward a position, and of dispersing his force. On the 26th and 27th of August he beat the Allies at Dresden ; but on the 23rd one of his corps under

¹ The whole story of affairs on the East Coast is admirably summarised, with full quotation of authorities, by Captain Vidal de Lablache, i. 442-470.

Oudinot was badly beaten at Grossbeeren; on the 29th 1813. another under Macdonald was utterly routed at the Aug. Katzbach; and on the 30th a third under Vandamme sustained an even more disastrous defeat at Kulm. In five days the Emperor lost one hundred thousand men, the best of his artillery and most of his baggage. His genius had deserted him; he was bitterly at variance with his Marshals, and, in a word, was lost. Still undaunted, he sent Ney to take command of the remnant of Oudinot's army and to strike at Berlin, only to learn that on the 6th of September the "bravest of the brave" had been totally defeated at Dennewitz with the loss of twenty-five thousand men and eighty guns. He lunged desperately at his assailants on every side, but they fell back before any troops that he commanded in person; and, after three fruitless marches of this kind, he returned to Dresden wearied and perplexed.

In the extreme north the Hanoverian general Walmoden with a heterogeneous force of his own countrymen, Swedes, Russians, the Seventy-third British and half of a British rocket-battery, the whole numbering some twenty thousand men, manœuvred successfully to check Davoust's corps, which was endeavouring to penetrate from the Lower Elbe to Berlin. On the 16th of September a portion of this force Sept. 16. beat one of Davoust's detachments handsomely at Göhrde,¹ killing and wounding two thousand of the French, capturing fifteen hundred prisoners and eight guns, and compelling the Marshal, against the whole tenour of Napoleon's plans, to stand on the defensive in isolation from the main French army. The decisive moment of the campaign came when Blücher turned the line of the Elbe by the north, and thence struck south upon Leipzig, forcing the Emperor on the 13th of Oct. 13. October to fall back upon that city. Here the nations

¹ Göhrde lies about forty miles south-east of Hamburg. The British 73rd and half of the rocket-battery were present at the action, but suffered no casualties.

1813. 'closed in upon Napoleon with a numerical preponderance of two to one—three hundred thousand to one hundred and fifty thousand—the British being represented by a single rocket-battery, which did great execution, and was brought out of action, after the fall of its commander, by Lieutenant Strangways, who was himself doomed to fall forty-one years later at Inkermann. After three days of desperate fighting
- Oct. 16-19. the Emperor was driven westward with the wreck of his army—a bare forty thousand men—leaving one hundred and ninety thousand of his best troops locked up in the fortresses of Germany. The Bavarians had forsaken him on the 14th; the Saxons deserted him during the battle of the 18th; all Germany rose against him; Jerome fled from Cassel, and the Kingdom of Westphalia came to an end. Murat, though he had fought valiantly at Leipzig, left his old master a few days later for Naples, having received a guarantee of his kingdom from England and Austria; and he and Napoleon never saw each other again. The Emperor continued his retreat, brushing away at Hanau on the 29th the Bavarians who tried to cut him off.
- Nov. 2. On the 31st he arrived at Frankfort, and on the 2nd of November at Mainz. His army crossed the river, and the eastern frontier of France receded once more to the western bank of the Rhine.

CHAPTER XII

THE news of the great events on the Continent of 1813. course took long to reach Wellington, who on the 14th Aug. 14. of August still held a gloomy view of the concert of the Allies, and declared that "he would not march even a corporal's guard upon such a system." The firmness of this statement was perhaps emphasised by the fact that there had been some idea of his taking the command of the Allies in Germany, which he was by no means inclined to do. On the 5th of September he Sept. 5. heard rumours from French sources of Napoleon's victory at Dresden, which were not reassuring ; but ten days later came information of the first victories on the Elbe, though the full significance of these events was still unknown to Wellington on the 25th of that month. Meanwhile, as early as in August he had received from the Duc de Berri, eldest son of the Comte d'Artois and eventual heir to the throne of France, an invitation to cross the frontier, with the undertaking that twenty thousand royalist French, duly organised and in part armed, should immediately join him. This letter he referred to the Ministry in England, pointing out that it was to the interest of the Allies to accept such assistance if they intended to persevere until Napoleon were dethroned, and describing the Emperor's position with singular shrewdness and accuracy. "If he can be confined to France by any means, his system must fall. He cannot bear the expense of his internal government and of his army ; and the reduction of either would be fatal to him." Clarke's hesitation to concentrate

1813. Sept. Soult's army upon French soil is sufficient to vindicate the soundness of Wellington's judgment upon this point. Every consideration, therefore—common sense, the health of his own troops, and the solution of all difficulties on the East Coast—favoured the policy of an early invasion of France, if the operations of the Allies were sufficiently successful to divert all French reinforcements from the Peninsula.

For the present, however, it was impossible to advance the whole army until Pamplona should have fallen; and hence there was a long period of inaction after the retreat of the French from San Marcial. Soult after the engagement replaced his troops in their former positions. On the right Thouvenot's¹ division was at Urrugne, Maucune's at Croix des Bouquets, Villatte's at Serres; in the centre Conroux's and Rouget's (late Vandermaesen's) divisions were at Sare, and Taupin's on the heights of La Bayonnette. On the left the divisions of Darmagnac, Abbé and Maransin took their old places about Ainhoa; and on the extreme left Foy reoccupied St. Jean Pied de Port. The men were discouraged, and their spirits were not raised by a continual downpour of rain, and by extreme irregularity in the issue of rations. In fact, despite of Soult's reiterated orders, it was found impossible to keep four days' supplies in hand for the troops; and on every night was heard the report of firearms discharged by the peasants against marauding soldiers in the fields. In the circumstances Soult could do nothing but sit still, bar the passes on the frontier by trenches and abatis, and fortify his position. Owing to the existing dearth of forage he actually sent not only his cavalry but the greater part of his artillery behind the Adour, keeping only four squadrons and three field-batteries at the front, and mounting thirty naval guns in his earth-works in their stead. In view of the fact that, until reinforced, he was bound to stand on the defensive,

¹ Late Lamartinière's division. Lamartinière died on the 6th of September of the wounds received at San Marcial.

he submitted for Napoleon's approval a scheme for three successive entrenched positions: the first being that which he actually occupied; the second extending from St. Jean de Luz up the course of the Nivelle to Ainhoa, and thence by Mondarrain north-eastward to the double bridge-head at Cambo on the Nive, and so to Mount Ursouia, covering the road from Bayonne to St. Jean Pied de Port; the third having its right at an entrenched camp to be constructed before Bayonne, its centre at Cambo, and its left at St. Jean Pied de Port.

This plan, however, had to await the Emperor's pleasure; and meanwhile Soult treated the whole series of positions between St. Jean de Luz and Cambo, on both banks of the Nivelle, as his line of defence. It was far too long—over thirty miles—for his force to occupy efficiently; and he accordingly decided on the 11th of September to modify his dispositions, so as to hold a greater number of troops in reserve for transfer to any threatened point. He therefore directed Reille as a preliminary measure to guard the fortifications of his first line from the sea to Biriattou with one division, and mass the other at Urrugne, from which point it could furnish working parties to complete the entrenched camp at Bordagain, immediately to west of St. Jean de Luz, and, if necessary, replace Villatte's Reserve in that post. Reille divided the front assigned to him into three sections, the first from the ford of Enderlaza to the church of Biriattou, the second from the church of Biriattou to the bridge of Béhobie, and the third from that bridge to the sea; and he called Maucune's division forward to the foremost place. One regiment occupied Biriattou, two the Croix des Bouquets, and the fourth was at the foot of the Mont du Calvaire. One regiment, the 119th, of Thouvenot's division remained on the heights of La Bayonnette by the Col du Poirier, of which the western spurs were entrenched as a rallying-point for the advanced parties that guarded the fords of the Bidassoa; and the re-

1813. mainder were placed in reserve at Urrugne. Elaborate
Sept. instructions were given as to the line of retreat in case of any attack on the first and second sections ; but, as to the third, Reille contented himself with ordering the fords to be watched during the hours of low tide.

Clausel, an abler general, laid down for his subordinates certain principles, and left them to use their discretion in applying these. "Above all things," he said, "make your dispositions before you are attacked, and name your commanders for the various points ; for in so difficult a country every commander, knowing his general's intentions, must be a general himself." The height of La Bayonnette was entrusted to Taupin's division for defence ; next to left, or east, of it, but separated by the rugged mountain of La Rhune, one brigade of Conroux's division guarded the roads from Sare to Vera and Echalar, while the other, together with Maransin's division,¹ was massed about Sare itself. A detachment from Taupin's division on the summit of La Rhune maintained communication between Reille's corps and Clausel's ; and four companies from the same division occupied the hill of Alzate Real, called by the British the Boar's Back, above Vera. The lower slopes of the height of La Bayonnette were entrenched ; and half-way up it was a star-redoubt which served as a citadel to those entrenchments. The acclivity above this plateau was blocked by abatis, and on the crest was a redoubt, from which field-works were designed to extend eastwards along the ridge of Commissari towards La Rhune. This same ridge between La Rhune and La Bayonnette seemed to Clausel the weakest point of the line ; and he ordered Conroux, upon the first sign of a hostile movement, to move the 12th Light to the western spur of La Rhune, called Soubicia, so as to command the road from Vera to Olhette, and the 32nd Line to the Chapelle d'Olhain, dominating the junction of the roads from Vera and Echalar to Sare.

In general Clausel made his arrangements so that

¹ Late Vandermaesen's.

the ultimate rallying-point for his corps should be La Rhune itself, treating this huge rocky mass as an integral part of his scheme of defence, instead of accepting it as an obstacle which must sever his line in twain. But the most dangerous station of all seemed to him to be that of Taupin, who was left in isolation on La Bayonnette opposite to a greatly superior force. From Sare to La Bayonnette was a day's march, so that it was impossible for any part of his own corps to give support at that point; wherefore, if the Allies should make a serious attack upon Taupin, that general might not be able to hold his own, and might find great difficulty in making good his retreat.

East of Clausel d'Erlon and Foy retained their old stations, the former about Ainhoa, the latter about St. Jean Pied de Port; Soult fondly hoping that his double bridge-head at Cambo would effectually link Foy to the rest of his line. The Marshal was too good a soldier not to be aware that his front was far too extensive for his force, and from the first he distrusted his power to hold it. The position, which he had already designed, on the Nive from Bayonne on the north through Cambo to St. Jean Pied de Port on the south, would have been shorter by one-fifth, far more easily defensible, and infinitely more convenient as being nearer to the sources of supply; but the complaints of the French peasants against the marauding and pillage of their countrymen in the army had already reached Paris: and Clarke dreaded nothing so much as the retreat of some scores of thousands of French soldiers into the heart of France. War ceased to be an object to Napoleon when it was no longer (to use Wellington's phrase) a financial resource; and the safety of Soult's troops was compromised because the boasted French Empire could only subsist upon plunder.

Wellington, for his part, fortified as strenuously as Soult the ground which he held; but, the moment that the Castle of San Sebastian had fallen, he ordered the pontoon-train to be assembled at Oyarzun with a view

1813. to an advance of his left.¹ It does not appear that this Sept. movement had any political object,² but was designed simply to obtain a more advantageous position for the army. "The heights on the right of the Bidassoa command such a view of us," were Wellington's own words, "that the sooner we get them the better." Owing to the negligence of the officer in charge of the pontoons there was much delay in bringing them forward, and the time was utilised in careful reconnaissance of the lower part of the river, and in ascertaining, with the help of Spanish fishermen, the situation and depth of the fords. During this interval part of del Parque's force came up from Tudela to Pamplona, enabling the Andalusian division, which had been employed in the blockade, to reinforce Giron at Echalar, and Mina's band to assemble in the neighbourhood of

Oct. 1. Roncesvalles. On the 1st of October Wellington inspected that part of his line, and caused Campbell's Portuguese to attack the French advanced posts at the foundry of Aldudes, when the enemy was driven back with the loss of forty men and two thousand sheep. The affair was trifling but served to add to the appre-

¹ *Wellington Desp.* To Graham, 9th September 1813.

² Napier's attribution of the movement to political motives is traceable to the following passage in Wellington's letter to Bathurst of 19th September: "I acknowledge that I feel great reluctance to enter the French territory under existing circumstances" (here he enumerates the circumstances, viz. the danger of taking 25,000 unpaid and unfed Spanish troops into France; the obstacle presented by the fortress of St. Jean Pied de Port and that of Bayonne; the state of affairs on the East Coast; and the defeat of the Allies at Dresden). "I see that as usual the newspapers on all sides are raising the public expectations, that the Allies are very anxious that we should enter France, and that the Government have promised that we should, *as soon as the enemy should be finally expelled from Spain*; and I think I ought and will bend a little to the views of the Allies, if it can be done with safety to the army, notwithstanding that I acknowledge that I should prefer to turn my attention to Catalonia, as soon as I shall have secured this frontier." This passage, though not without its bearing upon the movement immediately in contemplation, seems to me to refer rather to some future period.

hensions of Soult. On the 14th of September he had ^{1813.} heard from a deserter that pontoons were on their way to Oyarzun, and from that moment watched jealously for the laying of a bridge.

On the 25th of September Clausel and Taupin learned ^{Sept. 25.} also from deserters that the Allies would attack the whole line on the 27th, and would cross the Bidassoa about Irun; three boat-bridges having been prepared for the operation. The date, though wrong, was not ill-conjectured, for the 27th was the day on which the pontoons were at last ready. Soult, reconnoitring from Vera and La Bayonnette on the 26th, could see no sign of any intended movement of the Allies; but he put Reille upon his guard, who made his final dispositions of Maucune's division. The 15th Line of Pinoteau's brigade occupied Louis XIV.'s Hill; the 3rd Line formed a chain of posts from the ruined bridge of Béhobie towards Hendaye; and the 17th Light was placed in reserve at Café Républicain. Of Montfort's brigade two battalions of the 10th Light were appointed to defend Biriattou; two battalions of the 105th occupied Croix des Bouquets, and one battalion of the 101st Calvaire; these last three being held in reserve to support either the 10th or Pinoteau's brigade. Clausel busied himself in placing impediments on the roads that led to La Rhune, so as to gain time, examining his enemy's movements and arranging his own. On the extreme French left Soult, feeling alarmed for Foy's safety, directed General Paris in case of need to leave only a screen of troops to cover the Val d'Aspe, and to march with the rest of his men to Foy's assistance.

On the 5th of October Wellington decided that, ^{Oct. 5.} tide and weather being favourable, he would make his attack on the 7th, and issued his orders for the preliminary concentration between the pass of Maya and the sea. By these instructions Hill was directed to shift his Portuguese division at daybreak from the valley of Baigorri into that of Baztan, so as to relieve Picton's division, which was to move in its turn to Atchuria, and

1813. so relieve that of Dalhousie, which was to fill the room
Oct. 5. of Giron's Spaniards at Echalar. At the pass of Maya Colville was to keep his place and make a demonstration to prevent d'Erlon moving his troops from Ainhoa. To Giron, thus liberated for action, was committed the attack on the position of Vera. He was to advance in two columns to the crest of Soubicia, and throw out a battalion to his right, which, concealing its march, so far as possible, in woods and hollows, should ascend the Great Rhune, occupy the summit with a detachment and establish itself so as to turn Soubicia from the east. One brigade was to be left in reserve on the road from Vera to Sare, so as to cover the right and rear from any counter-attack from the direction of Sare; and the forward movement was to begin punctually at seven o'clock.

On the left of Giron the Light Division and Longa's Spaniards were to assail the position of La Bayonnette. The right column of the Light Division was to advance directly on the road which led to the pass of Vera, and the left column directly upon the star-redoubt, the interval between them being filled by half of Longa's troops. Of the rest of Longa's men the bulk were to cross the Bidassoa by the ford near Salain de Lesaca and, moving wide on the left of the Light Division, to turn by the west all the entrenchments subordinate to the star-redoubt; while a few companies, passing the stream at Enderlaza, were to command the spur of La Bayonnette immediately opposite to them, where the French had established a telegraph station. The supreme direction of this attack, which was to begin at half-past seven, was entrusted to Charles Alten; and the Fourth Division was held in reserve on the heights of Santa Barbara to relieve Alten's reserves as the advance progressed.

On the extreme French right, where the decisive blow was to be struck, the operations were more delicate. A line of eight redoubts, extending from Mount Aya to the sea beyond Fuenterrabia, had been occupied since

the battle of San Marcial by Freire's Spaniards, Aylmer's 1813. Brigade and the First Division, now under command of Oct. 5. General Howard ; and behind this screen were secretly assembled the Fifth Division, now led by General Hay, the artillery and the bridge-equipment. On the night of the 6th the First Division moved to Fuenterrabia, the Oct. 6. Fifth to the vicinity of Irun, and the guns and pontoons to Irun itself ; and it was ordered that all tents should be left standing on the morning of the 7th so as the better to deceive the enemy. Hay, after filing through Fuenterrabia, was directed to cross the Bidassoa with two divisions of infantry and one squadron of the Twelfth Light Dragoons by two fords on the estuary, under the protection of two batteries ; the time being fixed for a quarter past seven. Howard, with his own division, Wilson's Portuguese and three squadrons, was to pass the river at the same moment by the ford called the Grand Jonco, just below the ruined bridge of Béhobie, by a second ford above it, and by two more below, being careful to conceal his troops as much as possible until the time should come for moving. His advance was to be covered by three batteries posted on the slopes of San Marcial. Freire's Spanish division was to cross in two masses, the left by the three fords about Biriattou, the right by several fords farther up the river over against the hills of Chouille and Mandela ; the whole being sheltered by the fire of these same batteries. Hay's duty was to turn the right flank of the troops opposed to Howard ; Howard's to establish his right on Louis XIV.'s Hill, so as to cover the laying of a bridge of boats at Béhobie, and his left in communication with Hay ; and Freire's to take the hills of Biriattou and Lumaferde with his left column, and the heights of Chouille and Mandela with his right.

Rumours of the intended movement were current in the British camp on the evening of the 6th, when after a day of intense heat the massed clouds on the mountains broke into a violent thunder-storm. At three o'clock in the morning the Allies were under arms ; and the Oct. 7.

1813. tempest, having passed to the French side of the river,
Oct. 7. veiled the movements of the troops to their stations, though it could not quite drown the clatter of the guns and pontoons as they moved along the high road to Irun. At seven o'clock Hay's battalions filed out from their hiding-places behind an embankment of the river, and passed over the sands to the water, at this point three furlongs broad and in many places waist-deep, which they reached at about half-past seven. The advance was made in three columns, Greville's brigade on the right, the bulk of the Portuguese brigade in the centre, and Hay himself with Robinson's brigade, the guns and the cavalry, flanked by three hundred of the 8th Portuguese, on the left. The solitary French battalion of the 3rd Line, which was charged with the custody of the shore from Béhobie to Hendaye, allowed them to traverse one-half of the estuary before firing a shot. As Hay's division reached the sandbank which divides the channel at low water, a rocket soared up from the church tower of Fuenterrabia, the batteries opened fire, and Howard, Freire and Giron in succession led their troops down to the river. Then the French woke up; and Hay's men, who could move but slowly through the mud and the tide, on reaching the shore were greeted with a lively fusillade from the 3rd Line; but, taking advantage of broken ground, they soon swept both this battalion and that of the 17th Light, which was in reserve at Café Republicain, from two successive positions. Hay, always bearing leftward, soon lost sight of his two remaining columns, but continued independently his wide turning movement round the French right.

Meanwhile Maucune had been informed soon after seven o'clock of the movements of the Allies, and had warned Reille, who was at Urrugne. Reille, according to his own account, called to arms the 9th division (which on this day was commanded by Boyer)¹ at half-

¹ This was the division commanded originally by Lamartinière, since San Marcial by Thouvenot, and lately handed over to Boyer.

past seven, and on hearing the signal of alarm from 1813. Café Républicain a quarter of an hour later, ordered Oct. 7. it to march to Croix des Bouquets, while he himself galloped forward to Louis XIV.'s Hill. In reality he must have antedated his movements by half an hour,¹ for he confesses that he gave orders to the 9th division to detach a battalion to check Hay, of whose movements he could hardly have been aware if he had not seen Robinson's brigade while riding forward to the front. Arrived at the hill he found the 7th division disposed as he had ordered; the 15th regiment—a single battalion—massed in rear of it; the 10th Light occupying all the positions of Biriattou; the 101st at the foot of Mont du Calvaire, and the 105th on the left—that is to say, to east—of Croix des Bouquets. But Howard was by this time menacing Reille's front, while Hay was sweeping round his right flank. Howard's left-hand column, led by the German Light Infantry, had at the outset missed the ford at the Grand Jonco, and floundered into deep water, but had recovered the true direction with little loss of time; and the whole division, covered by a cloud of skirmishers, was forming on the northern shore.

Reille looked impatiently but in vain for the arrival of Boyer; and observing that the troops, which he had detached from that division to meet Hay, could not arrive in time, he sent a battalion of the 105th in their stead, with orders to occupy a ruined redoubt on the spur by which Hay was approaching Sansculotte's Hill. This left him but one battalion in reserve at Croix des Bouquets; and with overwhelming numbers Hay and Howard were already developing their attack upon that point. The 3rd, 15th and 17th of Pinoteau's brigade had been driven from Louis XIV.'s Hill and Café Républicain, and were falling back in confusion. Reille contrived to rally some of them on the flank of his solitary battalion of the 105th; and now at last he

¹ A letter of Villatte, quoted by de Lablache, says that Reille received Maucune's message at 7.50.

1813. perceived the leading brigade of the 9th division within Oct. 7. ten minutes' march of him. But this reinforcement was miserably weak. One battalion, that of the 24th, had already marched westward against Hay ; and the other, the 118th, had left at St. Jean de Luz a working party of a third of its numbers, which could not be recalled in time. Moreover, Reille had noticed that for some minutes past the 101st had been heavily engaged on the slopes of Mont du Calvaire, signifying that the 10th had been driven from Biriadou, and that the lofty rock of Mount Chouille was in the enemy's possession, or, in other words, that on the left as well as on the right his position had been outflanked. Lastly, there was no sign of Boyer's second brigade, which in fact had not yet left Urrugne.

The 105th with difficulty held its own long enough to enable the guns to retire, for Greville's brigade was now climbing the comparatively easy western slope of the hill straight upon the entrenchments ; and there was a sharp fight before the Ninth, at the head of Greville's column, drove the last remnants of Maucune's division into disorderly retreat. Reille had already sent the 118th back to the hill of Socorry to cover the movement ; and a few minutes later Gauthier's brigade of the 9th division aligned itself to east of Urrugne on the hill known as the Camp des Gendarmes, thus flanking the great road from Irun to St. Jean de Luz upon both sides. The retrograde movement then continued, and Reille took up a new line from Sansculotte's Hill, which was still held by the 24th, through Socorry to Camp des Gendarmes. To this last place after a time came in the 119th, while the remains of Pinoteau's brigade joined Maucune's division, namely, the 2nd and 10th Light and the 101st Line, which after considerable resistance had been dislodged from Biriadou, Mandela and La Chouille by Freire's Spaniards. A few of the Allied sharp-shooters penetrated to Urrugne, but were quickly driven out of it ; and the divisions of Wellington's left attack halted upon the ground that they had won.

They had captured four heavy guns in a battery near 1813. the sea, which were the spoil of Robinson's brigade, three Oct. 7. field-guns in Bariatou, and four in Croix des Bouquets, at a cost to the British of about two hundred and eighty killed and wounded. The Ninth with eighty-two casualties, and the 1st Light German battalion with seventy-four, were the regiments that suffered most severely. Freire's Spaniards, being confronted with the very steep entrenched declivity of Mandela, had the sternest of the work, and paid for the honour with slightly heavier losses than those of their British comrades, but behaved admirably throughout.

Reille's division escaped with barely four hundred killed, wounded and prisoners, which cannot be called serious loss. The truth seems to be that in their first line they had fewer than five thousand men to withstand some fifteen thousand British and Spaniards, and that consequently they made all possible haste to retire. The slowness of Boyer's division in coming to the front may perhaps be accounted for by the fact that it had changed commanders three times within a month; but it seems certain that Reille was taken by surprise, that his reserve at Urrugne was unready for action, and that he had never anticipated the possibility of the passage of the estuary near its mouth and the turning of his right flank. Altogether it is out of the question to pretend that his handling of his corps was felicitous.

In the centre Alten, Longa and Giron debouched simultaneously from their appointed stations, and formed up, the former in the gorge of the pass leading from Vera to Sare, the latter in an open space to the right, or south, of Vera village. Kempt's brigade,¹ together with the 17th Portuguese, was on the right of Alten's array; half of Longa's division on the right centre; Colborne's brigade² and two battalions of Caçadores on the left centre, and the remainder of Longa's division on the left. Clausel had been warned by deserters at four o'clock in the morning of an imminent attack, and

¹ 43rd, 1 and 3/95th.

² 52nd, 2/95th.

1813. at seven Conroux reported that Giron was advancing
Oct. 7. from the foot of Ibantelly from Vera, though the tents of the British were still standing. Taupin on the heights of La Bayonnette likewise observed and communicated to Clausel the massing of Alten's and Longa's troops about Vera. At half-past seven musketry was heard in the direction of Urdax, and Clausel, having ordered Maransin to detach the 50th Line to the Great Rhune so as to protect Taupin's left flank, rode over from Sare towards Vera. On the way he remarked that the 12th Light were on the ridge of Soubicia, and the 32nd ascending to their appointed position above the Chapel of Olhain, pursuant to his orders; but on arriving at the summit of the pass he perceived Giron's right flanking battalion about to begin the ascent of the Great Rhune. From this fact it is manifest that, whatever the hours stated in his report to Soult, Clausel came late upon the ground, otherwise this Spanish battalion could not have advanced so far upon its way as to be visible. Be this as it may, he at once sent orders to Maransin at Sare to reinforce the 50th on the Great Rhune with the 34th, and to hold his two remaining regiments ready to proceed to the same quarter. Meanwhile Alten had decided preliminarily to master in concert with Giron the natural outwork of La Bayonnette called the Boar's Back, which was held by four companies of the 31st; and soon after seven o'clock five companies of the Ninety-fifth Rifles,¹ supported by the 17th Portuguese, attacked it at the western end, and a battalion of Spaniards, led by a company of the Forty-third, at the eastern. The hill was soon cleared, and the remainder of Kempt's brigade joined the advanced detachment, following the road from Vera towards the Commissari, while Colborne's brigade turned to the left to ascend the entrenched hill of La Bayonnette.

The spur by which this hill runs down to the Bidassoa forks out on its lower slopes into three tongues, all of them converging upon a plateau, which was crowned

¹ 3rd battalion.

by the star-redoubt. In rear of this redoubt lay three more, blocking the advance along the spur to its junction with the main ridge on which, to the left of the line of Colborne's advance, stood the great redoubt known as La Bayonnette, which formed as it were the citadel. Dividing his force into three columns, Colborne assigned the left tongue to the Rifles and 3rd Caçadores, the right to the 1st Caçadores, and himself ascended in the centre with the Fifty-second. Holding back the central column for the actual work of the assault, he urged the two flanking columns forward to cover the formation of the Fifty-second ; and after a long climb the light troops emerged from the brushwood which covered the slope, and closed in upon the star-redoubt. Deceived by the dark uniforms of the Ninety-fifth, the French commander judged the whole of his assailants to be Portuguese, sallied forth from the redoubt, and charging with the bayonet, drove them head-long down. Exulting in their success the French pursued until they found themselves confronted with the scarlet coats of the Fifty-second. They then halted, hesitated, and presently ran back to their trenches, whereupon Colborne ordered the Fifty-second to charge, and stormed the redoubt out of hand. After granting to his men a few minutes' rest Colborne resumed his advance, and attacked the three remaining redoubts in succession after the same manner, sending forward the Riflemen and Portuguese to cover the Fifty-second, and entrusting the final assault to his own regiment. The enemy seem to have been swept out of the intermediate works with little difficulty ; but at La Bayonnette itself they offered a stout resistance, for they had a mountain-battery, and by rolling down huge stones they brought Colborne for some time to a standstill.

On the right Longa's irregulars made but slow progress through the great wooded ravine that divided the two brigades of the Light Division ; and Kempt's brigade could only advance with difficulty over steep rocky ground, and through thickets that tore the men's

Oct. 7.

1813. clothes off their backs. All formation was lost, and
Oct. 7. the soldiers came up in small groups, streaming with sweat, and with their hands and limbs lacerated by thorns, before the first of the enemy's entrenchments. After some delay enough men were collected to storm it, and Kempt's brigade laboriously worked its way round the left flank of Taupin's division, while Freire's victorious Spaniards, pressing on towards Jolimont, threatened their right flank and rear. Then the French gave way. Colborne stormed the main redoubt and captured three guns; and the enemy poured down the mountain in confusion towards France. Colborne with his staff and a handful of men rashly chased them down one spur; while Lieutenant Reid of the Engineers, also with about a dozen men of Kempt's brigade, as rashly followed the fugitives on a parallel spur, neither party having so much as a company near them for support. Looking down into the ravine that separated him from Reid, Colborne perceived a compact body of four hundred French, and galloping ahead of them, hailed their officer in French with the words, "You are cut off. Lay down your arms." Deceived by the Englishman's assurance the officer surrendered his sword with a theatrical speech; and Colborne, having ordered him to file his men to a distance from their arms and to make them sit down, held him in conversation, while Harry Smith galloped back to hurry forward the brigade. It arrived before the unlucky French could realise what had happened; and in this way twenty-two officers and some four hundred men were taken. The total loss of Taupin's division, which was forty-six hundred strong, on this day amounted to close upon nine hundred, of whom over three hundred and fifty were killed and wounded, and over five hundred prisoners. In Colborne's brigade the Fifty-second lost eighty-two and the second battalion of the Rifles one hundred and two of all ranks, the Caçadores suffering rather less severely. In Kempt's brigade the casualties were trifling.

Farther to the Allied right Giron, after the capture

of the Boar's Back, brought forward his left wing, and 1813. fought his way abreast of the British line, until he was Oct. 7. brought to a standstill by a line of abatis behind which were ensconced two French regiments.¹ It chanced that Lieutenant William Havelock, one of Alten's aides-de-camp, came up at this moment with a message to Giron. Being young and of impetuous temper he put his horse at the abatis, cleared it at a bound and, calling to the Spanish to follow him, dashed straight in among the enemy. Fired by his example, Giron's men charged and broke the French, who retired to the Great Rhune. We shall meet again with William Havelock, less famous but not less gallant than his brother Henry, in India. This was the last success of the day. Villatte at nine o'clock received orders to leave Serres in order to cover Taupin's retreat, and he arrived in time not only to arrest the advance of Freire's soldiers, but by a counter-attack to drive them back to the southern slope of the pass of Olhette. On the Great Rhune itself Clausel ever since the evacuation of La Bayonnette had been accumulating battalion after battalion. The 12th Light was in the Hermitage on the summit, with posts thrown out eastward towards Sare; the 32nd prolonged the line south-eastward at Olhain and Bechinen; and north of the Hermitage four regiments of Maransin's division and two of Taupin's occupied the saddle which connects the Great with the Little Rhune. Hence when Giron at four o'clock in the afternoon attempted an attack upon the Hermitage and the ground to east of it, he was beaten off by huge stones rolled from the crest, and was obliged to content himself with a distant fire, which lasted until nightfall.

East of the Great Rhune the bulk of Conroux's division at Sare, though never seriously engaged, had been paralysed by the presence of Dalhousie's division; and on the extreme right of the Allies the demonstra-

¹ Napier states that there were two regiments, but it should seem from Vidal de Lablache that there was but one—the 32nd of Conroux's division.

1813. tion of Colville was efficacious in keeping the whole of
Oct. 7. d'Erlon's corps employed. The impetuosity of the Portuguese, or the thoughtlessness of their brigadier, Douglas, brought on a severer engagement than Wellington had desired, which cost them many men, though not apparently more than their opponents of Darmagnac's division, who confessed to over two hundred casualties. Whether d'Erlon should have allowed his three divisions to be wholly preoccupied by so feeble an attack may be questioned; but his chief must share the blame with him. Soult, on the morning of the 7th, had so little suspicion of Wellington's designs that he was actually at Ainhua on a tour of inspection; and, though he galloped off with all speed towards St. Jean de Luz after the opening of the attack, he did not reach Urrugne until one in the afternoon, when the line of the Bidassoa was already lost to him. His excuse was that he had reason to anticipate an attack at Ainhua, and he blamed Reille for the delay in the advance of the 9th division. But no excuse can do away with the damning fact that at the critical moment he was far away from the right place, and could exert no influence upon the course of the fight.¹ At the end of the day Maucune's division occupied Urrugne and the entrenched camp of Bordagain; Boyer's the heights of Ascain and Serres on both banks of the Nivelle; Maransin's, Taupin's and part of Conroux's the Great and Little Rhune; while the bulk of Conroux's lay about Sare. But Soult had little hope of holding La Rhune, and, apprehending that he would be speedily forced back to Bayonne, he took preliminary precautions for a retreat. There was so little confidence in all ranks of his army, from general to private, as to extort from him the admission that, if the troops of the Allied left had continued their advance, they could have marched straight into St. Jean de Luz.

¹ Napier, of course, conceals all this, and by implication gives Soult credit for bringing up Villatte's Reserve, which had moved some hours before Soult appeared.

"Our soldiers fight badly," wrote Villatte on the same 1813. evening, "they are worth nothing. Only disgrace can be expected with such troops."¹

The Allies on their side bivouacked on the ground that they had won ; and on the 8th neither party moved Oct. 8. until the afternoon, the Great Rhune being enveloped in fog. But between three or four o'clock Giron, by Wellington's order, attacked the French posts by the chapel of Olhain, while Dalhousie's skirmishers threatened the redoubts of Ste. Barbe and Granada on the south of Sare, and Colville made a demonstration towards the bridge of Amoto on the Nivelle. The chapel was abandoned at the first shot, and at nightfall the French evacuated the approaches to Ste. Barbe. Moreover, such was the general demoralisation that the commander of the 12th Light on the Great Rhune withdrew his battalion during the night, in dread of being cut off from Sare ; and, communicating his fears to his neighbours of the 34th, he caused them also to leave their post, and to retire with him to the Little Rhune. The first impulse of Clausel, on receiving this news, was to order the 34th back to their station ; but after hearing the report of the officer sent to him by the colonel, he decided, though wrongly, that nothing else could be done. On the 9th, therefore, the Hermitage was occu- Oct. 9. pied by the Allies, and the entrenchments in front of Sare were taken over by detachments of the Seventh Division. An attempt of these last upon the village of Sare was, however, repulsed, and therewith the operations for the present closed.²

The three days' fighting had cost the French sixteen hundred and fifty-four men, nearly one-third of them prisoners, and ten guns. The Allies lost almost as

¹ Villatte to X. 7th Oct. 1813, *Arch. de la Guerre*.

² The chief authorities for the passage of the Bidassoa are Napier, Batty (*Campaign in the South of France*) and Vidal de Lablache. Some interesting details of the action of the Light Division are to be found in Cooke's *Memoirs of the Late War*, Moorsom's *Hist. of the 52nd*, and in the chroniclers of the Rifle Brigade, Kincaid, Surtees and Costello.

1813. many, one-half of them Spanish, about one-eighth of
Oct. them Portuguese, and the remainder British ; but the moral effect of their success was immense. The French began to look upon defeat as their inevitable portion, and even generals urged the pretext of trifling wounds to leave the front and retire into France. The troops at large compensated themselves by plundering the villages of their own countrymen, not hesitating to force the doors of the peasants and drive them from their dwellings. So far did these outrages go that Soult, on the 9th, published a general order condemning them in no measured terms ; and he actually shot a captain, who was a knight of the Legion of Honour, for conniving at them. It is to be feared that the Allies behaved little better than the French, for they too seized the opportunity to get drunk and load themselves with pillage, without any effort on the part of their officers, in some cases, to prevent them. Wellington, when approaching the French frontier for the first time in July, had issued strict orders upon this subject, and was furious at finding them disregarded. He now once more called attention to this order, and sent home certain offending officers as an example to the rest. "If we were five times stronger than we are," he wrote, "we could not venture to enter France, if we cannot prevent our soldiers from plundering."¹

For the rest, the passage of the Bidassoa was, as Napier long ago pointed out, a general's and not a soldier's battle. Soult's dispositions were thoroughly vicious, his army being drawn out in a line so long that the isolated divisions in the front line were overwhelmed by thrice their numbers, before their reserves could reach them ; while, to make matters worse, the Commander-in-Chief was at one end of the line—and that the wrong end—at the moment of attack, instead of with his reserves in the centre. Out of over seventy thousand men only forty-five thousand at the very most were engaged ;

¹ *Wellington Desp.*, G.O., 9th July, 8th Oct. ; to Hope, 8th Oct. 1813.

and d'Erlon stood quaking over the approach of 1813. imaginary dangers when he should have reinforced Clausel. Even on the 9th he continued to send in dismal reports that he was threatened by superior numbers, when in reality there was not the slightest ground for alarm. But the movement which outwitted Soult and all his subordinates was the fording of the estuary, arm-pit deep, which they had left out of all their calculations as impossible. Considering the extreme delicacy and hazard of this passage, the complete surprise of the French commanders from the highest to the lowest, and the perfect concert in the working of every column of the Allies over a wide front in an extremely blind and difficult country, the passage of the Bidassoa must be ranked among the most masterly, both in conception and execution, of all Wellington's operations.

Having gained what he needed, a better line for his advanced posts, Wellington did not pursue his forward movement, having Pamplona still untaken in his rear, and being not yet free from doubt as to the issue of the campaign in Germany. Soult, relieved of his apprehensions, soon persuaded himself that the loss of the heights of the Bidassoa was not only advantageous but creditable to him as a commander, a discovery which he might more profitably have made before sacrificing sixteen hundred men in the attempt to hold them. Having vented his ill-humour by making a scapegoat of Maucune and demanding his recall, the Marshal set himself to fortify the line of the Nivelle. As a means to that end he ordered Clausel to attack the redoubt of Ste. Barbe, which that General did on the night of the Oct. 12. 12th with complete success, surprising Giron's Spanish garrison and taking over three hundred prisoners. Two feeble attempts were made by Giron to recapture it at dawn of the next day, but without success; and Wellington then decided to abandon it, as being dangerously close to the enemy's camp. Soult made no effort to repeat this offensive movement, but busied

1813. himself with the spade, and, as frequently happens, Oct. carried fortification to excess. Throughout August and September he had issued instructions for a network of roads to be begun from the central point of Sare to east, west and north ; for the fords from St. Pée to St. Jean de Luz to be destroyed as far as possible ; for batteries to be traced for the defence of the bridge of Amots, and for the old entrenchments of 1793 at Serres to be repaired. He had some vague idea of preparing so formidable a front as to deter Wellington from attacking him ; or, in other words, of trying to make earth take the place of the fighting spirit.

In the last action he had been driven back by the turning of his right, and he was resolved that this should not happen again. There was already a battery at Socoa, on the western horn of the bay of St. Jean de Luz ; he had already dug an entrenched camp at Bordagain, and he was constructing two redoubts, Fort Ste. Anne and Fort Ste. Croix, to south of Ciboure. But he now carried his line of defences forward on the south to the ridge which runs from Urtubie to the Redoubt des Gendarmes ; and on the west to the Unxin rivulet, which was dammed up into a succession of ponds. Moreover, the whole length of the road from Urrugne to Ciboure was barred by a succession of epaulments, made of casks filled with gravel ; and the outskirts of Ciboure itself were defended by redoubts with cannon mounted in them. The country about St. Jean de Luz greatly resembles that traversed by the North Devon Railway between Exeter and Barnstaple, showing the same narrow marshy flats and the same tangle of low rounded hills, heavily enclosed, and much wooded. In such a country earth-works must necessarily be numerous, and, if they are to be formidable, they must be extensive. As a natural consequence they required large garrisons. The 7th division¹ and Villatte's Reserve were placed in charge of Bordagain, Belchenia, and the rest of the first line ; the 9th² was stationed

¹ Formerly Maucune's.

² Formerly Lamartinière's.

between Urtubie and Ascaïn. Practically, therefore, 1813. three divisions were locked up in this entrenched camp Oct. alone.

The link between Reille on the right and the centre under Clausel was formed by the entrenchments of Serres where three divisions occupied a line north of Sare and on the left bank of the Nivelle, from the gorge of Amots on the east to the Col de St. Ignace on the west. In other words, they were extended for over four thousand yards across the great bend of the river, which is formed by its sudden change of course at St. Pée from north and south to east and west. This strip of country gives the impression of a series of conical disjointed hills, varying in size from the highest to the lowest features of Exmoor. These hills are mostly bare all over, though occasionally clothed at the base by a skirt of stunted copse, and the rock is never far from the surface on the summit. The eastern end of the chain was crowned by two closed redoubts, with further entrenchments and abatis on the slope below ; the promontory by which it abuts on the Nivelle was armed by two batteries ; and a second promontory, rather higher up the stream, was protected by an inundation and abatis. On the heights of St. Ignace was a closed redoubt, flanked by open works and entrenchments half-way down the hill. This was the main position.

In advance of it a second line had been prepared on the elevated plateau immediately to north of the Little Rhune, where a star-redoubt (of which fragments still remain) had been built of unmortared stone, and called Étoile de Mouiz ; a ridge which falls from this spot towards the Col de St. Ignace forming the connection between the Little Rhune and the principal line of defence. The Little Rhune itself was strongly entrenched, and committed to the charge of three battalions of Rouget's brigade of Maransin's division. South of Sare there was another advanced position in rear of the redoubts of Ste. Barbe and Granada ; while these redoubts themselves, closed in

1813. the rear, covered in front by abatis and other obstacles Oct. and provided each with a garrison of two hundred, barred the roads from Sare to Vera and to Echalar respectively. It will be noticed that Clausel took pains, so far as possible, to close the gorge of every redoubt, a doubtful policy in the case of works which were not intended to arrest an enemy permanently, since it could not but endanger the retreat of the men that held them.

East of Amots the lines passed to the right bank of the Nivelles, where d'Erlon's corps occupied the comb of a ridge with a front of about five thousand yards, between the river and the road leading from Ainhoe to Espelette. Most of this section of the country is higher ground than that occupied by Reille, and lower than that occupied by Clausel, except on the extreme east, where the Pic de Mondarrain is almost on the same scale as the Great Rhune. The principal line of defence was long, lofty, and little more than one hundred yards in depth, the acclivities being steep and abrupt and covered with thorny scrub. Hedges, redans and abatis, as well as a few houses, furnished shelter for the French skirmishers near the foot of the heights; batteries were erected on suitable positions half-way up the slope; and closed redoubts on the summit served as citadels to these outworks. A single battery was mounted between Atchulegui and the principal line of defence, so as to rake any columns that might attempt to enter the valley between them. In advance of these, Darmagnac's division was stationed to south of Ainhoe, so as to compel any attacking force to deploy a mile and a half from the main position; and, in order to shield it against any turning movement from the east, entrenchments had been prepared on a spur of the mountain of Atchulegui, on the neck which connects this eminence with Chapora, the next height to eastward, on the southern brow of Chapora itself, and on the Pic du Mondarrain, which formed the extreme left of Soult's position. These posts were not permanently occupied owing to the difficulty

of bringing victuals up to the garrisons ; but a single 1813. battalion was entrenched between Atchulegui and Oct. Chapora, and one brigade of Abbé's division was encamped between the former hill and Espelette. To secure d'Erlon's retreat across the Nive a double bridge-head had been constructed at Cambo ; and to strengthen the left flank still further Soult contemplated the occupation of Mount Ursouia, which commanded all roads from St. Jean Pied de Port to Bayonne, and thus would prevent any wide turning movement of the Allies by the east.

Wellington showed no anxiety for any resumption of the offensive, and discouraged foraging, petty skirmishes over debatable ground on the line of outposts, or anything that might provoke a new engagement. His line extended from the sea, where Sir John Hope had taken command of the left wing, to Roncesvalles, where Hill still covered all access to Pamplona, the more jealously since on the 13th General Paris had joined Foy at St. Jean Pied de Port with between two and three thousand men from Oloron. The First and Fifth Divisions, Aylmer's brigade, and Spry's and Wilson's Portuguese occupied the position won from the French at Hendaye, Croix des Bouquets, Mont du Calvaire and La Chouille ; the Fifth Division being on the extreme left, and the First nearly at the extreme right. The heights of Mandela were held by Freire's Spaniards ; La Bayonnette by Longa ; the Great Rhune by the Fourth Division and by one brigade of the Light Division ; and the pass of Vera by Alten's second brigade. The Seventh Division at the pass of Echalar, the Sixth at that of Maya, and the Third at Zugarramurdi, prolonged the line to Roncesvalles ; where the Second Division, together with Mina's and Morillo's Spaniards, being exposed to constant snow and occasional hurricanes, suffered not a little from the weather. Copying his adversary, and possibly with the idea of misleading him as to his intentions, Wellington covered his front with entrenchments, as if dreading an attack.

1813. Meanwhile, in spite of all his successes, his troubles
Oct. with the Spanish and Portuguese Governments had reached an acute stage. On the 5th of October he received information from the Spanish Regency that his resignation as Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish armies had been accepted, and that his tenure of that appointment was to end upon the assembling of the new Cortes. Bitter attacks upon his personal character, the neglect of the Spanish troops at the front by their masters in the south, and the general inefficiency and folly of the Spanish Government were exhausting his patience. "It is quite clear to me that unless we beat down the democracy at Cadiz, the cause is lost," he wrote. "How that is to be done, God knows." In Portugal Lisbon was impoverished by the withdrawal of the British base to Spanish ports; and the resulting discontent and distress found vent in factious obstruction by the Regency of all measures for the prosecution of the war, and in venomous libels against Wellington and the British nation at large. So serious was the effect upon the recruiting of the Portuguese army that Beresford was obliged to hurry from the front to Lisbon. There Forjaz complained of the scanty credit given by British newspapers and the British Parliament to the Portuguese troops who, to do them justice, had nobly redeemed in 1813 their failings of 1812; and the Minister demanded that they should be formed into a separate army, though still under Wellington's supreme command. Wellington rejoined that unless the Portuguese soldiers were incorporated with the British divisions and supported, as they had been hitherto, by the British Commissariat, they would only disgrace themselves, and that if Forjaz intended to found quarrels upon the statements or omissions of English newspapers, he, Wellington, should leave the Peninsula for ever.

The project was then dropped, but there was some truth in the lament that the military services of the Portuguese had never received such full and public

recognition as those of the Spaniards, and Wellington 1813. took pains, though rather late, to remedy the injustice. Oct. The truth of course was that both Portuguese and Spaniards, now that they were fully or nearly quit of the French, flattered themselves that this result was due to their own efforts, and wished to be quit also of the British. The people of both countries had suffered so terribly and made such sacrifices, that they may readily be pardoned for the feeling. But the Peninsula could never have been cleared of the French without Wellington and the British army; and, more important still, the war was not yet over. These were facts which should not have been ignored either by the worthless oligarchy at Lisbon or the equally worthless democracy at Cadiz.¹

The insecurity of the maritime communications also never ceased to vex and harass Wellington. His former remonstrances had brought him a peremptory and captious letter, signed by the First Lord of the Admiralty but evidently the composition of the Secretary, Mr. Croker, which somewhat aroused his resentment. "You must not read Croker's compositions," answered Bathurst, "as you would those of any other official person. He has the talent of writing sharply and with great facility—a great misfortune in an official person. His style is not what it should be to the other departments, but I take no notice for I know he means nothing, and you are the god of his idolatry." The Admiralty in fact yielded so far as to send Rear-admiral Martin to Passages with the special object of ascertaining Wellington's requirements; which reduced themselves practically to a demand for safe escort for troopships and store-ships. Some hundreds of British soldiers and a number of Portuguese, fit and ready to join their corps, were detained at Lisbon and elsewhere for want of transports or of convoys; three store-ships had been captured by privateers; and two more, from

¹ *Wellington Desp.* To Bathurst, 5th Oct.; to C. Stuart, 11th Oct.; to H. Wellesley, 11th, 16th Oct. 1813.

1813. want of instructions to the masters, had run into
Nov. Santoña, which was still held by the French, and had
of course been captured. Admiral Martin duly arrived ;
but it does not appear that his visit greatly forwarded
matters, for Wellington throughout the month of
November was still crying out for men-of-war. The
truth seems to be that Ministers, by engaging to send
a fleet to the Baltic, so as to ensure the safe passage of
Bernadotte's troops to the Continent, had overtaxed
the resources of the Navy.¹

Another matter which required Wellington's serious
attention was that of reinforcements. Already a
difficulty had arisen over the expiration of the terms
of some hundreds of men enlisted for short service,
and had been surmounted by offering them a bounty to
re-enlist. The old trouble of provisional battalions had
since showed itself once more, and Wellington had
pressed urgently for permission to continue the system,
so as to keep old and seasoned soldiers with the active
army. Greatly to his credit the Duke of York, though
with much reluctance, consented to the transfer of these
old soldiers to any regiment that they might select,
thinking probably that the end of the war might shortly
absolve him from the consequences of sanctioning a
practice which was certainly detrimental to the efficient
organisation of the army at large. But behind these
minor affairs rose the more serious question of augment-
ing Wellington's army by extraordinary means to a
strength which should ensure that his next campaign
should be decisive. Time was of the utmost import-
ance, for it was imperative to despatch any large body
of troops before winter should render dangerous the
navigation of the Gulf of Gascony, and before Napoleon
could gain successes which would enable him to rein-
force Soult. The regular infantry of the British Isles
was exhausted ; militiamen were no longer ready in any

¹ *Wellington MSS.* Beresford to Wellington, 25th Sept. ;
Bathurst to Wellington, 9th Oct. *Wellington Desp.*, to Bathurst,
20th Oct. 1813. *Supp. Desp.* viii. 223-226.

great number to volunteer into the regular battalions ; 1813. and any measure for increasing the Militia, so as to promote such volunteering, would need some months for effective execution. It was, however, hoped that many militia-battalions would offer to serve abroad, and it was proposed to invite them to do so, gilding the invitation with a bounty of five pounds to every non-commissioned officer and private, and an engagement to give pensions to wounded men and to the widows and orphans of the dead. Under this scheme three-fourths of every battalion would go abroad, one-fourth would be left at home to form a depôt under two field-officers, whose place would be taken at the front by officers drawn from regiments of the Line ; and units of less than three-fourths of a battalion would be formed into provisional battalions. The advantage of the plan would be that the war might be ended by one great stroke. The objection to it was that, if the great stroke failed and the war were prolonged, the organisation for internal defence would be destroyed.

Wellington's answer to this proposal was short and to the point. He confessed that his acquaintance with the Militia was slight, having never had but one militia-regiment under his command ; but that this one had no interior economy nor discipline, while the officers possessed all the faults of their brethren of the Line in an aggravated degree, and some additional ones peculiarly their own. He therefore expressed his preference for a large draft of militiamen into the old regiments which were to join him in the spring, as likely to give greater efficiency with less expense. Since Wellington's opinion in this matter was justified in a remarkable degree, it will be convenient as well as chronologically correct to state briefly what ensued upon it.

Ministers were by no means disposed lightly to set aside Wellington's wishes, but having, in the interval between the arrival of his letter and the meeting of Parliament, received the news of Napoleon's overthrow at Leipzig, they rightly concluded that the time was

1813. come for flinging caution to the winds and for staking all upon one final and supreme effort. They were stimulated to this course by unpleasant signs that the military measures which had supported the war since 1809 were beginning to break down. Many of the Regular Militia regiments were reduced to mere mobs of recruits owing to the heavy drafts required from them by the Line, and to the discharge of principals upon the expiration of their term of service. More serious still, the competition between the Regular Militia and the Local Militia was becoming acute ; and the commanding officers of the former force were complaining bitterly that the Local Militia was taking all their men from them. Ministers therefore decided upon a compromise between their own idea and that of Wellington. They offered a bounty of eight guineas to all non-commissioned officers and privates of the Regular Militia, up to the number of thirty thousand, who would volunteer to serve in any part of Europe till the close of the war and until six months later, and endeavoured by giving a wide choice of conditions to sweep every possible man into their net. Thus Militia regiments, which supplied from six hundred to nine hundred volunteers, could practically take the field as distinct units ; those which furnished three hundred, or three-fourths of their strength, could be amalgamated into provisional battalions ; and those which came forward with one hundred could either be attached as a distinct company to such battalions of the Line as they might select, their officers receiving commissions in that battalion, or could be massed together into additional battalions. Commissions were also offered to Militia officers who prevailed upon smaller parties of their men to enlist ; and men were of course also permitted to transfer themselves to the Line independently. Altogether, by ordinary recruiting and one shift and another, Castlereagh hoped to pour into the Regular Army in 1814 not fewer than forty thousand men.

The results were disappointing, for the very multi-

plicity of the terms of service militated against success. 1813. The officers of the Militia, thinking that they could best meet the wishes of the Government by attracting their men to the Line, gave little thought to the provisional militia battalions. The men, excepting in a few regiments, were ready enough to enter the Line after the fashion of previous years, but showed decided reluctance to serve abroad upon any other conditions. Many who had at first declared themselves ready to go to France as part of a provisional battalion, backed out at once upon finding that they would not be subject to their own company-officers and battalion-commanders; and after much difficulty and confusion, owing to the withdrawal of these individuals from their first engagements, there were ultimately formed in February 1814 no more than three provisional battalions, numbering just under twenty-eight hundred men.

It would be unjust to draw the inference that the Militia were unpatriotic. They had given clear proof to the contrary by furnishing nearly one hundred thousand recruits to the Regular Army since 1805. But even regular regiments with the best systems of interior economy and of discipline can hardly be efficient for the field if employed permanently as mere depôts for training of recruits, and drained periodically of their best and most promising men; and the ordeal was far too severe for militia battalions, which for the most part depended for their efficiency upon the personal influence of, at most, two or three individual officers, and very frequently of one only.¹ Discipline, as Wellington pointed out, consists in something more than the exact performance of the manual and firing exercise and of field movements; and since that something more was wanting to the Militia, he doubted whether in a campaign a large militia army would be of use for more than a momentary exertion. Ministers, which is to say the

¹ For instance, the Denbigh Militia were eager for any service so long as Sir Watkin Wynn was at their head, but would do nothing without him.

1813. nation, expected too much of the force. They organised it rightly upon a territorial basis, and yet called upon it for general service; they used it as a machine for furnishing recruits, both officers and men, for another force, and yet required it to produce efficient battalions of its own. This impossible situation was not the fault of Liverpool and Castlereagh. It had grown out of the timidity of Pitt and Addington in failing to insist at the outset upon compulsory military training for every able-bodied citizen. If Napoleon had not been the most extravagant commander that ever lived in the matter of men's lives, this initial blunder of British statesmen might well have brought about their country's downfall.¹

Whatever Wellington's troubles, however, he was already studying his next movement, which was to follow upon the fall of Pamplona. The grip of starvation was slowly strangling the life out of the garrison; and an intercepted letter from the Governor, Cassan, to Soult early in October revealed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Allies that the fortress could hardly hold out beyond the 25th of the month.² As the fateful day drew near, Cassan sought to obtain honourable terms by threatening to blow up the ramparts, to which Wellington replied by ordering Carlos d'España, if any such thing were done, to shoot every officer and non-commissioned officer from the highest to the lowest, and one-tenth of the men of the garrison. On the Oct. 25. 25th Cassan sent out a flag of truce to Carlos d'España, but after an angry debate broke off the negotiations, and charged his mines in fulfilment of his threat. On the 27th, Wellington, in anticipation of the surrender of the fortress, issued his instructions for an attack on

¹ *Wellington Supp. Desp.* viii. 247, 249; *Wellington MSS.* Memo. of War Office, 31st Aug. 1813; *Wellington Desp.*, to Bathurst, 24th Sept. 1813; and see my *County Lieutenancies and the Army*, pp. 270-281.

² Napier says that this despatch was intercepted on the 20th of October, but he is plainly wrong. Cassan's letter was dated the 28th of September. *Wellington Desp.*, to Graham, 5th Oct. 1813.

the French lines, which he expected to take place on the 1813. 29th or 30th; and on the latter day Cassan agreed to Oct. 30. a capitulation which permitted his garrison to march out with the honours of war before embarking for England as prisoners. With his right thus freed from the duty of covering Pamplona, Wellington was at last able to resume the offensive. It was none too soon, for severe weather had set in. Hill's division at Roncesvalles was up to its knees in snow; and the troops, being necessarily camped upon high ground, were suffering much from exposure. It was impossible for the Commander-in-Chief to keep them much longer in the mountains; he was bound to march either forward or backward; and, as news had come in on the 31st that the Bavarians had turned against France, he judged that Napoleon would not remain in Saxony, that the Confederation of the Rhine was gone, and that he might safely move at least one step into France.¹

¹ *Wellington Desp.*, to Hope, Bathurst and H. Wellesley, 31st Oct. 1813. Napier states vaguely that the news of Napoleon's disasters in Germany arrived about this time. He does not say which disasters, but evidently means Leipzig. But the news of Leipzig had certainly not reached Wellington before the battle of the Nivelle.

CHAPTER XIII

1813. IF we are to believe the vivacious narrative of Harry Smith, Wellington used daily to visit the outposts of the Light Division on the Great Rhune, and from thence observe the progress of the French entrenchments on the hills beneath him. Upon one such day he remarked to Colborne that he should capture the works with ease, because the French had not soldiers enough to man the whole length of them, and could not know which would be the point of attack ; and therewith he began debating plans with Murray, his Quartermaster-general, who then and there set down the instructions for the intended assault. Whatever truth there may be in the picturesque details related by Smith, there can be no doubt that Wellington had observed Soult's blunder of excessive fortification, and was confident that he could turn it to good advantage.

Many difficulties, however, cropped up at the last moment. In the first place, the weather throughout the last days of October and the first week of November was so terrible that it was physically impossible for Hill to move owing to snow, and morally impossible for the rest of the army to do so owing to the rain. So gloomy was the outlook on the 31st of October that Wellington wrote, "The rain will destroy us if it lasts much longer." Then on the 2nd of November Freire reported that, owing to the neglect of the Spanish Government, he must send some of his battalions to the rear to find subsistence ; and he was only prevented from doing so by Wellington's undertaking to provide

the starving Spaniards with flour. However, the ^{1813.} weather cleared up on the 4th, and fresh orders were ^{Nov. 4.} sent to Hill to set his troops in motion on the 6th, with a view to a general action on the 8th. But on the 6th some untoward event must have threatened, for Wellington actually drafted directions for withdrawing Giron's corps from the front and cantoning it on the Bidassoa, though on the same day supplementary instructions were despatched to the generals for the attack as originally designed. Moreover, there exists a memorandum, which must belong to this same period, setting forth a scheme for turning the lines of the Nivelle by St. Jean Pied de Port, which might seem to indicate that Wellington was still undecided as to the course that he should follow. It is, however, likely that these apparent deviations from the original project were only suggested by the Quartermaster-general to meet certain possible contingencies. In any case the attack, though delayed, till the 10th by ^{Nov. 10.} a further fall of rain, was finally delivered according to the orders first issued on the 27th of October. Their purport was as follows.

As preliminary movements, Mina on the extreme right was to bring forward his centre to Roncesvalles, his right to Orbaiceta and his left to the valley of Aldudes, thus relieving the troops of Hill, which, with the exception of one British brigade left at Roncesvalles, were to march together with Morillo's Spaniards by Aldudes to the valley of Maya. At the same time Grant's brigade of cavalry, together with the 4th Portuguese Horse, was to move into the valley of Baztan, and Victor Alten's to the valley of the Bidassoa, occupying Santesteban, Sumbilla, Yanci and Lesaca, while the Hussar Brigade was to take the place of Alten's further in the rear.

The main attack was to be launched against the French centre at Sare. On the extreme left of this attack the Light Division and Longa's Spaniards, with three mountain guns, were to storm the Little Rhune

1813. from the western end, Longa furnishing a flank-guard
Nov. 10. to parry any counter-attack of the enemy from Ascain.
The command of these troops was to be entrusted to Charles Alten.

On the right of Alten, Giron was to advance upon Sare with his main body, detaching three battalions to his left to ascend the Little Rhune from the south, and as he gained ground, pushing yet more troops up the valley in rear of the same hill.

On the right of Giron the Fourth Division, accompanied by a troop of horse-artillery, was to attack the more westerly of the two redoubts that commanded Sare on the south, and proceed in co-operation with Giron to the assault of the heights beyond the village.

On the right of Cole the Seventh Division, descending from the pass of Echalar and taking with it a troop of horse-artillery, was to assail the Granada redoubt, afterwards continuing its advance somewhat wide to the right of the Fourth Division.

On the right of Dalhousie the Third Division under Colville was to cover the right flank of the Seventh, penetrate into the gorge of the Nivelle, and seize the bridge of Amots.

The supreme command of Giron's troops, of the Third, Fourth and Seventh Divisions, and of Victor Alten's cavalry brigade which acted with them, was committed to Beresford.

Subsidiary to this main attack the following movements were prescribed for the remainder of the army on both flanks :

On the immediate left of Alten, Freire was to push one division against Ascain and the other to its right rear towards Jolimont ; and on the extreme left of the Allied line Sir John Hope, commanding the First and Fifth Divisions, Aylmer's brigade, Wilson's and Bradford's Portuguese, Vandeleur's light brigade and the German heavy brigade of cavalry, was to make a feint attack upon Soult's right wing, while Commodore Collier's squadron cannonaded the fort of Socoa from the sea.

On the immediate right of Colville the Sixth ^{1813.} Division, Hamilton's Portuguese, the Second Division ^{Nov. 10.} and Grant's cavalry-brigade, all under the command of Hill, were to advance in echelon from the left upon the eastern end of d'Erlon's position behind Ainhoa, while Morillo, still farther to the eastward, threatened the works upon Chapora, which guarded the enemy's extreme left flank.

The Allies, not including the Spanish cavalry and the blockading force about Pamplona, numbered about ninety thousand in all ranks, of whom some forty-five thousand were British and German, twenty-five thousand Portuguese, and the remainder Spaniards. To these the French could oppose, if Foy's division be included, some sixty-seven thousand men.

The temporary improvement of the weather on the 4th of November, together with a sudden decrease of deserters from the Allied Army, had warned Soult to expect an attack. The movements of Wellington's artillery at various points could be observed with the naked eye, and the passage of Hill's troops from the valley of Aldudes to that of Baztan was reported to Foy, who sent out reconnoitring parties on the road to Roncesvalles, and found some of the field-works of the Allies abandoned. On the 7th he conducted a detachment in person towards Altobiscar, and by an attack on the entrenchments discovered that a British brigade was still in position at Roncesvalles. He also ascertained that Mina was in the valley of Aldudes, and the blockading force from Pamplona in the valley of Baztan. Soult concluded from this display of strength on his left that Wellington intended to assail his right, left and centre simultaneously. The Marshal had already taken Darricau's division from d'Erlon and placed it at Serres to form a reserve midway between Reille and Clausel; and he now ordered Foy to leave a strong garrison at St. Jean Pied de Port, and to march with the rest of his division, some seven thousand men, to Bidarray, from which point he

1813. could either fall upon the right flank of any Allied
Nov. 10. column that advanced from the pass of Maya, or join d'Erlon between Ainhoa and Espelette. He also summoned his brother's division of cavalry to Cambo, so that it could pass to the west of the Nive at the same time with Foy, and brought forward one brigade of Treilhard's dragoons from Orthez to St. Palais, which lies about fifteen miles north-east of St. Jean Pied de Port, to seal up the gap that had been opened by the removal of Foy's division.

The whole of Wellington's columns of attack had been ordered to be in their appointed places before dawn, and officers had been stationed on the Great Rhune to note down and report the exact position of the enemy at daybreak, as well as any movements that the French might make subsequently. The battle was opened at six o'clock by the fire of Hope's guns upon the hostile entrenchments at Socorry, and by a general attack of the Allied picquets upon the French outposts. This was well conceived ; for Soult, dreading a repetition of the manœuvre that had ousted him from the lines of the Bidassoa, had been careful to post himself on his extreme right. When the French cannon had been reduced almost to silence, the Allied columns debouched to the false attack : the Fifth Division on the extreme left by the sea, Stopford's brigade of Guards next on the right ; Halkett's Germans, next to Stopford, turning Socorry by the west ; the picquets menacing Socorry in front ; and Aylmer's brigade on the right of the picquets, opposite to Urrugne. There being only four, or at most five, French battalions opposed to this overwhelming force, the enemy was speedily forced back ; and, after Aylmer had carried the village of Urrugne, Maitland's brigade of Guards and Wilson's Portuguese came forward on his left. The whole line, covered by a continual fire of artillery, then engaged in a prolonged combat of skirmishers before the main French entrenchments, while Freire, moving towards Ascaïn, drove back Villatte's advanced

troops and opened a cannonade upon the bridge of that village. Villatte thereupon joined Darricau at Serres, and these two French divisions remained motionless and helpless for the rest of the day in face of no more than six thousand Spaniards. Reille's loss was indeed trifling, little exceeding three hundred men in his two divisions. That of the Allies cannot have been much greater, for hardly more than two hundred British and Germans fell in the First and Fifth Divisions. Altogether the feint on the Allied left was extremely successful, since it paralysed four divisions completely.

In the centre there was sterner fighting. Alten in the early hours of the morning brought the Light Division to the spurs of the Great Rhune which runs down to Ascain, and halted them within a few hundred yards of the French position on the Little Rhune. This latter hill, which runs parallel to the Great Rhune and lies within easy cannon-shot of it, has its summit covered from end to end with a comb of rocks, rising in places to a height of forty feet and absolutely insurmountable if approached from the front, that is to say from the south. It was therefore imperative to turn this position, which was not easy, since the base of the hill on the western side is covered by a swamp—the source of two little rivulets which flow away to northward and within a few hundred yards sink into two deep combes, so rocky as to be in many places impassable and everywhere difficult and exhausting of ascent. Hence Alten's men had no alternative but to gain the lower slopes of the Little Rhune on the south front, pass round them under fire to the western end, and then to assail the comb itself. This last had been built up by the French into a succession of strongholds, connected by narrow footpaths and culminating in a natural citadel, called by the French soldiers the Donjon, which was covered by a cleft fifteen feet deep and had two mountain-guns within it. On the north front a dry stone wall connected the comb with the Mouiz redoubt, and served as a traverse to shield the retreat of the garrison to the

1813. main position. The redoubt itself was held by a
Nov. 10. battalion of the 4th Light; and the defence of the comb was entrusted on the west and centre to two battalions of the 40th, and at the eastern end to a battalion of the 34th. Two companies and a half of the 40th were pushed forward into the hollow between the two Rhunes, where a part of them occupied a cluster of rocks which furnished a natural fortification.

Alten decided to direct his principal attack against the dry stone traverse and the Mouiz redoubt, so as to force Barbot's brigade to retire from the comb on pain of being intercepted. Sending Longa's Spaniards therefore down the slope towards Ascaïn, he ordered one battalion of Rifles, covered by the fire of two mountain-guns, to fall upon the post in the hollow just mentioned, and the Forty-third and the 17th Portuguese to move round the higher side of the marsh and attack the hill from the western end, while the remainder of the division under his personal command should march round the lower end of the marsh against the traverse. At about seven o'clock the signal for the attack was given by the firing of three guns from Pic Atchuria, where Wellington himself had taken his stand; and the Light Division leaped to their feet. William Napier, who was in command of the Forty-third, then detached two companies, which contrived to cross the swamp without very heavy loss and cleared the French out of the lowest breast-work. Thereupon Napier at once brought forward the remainder of the battalion, the four leading companies in line and the rest in column; and these running at high speed round the marsh turned sharply to their left and threw themselves, panting after a race of half a mile, into the captured entrenchment. Here, though not altogether sheltered from the fire of the lowest of the French castles, named the Place d'Armes, which was held by three companies of the 40th, they waited for some minutes to take breath.

The men having recovered from their run, Napier

gave the order to storm the Place d'Armes, himself ^{1813.} leading the way and attempting to scale the wall at a ^{Nov. 10.} very dangerous point until pulled back, in spite of his furious protestations, by two of his officers. He then climbed over an easier place, his men swarmed in, and the French ran out of the work to the castle next above it, called the Magpie's Nest. This also was carried, seemingly after no great resistance, in spite of a noble example set by the French officers. A long line of entrenchments was also abandoned, and the defenders fled to the Donjon, while Napier halted to collect his scattered soldiers, and during the halt turned their fire upon the flank of the Frenchmen who lined the traverse. Simultaneously Alten's battalions came up to assault the traverse in front; and the Fifty-second, on Alten's extreme left, showed itself to south of the star-fort of Mouiz. Seeing both their flanks turned, the enemy abandoned their works, and Napier, seizing the moment, launched his men at the Donjon and stormed it out of hand. The whole of Barbot's brigade, the 34th excepted, now streamed in disorder down the northern slope—little less than a mile long—of the Little Rhune. The 34th had successfully withstood the attack of the Rifles which, after carrying the post between the two Rhunes, had advanced against them; but now even this regiment fell back, endeavouring to cover the retreat. The fugitives rallied for a few minutes in the neck of land which led to the main position, but presently retired again without further attempt to stand. Alten, pursuant to his orders, then halted his division until the Allies on his right should come level with him, having accomplished the first and most dangerous part of his task with great success. The manner in which Colborne's brigade had been brought up through the darkness to their appointed position without any road to guide them reflected the greatest credit upon that officer and his brigade-major, Harry Smith; and the perfect accuracy with which the various manœuvres were combined excuses Harry

1813. Smith's description of the attack as "the most beautiful Nov. 10. ever made in the history of war."

On the right of Alten, Giron's Spaniards appear to have contributed little, if at all, to the success on the Little Rhune, though their advance gave effective help to Beresford's three divisions on their right. Cole's brigade seems to have deployed at about eight o'clock before the Ste. Barbe redoubt, against which Beresford concentrated the fire of the three horse-artillery batteries under his command. The garrison thereupon evacuated the work without awaiting the assault; and the guns were then turned upon the Granada redoubt with the same result. Cole now led his division straight against Sare, while Giron turned that village on the west and the Seventh Division did the like on the east. Rey's brigade of Conroux's division offered some resistance at the outskirts of the village; but the Third Division by this time was heavily engaged with Conroux's second brigade at the bridge of Amots; and the Allied skirmishers soon swarmed into the streets, drove the defenders out, and continued their advance upon the low heights in rear. Here, before the site of two camps, Maransin had originally formed his second (Rouget's) brigade; but the evacuation of Sare, and Colville's progress towards the bridge of Amots compelled him to detach the 59th to the Louis XIV. redoubt, which was occupied only by conscripts, on the principal line of defence. He had already sent the 50th to cover the retreat of Barbot's defeated soldiers towards the St. Ignace redoubt; and hence there were left to him only two battalions, the 27th and 130th, with which he held his own stoutly until ordered too late to withdraw to the main position. Since dawn Taupin had occupied the station appointed to him on the right of that position. The 47th held the entrenchments immediately above Ascain; the 9th Light those opposite to the Rhune; the 70th the St. Ignace redoubt and another to west of it; the 88th the Signal redoubt, a little in rear of these two; the

26th the spurs that descend towards Sare ; and the 31st was held in reserve. But excepting with one battery he had been unable to give the slightest support to Maransin, whose troops by this time were much shaken. Clausel rallied these last as best he could, and drew them up between the Signal redoubt and the Louis XIV. redoubt, ordering Conroux's division, which was also unsteady after the engagement about Sare, to fill up the space between the latter redoubt and the Nivelles. 1813.
Nov. 10.

It was now half-past nine, and the Allied columns were rapidly re-forming to assail the second line of the French. Clausel, alive to the danger, called up a battery to the east of the Louis XIV. redoubt, and ordered Maransin to enclose the work itself, which was still unfinished, with his two brigades, Barbot's on the left, Rouget's on the right, to await the British in that formation, and to charge them as soon as they should have passed an abatis about two hundred yards to the front. He had, however, little confidence in these troops, for half an hour later he ordered Taupin to send half of his reserve to the same point, if he should observe that the redoubt was vigorously attacked. Shortly after ten the Allied skirmishers began to ascend the heights, and Taupin, judging that the moment was come, sent off both the 31st Light and the 47th, which were presently followed by two guns, towards the threatened point. They had hardly started when the Light Division swarmed forward to the attack ; and Taupin, dreading lest these might penetrate by the ravine just to the east of Ascaïn and cut him off from Darricau's division at Serres, recalled the 47th to its former post. Meanwhile Colville had developed a vigorous onslaught by the bridge of Amots against Conroux's division, which stood for a time firmly in its entrenchments, though the British, taking advantage of small enclosures for shelter, were able to return its fire with effect. At last Conroux fell, mortally wounded ; and the soldiers, discouraged by the loss of their beloved chief, gave way and fled down

1813. the bank of the Nivelle, uncovering the left flank of
Nov. 10. Maransin. By eleven o'clock the Third Division were masters not only of the bridge but of the eastern end of the hill between it and the Louis XIV. redoubt.

The 59th, which it will be remembered had been detached to this quarter earlier in the day, was able to check the onset of Colville for a time; while Barbot, as fast as he could rally his battalions, brought them forward in support, and Rouget hastened the rest of his brigade to join them from Sare. Clausel attempted with his eight guns to cover the retreat of Conroux; but Ross's troop of horse-artillery, which had contrived to keep up with the infantry in spite of all difficulties of ground, soon silenced these cannon; and then the Fourth, Seventh and Third Divisions closed in upon the front and flanks of Maransin with overwhelming numbers. Barbot's battalions were hurled down into the ravine in rear of the position. The redoubt was surrounded and stormed and over one hundred and eighty men captured in it. Maransin with such regiments of Rouget's brigade as he could collect, fought desperately to save it; but the last of them, the 130th, did not come up until the moment when the redoubt had fallen and all the defenders were in confusion. For a short time Maransin was a prisoner, but presently escaped; and then, ordering the 130th to cover the retreat, he rallied his fugitive soldiers on the first plateau to the rear, and brought them, hotly pursued by the Allies, by succession of brigades into St Pée.

There still remained Taupin's division ensconced between Ascain and the Signal redoubt; and Clausel, looking every moment for the arrival of Darricau's division from Serres, hoped that he might still maintain himself in that part of the position. Taupin, upon perceiving the evacuation of the Louis XIV. redoubt, had betaken himself at once to the Signal redoubt, from whence he saw the 31st Light astride the roads from Sare to St Pée and hotly engaged with the Allies. Clausel, hastening likewise to the Signal redoubt, exerted

himself to rally Conroux's and Maransin's troops ^{1813.} behind the 31st. But there was danger now in his front ^{Nov. 10.} as well as on his flank. Alten, observing the steady progress of the neighbouring divisions on his right and left, had long since resumed his advance. The Fifty-second, running rapidly down the long northern slope of the Little Rhune under a smart fire from Taupin's guns, gained a wood at its foot, stole through the trees almost to the edge of the watercourse beyond, flew over a small patch of open ground to an unguarded bridge, and formed under cover of a bank on the farther side of the stream within eighty yards of the nearest French entrenchment. There, while Freire's and Longa's Spaniards pressed forward upon Ascain, they suddenly sprang up and dashed upon the enemy. The 70th, which was opposed to them, gave way directly, and abandoning not only the outworks but the St Ignace redoubt and another fort close to it, broke up and disappeared from the field.

In desperation Clausel ordered Taupin to recapture the two redoubts, and hastened to the 31st to hearten them to stubborn resistance. He was presently rejoined by Taupin, who reported that the 70th had dispersed, and that by some misunderstanding he had withdrawn the 9th Light and 47th from their positions over against the Little Rhune to form them in support of the 31st on the road to Harostegua. Clausel realised that this road, which led to a bridge over the Nivelle,¹ was now the only line of retreat left to him, and that he must secure it without delay ; but he wished first to save the 88th, which was locked up in the Signal redoubt. Colborne was already advancing against it with the Fifty-second along two parallel spurs, and there was no time to be lost. Clausel therefore bade Taupin to bring back the 9th and 47th, and to lead them to the redoubt on the

¹ Napier (vi. 347) speaks of the fort of Harostegua. He evidently misread or mistranscribed Clausel's report to Soult of 11th November, in which Clausel speaks of the bridge (*pont*) of Harostegua as the only remaining line of retreat.

1813. west side, while he himself fell upon Colborne from the
Nov. 10. east. But the 31st was already outmatched in front and
on its left flank by Cole's division, while Giron's Spaniards,
debouching from Sare, threatened its right. Taupin
sent two officers to the Signal redoubt to tell the 88th
to evacuate it while there was still time, but they failed
to reach it. The 9th and 47th, in spite of repeated orders
to halt, continued to retreat by the road west of the
redoubt, with the British Rifles in pursuit; and the 88th
was doomed. Colborne for his part had in the first
instance halted after the capture of St. Ignace, seeing
that the Signal redoubt must fall, with or without its
garrison, in a few minutes; but, being urged on by some
mistake of a staff-officer, he moved up to the work under
a heavy fire, and made three several attempts to storm
it, only to be beaten back with very heavy loss. At last,
waving his handkerchief, he summoned the commandant
to surrender or take his chance of falling into the hands
of Giron's Spaniards. The French Colonel demurred
and tried to make terms, but being answered "Nonsense,
you must surrender," he yielded, cursing his hard fate;
and he and nearly four hundred veteran soldiers became
prisoners.

During this time Conroux's division had repassed
the Nivelle at St. Pée, but Maransin's found itself
intercepted by Colville's skirmishers, who had crossed
the bridge of Amots and reached the village by the right
bank before them. Maransin therefore was obliged to
turn back and cross by two bridges near Ibarron.
Taupin's battalions were completely dispersed. The
31st, rallying on the 26th, was overtaken by the Seventh
Division near Harosteguaia, but contrived to pass the
river, after heavy loss, partly at Ibarron and partly by
fords. The 47th with Taupin himself was hustled aside
to the bridge of Ascain, but, being little pressed by any
pursuit, the general was able then to rejoin his division
on the right bank. The 70th had disbanded itself, and
could not be found till next day. The 9th, having begun
its retreat early and refused to depart from it, escaped

with comparatively little damage. Altogether the casualties of Clausel's corps amounted to nearly twenty-seven hundred, of which over one thousand were missing or prisoners; Taupin's and Maransin's divisions losing each of them rather more than nine hundred of all ranks, and Conroux's nearly eight hundred and fifty. The truth is that they had fought very ill; and Clausel, in the last stage of exasperation, begged Thouvenot to lock up in the citadel of Bayonne all unwounded men of his three divisions who should present themselves at Bayonne. "They are cowards," he said, "who shun glory and are content to be filled with disgrace." But these poor French soldiers had begun the day by witnessing the headlong flight of their comrades down the long slope of the Little Rhune, and had then been attacked by at least four times their own numbers. Moreover, their Commander-in-Chief during the four first critical hours of the fight had remained stationary at St. Jean de Luz, where there was nothing to be feared, and only at half-past ten had joined his reserves at Serres, whence, even then, he had not made the slightest attempt to move Darricau's division to Clausel's assistance. Such mishandling was not calculated to inspire troops, already demoralised by many defeats, with confidence or courage.

On the extreme left of the French, though the fortifications were nearer to completion and therefore more formidable, matters went as ill for Soult as in the centre. In this quarter the first line of defence was manned by Darmagnac's 1st brigade about Ainhoa, and a brigade of Abbé's division in the entrenchments of the Atchulegui, Chapora, and Mondarrain;¹ while the main position from the bridge of Amots eastward was held by the two remaining brigades of the same two divisions. Hill on his side arranged to make his advance in

¹ The difficulty of identifying places and names owing to imperfect cartographical surveys is enormous. In a modern French map I find Mt. Atchulegui called Mt. Ereby, and Chapora called Atchulegui. But there is another Atchulegui touching Mt. Ereby; so I have left the names as they stand in the text.

* 1813. echelon from the left, Clinton's British and Hamilton's
Nov. 10. Portuguese divisions leading, with Stewart's division following on the right rear of Hamilton. Clinton, on Hill's extreme left, moving forward first by the left bank of the Nivelles, manœuvred a French detachment out of a fortified post by the stream, crossed the water by two fords under cover of a wood, and halted his division at the very foot of the heights occupied by the enemy. At the same time Hamilton drove the French from the forge of Urdax, but made slower progress than Clinton, owing to the greater difficulty of the country and to the active opposition of the French skirmishers from Ainhoa, who came forward in force to contest the passage of the river. Hamilton and Clinton, however, simultaneously detached troops to assail the right flank of these skirmishers, who, being thus driven off, left several fords open to the Portuguese. Thereupon d'Erlon directed Darmagnac to abandon further resistance, and to withdraw his first brigade to join his second in the main position.

This order would seem to have been premature, for Hamilton's difficulties were by no means yet over. His battalions on reaching the right bank of the Nivelles did not find themselves, as had Clinton's, at the foot of the heights fortified by the French, but at least half a mile from them, with a steep ridge standing in the way. Upon ascending this ridge the Portuguese came under enfilading fire from the French cannon to north of Mount Atchulegui, and were checked for a time until their own guns came up to answer those of the French. Then at last they were able to proceed; and meanwhile Stewart had come forward by the road from Urdax to Ainhoa to take his appointed place in the echelon. By this time Colville's skirmishers had crossed the bridge of Amots and were threatening Darmagnac's right; and soon after one o'clock Hill launched his troops to the attack, directing Clinton against the first, Hamilton against the second, and Stewart against the third of the three redoubts immediately to east of the bridge of Amots.

Clinton ordered his division into two lines, Lambert's ^{1813.} brigade¹ and the 12th Portuguese forming the first, with ^{Nov. 10.} Pack's² and the 8th Portuguese in support; a swarm of marksmen being in advance and two companies pushed out to the right as a flank-guard. As they breasted the steep ascent the first line suffered some loss from the cross-fire of the French; but without pausing for an instant they climbed to the summit and rushed at the redoubt before them, which was thereupon abandoned by the enemy without further resistance. Hamilton then came up to the right of Clinton, but on reaching the top of the hill found that the French had set fire to their huts, which flared up so fiercely for a time as to bring the bulk of his division to a standstill. However, the grenadier-companies and a battalion of Caçadores, being to windward of the flames on the extreme right, attacked the redoubt single-handed and soon carried it. D'Erlon then drew off Darmagnac's division towards Habacemborda, leaving Abbé's to take its chance; and Stewart came up to attack the third and fourth redoubts, which he did with Ashworth's Portuguese and Byng's brigade. Abbé seems to have made a spirited resistance for a time, for Byng's light companies, which led the assault, suffered, relatively to their numbers, considerable loss. The French general, however, seeing his enemies increase upon every side, made no serious effort to defend the redoubts, but retired towards Espelette, so as to pick up his remaining brigades from Atchulegui and Chapora, and cover the bridge-head of Cambo. D'Erlon, upon reaching Habacemborda, found Conroux's division already there, and led Darmagnac's division to Ustarits, so as to cover the road from Ainhoa to Bayonne. The losses in d'Erlon's two divisions did not exceed six hundred and fifty; and his feebleness and indifference did not escape rude comment in the French army.

Still farther to the east Foy led out his divisions at

¹ 1/11th; 1/32nd; 1/36th; 1/61st, late Hinde's.

² 1/42nd; 1/79th; 1/91st; 1 co. 5/60th, late Sterling's.

1813. daybreak towards Mount Gorospile, so as to fall upon
Nov. 10. the flank of the Allies as they advanced. During the
march he received an order from d'Erlon to send him
one of his brigades ; but, ignoring this, Foy pursued his
way, and at ten o'clock attacked the Spaniards of Mina
and Morillo on Mount Gorospile, whom after sharp
fighting he drove back. Pursuing them towards Errazu
he was on the point of capturing the baggage of Hill's
corps, which was collected at that point, when he judged
by the sound of the firing that the French centre had
been forced, whereupon he retired with all speed to
Cambo. His diversion, so far as it went, had been
perfectly successful, but towards the general operations
of the day it had contributed nothing ; and Foy's ten
thousand men for all serious purposes can hardly be
said to have taken part in the action.

It was past five o'clock when Hill's corps at last
came abreast of Alten's and Beresford's, both of which
had been halted by Wellington at St. Pée. Wellington
then pushed the Third and Seventh Divisions across the
river, and drove back the remnants of Maransin's
division, which had begun to reassemble upon Conroux's
at Habacenborda. Darricau's division made no attempt
to save its comrades, but took a foremost place in
retreat, and was sent to Bidart, while Villatte's Reserve
came forward to Serres in its stead. Scattered firing
continued until late at night ; but the troops on both
sides were too much exhausted to renew the combat
seriously ; and further immediate pursuit was impossible.
The Allies therefore bivouacked upon the ground that
they had won ; Wellington somewhat disappointed that
the length of time consumed by his various operations
should have prevented him from accomplishing any
greater result. "If we could have moved earlier from
St. Pée," he wrote to Hope, "Soult could not have
retired easily from St. Jean de Luz." Soult was
evidently of the same opinion, for in the evening he
ordered Reille to spike any guns of position that he
could not carry off and to retire to the heights of Bidart,

leaving detachments to destroy the bridge at St. Jean de Luz itself and the trestle-bridge farther up the river. All through the night accordingly infantry and field-artillery were crossing the Nivelle, and at nine o'clock on the morning of the 11th Reille's two divisions took post on the heights of Bidart. On their right Darricau's division marched to Arbonne, and the divisions of Maransin and Taupin (late Conroux)¹ to Arcangues, while Darmagnac stood fast at Ustarits, and Abbé and Foy at Cambo.

Upon learning of this retreat Wellington issued the following orders. Hill was to advance upon Cambo and Ustarits, but not beyond Souraïde, unless the enemy could be driven across the Nive without a serious engagement. Clinton was to march likewise towards Ustarits upon Hill's left. The Third and Seventh Divisions and Giron's corps on the right, and the Fourth and Light divisions and Bradford's Portuguese on the left were to move in two columns on the left of Clinton, and, having traversed the forest of St. Pée, were to front towards Bayonne. Lastly Freire and Hope on the left were to proceed, the former to Ahetze and the latter to Guéthary. Unfortunately the tide did not permit Hope's corps to ford the Nivelle until half an hour past noon, so that the retirement of the French was unmolested; but Wellington was fully resolved to attack them on the morning of the 12th unless they should again retire; manœuvring in echelon from his right centre—that is to say with Clinton's division in the foremost place—so as to threaten their communications with Bayonne. Not daring to await the shock Soult withdrew very early in the morning of the 12th. His first idea was to take up a position between the sea and the Nive at about the level of Biarritz; but, after reflection upon the advantage of possessing the bridges of Bayonne for passage to the right bank of the Nive, he decided to occupy the two entrenched camps

¹ As shall presently be seen, Taupin's own division was broken up, and his troops distributed among the other divisions.

1813. just south of Bayonne upon both sides of that river.
Nov. 12. Reille, therefore, was stationed a little to north of Biarritz, Clausel's two divisions about Marrac, and Villatte's division in reserve on the left bank of the Nive. D'Erlon's three divisions were on the right bank at Mousserolles, Mouguerre, Villefranque and Halsou; with Foy in advance at Cambo, Pierre Soult's division of cavalry wide to the east at Hasparren, and General Paris's brigade in front of all at Bidarray. The retreat was untroubled by the British, being covered by a dense fog; but later in the day Hill cannonaded Cambo, and endeavoured to pass the fords and restore the broken bridges at Ustarits. Heavy rain, however, had made the river impassable, and enabled Foy successfully to hold his own; indeed it had so damaged the roads as to make them almost unfit for use by infantry and cavalry and wholly so by artillery. On the 12th, therefore, the movements consequent upon the battle of the Nivelle were perforce brought to an end.

The loss of the French in the action amounted to nearly forty-three hundred killed, wounded and prisoners, of which close upon twenty-seven hundred belonged to Clausel's three divisions alone; and they left as trophies to Wellington's army sixty-nine guns, of which two-thirds were abandoned in Soult's elaborate strongholds about St. Jean de Luz. The casualties of the Allies, curiously enough, were almost exactly the same in number as those of Clausel. The Light Division was that which suffered most heavily, owing chiefly to the mistaken order to Colborne to assault the Signal redoubt, for the killed and wounded of the Fifty-second numbered two hundred and forty, which was four times as great as that of any other battalion of the division. It is noteworthy that on the morning after the action the Fifty-second still showed a fair muster upon parade, for one hundred men, who had received only flesh-wounds, refused to go to the rear, and came up for duty as usual. Considering the strength of the French position, the cost of lives in

carrying it cannot be deemed great ; and it is almost 1813.
ludicrous to read Soult's opinion that the entrenchments Nov.
should not have been mastered without the sacrifice by
the Allies of at least twenty-five thousand men. Each
of the French generals, as is usual in such cases, ascribed
his misfortune to his neighbour. Taupin blamed
Maransin, Clausel blamed d'Erlon, and d'Erlon blamed
Clausel. Soult of course threw the responsibility upon
his subordinates, and selected Clausel as the scape-goat,
saying that he himself, being on the extreme right and
receiving no reports, had no share in the action. But
Clausel retorted with justice that he had held his own
for nearly five hours, during which time no attempt had
been made to reinforce him either from Serres or from
St. Jean de Luz ; and it is incontestable that Darricau's
division hardly fired a shot, and that Foy's, some ten
thousand men, was wasted in the delivery of a futile
blow in the air. Upon the whole it must be pronounced
that Soult cut a sorry figure, and that the French troops
made but a faint resistance. But as they had received
the news of the catastrophe at Leipzig on the morning
of the battle, there was much excuse for the poor spirit
shown by all ranks.

On the other hand Wellington's victory was in great
measure barren, since he failed to cut off the troops of
the French right, as he had hoped.¹ This misfortune
he attributed to the slowness with which the troops on
the right of the Nivelle came up to St. Pée. "If I had
had an hour or two more of daylight, or if I could
have kept two divisions in reserve," he wrote to Graham,
"I must have caught Soult's right before they could
have got into the entrenched camp at Bayonne." Upon
this Napier conjectures that, if Carlos d'España's troops
and the whole of Mina's had been added to Morillo's,
such a body would have sufficed to keep d'Erlon dis-
tracted, and would have enabled the full strength of
Hill's corps to be turned upon Clausel for the decisive

¹ See the proposed movements of the army drawn up on the
morning of the 10th by Sir G. Murray. *Supp. Desp.* viii. 350-352.

1813. manœuvre of breaking Soult's centre and intercepting the retreat of his right wing. Considering that d'Erlon was always a half-hearted and unenterprising man, and that the entire French army had been left by constant defeats with little stomach for fighting, the force of this criticism may be admitted ; and it may be confessed that, for the object which he had set before himself, either Wellington's calculations were faulty, or his dispositions were insufficient. Since he, not less than his enemy, had heard before the battle some news of Napoleon's disaster at Leipzig, it might be thought that on such an occasion he would have taken more than ordinary risks. But his strong good sense rightly forbade him to count too much upon unity and energy on the part of the Coalition, while the increasing hostility of the Spanish Government made him apprehend that, in case of mishap, a retreat through Spain would be a dangerous operation. He was aware that, if he was to enjoy any peace during the winter, he must deprive Soult of the bridge-head at Cambo ; but he was content to defer even this matter for a few days in the hope of learning more of the intentions of the coalised armies which had triumphed at Leipzig.¹

¹ *Wellington Desp.* To Hope, 14th Nov. 1813.

CHAPTER XIV

HAVING gained access to the plains of France for his 1813. winter-quarters, Wellington found his situation sensibly Nov. improved. Desertion, which in the previous four months had cost him twelve hundred men of all nations, diminished visibly when the troops were released from the hardship and exposure of camping on the mountains; and, thanks to a proclamation forbidding all plunder and ordering all requisitions to be faithfully paid for, the French inhabitants soon returned to their homes, to live peaceably in them with the British and Portuguese for their guests. "Hitherto," wrote Wellington on the 21st of November, "our troops have behaved well, and there appears a new spirit coming among the officers, which I hope will continue, to keep the troops in order." But this happy end was only attained by ordering the Spaniards into cantonments in Spain; for starving as they were and with many injuries to avenge, they were not disposed to spare the French peasantry. Longa's people, who were a light-fingered tribe, were sent, less one or two of their number hanged, far to the rear at Medina de Pomar; and even Freire brought down upon himself a biting sentence from the Commander-in-Chief. "I have not come to France to plunder; I have not lost thousands of officers and men killed and wounded in order that the surviving men may plunder. On the contrary it is my duty, and the duty of us all to prevent plundering, especially if we wish to subsist our armies at the cost of the country." But Wellington did the Spaniards justice, for he admitted

1813. that, unless they were fed and paid, it was unreasonable
Nov. to expect them to abstain from pillage. Nor did he
underrate their good qualities. "If I could bring
forward twenty thousand good Spaniards, paid and
fed," he wrote, "I should have Bayonne. If I could
have forty thousand, I don't know where I should stop.
Now I have both the twenty thousand and the forty
thousand at my command upon the frontier, but I
cannot venture to bring forward any for want of means
of paying and supporting them. Without pay and food
they must plunder; and if they plunder they will ruin
us all.¹

Nov. 17. As it chanced, heavy and almost ceaseless rain
between the 11th and 19th made all main roads so
difficult, and all by-roads so impassable, that military
operations were out of the question; and on the
16th orders were issued for the cantonment of the
troops. Accordingly on the 17th Hill's corps occupied
Larressore, Cambo, Itxassou, Espelette, and Souraïde;
the Third and Sixth Divisions Arraunts, Ustarits and
the adjoining villages; the Light Division Arbonne and
Arcangues, with its right in communication with the
Third; the Seventh Division St. Pée; the Fourth
Division Ascain and Serres; and Hope's corps the
villages of Bidart, Guéthary, Ahetze and the neighbour-
hood. Head-quarters were fixed at St. Jean de Luz,
which town, together with Ciboure, was assigned to the
two brigades of Guards. Of the cavalry Vandeleur's
brigade, with the exception of one regiment left at
St. Jean de Luz, was sent to Urrugne, Hendaye and
Biriattou; Victor Alten's was divided between St. Pée
and Sare; Bock's fell back to the rear of Hernani, and
Lord Edward Somerset's to the valley of the Bidassoa.
Meanwhile Wellington had leisure to survey the position
of the British forces that remained in Spain; and he
advocated the withdrawal of the troops from Cadiz,
which, though maintained at great expense, no longer
served any military purpose, but only kept alive the

¹ *Wellington Desp.* To Bathurst, 21st Nov. 1813.

jealousy and ill-feeling of the Spanish Government. At 1813. the same time he hinted strongly that, but for the Nov. danger of a fresh advance of Suchet to Valencia, he should be disposed to break up the army on the east coast, send the Italians and Sicilians back to Sicily, and add the British and Germans to his own force. He also recommended that in any case, until Tortosa should be taken, Carthagena should continue in the hands of the British, no doubt for the sake of retaining at least one port of entry to eastward.

Then turning to the internal condition of France, he recorded his opinion, which was justified by subsequent events, that the people were sick of war and therefore anxious to be rid of Napoleon, being convinced that, so long as he should reign, there was no prospect of peace. Nevertheless, as there was little sign of partiality for the Bourbons, Wellington recommended Ministers to come to terms with the Emperor, if they saw the prospect of obtaining all they had a right to expect. "If Bonaparte becomes moderate," he wrote, "he is probably as good a sovereign as we can desire in France; if not, we shall have another war in a few years; but if my speculation is well founded we shall have all France against him. . . . It is desirable, before I go further forward, that I should know what the Allies propose to do this winter . . . as I move forward I can enquire and ascertain more fully the principles of the people . . . if I were a Prince of the House of Bourbon, nothing should prevent me from now coming forward, not in a good house in London, but in the field in France; and if Great Britain would stand by him, I am certain he would succeed. This success would be much more certain in a month or more hence, when Napoleon commences to carry into execution the repressive measures which he must adopt in order to retrieve his fortunes."

The "repressive measures"—probably a slip of the pen for "oppressive measures"—were not long in showing themselves. Soult, upon first taking over the command of the army in July, had demanded a levy of

1813. thirty thousand conscripts, which was authorised on the Nov. 28th of August, and limited to the class of the unmarried in twenty-eight departments of the south and south-west. This limitation, being considered unjust, excited much opposition. It does not appear that the full number, nor nearly the full number, was raised ; the means of clothing and arming them, where not absolutely wanting, were deficient ; and there were no regular depôts. Escape was consequently easy, and the deserters amounted to nearly six thousand in a single fortnight. Such conscripts as remained were mere children ; but they were none the less instantly swept into the ranks by Soult, and as a natural consequence passed, after a few bivouacs in wet weather, straight into hospital. Once there, they either died of neglect, owing to the disorderly state of the medical arrangements, or, with the connivance of the hospital staff, made their way to their own homes. On the 9th of October a decree of the Senate ordained a further levy of three hundred thousand men, half of them from these same twenty-eight departments ; and Napoleon, while at Mainz on his road to Paris, proposed to assign half of them to the Army of the Pyrenees. His design herein was not to resume the offensive in that quarter, but to strengthen negotiations with the captive Prince Ferdinand of Spain ; whereby, as shall in due course be told, he hoped to rid himself of the Spanish tangle altogether, and afterwards to incorporate these levies with the armies of the North.

This second conscription was likewise met with recalcitrance and evasion of every kind ; and the spectacle of scores of wretched boys, tied to one another in Indian file like pack-horses, revolted even the officers who were crying out for recruits. Lastly an effort was made to raise a levy *en masse*, which had been a favourite idea with Soult ever since the battle of the Bidassoa ; and, to make the movement popular, Generals Darricau, Maransin, Harispe, Coutard and Travot, all of them distinguished men and natives of the south, were appointed in December to take the command of the

National Guards in the districts to which they belonged. 1813. This expedient again proved to be an utter failure. Want of money and the disorganisation of the central offices in Paris raised insuperable preliminary difficulties; and the people, irritated by incessant calls upon their young men, by the misconduct of the troops themselves, and by the endless requisitions of the soldiers, refused for the most part to make any effort for their own defence. Wellington's proclamation, and his steady resolve to pay for everything that he took, produced the effect for which he had hoped; and the peasants began to murmur that the English would be less burdensome on the soil of France than their own countrymen.¹

On the 19th the weather improved, and Foy and Nov. 19. Darricau reported that the Allies were preparing to pass the Nive; but beyond slight skirmishes nothing serious occurred until the 23rd. On that day the picquets of the Light Division, owing to some mistake, sought to extend their posts too far outside the village of Arcangues, and, finding themselves drawn into a sharp conflict with superior numbers, were forced to retire with the loss of over eighty officers and men killed, wounded and taken.² On this same day Soult sent away St. Pol's brigade of Italians, and a few days later Severoli's brigade also, to Italy; the Emperor having resolved, after his experience of the Saxons at Leipzig, to disarm all his foreign troops and to give their weapons to his own soldiers. It was only a matter of a few weeks before the Spaniards, Portuguese, Poles and Germans were likewise to be disbanded; but meanwhile they were retained; and Soult reposed so much faith in his four weak German battalions³ that he begged that all troops of the Confederation of the Rhine, which were distributed in the

¹ Vidal de Lablache, ii. 81; and see the whole chapter, ii. 61-149.

² Soult of course reported 50 British left dead on the ground, 15 prisoners (which was correct), 300 wounded. His own loss amounted to 2 or 3 killed, 55 wounded. Soult to Clarke, 23rd Nov. 1813. *Arch. de la Guerre*.

³ 1 Baden, 1 Frankfort, 2 Nassau.

1813. French armies of the North, might be sent to him.
Nov. "German soldiers," he wrote, "generally like service in the south. The mildness of the climate and the wine in particular attract them; and by showing them a little attention they may be made of great use." The Marshal was destined very soon to change his opinion upon this subject.

On the 26th heavy rain began again; and the cross-roads becoming impassable forbade all movements; though the troops, being sheltered in cantonments, remained remarkably healthy. So matters continued until
Dec. 8. the 8th of December, in the course of which days Wellington received important intelligence from various quarters. In the first place there arrived a detailed account of the French disaster at Leipzig, a further account of their defeat at Hanau, and news, as yet vague, of the restoration of Hanover to the British crown and of the revolt of Holland against the French. In the second, Henry Wellesley sent satisfactory assurances that the party in the Cortes, which was friendly to the British, was prevailing against the factious minority which desired to take command of the Spanish armies from Wellington; and as a timely encouragement to this good feeling Bathurst sanctioned the withdrawal of the British troops from Cadiz and Carthagená. Lastly the British Government gave Wellington definite orders to continue his offensive movement into the interior of France.¹

As a matter of fact the British Commander had already decided to pass the Nive as soon as the weather should permit, less with a view to a future invasion than in order to disengage himself from his cramped position within the triangle formed by the Pyrenees, the Nive and Lower Adour, and the sea. The exceeding strength of Soult's entrenched camp before Bayonne made direct attack upon it impossible. The fortress of Bayonne itself served as a citadel, to which access was barred on the western and southern fronts by an artificial inunda-

¹ *Supp. Desp.* viii. 377-380, 382-389, 401. *Wellington Desp.*, to Bathurst, 8th Dec. 1813.

tion ; and beyond the inundation again was a chain of 1813. redoubts and fortified posts. The western flank of this Dec. camp was guarded by gun-boats on the Lower Adour, and the eastern end was covered by the Nive.

The country that lies between the line of the Allies' cantonments and this camp is blind and broken beyond description. Seen from the church tower of Arcangues it presents no regular ridges but a chaos of hills, not unlike those of Sussex about Horsham and Crawley, divided into innumerable small enclosures by hedges and banks, and dotted over in all directions by little coppices of oak. Among these hills are curious little basins, some nearly, some quite flat, which in places bear the appearance of having been formed by river-terraces. The best marked of these basins is that formed by the little rivulet Ouhabia, which, rising from a multitude of sources in the forest of St. Pée, flows in a general direction from south to north until, a little to northward of Arbonne, it turns abruptly to the west and runs into the sea a little to south of Bidart. Immediately to south of this valley lie the villages of Guéthary, close to the sea on the main road from St. Jean de Luz to Bayonne, and of Arbonne aforesaid, some three miles to east and north of Guéthary. North of it stand the villages of Bidart in the main road by the coast ; Barrouillet, a mere hamlet, two miles to north-east of it and also close to the road ; and Bassussary, about two miles further east ; while the village of Arcangues, about two miles to the east of Arbonne and rather over a mile south of Bassussary, forms, as it were, a connecting link between the two groups north and south of the valley.

The high road from Bidart to Bayonne marks in a rough way the line of the watershed in the small but intricate slip of country between the Ouhabia and the Lower Adour, the streams to west of it flowing to the ocean, and those to east of it into the Nive. A little to north of Barrouillet this road passes between two lakes or tanks, the Lac de Mouriscot on the west, and the Étang de Brindos on the east ; and by these the access

1813. to the heights of Barrouillet from the north is contracted
Dec. to a defile. From the Étang de Brindos flows a rivulet, the Aritzague, which after running for about a mile from west to east, strikes northward to the Adour a little to west of Bayonne, and furnished the means for inundating the front of the entrenched camp. East of the line Bassussary-Arcangues, and between it and the Nive flows the rivulet des Urdains, with a course from south to north till it joins the Nive a little to north of the level of Bassussary. The main road from Cambo and the south to Bayonne, after passing through Larres-sore, Ustarits and Arraunts, crossed this water by a bridge, known as the bridge of Urdains, less than a mile from its debouchment into the Nive. East of the Nive the ground is of the same character as on the west, and equally blind, intricate and difficult.

Dec. 7. On the 7th of December Wellington issued his orders for forcing the passage of the Nive. The task was entrusted to Hill, who was instructed to cross the river by fords near Cambo at daybreak of the 9th, re-establish the bridge, and assemble on the right bank the Second Division, the Portuguese Division attached to it, Vivian's and Victor Alten's brigades of cavalry, and Ross's troop of horse-artillery. With these he was to advance along the road from St. Jean Pied de Port to Bayonne, and take up a position in the vicinity of Villefranque and Petit Mouguerre. To support Hill, Beresford was ordered to throw bridges over the Nive near Ustarits on the night of the 8th, and to be prepared to cross the river with the Third and Sixth Divisions. To cover the movements of both Hill and Beresford, the Seventh Division was ordered up to the hill of Ste. Barbe, a mile to south-west of Arraunts, and the Fourth to a point in the vicinity, from which it could move with equal readiness upon Arraunts or Arcangues. Both Dalhousie and Cole were cautioned to conceal their troops from the enemy. To protect Hill's rear from any attack by General Paris, who lay at Louhossoa, some four miles up the river from Cambo,

Morillo's Spaniards were to pass the water at Itxassou ; 1813. and, to keep the French troops on the left of the Nive Dec. in their entrenched camp, Hope was directed to make a demonstration against Soult's right.

The Marshal, for his part, had received warning from his intelligencers that the Allies would cross the Nive between the 9th and the 12th ; and, upon reports of their movements on the 8th, he brought forward his brother's division of cavalry, with Treilhard's in support, to secure the retreat of General Paris from Louhossoa. He had already made up his mind to attack the Allies on one bank or the other of the Nive, so soon as they should have divided themselves on both sides of it, and he looked forward with no unjustifiable confidence to the result. Meanwhile Wellington's orders were punctually followed. Beresford successfully laid his pontoon-bridges to an island in the river Dec. 8. during the night ; and on the morning of the 9th a Dec. 9. beacon kindled on the height above Cambo gave the signal for attack.

The Sixth Division at once advanced upon Ustarits, drove the French sentries from the right bank of the river, and enabled the engineers not only to complete the pontoon-bridge but to repair another wooden bridge which had been partly destroyed by the French. They then crossed the water, Gruardet's brigade of Darmagnac's division falling back before them upon Villefranque, with little fear of being caught, for the marshy meadows were so heavy that the British could make but slow progress on their way to the road. Hill simultaneously threw his corps across the river in three columns, one of them above Cambo, the others at Larressore and at Halsou, which was accomplished with only the loss of a few men drowned, though the water was so high that the men slung their cartridge-boxes round their necks to keep them dry. Foy's division, which guarded this part of the stream, thereupon withdrew slowly, contesting every foot of ground. Fririon's brigade retired upon Petit Mouguerre and Vieux Mouguerre,

1813. where Abbé's division had been brought forward to support
Dec. 9. them ; while Berlier's brigade, being cut off from the road by the advance of Clinton, was forced to retreat due east to the moorlands of Hasparren, and did not rejoin Foy until the afternoon. Paris also was compelled to retire before Morillo eastward upon Hilette towards the shelter of Pierre Soult's cavalry. Nevertheless Hill's advance had been so much retarded by the saturated soil that it was one o'clock before the head of his columns reached the heights of Loursinthoa on the road to Bayonne, where he took up a position with the Sixth Division on his left, the Third remaining to cover the bridge at Ustarits. Here he halted for two hours to let the tail of his columns come up ; and during this interval d'Erlon deployed the whole of his troops between Villefranque and Petit Mouguerre, where Soult had already since noon taken up his own station. None the less the Marshal did not venture to assail Hill, and at last at three o'clock the Portuguese of Clinton's division came down to attack Villefranque, and after one repulse succeeded in driving from it one of Darmagnac's brigades. A thick fog coming on before dark brought the combat to an end.

On the Allied left Hope, after marching for five hours, brought the First Division to the heights of Barrouillet, where it halted, while the Fifth Division on its left advanced along the coast beyond Bidart. He then wheeled the whole corps half right, and at eight o'clock threw his skirmishers into action, steadily pressing the French back until at one o'clock the First Division held Anglet, while the Fifth occupied the forest of Bayonne immediately to west of the entrenched camp. At the same time the Light Division, advancing from Bassussary towards Plaisance, met with no resistance until they reached the outer line of entrenchments at Monréjau, and halted just short of the castle of Marrac. In these positions they remained until night-fall for purposes of reconnaissance, Wellington being anxious to ascertain the nature and extent of the

French defensive works, and to satisfy himself as to the possibility of throwing a bridge over the Adour near its mouth. The whole then retired under cover of the Fifth Division ; the Guards, who had marched through pouring rain and seas of mud from St. Jean de Luz, being greatly exhausted when they returned to their quarters. The casualties of the two brigades of Boyer's and Leval's divisions, which were opposed to Hope, did not exceed four to five hundred men ; and those of the rest of the French army was probably rather fewer. The loss of the British and Germans exceeded five hundred, nearly half of it falling on the First and Fifth Divisions ; but that of the Portuguese probably made the aggregate of the fallen about equal on both sides.

The Allies were now divided by the Nive, and Soult was at liberty to execute the project which he had meditated against them. "It seems to me," he wrote on the 9th, "that the enemy by extending his troops has lost the advantage of his numerical superiority, and I have resolved to attack him in the false position which he has taken up." The Marshal issued his orders accordingly, and at midnight the four divisions under d'Erlon's command—namely those of Foy, Darmagnac, Abbé and Darricau—moved off silently towards Bayonne, crossed the river a little above the fortress, and halted in the entrenched camp at Marrac, in readiness to support the divisions of Taupin and Maransin belonging to Clausel's corps. These last with one hundred sappers and a battery of artillery were assembled at Boudigau, a short distance south of Marrac Castle, from whence they could move either towards Bassussary or towards Arbonne or still further westward, as circumstances might require. To them was entrusted the opening of the attack, which was to be flanked on the west by Leval's and Boyer's divisions of Reille's corps, advancing from the front of the entrenchments at Beyris. Reille was instructed to move forward to the heights of Plaisance as soon as Clausel

1813. should emerge from the defile between the Nive and the Dec. Aritzague, and to seize the crests of Pucho, Barrouillet and Bidart, keeping the bulk of his forces east of the main road, one column upon the road itself, and a few light companies only between it and the sea. Villatte's division was held in reserve on the south-western front of Bayonne, so as to be able to follow the attack either of Reille or of Clausel. Altogether Soult had concentrated on the left bank of the Nive river nine divisions of infantry, Sparre's division of dragoons, and forty guns.

Wellington, lulled perhaps into undue security by unbroken success, had taken no precautions to meet such a counter-stroke. On the Allied left the First Division and Aylmer's brigade had returned, as has been told, to St. Jean de Luz. The Fifth Division and Bradford's Portuguese brigade occupied the plateau of Barrouillet and Bidart; the advanced posts by Lake Mouriscot being furnished by the 8th Caçadores of Campbell's Portuguese brigade. Orders had been given for trenches to be thrown up before Barrouillet and Bassussary, but, beyond the construction of a few abatis at the latter place, nothing had been done; and there was no means of communication between these two places but a rough and imperfect road traced by the engineers. In the centre the Light Division had halted for the night at Arcangues, but had received orders to fall back to Arbonne. Its outposts were stationed on three salient spurs which shoot out northward and eastward from the plateau of Bassussary; and the line of picquets was extended from the eastern end of the Étang de Brindos, by Sallaberry to an inundation of the Urdains rivulet above Urdains Mill, across which a bridge led to the country house of Senator Garat. On the right one brigade of the Seventh Division prolonged the line of posts to the Nive, holding Urdains bridge; but the other brigade lay in rear of Ste. Barbe's hill, some three miles away; and the Fourth Division was still further behind

on the edge of the forest of St. Pée. Thus the first line 1813. of the Allies was weak, and not only weak but Dec. disjointed, for there was no certain continuity of communication between Hay's division and Alten's, and the second line was not within supporting distance. Moreover, there was no single commander on the spot to take charge of the defence in case of attack, for Hope was at St. Jean de Luz, and Wellington, Hill and Beresford were all on the right bank of the Nive, reconnoitring the ground about St. Pierre d'Irube and Mouguerre. Lastly, it chanced that deserters had informed Reille of the return of the First Division to St. Jean de Luz, so that Soult was perfectly aware of these vicious dispositions.

The Marshal had originally ordered the attack to Dec. 10. be made by surprise with the bayonet; but rain had fallen heavily all night; the massing of Clausel's and d'Erlon's divisions by the outlet of Laussac forbade any rapid advance; and Foy's division was presently disengaged from d'Erlon's command and sent to Reille at Beyris. At daybreak of the 10th the French were seen loitering, idly to all appearance, before the post of Lieutenant Cooke of the Forty-third, who was watching the spur along which passes the road from Bayonne towards Bassussary and Arcangues. At eight o'clock Cooke was visited by Kempt, William Napier and others, who sat round his fire and talked of indifferent matters, until Napier remarked that he had seen on other occasions the French assemble in this desultory and inconspicuous fashion before an attack, and recommended preparations to receive it. Kempt laughed at the idea and actually sent word to his brigade to return to Arbonne, but at the instance of one of his staff, who confirmed Napier's opinion, he cancelled the order and warned the supporting companies to be ready for work.

Shortly afterwards a mule carrying a mountain-gun was seen to come up, and not many minutes later Soult himself approached the spot with his staff. At half-past

1813. nine a party of French skirmishers came forward in care-
Dec. 10. less fashion, and called to the British sentries to retire ;
and immediately afterwards the attack began upon the
whole of Alten's outposts simultaneously, the enemy
seeking to envelop each party upon both flanks. The
picquets fell back as best they could, resisting wherever
the ground gave them opportunity but losing many
prisoners, and rallied round the church and château of
Arcangues, more than half a mile in rear of the village
of that name, where Alten had established the reserves
of his division and was actually hastening the pre-
parations for defence. The walls of the church being
proof against cannon-shot, and the graveyard surrounded
by a stone wall, a citadel was thus formed, in front of
which a mass of felled trees, cut down during the
previous days, offered an impenetrable obstacle. This
stronghold was held by the Forty-third. Two hundred
yards from it, and connected with it by hedges, stood
the château of Arcangues, with a breastwork before it
and a succession of stone walls on the slope in front
of it, all of which were held by the first and third
battalions of the Rifles. The Fifty-second, supported
by the rest of the division, at the same time took post
to the left rear of Kempt's brigade, and extended the
line to the valley of the Ouhabia.

Strangely enough, the French made no effort to press
their attack in this quarter. Clausel brought up twelve
guns to play upon the church, and once essayed a
feeble assault with four or five hundred men ; but the
aim of his artillery was uncertain owing to the deadly
fire of the British light troops, and his infantry was
driven back without difficulty. By one o'clock or even
earlier the combat was reduced on Clausel's side to
little more than an inaccurate cannonade. Further to
the east Abbé's division was engaged with Dalhousie's
first brigade by the bridge of Urdains, but in so half-
hearted a fashion that the British of the Seventh
Division suffered not a single casualty. Even in the
Light Division the losses of the British did not amount

to one hundred and forty. Thus all the activity of 1813. four French divisions—Taupin's, Maransin's, Abbé's Dec. 10. and Darmagnac's, which last remained in reserve at Monréjau during the entire day, was absorbed by one and a half British divisions, which were permitted with little molestation to fortify and establish themselves in a strong position with an enemy of superior numbers within a thousand yards of them. No effort was made to penetrate past Alten's left flank into the valley of the Ouhabia and cut him off from Barrouillet; and altogether the movements of Soult's left wing, perhaps owing to the nature of the ground and the appalling state of the roads, were slow, feeble and unenterprising. It should seem, indeed, from the despatch of Foy's division to the French right, that the Marshal at the opening of the day transferred the charge of the principal attack from Clausel to Reille without giving adequate instructions as to the new part which Clausel was in consequence to play.

Further to the west the fight was far more serious, though here also the French advance was slow. Waiting until after nine o'clock for Alten's advanced posts to be driven back by Clausel, Reille set Leval's division in motion along the great road towards Barrouillet, and Boyer's towards Pucho. He delayed his attack, however, until Clausel had deployed at Bassussary, and until the bulk of Foy's division could be seen moving towards La Croix d'Olhar, a little to north-east of Barrouillet. Campbell's Portuguese also made so stubborn a resistance, in the defile between the Étangs de Mouriscot and Brindos, that Hay had time to bring up Robinson's brigade and establish it strongly before Barrouillet. This village was well adapted to defence, the front being covered by thick coppice, with a house, known as the Mayor's house, a little to east of the road, and separated from it by an enclosed field and an orchard. At last about noon Reille launched Boyer's division in column of battalions at the plateau of Barrouillet from the north, while

1813. Foy's division converged upon it from the east ; Leval's
Dec. 10. division being held for the time in reserve. The French
were soon broken up into small parties among the
woods and hedges, and the combat resolved itself into
encounters between little groups of men on both sides,
success inclining now to the one and now to the other.
Boyer's second brigade was soon drawn into the
combat ; but the British stubbornly held their own,
and after a sharp struggle the first onslaught of the
enemy was repulsed.

Soult thereupon ordered a second attack by Montfort's brigade of Leval's division along the great road on the west, Gauthier's brigade of Boyer's division in the centre, and Berlier's brigade of Foy's division on the east. But by this time Aylmer's brigade and Bradford's Portuguese had come up, enabling Hope to throw in Greville's brigade to the help of Robinson. The three French columns advanced bravely enough, but soon became intermixed, impeded each other, and ultimately blundered, a confused mass of men, into the garden and orchard of the Mayor's house. Here, though shot down by scores, they held their own for a time, till the Ninth Foot on the right and the Portuguese on the left wheeled inward upon the tail of the column and shattered it completely, taking many prisoners. Thereupon the whole of the attackers seem to have taken to flight.

It was now past two o'clock, and the First British Division could be seen marching up in all haste from St. Jean de Luz ; but Soult, intent upon a last effort, called up to the front the German brigade of Villatte's division, which had followed in rear of Foy, and sent Foy's second brigade eastward to turn Barrouillet by the valley of the Ouhabia. Before he could renew the assault, he received a message from Clausel to the effect that large bodies of troops were threatening Abbé at the bridge of Urdains. Unable to account for this, Soult broke off the fight, according to his own account, in order to reinforce Abbé, though Darmagnac's division

was close at hand to fulfil the purpose. The fact was ^{1813.} that Wellington, on hearing the cannonade from the ^{Dec. 10.} right bank of the Nive, had directed the Third and Sixth Divisions to recross the river, and had hastened in person to the left bank. There, seeing how matters stood, he moved Dalhousie's second brigade westward from Ste. Barbe, posted the Third Division at Urdains, and brought forward the Fourth to a height a mile in rear of Arcangues church. Cole reached his station at one o'clock and detached Ross's brigade westward to cover Arbonne and the left of Alten's division, thus frustrating Soult's belated attempt to sever communication between Arcangues and Barrouillet. Night fell before the new movements upon the French side could take effect, and the day ended with the decided failure of the French attack. Foy and Villatte fell back to Pucho, and Boyer to the plateau of Plaisance, leaving Leval's division to furnish the line of outposts before Barrouillet; while Clausel's division remained on the ground that it had won.

The casualties of the British and Germans on this day were rather over six hundred;¹ those of the Portuguese, to judge from the numbers of officers fallen, must have been considerably greater; and the total loss of the Allies must therefore be set down at from fifteen to sixteen hundred killed, wounded and taken. The battalions that suffered most heavily were those of Hay's division, particularly the Ninth, Forty-seventh and Fifty-ninth. Of the Portuguese troops there fell in the 1st Line of Campbell's brigade, which was charged by some of Sparre's cavalry, ten officers, and in the 3rd, attached to Hay's division, eight officers killed and wounded, with presumably from three to four hundred men. Soult in his report of the evening conjectured his loss to amount to one thousand, which was probably

¹ In the *Gazette* the casualties of the 84th on the 10th and the 11th appear to have changed places; for this regiment certainly lost its Colonel on the 11th when, according to Napier, it suffered very heavily.

1813. understating the actual figures by one half, for in the
Dec. 10. 39th and 65th of Foy's division alone over three hundred were killed and wounded in the attack upon the Mayor's house. But the most serious mishap that befell the Marshal on the 10th was the desertion of the three German battalions of Nassau and Frankfort, which, by the contrivance of Colonel Kruser of the former regiment, allowed the French to pass them during the retreat of the evening, and then marched into the British lines. The whole affair had been previously arranged, and on the 15th these troops were shipped off from Passages to Germany. Soult then disarmed the weak battalion of Baden, which still remained with him ; and his army was thus diminished by some twelve hundred men over and above those fallen in the action.¹

To Wellington the most obvious lesson of the combat was the need for another bridge lower down the Nive opposite Villefranque, and of this he had accordingly ordered the construction in the course of the day. He had, it is true, two bridges at Ustarits, but only one of them was practicable on the 10th, and Wellington was keenly alive to the danger that Soult might withdraw his troops once more to the right bank of the Nive and fall upon Hill. To add to his anxiety he was not certain whether three divisions or four had been transferred by the Marshal to the left bank ; and he could only give orders to Beresford to move the Sixth and Seventh Divisions immediately across the river at Villefranque and Ustarits in case Hill were attacked. As a matter of fact the difficulties in the matter of removing and repairing the bridges proved to be greater than had been anticipated, and throughout the whole of the 11th only one, that at Ustarits, was serviceable.

Dec. 11. The morning of the 11th opened with dense fog about Barrouillet, but Wellington went thither in person from St. Jean de Luz, and at dawn ordered Hope to clear Leval's picquets from the crest towards Bassussary. These, however, retired by Soult's order without dis-

¹ I take the numbers given by Larpent.

puting the ground, and the British outposts resumed ^{1813.} their former stations. At ten o'clock Wellington pushed ^{Dec. 11.} forward the Ninth Foot towards Pucho to ascertain what the French were doing ; and a lively skirmish ended, through a staff officer's error, in the rash entry of the Ninth into the village, where it was attacked on all sides by Leval's men, and only extricated, after suffering very heavy loss, by the advance of some Portuguese infantry. All then became quiet. Wellington rode eastward to join Beresford and look to the bridges. The weather cleared. Rations were issued to the men, who were weary and cold after much hard marching and continual chilly rain and wind ; and Hope's soldiers dispersed to gather fuel with an assumption of security which was utterly unwarranted by the military situation.

Early in the afternoon Soult ordered Reille to drive back the British vanguard to Barrouillet, moving Boyer's division along the great road, and Foy's from the west end of the Étang de Brindos towards La Croix d'Olhar. Shortly after two o'clock the British observed the French sappers cutting gaps in the hedges for the passage of their artillery ; and a little later Boyer opened his attack with great vigour by the road. The British fatigue-parties ran back in all haste to their arms ; the enemy, exhilarated by the sight, shouted loudly, "Forward, forward" ; and in a few minutes the French were swarming in all directions over the battlefield of the previous day, where they seized the outbuildings of the Mayor's house and occupied the coppice before it. For a time there was wild and confused fighting, while Hope, huge of stature and imperturbably calm, exerted himself to rally his soldiers and range them in order. Boyer's advance was checked by the flanking fire of a British battalion on the road ; and gradually the array of the Allies was restored. The Fifth division, part of Aylmer's brigade and the Portuguese formed the first line, with their left resting on Lake Mouriscot, and their front extending across the wood and orchard before the Mayor's house to the valley of the Ouhabia. The

1813. Guards and the remainder of Aylmer's brigade made a
Dec. 11. second line on a ridge in rear of Barrouillet. The attack was beaten off, and the French, retiring to the posts which they had regained, opened a fire of artillery that continued until nightfall.

The Fifth Division was then withdrawn from the first to the second line; for both of its brigades, especially Robinson's, had been roughly handled. The Fourth and Ninth Foot on this day each lost over one hundred men, raising the casualties of three days' fighting to nearly two hundred in the case of the former regiment, and to rather over two hundred in the case of the latter. The Fifty-ninth within the same period had suffered little less than the Fourth. Altogether the French were perilously near to success; and it is difficult to acquit Hope of carelessness in permitting such a thing to be possible, though he redeemed all errors by the superb courage and coolness with which he restored the fight. He received a severe wound in the ankle, but refused to leave the field; and his hat and clothes were pierced by many bullets. Wellington, with the greatest admiration for him, deplored the fashion in which he took his place among the sharpshooters, without taking cover as they did. "We shall lose him," the Commander-in-Chief wrote, "if he continues to expose himself as he did on the last three days"; but Wellington found it difficult to hint to Sir John that he should take greater care of himself, for "the subject was a delicate one" to this noble and gallant Scot.

Throughout this day Clausel's divisions remained before the church and house of Arcangues, which by this time the Light Division had made almost impregnable, but fired not a shot. D'Erlon's division, concentrated between Bassussary and Urdains bridge, likewise lay supine, not noticing even the construction of Wellington's new bridge before Villefranque, but by its mere presence forbidding any change in the dispositions of the Allies. Hill was still stationed on the

heights of Petit Mouguerre and Vieux Mouguerre, with ^{1813.}
his right on the Adour and his left on the Nive near ^{Dec. 11.}
Villefranque. Here Sparre's brigade with a few companies of infantry, which had been sent to reconnoitre the road to St. Jean de Luz and to open communication if possible with Mendionde, came upon him, and after maintaining a futile fusillade until nightfall, reported that Hill had at least two divisions with him. Further to the east Pierre Soult, after a timid reconnaissance from La Bastide Clairence, discovered a hostile camp, which was that of one of Hill's brigades, at Urcuray. Soult, therefore, whose principal apprehension was the advent of more Allied troops from the right bank of the Nive for a counter-attack, felt reassured, and resolved to keep his present station for another day ; though the laying of the new bridge, which was the best means of bringing about the situation which he dreaded, appears entirely to have escaped his notice. The divisions of Foy and Boyer therefore occupied the plateau of La Croix d'Olhar, while Leval's was held in reserve to support them or Clausel, as occasion might require.

During the evening of the 11th the new bridge opposite Villefranque was completed, and much of Wellington's anxiety was removed. On the morning of the 12th he rode to the extreme front of the British ^{Dec. 12.} posts on the left. Owing to the proximity of these to the French and the events of the two previous days, both sides were extremely nervous ; and the visiting of the British picquets by Pakenham, the Adjutant-general, was sufficient to make Reille's troops turn out to meet an attack. The British caught the contagion of alarm, and in a moment the picquets of both sides opened upon each other a hot fire. Wellington himself sufficiently shared the general feeling to transfer the Seventh Division to Arbonne ; and Soult, observing the movement, concluded that this division had come from the right bank of the Nive, and that Wellington would attack on the morrow. Towards noon the firing died away, after

1813. about two hundred¹ had fallen on each side, and
Dec. 12. Wellington turned his attention to Hill. He was not without foreboding that the French gunboats might come up with the tide to destroy his new bridge, and warned Beresford to be on the watch to prevent it; and there actually was some exchange of fire between these vessels and the British troops. But his chief injunction to Hill was to establish a post on the Adour to prevent the victualling of Bayonne by water, and so to force Soult to evacuate his position.

South of Hill's line Pierre Soult made a second reconnaissance towards Hasparren with his own light cavalry division and General Paris's infantry. He drove Vivian's cavalry brigade² before him, but was presently checked by Morillo's Spanish division at Urcuray. Nevertheless his movement had its effect, for Hill, who had withdrawn one of his brigades from Urcuray upon Morillo's arrival, was obliged to send it back there once more. This fact, added to the failure of his efforts on the left bank of the Nive, stimulated Soult to shift his operations to the right bank. Accordingly at five o'clock he ordered d'Erlon to assemble Foy's, Abbé's, Darmagnac's and Darricau's divisions before the entrenched camp of Mousserolles, and Clausel to resume his old position about Marrac and prepare to pass the Nive. He then made over the rest of the troops on the left to Reille, with orders to hold Anglet and Plaisance until threatened by superior forces. Hill marked the march of the French columns towards the bridge, and recalled Cameron's brigade which was on its way to Urcuray.

Wellington, foreseeing some such manœuvre on the part of Soult, had ordered Beresford to be ready to cross the river with the Sixth and Seventh Divisions if

¹ The British casualties numbered just two hundred, falling almost entirely on the Guards.

² 13th and 14th L.D. Vivian, who had served in the 7th Hussars during Moore's campaign, had brought out that regiment (which was attached to the Hussar brigade) in September, and had been appointed to the command of the above brigade on 24th November.

Hill should be attacked ; but during the night a flood ^{1813.} carried away the bridge of Villefranque, and, though the work of reparation was undertaken without delay, Hill found himself on the morning of the 13th in complete ^{Dec. 13.} isolation with some fourteen thousand men and fourteen guns. His position was a concave line nearly three miles long, the centre being slightly drawn back on the road to St. Jean Pied de Port, and the wings pushed forward along the Nive and Adour. On the left Pringle's brigade¹ occupied the wooded hills on the right bank of the Nive about Château Larralde, perhaps a mile and a half below the site of the pontoon-bridge of Villefranque. On the right (or east) of Pringle lay the valley of Errepialuche, barred by a series of mill-ponds, from which the ground rises again eastward over rocks and brushwood to the heights traversed by the road to St. Jean Pied de Port. East of this road and in front of Losterenea stood Ashworth's Portuguese, with their skirmishers pushed forward into a little copse and a tangle of thick hedges towards Hiriberry, and with twelve of Hill's fourteen guns distributed on either side of the highway. Of Barnes's brigade, which likewise occupied the centre, the Seventy-first stood to west of the road and north of Gelos, covering Ashworth's left ; the Fiftieth still nearer to the road ; and the Ninety-second behind Losterenea. Lecor's Portuguese, which formed the reserve, with two guns, were drawn up in rear of Barnes at the foot of the knoll of Horlopo. On the right the Buffs were posted on the hill of Partouhiria, the highest point but one in the field, guarding the principal passage over the stream

¹ *Stewart's Division :*

Cameron's brigade : 1/50th, 1/71st, 1/92nd ; 1 co. 5/60th.

Byng's brigade : 1/3rd ; 1/57th ; 2nd Prov. Batt. (31st, 66th) ; 1 co. 5/60th.

Pringle's brigade : 1/28th ; 2/34th ; 1/39th ; 1 co. 5/60th.

Ashworth's brigade : 6th, 18th Line ; 6th Caçadores (Portuguese).

Lecor's Portuguese Division : 2nd, 4th, 10th, 14th Line ; 10th Caçadores.

1813, and valley of Escouteplouya, which separated Hill's
Dec. 13. right from his centre. The rest of Byng's brigade stood higher up this same valley on the hill of Vieux Mouguerre. About a mile in front of the position was another line of heights, which was crowned by the village of St. Pierre d'Irube,¹ and occupied by the French; and between the opposing forces a broad basin spread out before the right and right centre of the French, severed by a line of low heights from a second basin before their left. The open spaces and inferior slopes of Hill's position were all of them swept by Hill's cannon; but the ground on both sides of the great road is so tricky, so full of little hollows and copses and houses, as to offer the certainty of a confused combat, and wholly to prohibit the use of cavalry.

For the attack Soult had brought out six divisions,² Sparre's brigade of horse and thirty guns. Of these the divisions of Darmagnac, Abbé and Darricau, the cavalry and twenty-two guns were placed under d'Erlon's orders for the immediate assault; while those of Foy, Maransin and Taupin were in support. At half-past six the head of d'Erlon's columns began to debouch from St. Pierre d'Irube, not without difficulty, for the narrow front between the Nive and Adour was straitened by the fortifications of the entrenched camp. They then deployed as best they could; Abbé's division in the centre astride of the great road, Darricau's division on the right, and Gruardet's brigade of Darmagnac's division on its left. The morning was so misty as to afford only short and intermittent views of the French advance; but at half-past eight the British outposts were thrust back, and Hill took up his place on the knoll of Horlopo, whence he viewed the entire field, while William Stewart repaired to Losterenea.³

¹ I need hardly point out that Napier's nomenclature of the villages and hamlets and hills on the field is utterly incorrect, though his description of the ground is more or less accurate.

² Only five came into action, but in his report Soult says expressly that he intended to employ six.

³ This hamlet is called Haute St. Pierre by French writers; but

D'Erlon's guns then unlimbered on the lower slopes of St. Pierre to cover the central attack ; and Abbé's division, impetuous men under a brave and impetuous commander, surged forward well in advance of Darmagnac and Darricau, part of them following the course of the valley of Errepialuche, and part turning eastward to the ascent of the spur of Gelos. So rapid was their progress upon Ashworth's left that Stewart was compelled to send the Seventy-first with two guns towards Gelos, while two companies of the Ninety-second came forward to defend the houses of Marichorry along the great road. Though checked at this point the enemy mastered the little copse of Hiriberry on Ashworth's right ; and half of the Fiftieth was sent down to the assistance of the Portuguese. After a sharp struggle the copse was retaken, but at the cost of weakening the centre ; and Abbé, storming forward, carried the crest of the hill, and drove before him the Portuguese and the remaining wing of the Fiftieth. Barnes then called up the Ninety-second, which extended its right wing to drive back the French skirmishers, while Colonel Cameron led the left wing to the charge along the road. So furious was their onslaught that the French gave way, and for the moment fell back repulsed.

It was only for the moment. A battery of horse-artillery now disengaged itself from d'Erlon's massed guns, and galloping forward, unlimbered on the knoll of Ametsonde, near the road a little north-west of Hiriberry ; while Abbé's second brigade, though horribly torn by the British guns, advanced with unflinching courage up the very steep road to the summit of the ridge, sweeping everything before it. The Ninety-second retired behind the shelter of Losterenea ; and the Portuguese guns were limbering up to retire likewise, when Barnes came down to bid them reopen fire at any

St. Pierre by the villagers, whence the use of the name by all English writers. I call it Losterenea to avoid confusion with St. Pierre d'Irube. See footnote to appendix to *A Bad Four Hours* by Lt.-Col. W. H. James.

1813. cost. Mishaps now multiplied in every quarter.
Dec. 13. Darricau had by this time closed with Pringle, and Darmagnac with Byng ; and on each flank—a rare thing in any army—there was a British regimental commander whose nerve failed him. On the left of Ashworth the Colonel of the Seventy-first abandoned the spur of Gelos before the advance of the French column ; and on Hill's right the Colonel of the Buffs had likewise fallen back from his strong post at Partouhiria, and allowed Darmagnac's leading brigade to pass round Byng's flank. Barnes was struck down by a second wound ; Ashworth too was badly hurt ; and, but for the persistent clinging of the Caçadores to the copse of Hiriberry, the Allied centre was to all appearance driven in.

But the French also had suffered heavily. General Maucombe of Abbé's division had fallen, and his men were unsteady. At this crisis of the battle Hill galloped down to the Seventy-first and turned them, not unwilling, back to their first position, at the same time ordering Da Costa's brigade of Lecor's Portuguese division to their support. Under the personal direction of Hill and Stewart these troops made a vehement counter-attack, the Seventy-first being anxious to redeem the character imperilled by their Colonel, and successfully drove back the enemy. Almost at the same moment the Ninety-second, having rallied behind the houses of Losterenea, charged down the road with pipes playing, and with so formidable an aspect that the officer in command of the French column ordered his men to retire. The withdrawal of their comrades shook the nerve of Darricau's division which, it should seem, had never pressed its attack home against Pringle ; and in this quarter also the French gave way in confusion.

It remained only to restore the battle on the right, to which Hill had already directed Lecor's remaining brigade under Colonel Buchan. Rallying the Buffs, the Portuguese advanced with them to recover the lost ground on the ridge of Vieux Mouguerre and Partou-

hiria ; and Hill, observing their progress, summoned 1813. Byng with his Provisional Battalions and the Fifty-seventh to reinforce his centre. Thus the last reserves of the Allies were absorbed into the fight ; whereas Soult had so far engaged but two and a half divisions out of five that were under his hand. He now brought up the other brigade of Darmagnac's division and Foy's division complete, to the support of Abbé ; but too late. The rush of fugitives and wounded towards St. Pierre d'Irube prevented the deployment of Gruardet and Foy and, despite of all d'Erlon's efforts, carried disorder into their ranks. Then as usual panic began in the rear of the column before the head had really given way. Abbé's men had fought most gallantly, but they had suffered so severely that they could not renew their attack unaided, and were in no condition to withstand the onset of Da Costa's Portuguese.

It was now one o'clock. The French officers could be seen vainly striving to bring forward fresh columns ; but by this time the bridge of Villefranque had been restored ; the Sixth Division was approaching Horlopo ; the Fourth was close behind it ; and two more brigades of the Third and Seventh Divisions were on march to cross the river, leaving the two remaining brigades to guard the bridge of Urdains. The Buffs and Buchan's Portuguese had mastered the ridge of Vieux Mouguerre ; and Hill now ordered Byng to lead his entire brigade to the attack of the knoll of Ametsonde. The Provisional Battalions and Fifty-seventh thereupon advanced by the valley of Escouteplouya, and the Buffs by the ridge of Partouhiria. On arriving before the knoll Byng seized the colours of the Thirty-first and carried them to the summit, which he was the first man to reach, whereupon the French artillerymen retreated hurriedly, leaving one gun behind them. Soult hastily brought up Maransin's troops to recover the knoll ; but the effort, being ill-directed, was easily foiled ; and the whole line of the Allies coming forward drove the last of Abbé's troops from the hill ;

1813. while Pringle, extending his battalions along the Nive,
Dec. 13. poured a heavy enfilading fire into the masses of the French round St. Pierre d'Irube. Not until near sunset did the fusillade wholly cease, by which time Pringle had arrived within half a mile of the entrenched camp of Mousserolles. The victory was complete, and, as Wellington joyfully confessed, was all Hill's own.

This action, known, so far as it is known at all, by the name of St. Pierre, was as bloody and as well contested as any of the Peninsular War. Wellington, indeed, said that he had never seen the dead lying so thickly upon any field. Soult acknowledged a loss of three thousand killed and wounded ; and, though no separate return of his casualties on this day seems to exist, it appears that the three divisions of d'Erlon's corps suffered frightfully, and in particular that of Abbé, in which the 94th of the Line alone lost twenty-two officers and three hundred and sixty-eight men.¹ Three brigadiers, Baille, Mocquerry and Maucombe, were wounded ; and d'Erlon, Darricau, Maransin and St. Pol all of them received contusions. On the side of the Allies, the casualties of the British numbered nine hundred and six, and those of the Portuguese, who lost fifty-two officers, can hardly have been fewer than seven hundred ; so that Hill's total loss may be set down at sixteen to seventeen hundred. The Ninety-second was the battalion that suffered most heavily, one hundred and seventy-four of all ranks having fallen. The Fiftieth, Fifty-seventh and Seventy-first each of them counted over one hundred and twenty casualties ; and the Provisional Battalion of the Thirty-first and Sixty-sixth one hundred and nine. Among the higher rank of officers Barnes and Ashworth were severely wounded, and Lecor slightly hurt ; and almost every officer of Barnes's and Stewart's staff was struck down by injuries more or less serious.

¹ I select this regiment because, according to Martinien's lists, the whole of the twenty-two officers fell on the 13th ; from which I infer that most of the men fell on this day likewise. The French casualty lists are made up for the five days, 9th-13th December. Martinien's lists are very defective as regards the casualties of this day.

In truth the French at the outset fought uncommonly well ; but in ground so much broken and confined it was difficult for them to turn to full account their numerical superiority. The Allies on the other hand utilised their advantages to the utmost, and fought, Portuguese no less than British, with extreme tenacity. Decidedly upon this occasion Soult showed great defects as a commander. It was amazingly good fortune for him that on either flank of Hill there was an officer—Colonel Bunbury of the Buffs and Sir Nathaniel Peacocke of the Seventy-first—who flagrantly misbehaved himself, and that these two wretched men should have withdrawn their unwilling regiments at the very moment when Abbé's vehement attack upon the centre was on the point of being crowned by success. Yet, even though he had his supports at hand, Soult never pushed them forward at the critical point until too late. Had Foy's division arrived when Abbé's troops, though wavering, had not yet turned, the new impulse given to the latter might well have carried them over the crest of the hill in spite of the noble efforts of the Fiftieth and Caçadores in the coppice, and of the Ninety-second in the village. Throughout the whole of the operations on the Nive the Marshal's military qualities, for good and evil, are conspicuous. His adversary had deliberately undertaken the dangerous task of attacking upon both banks of a river over which communication was uncertain. Soult perceived at once the opportunity thus afforded to him, and laid his plans skilfully enough to make the most of it ; but, though he enjoyed the additional advantage of somewhat careless dispositions on Wellington's part and extreme favour of fortune, he failed through sheer irresolution to accomplish anything. If we contrast the decisive energy with which Hill threw the whole of his reserves quite early into action with the belated advance of Foy and the ill-planned effort to convert it into a new attack, there is no escape from the conclusion that the British General, though his name is unknown outside the British Isles, was a commander indeed ; while the French

1813. Marshal, though his fame is deservedly world-wide, was Dec. 13. no more than an admirable chief of staff.

The total loss of the French in the five days of fighting was five thousand six hundred and fifty, of whom fewer than four hundred were prisoners.¹ That of the Allies was five thousand and sixty-one, of whom nearly twenty-seven hundred were British, and over twenty-three hundred Portuguese; the number of prisoners being nearly five hundred. The result of the various actions was to cut Soult's direct communications with St. Jean Pied de Port, to threaten the navigation of the Adour, and thereby greatly to increase the difficulty of feeding the troops at Bayonne, while gaining for the Allies a fertile district to support their cavalry, and closer touch with the French who were disaffected towards Napoleon's Government. Upon the general situation in Europe the influence of the operations was so slight as to be negligible; and it will be convenient at this point to review that situation for the better understanding of Wellington's coming campaign.

¹ Vidal de Lablache gives the figures as 5188, with the detailed loss of each division, drawn from some returns which I have not seen. My own figures are drawn from a return in the *Archives de la Guerre*, which show the total given in the text.

CHAPTER XV

THE Allies had hardly won the great victory of Leipzig 1813. before they began to fall out among themselves; the Oct. principal causes of variance being the conflicting claims of Prussia and Austria to hegemony in Germany, and the ambition of the Tsar to be sole arbiter of the future of Europe. Alexander's design was to make himself King of Poland, to compensate Prussia by the gift of Saxony, and to establish Bernadotte as King of France. King Frederick William, animated by the characteristic rapacity of his race, was disposed to agree to anything which would give him a large accession of territory. Metternich, on the other hand, desiring a confederated Germany under the leadership of Austria, was by no means ready to grant so much power to Russia and Prussia, and thus naturally turned for support to England. Between England and Austria, however, there was this important point of difference, that the British Government considered a permanent peace impossible unless Napoleon were driven out of France; whereas Metternich had no wish to overthrow the Bonaparte dynasty, but aspired to impose upon France a regency which should be under his own influence. To persuade France, which asked only for peace at any price, to accept this arrangement, he counted upon the co-operation of Talleyrand, and upon the offer to France of "natural frontiers," a term which the French would certainly construe to mean the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees, but which might be variously interpreted according to the will and circumstances of the Allies.

1813. With some difficulty Metternich obtained the consent of Russia and Prussia to negotiate upon these conditions, being meanwhile still determined to prosecute the war, and to harden his terms in case of military success.
- Nov. 4. On the 4th of November the Allied forces entered Frankfort with the Tsar, the Emperor Francis and the envoys of all nations at their head, but without the King of Prussia. On the 7th a council of war was held, in which Schwarzenberg and Radetsky represented Austria and Gneisenau Prussia. The two former advocated a halt until the 20th to reorganise the army ; but Gneisenau pressed for the immediate passage of the principal host under Schwarzenberg to the left bank of the Rhine between Mainz and Strasburg, and for the advance of Blücher into Belgium to deliver Holland.
- Nov. 13. A few days later Castlereagh wrote to Lord Aberdeen, his representative at the Court of Vienna, that England would consent to no peace that might be patched up, without solid guarantees for its durability, and added that to England the most essential object was to take Antwerp from France. The letter, of course, took some time to reach its destination ; but it showed clearly that England had no intention of subsidising the Allied armies unless, in return for her money, they should prosecute their operations to an end which should satisfy British as well as Continental interests. It was the first step towards that general treaty of alliance between all the powers of Europe which Castlereagh was presently to accomplish ; and meanwhile the British Government, on the 22nd of November, decided to send a small expedition under Sir Thomas Graham to Holland to second the Dutch in their effort to throw off the yoke of Napoleon, and to ensure attention to the British claims respecting the navigation of the Scheldt.¹

On the 19th of November a second council of war was held at Frankfort ; and it was decided that Holland

¹ *Wellington Supp. Desp.* viii. 376-377, 390.

and Switzerland, on the extreme flanks north and south, 1813. should be the principal bases for the invasion of France ; Nov. 19. Bülow's corps of Bernadotte's army advancing into Holland, while the main army under Schwarzenberg should assemble at Bâle, and thence march by Belfort upon Langres and Dijon, joining hands in some unexplained fashion with another Austrian army under General Bellegarde, which was to move forward from Vicenza through Italy. The connecting link between Bülow and Schwarzenberg was to be Blücher's corps, which, however, was of course chained to Frankfort until Schwarzenberg could reach Bâle. A more absurd plan than this wide enveloping movement with troops scattered along a front of two hundred miles can hardly be conceived, especially if it be remembered that such a leader as Napoleon was left in the centre, free to strike at any point in this vast semi-circle. Gneisenau, being a sound soldier, strongly opposed it ; and Lord Burghersh, Wellington's correspondent at the Allied head-quarters, viewed it with the deepest dismay. The fact was that the Allied commanders and their rulers were thinking rather of gaining pledges—Holland, Switzerland, Italy—with which they could traffic in the ultimate negotiations for peace, than of striking down the great enemy of all. It was task enough for them to accomplish the subjugation of France without undertaking also that of Italy ; but Metternich, having guaranteed to Murat his kingdom of Naples, looked to him for help in the great invasion. It was even proposed that Murat's troops should be embarked in English transports and landed at Antibes, together with Bentinck's battalions from Sicily.

The whole design was complicated by the self-seeking of nations and the whims of individuals. Bernadotte, aspiring to be King of France, did not wish to enter French territory except as a deliverer, and preferred operations against Denmark to a campaign in Holland. Austria, greedy for possession of Italy, was loth to engage herself on the eastern frontier

1813. of France. And, even after the great plan had been
Nov. agreed upon, from sheer timidity Frederick William
shrank at first from taking part in it; while Alexander
suddenly bethought himself that he was the champion
of Swiss independence, and upon this pretext delayed for
some days the already belated march of Schwarzenberg
to Bâle. Not one of the sovereigns gave a thought to
Wellington, the one uniformly successful general against
the French, who had under his hand the most efficient
fighting machine of its size in Europe, and who was
already established, though in isolation, upon French
soil.¹

Wellington on his side saw the vice of the Allied
dispositions, and pointed it out with his usual per-
spicuous terseness. "In regard to the operations on
the Rhine, I confess that I feel no confidence in what
is doing. The Allies are not strong enough nor
sufficiently prepared to invade France at all, or do
more than cross the Rhine in one great corps, and then
blockade some one, two or three fortresses by taking
their cantonments for the winter. . . . They should
have operated from Mayence instead of by Switzerland.
The revolution in Holland and the advantage acquired
in that country would have turned the left of the enemy
for them, and the natural course of events would by
this time have placed them in possession of the course
of the Rhine from Mayence into the Dutch frontier
. . . and probably of the Austrian Netherlands. . . .
I suspect that Prince Schwarzenberg has come into
Switzerland to acquire his Italian objects, and at all
events, if he cannot advance into France, to have a
good position for his army in Switzerland. But if I
should be mistaken, and he should be able to advance,
is it possible that any man can hope that his operations,
even when joined with Bellegarde's Italian army, can
connect with mine from hence? . . . The Allies don't
appear to me to have reflected that everything was lost
in Europe by the loss of one or two great battles, and

¹ *Supp. Desp.* viii. 398, 408.

that everything has been restored to its present shape 1813. by their military success. . . . They cannot expect battles of Leipzig every day, and that which experience shows them is, that they ought above all things to avoid any great military disaster. Their object is peace upon a certain basis, on which they have agreed. Although I am quite certain that Bonaparte has no intention to make peace, notwithstanding his speeches and declarations, I am equally certain that the people of France will force him to peace if the Allies suffer no disaster." Never was prognostication more amply justified by subsequent events.¹

During these events Napoleon, who had reached St. Cloud on the 10th of November, had sought to lessen his difficulties by replacing Ferdinand on the throne of Spain, and so delivering himself from his ruinous quarrel with that country. The bitter hostility of the Spanish Regency towards England encouraged him to think that French influence was by no means inferior to English in the Peninsula. On the 19th of November, Nov. 19. therefore, he opened a secret negotiation with Ferdinand at Valençay, proposing to restore the Bourbon dynasty in Spain, to send back one hundred thousand Spanish prisoners, and to give Joseph's eldest daughter in marriage to Ferdinand himself. After some parley a treaty was signed on the 11th of December to the Dec. 11. above effect, except in the matter of the marriage. Two articles were added which directly affected the British, namely that all British troops should be withdrawn from any Spanish territory which they might be occupying, at Ceuta, Mahon or elsewhere; and that the evacuation of Spain by the French troops should take place simultaneously with this withdrawal. An emissary, the Duke of San Carlos, was then despatched by Ferdinand to Suchet, who was ordered to arrange with General Copons for the bearer to carry the document to the Spanish Regency for ratification; and Palafox, the hero of Zaragoza, was released and sent

¹ *Wellington Desp.* To Bathurst, 10th Jan. 1814.

1814. also to Suchet's head-quarters as an earnest of the
Jan. 9. Emperor's good intentions. By the 9th of January, 1814, Wellington had received intimation from Henry Wellesley of what was going forward; and, though the news caused him no surprise, he was not without misgiving as to the result.

Within a week, however, his mind was set at ease. By great good fortune the direction of foreign affairs in Spain lay at the moment in the hands of a singularly able and judicious man. Under his influence the Regency, after secret consideration of the treaty, dis-
Jan. 8. missed Ferdinand's emissary on the 8th of January with no further answer than a copy of the decree passed by the Cortes on the 1st of January 1811, to the effect that all acts of Ferdinand were null and void so long as he remained a prisoner; and that negotiations for peace could not be entertained while a French army remained in the Peninsula. When some days later the subject was referred to the Cortes, they answered plainly that Ferdinand could not be permitted to exercise royal authority until he had sworn to the Constitution in the midst of the Assembly itself. "Nothing," wrote Wellington, "can be more satisfactory than the whole conduct of the Spanish Government regarding the negotiations for peace." The Government thus commended was that which had recently done all in its power to thwart the British; and its good behaviour in this instance was due, as Henry Wellesley reported, to the chance that for once the right man was in the right place at the Foreign Office. There was every prospect, however, that the Regency would soon prove as mischievous at Madrid, to which it had in January removed itself, as it had been at Cadiz. Yet though many Spaniards, and all British in high places, wished to see it overthrown, Wellington checked all measures that had been taken with that object, and worked by every means in his power to conciliate the Government. Its most obnoxious member, the Minister for War, O'Donoju, had been dismissed, and there was

good hope that friendly relations might be maintained with the Regency until the war should end.¹ 1814.

Napoleon meanwhile had counted so far on the success of the treaty that on the 10th of January he directed Suchet to mass the whole of his cavalry on the frontier, and to be ready to send it with his artillery and half of his infantry to Lyons, as soon as the issue of the negotiation should be known. Suchet's situation was thus made very distressing. Having by the Emperor's orders dismissed his German and Italian troops, and sent away nearly two thousand veteran French to form the nucleus of new battalions in France, he was left, apart from his blockaded garrisons in the south, with no more than twenty-eight thousand men. Of these eight thousand held Barcelona, and five thousand Hostalrich, Figueras and Rosas, leaving only fifteen thousand free for use in the field. The ratification of the treaty of Valençay would of course have liberated the blockaded garrisons, but, as a pledge for the due discharge of their obligations by the Spaniards, it was essential for Suchet to hold Barcelona. Moreover, if his army were to be of any service for the defence of France against the Allies, it was imperative to keep it together and to move it as one body; whereas the Emperor, divided between strategical plans at Lyons and political designs in Spain, was bent upon breaking it up.

In the midst of his perplexity Suchet was roused by an advance of the Allies against his lines on the Llobregat. General Clinton, having got wind of Copons's share in the forwarding of Ferdinand's emissary to Madrid, thought it advisable to engage that general in active operations in concert with the British against the French. He therefore proposed to him that the British troops should attack the French in the plain of Barcelona, while the Spaniards, taking post between that city and Gerona, should check the arrival

¹ *Wellington Desp.* To H. Wellesley, 16th, 26th Jan. 1813. *Supp. Desp.* viii. 553. *Arteche*, xiii. 415-416.

1814. of French reinforcements from the north. Copons
Jan. replied that the force at his disposal was insufficient for the purpose, but put forward a counter-project for an attack on the enemy's posts on the Llobregat by detachments from both armies. Ultimately it was agreed that at eight o'clock on the morning of the 16th of January two of Copons's brigades should be on the heights in rear of Molins de Rey, while Clinton's troops were to be formed at the same hour within cannon shot of the bridge of Molins de Rey on the road to Barcelona.

Jan. 16. Every circumstance favoured the night march of Clinton, who appeared punctually at the appointed time at the appointed place ; but, as there was no sign of Copons, he engaged the enemy single-handed, so as to draw them forward and expose them the more readily to the attack of the Spaniards. The French defended their posts vigorously until at noon, three hours late, the fire of Copons's detachment was at last heard ; when they withdrew across the Llobregat. Clinton, observing that Suchet had brought up large reinforcements, thereupon broke off the action, and at three o'clock retired. The casualties upon both sides were trifling, and the British troops were not engaged.

There can be little doubt that Copons's tardiness in arriving was deliberate, though whether from political reasons or from general aversion from the British cannot easily be determined. Clinton declared that, if the original design had been executed, he could have cut off fifteen hundred or two thousand of the French ; and Wellington, looking to the fact that Copons had omitted to make any report to him of the passage of San Carlos through his lines, condemned the Spaniard's conduct as highly equivocal. The British Commander decided, however, to take no notice of the matter, beyond apprising Copons that no capitulation was to be made with any French garrison without the consent of the Commander-in-Chief, unless they should surrender as prisoners of war.

For the rest, Clinton's assumption of the offensive, 1814. however feeble, was in full accord with Wellington's wishes. A week after the action Suchet received Jan. 24. peremptory orders from Berthier to send ten thousand foot, two thousand horse and twelve guns of his army at once to Lyons. Suchet obeyed very reluctantly, for he fully expected—as also did Wellington—that Napoleon would accede to the conditions tacitly put forward by the Cortes, withdraw his armies from Spain, and send Ferdinand back to assure the release of the imprisoned garrisons. However, the Marshal pushed the troops across the frontier in small detachments so as to attract as little notice as possible, and remained himself at Barcelona till the 31st; when he left for Gerona, where he had concentrated such remnant of a field-army as was left to him. Clinton thereupon took up the line of the Llobregat with a part of his force, and made his dispositions in conjunction Feb. 1. with Copons to check any offensive movement for the relief of the blockaded garrisons.¹

In the course of these doings Clinton had been called upon for help by another officer, who has of late been little before our view, namely Lord William Bentinck. Returning to Sicily after the mishap at Ordal, Lord William heard of the collapse of the French at Leipzig, and thereupon discovered a new field for his activity. Early in January he proposed to send five thousand of his garrison to occupy Corsica, the northern end of which he was pleased to consider the most valuable position in the Mediterranean. It was, so he remarked, as near Naples as Sicily, menacing also the entire north coast of Italy and furnishing an admirable communication with it; and he judged that the possession of the harbour of San Fiorenzo, and the constant union of a strong military force with the Mediterranean fleet, must make “an extraordinary diversion.” Wellington, when the matter was referred

¹ *Wellington Desp.* To Clinton, 27th Jan. 1814. *Supp. Desp.* viii. 520-522, 552-556; *Mém. de Suchet*, chs. xx., xxi.

1814. to him by Clinton, answered drily that he had received no orders to give Bentinck assistance in an attack upon Corsica, and that such an enterprise was not likely to be approved either by the British Government or by its Allies.¹

Jan. 14. A week later, after learning of Murat's defection from his old master, Lord William decided to suspend the Corsican expedition, and to turn his thoughts to Italy. At the beginning of December he had already sent some Italian troops to the Gulf of Spezia, which after one or two slight engagements had, together with the Fourteenth Foot, temporarily occupied Genoa; and he now meditated further operations in the same quarter.² Among the troops which he could withdraw from Sicily were six thousand Neapolitans; and it was doubtful whether these, on coming into contact with their compatriots of Murat's army, would join them in favouring the new dynasty, or absorb them in taking the part of the old. But, owing to their hatred of the Sicilians, their presence in Sicily was a constant menace to the peace of the island; and Bentinck seems to have thought that their feelings for or against Murat were a matter of no great moment. There were also three thousand Italians, which would form a rallying point for all other Italians who disliked French rule; and lastly there were some six thousand British and Germans to form the backbone of the entire force. Bentinck judged it to be essential that this little army should have its own base and line of operations, apart from the Allies, though working for the same object; and the base that he preferred was the Riviera of Genoa.

Lord William had already been in communication

¹ *Wellington Desp.* vii. 306.

² Bentinck himself appears never to have reported, officially, this occupation of Genoa; but the account of the despatch and operations of the Italians is given in his letter to the Secretary of State of 27th December 1813, and the presence of the 14th at Genoa is shown by *Castlereagh Corres.* ix. 147. There are always wide gaps in Bentinck's correspondence.

through his private secretary with Count Neipperg of 1814. the Austrian service; and on the 31st of January he Jan. 31. repaired to Naples in order to learn more about the treaty between the Austrians and Murat. There, finding that it had been ratified, he himself signed an armistice with Murat. On the 2nd of February Feb. 2. Neipperg submitted a plan for the Italian campaign at large. Eugène Beauharnais was understood to be holding an entrenched position on the Adige. The task of Bellegarde with the main army was to drive him from this, organise the blockade of Peschiera and Mantua, and find the means to join Schwarzenberg north of the Alps. The Neapolitans, joined to an Austrian division, were to advance rapidly along the south bank of the Po by Modena, Parma and Piacenza to Stradella, so as to threaten the communications of the French and cut them off from Gavi, Alessandria and Genoa. The Neapolitans were then to undertake the siege of the two first of these places; while Bentinck, disembarking either in the Gulf of Spezia or at Leghorn, was to advance with all speed to invest Genoa and, if he took it, to continue his progress towards the Maritime Alps and the Var. Thus while working with the Allies, his force would be distinct and independent from theirs, being separated from the nearest Allied columns by the Apennines. No doubt Bentinck, thus isolated, hoped for an opportunity to propagate those Whig doctrines which, to his simple understanding, were the quintessence of all political wisdom. In any case he accepted eagerly the proposed arrangement, and repairing to Palermo made preparations for embarking some fourteen thousand men in the third week of February.¹

It will be our duty to follow the fortunes of Bentinck later on. Meanwhile it is more to the purpose to consider the whole situation as it presented itself to Wellington. In the first place he

¹ W.O. Mediterranean. Bentinck to Sec. of State, 8th, 14th Jan.; 3rd, 15th Feb. 1814; *Wellington Supp. Desp.* viii. 511, 571.

1813. saw the huge main army of the Allies committed to
Dec. a campaign which his judgment condemned, with perfect correctness, as insensate. In the second it was manifest that Napoleon was scheming to detach the Spaniards from the host of his enemies, and to withdraw the whole of the French troops from the Peninsula; and, though the Spanish Regency had behaved admirably in rejecting the Emperor's first overtures, there was every probability that he might meet them upon their own terms and restore Ferdinand to the Spanish throne. In the third, it was evident that on the east coast Copons was not behaving with perfect loyalty, and that William Clinton was an unenterprising officer who could not be trusted to disturb Suchet's designs by active military movements. In the fourth, it was certain that Bentinck, being no longer tied to Sicily, was intent on prosecuting some petty schemes of his own without the slightest regard to the main British army under Wellington; and that any project conceived and executed by so mediocre a personage would almost certainly be futile. Lastly, Wellington had been apprised that the British Government, in order to establish a claim to the ultimate disposal of Antwerp, was sending such small remnant of troops as remained in England to the Low Countries. There was every prospect that he would be left, as already he had for some weeks been left, in isolation upon French soil, with the whole population of France arrayed against him if he should advance, and with the possibility that Napoleon, after striking one or two telling blows against the Allies, might turn upon him in overwhelming strength, and compel him, at worst, to retreat into a hostile Spain, or, at best, to re-embark and return to England.

Wellington reckoned with some exaggeration that he had already one hundred thousand men opposed to him; and the French newspapers mentioned the formation of an army of reserve of the same numbers at Bordeaux. These numbers might or might

not be correct; but in any case the weather and ^{1813.} the state of the roads after the combats of the Nive ^{Dec.} forbade further immediate movements. Moreover, money was wanting; great-coats were wanting; and the work of the British cruisers on the coast was, with or without excuse, still unsatisfactory. Wellington decided therefore to keep his troops for the present under shelter in their cantonments, and to wait until the withdrawal of soldiers from the entrenched camp at Bayonne should give him a reasonable opportunity to attack. On the right bank of the Nive the Second Division and Lecor's Portuguese were at Vieux Mouguerre and Petit Mouguerre, the Sixth Division at Villefranque, and the Third at Halsou and Jatxou; the whole being under the orders of Hill. On the left bank the Fourth Division lay between Arrauts and Arcangues, facing the bridge of Urdains; the Seventh at Ustarits; and the Light Division between Arcangues and Arbonne, this section being under the command of Beresford. On the coast the First and Fifth Divisions under Hope were echeloned from Biarritz to St. Jean de Luz, where were Wellington's head-quarters. A chain of telegraphic signal stations on the church towers of Vieux Mouguerre, Arcangues and Guéthary ensured instant warning of the French movements along the whole line of cantonments to St. Jean de Luz.¹

As a matter of fact Soult's army had been seriously weakened by other causes besides the recent battle, notably by the disbandment or desertion of his foreign troops, and by the withdrawal of picked non-commissioned officers and men to recruit the Imperial Guard, and to form twenty reserve battalions at Bordeaux and Toulouse. Altogether his losses, including his casualties on the Nive, amounted to sixteen thousand men, and he was obliged to amend his organisation by breaking up Villatte's Reserve

¹ *Wellington Desp.* To Bathurst, 4th, 26th Dec.; to Beresford, 24th Dec.; to Sir G. Collier, 28th Dec. 1813.

1813. and reconstituting an 8th Division under General Harispe.¹ Soult's first care was to protect the navigation of the Adour above Bayonne, now seriously menaced by Hill; to which end he cut the dykes on the right bank along an extent of some fourteen miles above Bayonne, so as to flood the shore at high water. He also mounted a battery at Hayet opposite St. Pierre
- Dec. 14. d'Irube, and on the 14th of December extended Foy's division along the right bank and on all the islands from the mill of Bacheforêt to a point opposite the confluence of the Bidouse. Setting great store by the occupation of the promontory of Urt, where the river is considerably contracted, Soult caused three companies to be pushed across to the left bank at this point; but these were promptly driven out by the
- Dec. 16. British on the 16th. He then reinforced Pierre Soult's division and Paris's brigade, which were still on the left bank of the Adour between Helette and Isturits, and sent Clausel with Darricau's division and one brigade of light infantry to Bidache on the Bidouse with orders to keep an advanced post at Bardos and another at La Bastide Clairence, and so to prevent the Allies from occupying the coveted promontory.
- Dec. 18. A few days later Morillo descended upon Macaye and advanced towards Hasparren without any instructions, or indeed any object except that of plunder. To give his expedition some semblance of military order he borrowed two squadrons of the Eighteenth Hussars, only too readily lent to him by Victor Alten, and made a raid—which he called a foraging excursion—upon Mendionde. Pierre Soult's cavalry promptly attacked the party, whereupon the Spaniards ran away, leaving the Eighteenth to escape as best they could, which they did with the loss of four officers and three men wounded, and a few men and horses taken. To make matters worse, Mina likewise came down into the

¹ The 8th Division was made up of Paris's Brigade, the 9th, 25th and 34th Light, and the National Guards of the Department, Lower Pyrenees.

valley of Baigorri for purposes of pillage, and drew upon himself such an attack from the villagers as showed that the Basques were not to be maltreated with impunity. Wellington was furious. He was particularly anxious not to irritate so brave, resolute and sturdy a folk as the Basques, and here were the Spaniards playing the very game which he wished to avoid. The incident drew upon Morillo and General Freire some of the sharpest letters that Wellington ever wrote, and upon Victor Alten one of those sarcastic messages which were more galling than any open rebuke.¹

At about this time nine thousand Spaniards under Don Carlos d'España came up by the Commander-in-Chief's order to Ascain; and it should seem that Wellington, hearing false news that the Allies had crossed the Rhine, contemplated some small offensive movement. But on the night of the 20th the bridge over the Nive at Villefranque was swept away by a sudden flood, which carried off all the boats and materials; and that at Ustarits was only saved by being taken up. Hill and Clausel alike were totally isolated for a time. The men of Foy's division were obliged to take refuge in the upper stories of the houses, and to live as best they could because no convoys could reach them; and both on the islands and on the dykes they were absolutely cut off from the army.² Dec. 20. Soult accordingly decided to deploy his troops eastward along the Adour and southward along the Bidouse. Head-quarters were fixed at Peyrehorade on the north bank of the Adour by the confluence of the Gave d'Oloron. D'Erlon, with head-quarters at Biaudos, was in charge of the section from Bayonne to Port de Lanne; having four divisions in the entrenched camp.³ Foy's troops were

¹ *Wellington Desp.* To Morillo, 23rd Dec.; to Freire, 24th, 26th Dec. 1813; 8th Jan. 1814; to Bathurst, 16th Jan.; to Beresford, 28th Jan. 1814. *Supp. Desp.* xiv. 340-341; Malet's *Memoirs of the 18th Hussars*, pp. 77-78.

² *Campagnes du Capitaine Marcel*, pp. 233-234.

³ Abbé, Taupin, Maransin, Leval.

1813. extended from Bacheforêt to Pitre ; and Darmagnac's from Pitre to Port de Lanne ; while those of Boyer, under Soult's immediate command, were in the vicinity of Port de Lanne itself. On the 20th and 21st the Marshal reconnoitred the whole length of the new line, and gave orders for the construction of bridge-heads over the Bidouse and the Gave de Pau, as if to take
- Dec. 24. the offensive. But on the 24th he returned to Bayonne and brought Boyer's division with him, being nervously apprehensive lest Wellington should force the passage of the Adour with his whole army. In vain Soult's intelligencers reported with perfect truth that Wellington never left St. Jean de Luz except to go fox-hunting. Soult remained for five days at Bayonne, dreading some surprise by the Allies, and hastening to every point where the British Commander-in-Chief was reported, always falsely, to be.
- Dec. 29. At last on the 29th of December Soult went back to the Bidouse, and, having summoned Treilhard's division of dragoons, intimated to Clarke that he should cross the Nive and attack the Allies in flank and rear ; his real intention being if possible to manœuvre them out
1814. of their posts on the Adour without fighting. With
- Jan. 3. this object he posted Darricau's division on the 3rd of January at La Bastide Clairence, with Taupin's division in support slightly to the rear ; Treilhard's dragoons a little to the south-east about Pessarron ; one brigade of Harispe's division on the left flank of Treilhard about Ayherre ; Pierre Soult's cavalry at Bonloc ; and the remaining brigade of Harispe to north of Helette ; thus forming a new line from south to north with its front to the west. A battalion of Buchan's Portuguese, which was stationed at La Bastide Clairence, fell back towards Briscous, as this line advanced ; and a brisk fusillade soon called the Third and Lecor's divisions to the assistance of Buchan. Wellington, being informed by signal of the movement, rode to Ustarits to talk over the situation with Hill, having first called the Fourth Division across the Nive at Ustarits and the Sixth to

march southward from Villefranque, in order to sup-^{1814.}
port the Third and Seventh Divisions, which were in
first line about Briscous and Urcuray. On the 4th Jan. 4.
Wellington intended to attack, but was prevented until
the 6th by the rise of the small streams that traversed Jan. 6.
his front. On the afternoon of that day he set his
troops in motion and drove in the French advanced
guard to the east bank of the Joyeuse. Soult fully
expected a general action, but Wellington had no
intention of forcing one, and sent his soldiers back to
their cantonments on the Nive. The French Marshal
therefore despatched Harispe to expel the Spaniards
from the valley of Baigorri and, ordering Clausel to
remain on the Joyeuse, brought Foy's division to the
Bidouse for his support. He thus kept only two
divisions—those of Boyer and Darmagnac—on the
right bank of the Adour, but retained always three
under Reille at Bayonne.

Harispe soon fell upon Mina with vigour, and chased
him from the valley of Baigorri, rather, it should seem,
to the satisfaction of Wellington, who was not sorry
to see Spanish marauders roughly handled, and took
occasion to point the moral of the event for the benefit
of Morillo. But the British Commander-in-Chief was
himself deterred from any active movement by un-
certainty as to the reception of the Treaty of Valençay
by the Spanish Regency ; while Soult was so confident
of the success of the negotiation that he sent Harispe's
division, after it had driven Mina away, to the villages
round the base of Mount Ursouia to watch for the
withdrawal of the Spanish troops and to open parleys
with their officers. In the midst of this period of
suspense came the news that the main army of the
Allies had passed the Rhine. Simultaneously an order
reached Soult from the Emperor that ten thousand
infantry of the army of the Pyrenees, besides cavalry
and artillery, were to march for Paris immediately, and
were to be followed by more troops directly that the
treaty of Valençay should be ratified. Greatly depressed,

1814. the Marshal, though he saw no sign of the retirement
Jan. 16. of the Spaniards, sent away on the 16th Treilhard's division and Sparre's brigade of cavalry, Leval's and Boyer's divisions of infantry, and twenty-eight guns, thus reducing his army to forty-eight thousand men. Napoleon dared not remove more soldiers from the Spanish frontier while the negotiations of Valençay still awaited ratification ; and, though the twelve thousand men which he took from Soult played a noble part in his great campaign of 1814, they were too few to turn it decisively in his favour.

Albeit the diminution of his force demanded imperatively the recasting of his plans, Soult still clung to his entrenched camp at Bayonne, locking up there the five thousand men of Abbé's division in addition to the seven thousand of the regular garrison. Moreover he placed Reille in the command of the whole of these troops, thus raising discord between that officer and Thouvenot, who held the Emperor's commission as Governor of Bayonne. Soult was in fact scheming apparently for the dissolution of the Army of the Pyrenees, and for his own recall to the main army under Napoleon himself, being not unnaturally weary of the ungrateful task assigned to him. The Emperor, however, left Paris for Châlons on the 25th of January without giving him any further instruction.

Jan. 25. On that very day Schwarzenberg's army of one hundred and fifty thousand men had reached the line of Bar-sur-Aube, Chaumont and Langres, while Blücher with about half that number was approaching Brienne. On the 29th Napoleon fell upon Blücher and beat him back from Brienne ; but was himself defeated in turn with heavy loss on the 1st of February at La Rothière.

Feb. 2. On the 2nd the Emperor retired to Troyes ; and on the same day it was decided at the Allied council of war that Blücher should march north-west upon Paris with fifty thousand men, while Schwarzenberg was to turn south-westward upon Bar-sur-Seine and Sens. It was a mad movement in the presence of so great a captain ;

but Napoleon appears to have divined that this might be the outcome of the jealousies and differences among the Allies. He knew that Austria, being greatly alarmed at the growing ascendancy of Russia and Prussia, was anxious to make peace and would move slowly; and he knew that Blücher, spurred on by his own impetuosity and by the ambition of Gneisenau, was ready to take any risk. Between these conflicting wills and aspirations Napoleon saw a path which might yet lead him to victory.

Wellington, meanwhile, commanding indeed some sixty-seven thousand British and Portuguese and twelve thousand Spaniards, but short of money, short of clothing, hampered by the incessant rain, and always tormented by the uncertainty of naval assistance on the coast, had been virtually paralysed during the second half of January. Lord Bathurst, however, at about this time, sent out an intelligent officer—Colonel Henry Bunbury of the Quarter-master-general's department of the Horse Guards¹—to take oral note and personal observation of Wellington's wants; and by the end of the month the financial situation of the army had been greatly improved. On the other hand the attitude of Austria was so doubtful that the British Ministers fully expected the conclusion of peace upon terms advantageous to Napoleon; and they consulted Wellington, in the event of such a misfortune, as to the expediency of sending twenty thousand of his troops to America.² In such a situation the investment of Bayonne and the thrusting back of Soult's army for that purpose were the only enterprises open to the British army; and Wellington accordingly turned his thoughts to the means for passing the Adour.

By the 7th of February he had decided to build a Feb. 7.

¹ The same Bunbury whose work, *The Great War with France*, has been so frequently quoted in these pages. *Supp. Desp.* viii. 508, 525. *Wellington Desp.* Memo. for Col. Bunbury, 1st Feb. 1814.

² *Supp. Desp.* viii. 547.

1814. bridge of small coasting craft below Bayonne, where the river was a quarter of a mile broad, so as to gain the immediate use of the harbour, and had enlisted the aid of Rear-admiral Penrose on the coast to collect the vessels and furnish the necessary appliances. On the 10th the weather at last cleared up, and new dispositions were ordered for Hill's corps; the Sixth and Seventh Divisions under Beresford's command being distributed between the Nive and the Adour as far as Urt, fronting towards Bayonne; and the Second, Third and Lecor's divisions under Hill being assembled between Briscous, Hasparren and Urcuray, with an advanced guard towards La Bastide Clairence. These movements were executed on the 12th; and on the 14th Hope's corps came forward and took up its ground in two lines. The first, made up of the Fourth and Fifth Divisions, extended from Biarritz to the Nive; and the second, Aylmer's brigade and Campbell's Portuguese, was stationed about Bidart. Simultaneously the Fourth Division moved up to the heights of Mouguerre; and Hill with the Second, Third, Lecor's and Morillo's divisions of infantry, a brigade of light cavalry and two light batteries, advanced south-eastward, so as to post his right towards Helette and his left about Bonloc; while the Seventh Division moved up to Briscous. His forces being thus arranged to turn the French left, Hill attacked Harispe's division, which fell back towards Helette and Méharin, and, being further pressed on the 15th, retired towards St. Palais. There the French General took up a position, together with Pierre Soult's cavalry, to cover the road to St. Jean Pied de Port. Towards evening Wellington directed Pringle's brigade to attack him, with Lecor's Portuguese in support, at the same time sending Morillo round Harispe's left flank to cut him off from St. Palais.

Upon hearing Wellington's order that the position must be taken before dark, the Twenty-eighth and Thirty-ninth hastened down into a wooded ravine for the assault of the hill beyond it, and swarmed up the ascent with loud shouts. Harispe's troops, however,

though mostly conscripts, fought very gallantly, disabled 1814.
Pringle and most of the British mounted officers, and Feb. 15.
held the two battalions at bay for a time, until the
advance of Lecor and the turning movement of Morillo
warned the French General to retire to St. Palais, which
he accomplished with the loss of some four hundred
and fifty men, nearly half of whom were prisoners.¹
Farther to the north Picton pressed back Villatte's
division; while Foy's gave way before a few patrols
of Cotton's cavalry. On the evening of the 15th Foy's
division was at Guiche, Bidache and Came; Taupin's
about Bergouey; Villatte's at Ilharre; and in the
course of the night Harispe's division and Pierre Soult's
cavalry crossed the Bidouse by the bridge of St. Palais,
and blew it up behind them.

Soult had already divined that Hope's corps intended
to pass the Adour, and that Wellington was bent upon
manœuvring him away from that river by turning his
left; wherefore he resolved, according to his own
account, to hinder the crossing by concentration of his
troops. On the 16th he was unmolested, the Allies Feb. 16.
being occupied by the restoration of the bridge at St.
Palais; but at eight on the morning of the 17th Hill's Feb. 17.
column debouched from St. Palais towards Domezain;
while the Fourth Division, preceded by Cotton's
cavalry, advanced towards Bidache. Thereupon Soult
withdrew Maransin's division from St. Étienne northward
to Dax, and summoned Darmagnac's to Port de Lanne.
On the south side of the Adour the divisions of Foy,
Taupin and Villatte received orders to prepare to cross
the Gave d'Oloron and line its right bank; and
Harispe's division lay on the east bank of the Saison,
in support of Paris's brigade which guarded the bridge
of Rivareyte. At noon Hill, supported on his left by
Picton, attacked Paris, who, finding his right outflanked
by the Ninety-second, which had forded the Saison at
Osserain, fell back, but failed to destroy the bridge,

¹ The British loss was 120, and the Portuguese 43 killed and wounded.

1814. this being seized by the Highlanders before he could
Feb. 17. blow it up. Harispe then retired to the bridge-head of Sauveterre, his advanced posts holding the villages of Parenties and St. Gladie on the left bank of the Gave d'Oloron. In the course of the day Foy's and Taupin's divisions crossed the Gave by a bridge of boats at Carresse, and took up their position, the former at Ortheville and the bridge-heads of Peyrehorade and Hastingués, the latter between Athos and Sauveterre. Villatte's division prolonged the line from Sauveterre to Laas, and Pierre Soult's cavalry from thence to Navarrenx. Thus Soult had separated himself from the elaborately entrenched camp of Bayonne on the one side, and from St. Jean Pied de Port on the other, upon which points he had hitherto rested his flanks; and was trusting to the Gave d'Oloron to secure him for another day. These Gaves were troublesome obstacles, being fed by the snows of the Pyrenees, and therefore, deep, rapid, treacherous and subject to such sudden rise and fall of water as characterise all glacial rivers; but they were not impassable; and Soult, while professing his ability to maintain himself, already contemplated the possibility of a retreat north-eastward to Orthez.
- Feb. 18. On the 18th Hill pushed Picton's division forward to Parenties and St. Gladie, driving the French outposts to the edge of the Gave, despite the fire of twelve guns
- Feb. 19. on the opposite bank; and on the 19th the deployment of the British was prolonged from St. Gladie through Barraute to Montfort, while Morillo came up over against Navarrenx. In all, four divisions of the Allies, those of Stewart, Lecor, Picton and Morillo, together with two brigades of cavalry, were concentrated between the Saison and the Gave d'Oloron; while Soult's army was divided into two groups of equal strength, the divisions of Harispe, Villatte and Taupin under Clausel about Sauveterre, with one of Pierre Soult's brigades about Navarrenx; and the divisions of Foy, Darmagnac and Maransin, together with Pierre Soult's other

brigade, under d'Erlon about Port de Lanne and 1814. Peyrehorade. "If I am compelled to make another retrograde movement," wrote Soult to Clarke on the 19th, "I shall concentrate my army and fall on the Feb. 19. corps of the enemy that is nearest within reach." But he did nothing of the kind. No general ever gave more lavish expression to his intentions than did Soult at this time, but he could never nerve himself to translate words into deeds. Wellington, knowing his man, was content to have thrust him back so far, and on the same day returned to St. Jean de Luz to superintend the passage of the Adour by Hope. This operation, however, depended necessarily upon the weather at sea, which was so unfavourable that Wellington decided to carry forward the movements upon his right before going further. Accordingly on the 20th he ordered the Light Division to march Feb. 20. from La Bastide Clairence for St. Palais; the Seventh Division to take its place at La Bastide; the Sixth Division to cross the Nive and move to Hasparren; and the Fifth Division to relieve the Sixth before Mousserolles. This done Wellington returned eastward on the 21st, and again took up his head-quarters at Feb. 21. Garris.

Soult meanwhile was utterly puzzled by Hill's halt between the Saison and the Gave d'Oloron. First he thought that Wellington meant to turn his right, Beresford having passed a battalion over the Adour at Urt and collected boats, as if about to throw a bridge across the river. The reports from Pierre Soult of British cavalry and Spanish infantry between Araujuzon on the Gave and Charre on the Saison then made him tremble for his left. At last late on the 23rd the Feb. 23. Seventh Division drove Foy's posts from the outlying works at Hastings and Œyregave into the bridge-head at Peyrehorade,¹ while reconnoitring parties in the south reported to Soult the presence of the Allied troops along the Saison almost to Mauléon. The

¹ The British loss was 55, the Portuguese 37 killed and wounded.

1814. Marshal concluded that Wellington had abandoned the investment of Bayonne, and wrote to Thouvenot asking him to make a diversion in his favour with the garrison of that place. He now made up his mind that Wellington would advance upon the French communications by Pau and Tarbes, and announced that his measures were taken for concentrating his army and accepting battle. Wellington on the same evening issued his orders for a very different movement from that which Soult expected. On the extreme right Morillo was to make a demonstration before Navarrenx and the ford of Dognen, a little above it. On the left of Morillo the Second, Sixth and Light Divisions, Lecor's Portuguese, Fane's brigade of cavalry, two batteries of horse-artillery, one of foot-artillery, and the pontoon-train were to converge by various routes upon the ford of Viellenave, between two and three miles below Navarrenx. On the left of these a battalion of the Second Division was to threaten the ford of Barraute, a little above Sauveterre, and the Third Division and the Hussar Brigade were to make a feint of forcing a passage at Sauveterre itself, and at the fords of Castagnede, Auterrive and St. Dos, below it. Beresford, also keeping the Seventh Division to hold Foy in check, was to send the Fourth Division towards Sorde and Léren, still farther down the water, to find a fit place for throwing a bridge. Altogether the French line on the Gave d'Oloron was threatened at various points along a front of nearly twenty-five miles.
- Feb. 24. At ten o'clock on the morning of the 24th the Third Division advanced towards Sauveterre, and drove in the picquets of the French, who thereupon blew up the bridge.¹ Picton then opened fire with his artillery; and the light companies of Keane's brigade,² covered by a party of the Seventh Hussars, entered the stream below

¹ "The bridge was blown up in our faces"—*Journal of an Officer in the Commissariat*, p. 281. Robinson's *Memoirs of Picton* (a very untrustworthy guide) says the bridge was blown up in the night.

² 1/5th; 2/83rd; 2/87th; 94th.

the bridge, forded it with some difficulty, and lined a wall on the heights on the opposite bank. The hussars then returned; and the French 119th of Villatte's division, falling suddenly upon the light companies, drove them in such confusion down a narrow lane towards the water that they could hardly move. In the panic some tried to swim the river, while others attempted to recross by the ford; but many were drowned, and hardly one would have escaped had not Picton brought forward a battery to cover their retreat.¹ The diversion, however, served its purpose. Soult at once withdrew Harispe's division from Sauveterre towards Orthez; and the numerous fords between Viellenave and Laas, being guarded only by a few cavalry, were easily forced. As the Allied columns came up on the right bank they occupied the heights of Castetbon, and then turned north-westward towards Orion to block the road between Orthez and Sauveterre; but the crossing of the rapid icy water took so much time that Soult was able to withdraw without difficulty.

When night fell Wellington's advanced guard had not moved farther than Loubieng and Castetner. The rest of Hill's corps were between Loubieng and Orion, the Sixth and Light Divisions about Orion, the Third Division and Hussar Brigade near Sauveterre. The divisions of Harispe and Villatte, the latter forming the rear-guard, fell back to Orthez during the night; Taupin's reached Salies at nightfall and crossed the Gave de Pau by the bridge of Bérenx on the morning of the 25th. Vial's brigade of Pierre Soult's cavalry division, after an engagement with Morillo's Spaniards, withdrew towards Pau; Darmagnac's, Foy's and Rouget's² divisions reached Orthez by the road from Peyrehorade, which follows the right bank of the Gave de Pau. Altogether the day's work was not creditable to Soult, for the passage of the Gave d'Oloron had cost the Allies no more than eighty-seven killed,

¹ Donaldson's *Eventful Life of a Soldier*, pp. 347-348.

² The 5th, late Maransin's.

1814. wounded and missing. Nearly all of these belonged to Keane's light companies, though a few were of the Fourth Division, which had missed the fords at St. Dos and lost a small number of men drowned.

- Feb. 25. The Marshal now broke down all the bridges on the Gave de Pau except that of Orthez, behind which, after mining the arches, he directed the whole of his infantry to be concentrated, dispersing most of his cavalry along the right bank above Orthez almost to Pau, with only two battalions to support them, and keeping but one regiment below. Towards noon on the 25th some of Hill's Portuguese came up to the heights over against Orthez, and opened fire from one battery upon the French about the town, while two battalions entered the suburbs on the west bank of the river, and even penetrated for some distance on to the bridge. In the course of the day the whole of Hill's corps, together with the Sixth and Light Divisions, came up behind the Portuguese; while Picton's division, being arrested by the broken bridge at Bérenx, crossed the water by a ford a little lower down. The Fourth and Seventh Divisions and Vivian's brigade of horse under Beresford came up to Peyrehorade. Beresford was unable to pass
- Feb. 26. the river until the 26th, when, finding that Foy had abandoned the bridgehead, he threw some of his troops over the stream by a pontoon-bridge, and the rest, not without danger, by the fords of Cauneille and Lahontan. Leaving the Fifty-first at Œyregave, and sending out a flank-guard northward towards Habas, Sir William pursued his way eastward, the Eighteenth Hussars driving the French 15th Chasseurs with some loss from Puyoo and Ramous. In the evening he halted to east of Baigts, where he was reinforced by Somerset's brigade of cavalry and by the head of Picton's division, which had begun to ford the river below Baigts as soon as Beresford's advanced guard came up level with them. Darkness prevented the passage of the rest of the troops; but in the course of the night a pontoon-bridge was laid, to enable the remainder of Picton's division,

together with the Sixth and Light Divisions, to be 1814. transferred to the north bank.

While these intricate movements of Wellington's right were in course of execution, Sir John Hope had successfully accomplished the passage of the Adour. This enterprise was beset with unusual difficulties. In the first place, the tide ran so fast and so turbulently that ordinary pontoons could not have lived in the broken water ; and hence Wellington had been obliged to collect coasting craft to take their place. But, even when collected, it was necessary that these should be brought over a very dangerous bar, and that they should be accompanied by gun-boats to contend with the French armed flotilla that lay in the harbour. All of these were naval operations, wholly dependent upon favourable weather ; but it was of the greatest importance that they should be accurately combined with the military dispositions for the seizure of a landing-place upon the northern bank. Hope, as we have seen, had already moved up to Anglet on the 14th ; but the withdrawal of the Fifth Division to the right bank of the Nive had weakened his force below Bayonne, for he had been compelled to send Aylmer's brigade and Campbell's Portuguese to take the place of that division about Bassussary, and to make good the loss with Freire's Spaniards, which had been summoned by Wellington from Spain.¹ All arrangements had been made for laying the bridge on the 23rd ; and on the 22nd, in Feb. 22. spite of a not very favourable wind, Admiral Penrose put to sea with the flotilla from St. Jean de Luz, and managed to get every vessel out of the harbour by nightfall. Hope then set heavy guns, pontoons, and troops in motion at midnight, and marched with all secrecy, under cover of the forest of Bayonne, for the sandhills at the mouth of the river. Owing to the extremely ill condition of the tracks the heavy cannon did not arrive until late ; but the men reached their appointed station before dawn ; and at daybreak the Feb. 23.

¹ *Wellington Desp.* To Freire, 18th, 20th Feb. 1814.

1814. enemy's picquets were driven in along the whole front
Feb. 23. from the sea to St. Pierre, and compelled to retire to the entrenched camp.

His intentions being betrayed, as he thought, by the arrival of his guns under the eyes of the French, Hope moved two brigades of Guards, one of the German Legion, a pontoon-train, and a troop of horse-artillery down to the mouth of the Adour, and placed six eighteen-pounders in a battery opposite Le Boucau. The French flotilla, discerning the march of the columns, opened fire upon Maitland's brigade of Guards, but was effectually answered by the fire of rockets, a weapon which was little esteemed by Wellington, but on this day at least proved efficacious. The eighteen-pounders were used chiefly in fruitless endeavours to kindle a French corvette which was lying in the harbour; but succeeded only in killing her captain and thirty of her crew, and in compelling her to move farther up the river. There was, however, no sign of the British flotilla, and it was pretty evident that, owing to foul weather, the bar was impassable. None the less Hope insisted upon an attempt to make good a lodgment upon the north bank; wherefore, keeping the whole French camp engaged by a feint attack against the entrenchments, he caused rafts of pontoons to be constructed, and began to ferry his men over the water. The race of the tide, however, soon forbade the use of rafts, and Hope was obliged to fall back on a few boats which he had with him, and which would not carry more than six or eight men at a time. As he justly remarked, it was rather a nervous operation; but before evening eight companies of Stopford's brigade of Guards had been successfully transferred to the opposite shore, where they ensconced themselves as best they could among the sandhills between the river and the sea.

Meanwhile General Thouvenot with his garrison of eleven thousand men remained perfectly quiet at Bayonne, being convinced that in weather so unfavour-

able the Allies would attempt nothing by sea. At six ^{1814.}
in the evening, on hearing of the British landing at Le ^{Feb. 23.}
Boucau, he sent General Maucombe with two battalions
to ascertain their strength and to act accordingly. The
movement being perceived by the British on the left
bank, some rockets were hastily sent over to strengthen
Stopford, and two horse-artillery guns opened fire upon
the flank of the French columns as they advanced.
Stopford meanwhile allowed the enemy to come within
short range, when a few volleys and some well-directed
rockets caused the French to retreat in panic. At
eight o'clock Maucombe returned and reported that
he had encountered two thousand British, which was
just four times the true number. He took back
with him thirty wounded, leaving several more killed
and hurt upon the ground. Altogether this was a
great day for the rocket-battery: and Hope was fain
to admit that, when the range was short, rockets were
effective on enclosed ground or on water, though very
uncertain when used with any elevation.

On the 24th a favourable breeze brought the flotilla ^{Feb. 24.}
off the mouth of the Adour by daybreak. The surf on
the bar was very formidable, but Captain Reilly of the
Royal Navy nevertheless essayed to pass it; and though
his boat was upset, a few of his men drowned, and him-
self seriously injured, he launched it again into the river
to aid in the passage of the troops, which Hope had
already recommenced. A six-oared cutter followed
Reilly without mishap, and then with the fall of the tide
the bar became impracticable. But, with such craft as
he had, Hope continued to send over in succession the
second brigade of Guards, two brigades of the German
Legion, and part of a Portuguese brigade. The tide
turned and, as it chanced, the wind freshened and blew
almost with the force of a gale. Admiral Penrose
therefore ordered the flotilla to attempt the passage of
the bar again. The leading boat—the barge of the
Lyra—capsized, and every soul in her perished, but
the second boat found the right line of entry. The rest

1814. then followed in succession ; and, though several of them were overset and many brave officers and men were drowned, yet, with the moderating of the wind towards evening, the great majority entered the river in safety, and began the construction of the bridge at once. By nightfall the whole of the First Division had joined Stopford on the north bank, and on the 25th
- Feb. 25. Campbell's and Bradford's Portuguese, two squadrons of cavalry, and two guns followed them. Early on the
- Feb. 26. 26th the whole advanced towards the citadel, and took up a line from Le Boucau by the Château de Matignon (on the main road from Bayonne to Dax) almost to the main road from Bayonne to Port de Lanne ; Aylmer's brigade, the Fifth Division and the Spaniards making a demonstration the while against the entrenched camp. The full extent of this front was nearly four miles, which was too great for the numbers employed, and the eastern section was guarded only by a few posts, too weak to make the investment complete.

On the afternoon of the 26th the bridge was finished. Twenty-six coasting craft, known as *chasse-marées*, were moored bow and stern in line, having five strong cables stretched over their midst by capstans, so as to allow for the rise and fall of the tide, and oak planks bound transversely to the two outermost cables. Above the bridge was moored a boom to avert any attack by the enemy ; though Hope apprehended that this would not avail to fend off fire-ships if they were launched when the tide was ebbing at its fastest. Four gun-boats were also anchored above the boom to watch the enemy's flotilla, and batteries were erected on the bank to second them. Altogether the construction of the bridge was a very remarkable feat, reflecting equal credit on the daring of the seamen who brought the vessels over the bar ; on the ingenuity of Major Sturgeon of the Staff Corps, who designed it ; and on the skill and industry of Captain Todd, also of the Staff Corps, who was responsible for the execution of the work. Even more remarkable is the apathy with which Thouvenot suffered

this difficult task to be completed without raising a finger ^{1814.} to prevent it. It seems that, misled by the sound of ^{Feb. 26.} cannon towards the east, he persisted in the belief that the disembarkation at Le Boucau was only a feint, and that Wellington intended to effect the passage of the river at Urt ; but, be that as it may, the establishment of the bridge within two miles of the citadel of Bayonne cannot be considered creditable either to his vigilance or to his enterprise.

On the 26th Campbell's and Bradford's Portuguese joined the troops on the north bank, and on the morn- ^{Feb. 27.} ing of the 27th, amid the thunder of distant cannon from the region of Orthez, Vandeleur's brigade of cavalry and two troops of horse-artillery crossed the bridge. At two o'clock Hope advanced in three columns ; the first brigade of Guards moving on the left from the Bordeaux road, the brigade of the German Legion and the second brigade of Guards in the centre, and the Portuguese brigade of the First Division on the right, all converging upon the village of St. Étienne. The enemy's position was strong, the village standing upon high ground, where a number of houses and walls had been prepared for defence ; and the French made a stout fight ; but after a sharp struggle the Germans carried the church and churchyard, which were the key of the post, and captured a gun. Two counter-attacks were made from the citadel to recover this trophy, but without success, and the men of the Legion triumphantly brought it off. The loss of the French was one hundred and fifty-eight killed and wounded, and about forty prisoners. That of the five battalions of the Legion alone amounted to three hundred and twenty-eight ; and the casualties of the Guards, though these were not heavily engaged, probably raised the total to at least four hundred. However, the object of the movement was gained, and the Allies took up a new and closer line of investment, from the mill of St. Bernard on the west through St. Étienne to Hayet near the Adour on the east. On the south bank of the river Carlos

1814. d'España's division was in position before Mousserolles ; the Fifth Division between the Nive and Anglet ; and Aylmer's brigade at Anglet. Patrols of cavalry maintained communications with the Seventh Division, and also with the right wing by Peyrehorade ; and Wellington, on hearing that the bridge had been laid at Bayonne, directed boats to be brought up for the establishment of a permanent bridge at Port de Lanne, so as to link his left and his right securely together.

Feb. 26. Let us return now to the right at Orthez. Soult had counted upon the Gave de Pau, with its mined bridges at Bérenx and Orthez, as an impassable obstacle ; and he was not a little annoyed to learn at four in the evening of the 26th that Beresford's divisions were already on the right bank of the Gave de Pau, and the head of his columns approaching Baigts. The news soon spread among the French Generals, who hastened to join the Marshal on the road a little to west of Orthez, where they held an informal council of war. Clausel was for attacking the Allies, divided as they were between the two banks of the river ; but he stood alone in advocating so bold a stroke. The remainder, disheartened by long experience of failure, looked for nothing but defeat, and Soult himself, though he wrote brave words in his despatches to Clarke, was perhaps more thoroughly intimidated than any of them. This being so, his obvious course was to retreat, for in case of mishap the rapid torrent of the Luy de Béarn, spanned by the bridge of Sault de Navailles, lay only seven miles in his rear, and beyond it was a still worse defile over the Adour. Irresolute as usual, however, he could not make up his mind either to accept or decline battle, but as a middle course determined to take up a position on the height covering the road to Dax, in the hope that the sight of his concentrated host might strike dread into the Allies, or, in other words, that his military reputation—already sadly smirched since 1809—would suffice to daunt the rival who had never failed to beat him.

For the night he massed his army in Orthez and to

west of it along a line between the Gave about Castetarbe ^{1814.} and St. Boes, and gave orders for it to be deployed next ^{Feb. 26.} morning along the heights followed by the road to Dax, upon a front of over four miles.

The divisions of Taupin and Rouget, Paris's brigade, and the 15th Chasseurs formed the right, under the command of Reille, who had been withdrawn from Bayonne, and were stationed in rear of St. Boes; the right flank being thrown back in form of a sickle and shielded by a very deep, narrow, wooded combe. On the left of Reille Darmagnac's division covered the ground as far as the junction where the roads to Dax and Sallespisse meet; and on the left of Darmagnac stood Fririon's brigade of Foy's division, with Berlier's brigade prolonging the line to the Gave de Pau a little to the west of Orthez. Of Harispe's division a small portion was detached to hold the bridge and the western suburb of the town, while the bulk was massed to north-east of it on the ridge traversed by the road to Sallespisse. Villatte's division was on a hill to north of Rontun, which lies just to the south of the same road and midway between Sallespisse and Orthez, so as to be able to support Reille at St. Boes. The fords up the water almost to Pau were guarded by Berton's cavalry brigade and the 25th Dragoons; and Pierre Soult's two remaining regiments were sent to Sallespisse. Soult had evidently made up his mind to retire, whatever the issue of the battle—in fact to fight a rear-guard action and draw off his troops as soon as he should have inflicted sufficient loss upon the Allies. The non-combatant corps had already started on the road to Mont de Marsan; the park of artillery was at Aire; the reserve artillery marched for Sault de Navailles during the night; and Reille had received orders to occupy Amou, a little below Sault de Navailles, so as to secure the passage over the Luy in case of retreat.

Wellington, for his part, did not expect Soult to fight, and, not without some justification, construed the Marshal's movements at dusk of the 26th to signify

1814. a retreat.¹ At dawn of the 27th, therefore, the Sixth
Feb. 27. and Light Divisions, which had remained at hand to support Hill, began the passage of the river, and completed it by nine o'clock. Thus there were on the north bank the Hussar Brigade and Vivian's brigade of cavalry; the Third, Fourth, Sixth and Seventh Divisions of infantry; two troops of horse- and four brigades of foot-artillery; while on the south bank, on the heights round the suburb of Départ, were the Second Division, Hill's Portuguese divisions, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Light Dragoons, one troop of horse-artillery and a pontoon-train. Both Commanders-in-Chief were early on the field; Soult correcting the dispositions of Reille on his right; Wellington taking careful note of the French army from end to end. The foreground of the battle-field, seen from the heights by the river, presents a broken undulatory surface, not unlike that of the Weald of Kent, which rises gradually from south to north up to a great round heathery hill which formed the French centre. About a mile to the north-west of this hill stands the village of St. Boes; and here on his extreme right Soult had posted the 12th Light and 15th Chasseurs, with the rest of Taupin's division on its left, and Rouget's division with twelve guns on the round hill to the left of Taupin. West and south-westward from Taupin's position the heathery upland forks out into three narrow ridges, separated by deep valleys.

¹ Napier puts matters too strongly when he says that Wellington did not expect a battle on the 27th, that he anticipated no difficulty in crossing the Gave de Pau, that he considered the French to be retiring on the evening of the 26th, and that he designed to visit Hope at Bayonne. The letters on which he bases this statement are those of Wellington to Hope of 25th and 26th Feb. 1814; in which Wellington says: "*By all accounts* we shall have no difficulty in passing the Gave de Pau . . . the enemy's whole army were in front of Orthez, but *I understand* that they began to retire at dusk . . . I will *try* to go over and see you *if possible*." The words which I have italicised show that Wellington's statements were carefully guarded; and it is indisputable that most of his army crossed the Gave unopposed, and that Soult had begun the movements preliminary to a retreat on the night of the 26th.

Of these the northernmost culminates in a Roman ^{1814.} camp, which, rising nearly as high as the round hill ^{Feb. 27.} above-mentioned and not more than six hundred yards away from it, completely screens from view the ground to westward. It was from this Roman camp that Wellington made his reconnaissance and directed the battle.

Soult's position was strong, and Wellington had not more than thirty-three thousand men against nearly thirty-seven thousand of the French. The round hill, covered on its front by a shallow valley which at that time seems to have been more treacherous ground than it is at present, and defended by the mass of the French artillery, forbade a frontal attack. Soult's left was protected by the town of Orthez, and his right by a network of combes so deep and difficult as to make the progress of any turning column exceedingly slow and easy to check. Wellington therefore decided to direct the Fourth and Seventh Divisions with one battery of artillery and Vivian's brigade of cavalry against the extreme French right; while the Third and Sixth Divisions with the Hussar Brigade were to follow the road from Baigts to Orthez as far as Castetarbe, and then wheel north-eastward to engage the divisions of Darmagnac and Foy. The Light Division, of which two battalions—the Forty-third and the First battalion of the Rifles—had been left in the rear to get their new clothing, was held in reserve at the Roman camp to unite the two attacks. Lastly, Hill was instructed to pass the river about Orthez as soon as he could, and to co-operate according to circumstances.

Soult, posted on high ground a little in rear of St. Boes, could for long see nothing except Hill's battalions motionless on the heights of Départ, and a growing accumulation of troops on the road to east of Baigts; but between eight and nine o'clock the advanced guard of Cole's column began to appear on a ridge to west of St. Boes, having emerged from the marshy valley by which it had advanced from Baigts, while the main body

1814. of the column was still making its way through swamp
Feb. 27. and furze. Half an hour or more later Ross's brigade¹
opened the attack upon St. Boes, drove the 12th Light
from the church and forced it back upon the remainder
of Rey's brigade, which was deployed in rear of the
hamlet. But just to east of St. Boes the ridge which
debouches upon the round hill is straitened to a narrow
neck by the meeting of the heads of four several
combes; and over this neck, though he threw in Vas-
concello's Portuguese brigade to the support of Ross,
Cole could not force his way. Taupin's guns swept the
one street of St. Boes from end to end; and Taupin
himself, leading as usual the foremost of the skirmishers,
launched counter-attacks upon the British from the
combes on both flanks of the ridge. For three hours
the struggle continued; when Wellington, seeing that
he could not force the French right flank, sent Barnard's
brigade² of the Light Division to relieve Cole by
attacking Taupin's left. Barnard accordingly detached
the 3rd Caçadores for the purpose; but this reinforce-
ment arrived too late, for Vasconcello's men had already
given way; and Ross's brigade, whose commander was
disabled by a severe wound, only with difficulty effected
its retreat through St. Boes.

Farther to the right the Third and Sixth Divisions
had wheeled off the road to Peyrehorade, between nine
and ten o'clock, and advanced in two parallel columns;
of which the left, composed of seven battalions of the
Third Division, was directed against the position of
Darmagnac, and the right, which comprised Picton's
three remaining battalions (Wallace's brigade) and the
Sixth Division, against Foy. This attack accomplished
little more than the driving in of Foy's outposts about
Castetarbe, both columns suffering much from the fire
of a battery on the road a little above the church.
Moreover, a small detachment which Picton had sent to
his left towards the southern end of the round hill was

¹ 1/7th; 1/20th; 1/23rd.

² 1/52nd; 3rd Caçadores; 17th Portuguese.

charged by Darmagnac's troops and driven back with some loss.¹ Thus between nine o'clock and noon the Allies had made no progress. But still there was nothing desperate about the situation. The Seventh Division had not yet come up to the support of Cole, owing to the difficulty of bringing forward its artillery through the deep combes, but it was well on its way ; and so far the attack of the Third and Sixth Divisions had been in the nature rather of a demonstration than of a real assault. Wellington therefore now ordered Picton and Clinton to press their onslaught home,² and sent Colborne forward with the Fifty-second to accomplish the work which Barnard's Caçadores, through no fault of their own, had failed to do.

Clinton's division was, it seems, the first to come into action again, soon after noon, his column pointing straight upon Fririon's brigade and upon the battery in rear of it, covered by the fire of four guns. Of the action that ensued no detailed account appears to exist ; but it seems that Fririon's men soon began to waver under the British cannonade, and that Foy, while going down to them, was struck by a shrapnel-bullet and obliged to leave the field. His fall must evidently have demoralised his division. Fririon's brigade fell back in disorder to the north-east, though Berlier's was sufficiently steady to protect the retreat of the fugitives as they floundered across country between the roads to Dax and Sallespisse. Picton then brought up his guns near the meeting-place of these two ways ; whereupon Soult

¹ Napier says, with the loss of several prisoners ; but as only 63 Portuguese and British were missing at the close of the action, the number cannot have been very great.

² This, and no more, seems after careful perusal of Wellington's despatch to be the "sudden change of plan" of which Napier makes so much. Napier would seem to have made it his object to bestow as much praise as possible first upon Soult, next upon Wellington, and last but not least upon the 52nd, of which his brother, George Napier, was major. Napier (who was not present at the action) seems to me to exaggerate absurdly the danger of the moment, and I disbelieve altogether the legend of Soult's slapping his thigh and saying, "At last I have him."

1814. directed a squadron of the 21st Chasseurs to charge
Feb. 27. down the road upon them. What object was thereby to be gained it is difficult to see ; but the brave horsemen obeyed without hesitation, crashed apparently through some of the British infantry, but were caught in a hollow lane by the Eighty-eighth and destroyed almost to a man. The British batteries then advanced beyond the cross-roads and unlimbered, when they, together with the infantry, were exposed for nearly two hours to a most destructive cannonade, seemingly from Villatte's division, which caused terrible losses, until at last the movements upon the other flank, to which we must now return, began to take effect.

As Colborne rode down to his battalion on the reverse or western side of the Roman camp, he was hailed by Wellington, who asked him to ascertain if the valley beneath him were practicable for artillery. Colborne descended to make the trial, and returned at a gallop to report that it was. "Then," said Wellington, "make haste ; take your regiment on and deploy it in the plain, I leave it at your disposition." Colborne accordingly marched off the Fifty-second in column on the road to St. Boes, and reaching the ridge on the opposite side, met Cole retiring with his division. Sir Lowry had evidently lost his head, for he asked Colborne in great excitement what was to be done. Much provoked, Colborne exhorted him to be patient, and deploying his battalion into line to the right plunged down once more into the valley and moved towards its head, which was the point where Taupin's left joined Rouget's right. Shortly afterwards the Seventh Division came up in rear of the Fourth, which was in such disorder that Beresford directed it to be halted and re-formed while the Seventh pushed on to take its place. On its way the Seventh Division had been obliged to detach its Portuguese brigade and two battalions of Gardiner's brigade to check flanking attacks of the French on the ridge of St. Boes, and so reached the actual scene of combat with only four

battalions.¹ General Walker, who was in command, 1814. sent forward the Sixth Foot in extended order to the neck of land which Cole had been unable to force, so as to cover the deployment of Inglis's brigade; and, when the whole had been formed under a very heavy fire, led them forward to the charge. Taupin's division, the right of which had already wavered, there-upon gave way and fell back under the shelter of Paris's brigade, which was echeloned to its right rear. The way on to the plain from the neck being now cleared, Beresford brought forward two troops of horse-artillery and one battery of foot-artillery; and thus for the first time the fire of Taupin's guns was effectively answered.

A little later the Fifty-second came up the head of the combe round the right flank of Rouget, and on reaching the road to Dax opened a heavy fire. The valley over which the men had passed was deep and boggy, so much so that George Napier was unable to ride his horse through it, and many of the soldiers sank in it to the knees. But Colborne, riding ahead to the top of the hill, kept waving them on; and their advance appears to have been, if not unperceived, at any rate unchecked by the enemy, for all the French shot flew over their heads. While Colborne thus assailed Rouget's right, Picton's seven battalions simultaneously fell upon his left; and in half an hour Rouget's entire division gave way in disorder and ran back over the gentle slopes that flow down east and northward from the road to Dax. Taupin's division, overlapped on all sides owing to Rouget's retreat, fled away in sudden panic, and, being crowded in a hollow road, suffered terribly from the fire of Beresford's guns. Darmagnac's division, which for some reason had given not the slightest assistance either to Rouget on its right or to Foy on its left, then retired along the ridge upon which

¹ The 6th of Gardiner's brigade, and the 68th, 1/82nd and Chasseurs Britanniques of Inglis's brigade. Inglis's remaining battalion, the 51st, had been left at Œyregave.

1814. runs the road to Sallespisse and joined Villatte's division, Feb. 27. which had been deployed by Clausel on a transverse ridge athwart the Sallespisse road to the north of Rontun. Behind this screen the routed divisions of Taupin, Rouget and Foy streamed away in confusion through labyrinths of combes and thickets to Sallespisse, and thence north-eastward into the plain of the Luy de Béarn.

Meanwhile Hill, pursuant to his orders,¹ had been busily seeking the means of crossing the Gave de Pau. The ancient bridge had been mined by Soult, but the masonry was so strong that only an insignificant breach had been made in it. The roadway, however, was narrow, and the Portuguese brigade, which with two guns had been appointed to attack it, failed to force a passage. But Hill, doubtless anticipating such an event, made feints with his second Portuguese brigade of fording the stream at various places, and succeeded in throwing Stewart's division over the ford of Souars, about a mile above Orthez. The Portuguese brigade just mentioned then followed it, and the cavalry also, and the whole began to advance northward across the line of the French retreat. To arrest this movement Clausel threw out two battalions of conscripts wide to the south-west to a hill called La Motte de Turenne as a flank-guard, and deployed the rest of Harispe's division to the south of Rontun, on the left of the line already formed by Villatte and Darmagnac. Against this array the Allies now directed the whole of their force. Strangely enough it was Darmagnac's division in the centre which gave way first, after causing heavy loss to Picton's division; then Villatte's on the right flank; and finally Harispe's on the left. As the last-named moved off, the British cavalry came up the high road to Sallespisse, and the Seventh Hussars succeeded

¹ There is no ground whatever for Napier's statement that these orders were given when Wellington "changed his plan of attack"; indeed, Wellington's despatch distinctly implies the contrary. It is incredible that Hill's movements should not have formed part of Wellington's original plan.

in cutting off two battalions from that village and ^{1814.} taking many of them prisoners. As the pursuit was ^{Feb. 27.} pressed, the French, who had begun their retreat in admirable order, became more and more demoralised ; and, had not the country beyond Sallespisse been so thickly enclosed¹ as to be impassable by cavalry, they must inevitably have suffered much. Wellington, meanwhile, had been so severely contused by a bullet on the groin that he was unable to sit in the saddle, and his personal impulse was wanting to the completion of the victory.

Towards six o'clock the French army swarmed down as a disorderly mass to the Luy de Béarn about Sault de Navailles, where some crossed the river by the wooden bridge and others by fords below it. Twelve cannon were unlimbered on a height which commanded the single street of the village ; and through this street, choked with vehicles of all kinds, the defeated troops made their painful way, safe under the protection of their guns from the British cavalry, which had been checked by the darkness and by the obstacle of the river. At ten o'clock Villatte's division and Pierre Soult's cavalry left the village, setting fire to the bridge before the arrival of Harispe, who none the less contrived to extinguish the flames and to throw his division across it. At Hagetmau, eight miles farther north, Taupin's, Rouget's, Foy's, and Darmagnac's divisions, together with Paris's brigade, were at last able to bivouac. Villatte's division struggled up at two o'clock in the morning of the 28th, just as the main body was recommencing its retreat on St. Sever. Harispe's division, sorely tried, trailed on in the rear ; and Berton's cavalry brigade, which had been watching the fords above Orthez, made its way by Mant and Samadet wide on the east towards St. Sever.

The losses of the French in the action and the pursuit amounted to close upon four thousand killed,

¹ Vidal de la Blache calls it "un terrain de steeple-chase."

1814. wounded and prisoners of all ranks,¹ Harispe's division Feb. 27. being that which suffered most seriously. Those of the Allies fell just short of two thousand, of whom rather over fourteen hundred were British and the remainder Portuguese. Wallace's brigade of the Third Division appears from its casualties to have borne the brunt of the action; for the Eighty-eighth had two hundred and sixty-eight of all ranks killed and wounded, and the Forty-fifth one hundred and thirty. But it is probable that the Eighty-eighth, though it takes to itself credit for the destruction of the squadron which charged it, was first considerably cut up by the gallant horsemen. Picton wrote home complacently that the loss of his division reached the total of eight hundred and twenty-five; but according to the official return it did not exceed seven hundred at most, including prisoners; and indeed it is never quite safe to trust Picton's accounts of his own exploits. Ross's brigade of Cole's division counted, among its three battalions, two hundred and eighty-five casualties, over one hundred and twenty of which fell upon the Twentieth. The remaining brigade, Anson's, appears to have been hardly engaged at all. In the Seventh Division, which

¹ Soult to Clarke, 28th Feb. 1814. Casualties of the 27th.

	Officers.			Rank and File.			
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	
Foy's Div. (9 batts.) . . .	4	20	...	40	272	13	349
Darmagnac's Div. (11 batts.) . .	2	43	...	46	369	116	576
Taupin's Div. (10 batts.) . . .	8	19	5	69	444	46	591
Rouget's Div., 5th (7 batts.) . .	3	17	4	93	348	56	521
Villatte's Div. (8 batts.) . . .	...	5	5	35	96	198	339
Harispe's Div. (11 batts.) . . .	2	5	4	95	129	599	834
Paris's Brigade (9 Batts.) . . .	1	13	1	71	102	260	448
Cavalry	2	5	1	58	150	50	266
Total	22	127	20	507	1910	1338	3924

really did the hardest of the work, the Sixth had one hundred and forty-five killed and wounded; but Inglis's brigade escaped without heavy loss. In the Light Division the Fifty-second, which thought that it had done the whole of the work, and had indeed played a very honourable part, lost eighty-nine; and the remaining regiments hardly came under fire. In the Sixth Division only three battalions were touched, and among them the damage was trifling, except in the Forty-second, which lost one hundred and ten killed and wounded, having shared, it seems, in the havoc wrought by the 21st Chasseurs.¹

As to the action itself, it is noteworthy chiefly as an example of Soult's irresolution, and of Wellington's power of taking advantage of that weakness. Soult had two opportunities of taking the offensive effectively: first when the Allies were crossing the Gave de Pau at Bérenx, and secondly when the Sixth and Light Divisions were making a flank march across his front, covered only by the Third Division and the Hussar Brigade, to get into their appointed places in the line of battle. He had also after the first repulse of Cole's and Picton's attacks an excellent opportunity of making his retreat without danger, and with all the credit of a victory. But being determined neither to fight nor to withdraw he naturally handled his troops very ill, most notably in using Darmagnac's division to cover the retirement instead of directing all its efforts to the protection of Rouget against the flanking attack of the Third Division. He seems also to have trusted too much to the strength of the ground which he occupied; otherwise the Fifty-second could never have penetrated his line, as it did, practically unperceived and unmolested. When once he had determined to stand his ground, the issue of the fight was hardly doubtful. It is absurd to say with Napier that the crisis of the battle was decided by the Fifty-second, valuable though

¹ Anton's *Retrospect of a Military Life*, pp. 106-107; *Personal Narrative of a 42nd Highlander*, pp. 233-234.

1814. Colborne's service undoubtedly was; and it is inaccurate Feb. 27. to say that Wellington had only one Portuguese regiment left in reserve, for he had also two battalions of Rifles at the Roman camp, and there were two British brigades—Anson's of the Fourth Division and Lambert's of the Sixth—besides the Portuguese brigade attached to the Sixth Division, which had not lost one hundred men between them. In the matter of the pursuit juster cause may be found for criticism. There is nothing surprising in the fact that Wellington sent Colborne orders to halt after his first success, and would not allow him to pursue alone; but it is not obvious why the left wing of the Allies did not at once press more closely upon the flank of Villatte, nor why the Allied commanders allowed themselves to be so long imposed upon by the array of Villatte, Darmagnac, and Harispe. The explanation no doubt is that Wellington was disabled by his wound from directing the fight on the spot; and that none of his lieutenants had the courage to take the initiative without his orders. But a really effective pursuit is a thing which, though easily commended on paper, is not so easily accomplished in the field; a fact which is sufficiently proved by the extreme rarity of such a phenomenon in the history of war.

Feb. 28. On the morning of the 28th the British army resumed its march in three columns; the left column (Seventh and Light Divisions and Vivian's cavalry) by Amou and St. Cricq; the centre (Third, Fourth and Sixth Divisions, the Hussar Brigade, and reserve artillery) by the great road to St. Sever; and the right column (Hill's corps and Fane's cavalry) by Lacadée and St. Médard upon Samadet. The French army on the same morning had assembled on the right bank of the Adour at the intersection of the roads to Grenade and Mont-de-Marsan, just to the north of St. Sever, with the rear-guard on the heights which command the bridge and the right bank, and Pierre Soult's cavalry lining the wide and deep valley of the Luy de Béarn. This cavalry was

thrust back to Hagetmau by Wellington's centre ^{1814.} column, but, after charging the leading troops of the ^{Feb. 28.} Allies, was able to retreat unmolested. Soult meanwhile retired eastward towards Grenade with the divisions of Clausel, Reille and Foy, pushing out Harispe's division on the left bank of the Adour as a flank-guard, and keeping Darmagnac's division at St. Sever. Upon reaching his head-quarters at Hagetmau on that afternoon Wellington issued his orders for an attack upon St. Sever; but in the night Soult decided to withdraw south-eastward upon Aire and Barcellone. From this point, so he flattered himself, he could throw his troops into the way of the Allies, whether they advanced north-westward upon Bordeaux or eastward upon Toulouse.

Resuming his march, therefore, on the 29th Well- ^{Feb. 29.} ton detached Beresford and the left column to Mont-de-Marsan to seize the magazines in that place, and proceed on a mission, which will presently be described, to Bordeaux; while Hill on the right struck eastward through Samadet upon Aire, and the centre column, after repairing the broken bridge at St. Sever, crossed the Adour and overtook the French rear-guard at Cazères. On the afternoon of the 1st of March this rear-guard was twice ^{March 1.} attacked; and d'Erlon, who commanded it, would have retired on the morning of the 2nd had not Soult urged him to stand fast in order to ascertain whether the entire force of the Allies was really present. D'Erlon therefore remained at Cazères with Foy's and Darmagnac's divisions, while Soult disposed Clausel's troops upon the heights of Lasserre on the left bank and Reille's on the right bank of the Adour about Aire, apparently with some idea that Wellington, while pressing back d'Erlon, would push his army between the two lines of fire presented by Clausel and Reille.

At nine o'clock on the morning of the 2nd the ^{March 2.} central column of the Allies attacked the front and right of d'Erlon, who at once began to retire upon Barcelonne. Heavy rain had been falling for more than twelve hours

1814. past ; the country was flooded ; and the movement of
March 2. the French was consequently so slow that d'Erlon's rear-guard suffered somewhat from the British artillery before he reached his appointed position about Barcelonne. Towards two o'clock in the afternoon, to the utter surprise of Soult and in some degree even of Wellington, Hill's column approached Aire from the north-west by the valley of the Lourden. Perceiving an enemy before him, Sir Rowland at once sent forward Stewart's division against the French right, which rested upon Aire, and directed Da Costa's Portuguese brigade to assail their centre. Stewart without difficulty drove back Villatte's division on the right, penetrated to the road which leads due south from Aire upon Pau, and pressed his adversary so hard that Villatte was only rescued by the arrival of Rouget's division from the right bank. The Portuguese encountered Harispe's division, which resisted them so stoutly that they gave way in absolute rout. Fortunately Stewart was able to detach Barnes's brigade to their aid, and these beat back Harispe in his turn. The enemy, however, renewed the combat until Byng's brigade, coming up on Hill's right, finally forced Harispe to retire by Larquerat upon Crabot, and to seek refuge with Taupin's division. Thus the Allies at last secured the town of Aire. The loss of the British in this affair was one hundred and fifty-six killed and wounded, which was shared pretty equally by the Fiftieth, Twenty-first and Ninety-second. Soult made no return of his casualties, but Hill took one hundred prisoners, and not a few of the French ran away southward to Pau, which was not the line of their commander's retreat.

The rise of the waters owing to the continual rain, the consequent wreck of the repaired bridge of St. Sever, and the destruction of all other bridges by the French, enabled Soult to draw off his troops without molestation. In the course of the night he ordered the four divisions under Reille and Clausel to fall back eastward towards Maubourguet, keeping the divisions of Foy and Darmagnac and four regiments of cavalry about

Barcelonne until the morning of the 3rd, when they also ^{1814.} retired leisurely to Plaisance. Though aware that a ^{March 3.} column of troops of all arms had entered Mont-de-Marsan, Soult concluded from the presence of Wellington and Hill upon both banks of the Adour that the entire army of the Allies was following him, and decided to abandon Bordeaux and to shift his line of operations to Toulouse. Wellington, for his part, was fain to halt. The flooded streams were too rapid to permit his pontoon-bridges to be laid, and it was thus impossible either to move troops or to bring forward supplies. Soult, however, continued to retreat as though the Allies were still at his heels, evacuating Pau, and showing eagerness only to cover the road to Toulouse. His army, now reduced to twenty-five thousand infantry, a thousand cavalry and thirty-eight guns, marched like a mob, with the cavalry in flank and rear to sweep up the stragglers. By the 8th his head-quarters and Harispe's ^{March 8.} division were at Tarbes; Villatte's division at Vic-de-Bigorre, about ten miles to north; the divisions of Taupin and Maransin under Reille about Maubourguet, yet six miles farther to north; Foy's and Darmagnac's divisions under d'Erlon about Plaisance, most northerly of all. All contact between the contending armies had been lost; so that for the moment there was a lull in the operations, from which we must turn for a moment to survey the proceedings of the coalesced powers of Europe.

APPENDIX I

EFFECTIVE STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN, 29TH APRIL 1813

CAVALRY.

Effective Rank and File.
Regiment, Brigade, Division.

Household	{ 1st Life Guards . . .	208	} 725	} 7672
Brigade	2nd Life Guards . . .	224		
	Royal Horse Guards . . .	293		
Ponsonby's	{ 5th Dragoon Guards . . .	361	} 1085	
Brigade	3rd Dragoons . . .	353		
	4th Dragoons . . .	371		
Fane's	{ 3rd Dragoon Guards . . .	330	} 696	
Brigade	1st Dragoons . . .	366		
Maj.-Gen. Long	{ 13th Light Dragoons . . .	320	320	
G. Anson	{ 12th Light Dragoons . . .	335	} 725	
	16th Light Dragoons . . .	390		
Victor	{ 14th Light Dragoons . . .	380	} 998	
Alten's	1st Hussars K.G.L. . . .	387		
Brigade	{ 2nd Hussars K.G.L. . . .	231	} 512	
Bock's	1st Dragoons K.G.L. . . .	258		
Brigade	{ 2nd Dragoons K.G.L. . . .	254	} 1530	
Grant's	10th Light Dragoons . . .	505		
Brigade	{ 15th Light Dragoons . . .	521		
	18th Light Dragoons . . .	504	} 655	
Campbell's	4th Portuguese Cavalry . . .	282		
Brigade	{ 6th Portuguese Cavalry . . .	373	} 746	
D'Urban's	1st Portuguese Cavalry . . .	293		
Brigade	{ 11th Portuguese Cavalry . . .	197		
	12th Portuguese Cavalry . . .	256		

INFANTRY.

First Division (Howard (acting)).

Effective Rank and File.
Regiment. Brigade. Division.

Howard's Brigade	{	1/1st Guards . . .	355	}	829	} 4933
		2/1st Guards . . .	430			
		1 Company 5/60th . .	44			
Stopford's Brigade	{	1st Coldstream Guards .	574	}	1363	
		1/3rd Guards . . .	746			
		1 Company 5/60th . .	43			
Low's Brigade	{	1st Line K.G.L. . .	544	}	1519	
		2nd Line K.G.L. . .	499			
		5th Line K.G.L. . .	476			
Halkett's Brigade	{	1st Light K.G.L. . .	584	}	1222	
		2nd Light K.G.L. . .	638			

Second Division (Hill) (W. Stewart).

Cadogan's Brigade	{	1/50th . . .	675	}	2389	} 9581	
		1/71st . . .	873				
		1/92nd . . .	776				
		1 Company 5/60th . .	65				
Byng's Brigade	{	1/3rd . . .	738	}	2239		
		1/57th . . .	679				
		Provisional Batt. {	1/31st				359
			66th				407
O'Calla- ghan's (Pringle's) Brigade	{	1/28th . . .	818	}	2282		
		2/34th . . .	596				
		1/39th . . .	768				
		1 Company 5/60th . .	70				
Ashworth's Brigade	{	6th Portuguese . . .	1017	}	2671		
		18th Portuguese . .	1216				
		6th Caçadores . . .	438				

Third Division (Picton).

Brisbane's Brigade	{	1/45th	447	}	1806	} 5716
		74th	433			
		1/88th	732			
		3 Companies 5/60th	194			
Colville's Brigade	{	1/5th	510	}	1782	
		2/83rd	410			
		2/87th	501			
		94th	361			
Power's Portu- guese Brigade	{	11th Caçadores	277	}	2128	
		9th Portuguese	908			
		21st Portuguese	943			

Fourth Division (Cole).

Effective Rank and File.
Regiment. Brigade. Division.

William Anson's Brigade	{	3/27th	.	.	.	622	2329	
		1/40th	.	.	.	607		
		1/48th	.	.	.	449		
		Provisional Batt.	2nd.	326				
			53rd	269				
Skerrett's (Ross's) Brigade	{	1/7th	.	.	.	639	1622	
		20th	.	.	.	584		
		1/23rd	.	.	.	360		
		1 Company Brunswick-Oels					39	2537
		11th Portuguese					1018	
		23rd Portuguese					1094	
		7th Caçadores					425	

Fifth Division (Oswald).

Hay's Brigade	{	1/3rd	587	1694	{	5959	
		1/9th	633				
		1/38th	442				
		1 Company Brunswick-Oels	32				
Robinson's Brigade	{	1/4th	581	2183			
		Provisional Batt. {	30th				250
			44th				153
			2/47th				406
		2/59th	759				
Spry's Portu- guese Brigade	{	1 Company Brunswick-Oels	34	2082			
		3rd Portuguese	850				
		15th Portuguese	875				
		8th Caçadores	357				

Sixth Division (Pakenham) (Clinton).

Stirling's (Pack's) Brigade	{	1/11th	609	3147	{	
		1/42nd	493			
		1/61st	541			
		1/79th	602			
		1/91st	851			
		1 Company 5/60th	51			
Hinde's (Lam- bert's) Brigade	{	1/32nd	511	900		
		1/36th	389			
Madden's (Douglas's) Portu- guese Brigade	{	8th Portuguese	942	2469		6516
		12th Portuguese	1095			
		9th Caçadores	432			

Seventh Division (Dalhousie) (Le Cor). Effective Rank and File.
Regiment. Brigade. Division.

Barnes's Brigade	{	6th	944	1860	5993
		Provisional Batt. { 24th	293		
		2/58th	245		
		9 Companies Brunswick-Oels	378		
Inglis's Brigade	{	51st	374	2031	
		68th	419		
		82nd	470		
		Chasseurs Britanniques	768		
Le Cor's (Doyle's) Portu- guese Brigade	{	7th Portuguese	784	2102	
		19th Portuguese	890		
		2nd Caçadores	428		

Light Division (Charles Alten).

Kempt's	{ 1/43rd	895	} 1776	} 4976
Brigade	{ 1/95th	532		
	{ 3/95th	349		
Vandeleur's	{ 1/52nd	819	} 1217	
Brigade	{ 2/95th	398		
Portuguese	{ 1st Caçadores	602	} 1983	
Brigade	{ 3rd Caçadores	453		
	{ 17th Portuguese	928		

Silveira's (Hamilton's) Portuguese Division.

Portuguese Brigades: Da Costa, Campbell	{	2nd Portuguese	1115	4660	
		14th Portuguese	986		
		4th Portuguese	1106		
		10th Portuguese	1174		
		10th Caçadores	279		
Pack's	{			1979	8968
(Wilson's)		4th Caçadores	471		
Portu- guese		1st Portuguese	699		
Brigade		16th Portuguese	809		
Bradford's		{			
Portu- guese	5th Portuguese		469		
Brigade	13th Portuguese		786		
	24th Portuguese		1074		

Total (exclusive of officers and serjeants) 75,152

APPENDIX II

CHANGES IN COMMAND OF DIVISIONS AND BRIGADES, 1813

CAVALRY.

First Division. No G.O.C. Cotton absent till 25th June.
Long's Brigade became Grant's on 6th September.
Grant's Brigade became Vivian's on 24th November.
(The 7th Hussars joined this brigade in October.)

INFANTRY.

First Division. Graham was appointed to command on 19th May; was home 8th October, and was succeeded by Sir John Hope, Howard acting as his assistant, while Graham commanded the left wing.

Howard's brigade, while he commanded the division, was commanded by Lambert until 2nd July, and then by Maitland.

Löw went home on 6th May. Hinüber commanded the K.G.L. Infantry from 20th October.

Aylmer's brigade (76th, 2/84th, 85th) joined the Army in August, and was attached to the First Division.

The 2/84th was transferred to Robinson's brigade on 17th October, and the 77th New Lisbon was added to Aylmer's brigade on 24th November.

Second Division. W. Stewart commanded "under Hill's direction."

Cadogan's brigade, after Cadogan's death at Vitoria, was commanded first by J. Cameron (92nd), who was disabled at Maya on 23rd July; then by Walker from August to 18th November, and finally, when Walker took over the Seventh Division, from 20th November onward by Barnes.

Third Division. Colville was in command until Picton returned from leave in May, and then returned to his brigade till 8th August, when Keane took it over.

Picton was again absent from 8th September till late in

December, and in the interval Colville again commanded the Third Division, Keane retaining Colville's former brigade.

Fourth Division. On 2nd July Skerrett was transferred to the Light Division, and Ross took over his brigade.

Fifth Division. Oswald commanded the division until Leith returned from sick leave on 30th August. Leith was wounded on 1st September, and Oswald resumed command on that date for a few weeks. At the Bidassoa (9th October) Hay commanded the division, and Greville of the 38th took over his brigade.

Sixth Division. Pakenham commanded from 6th January to 26th June, when Clinton returned, but was again absent on 22nd July, when Pack took over the division, Pakenham having become Adjutant-General. Pack was wounded on 28th July, and Pakenham took over the division till 8th August, when it was transferred to Colville, who commanded it until Clinton's return after the passage of the Bidassoa (9th October), when Colville went back to the Third Division.

On 2nd July Pack took over Stirling's brigade, and Lambert took over Hinde's brigade. Stirling returned to his brigade when Pack got the division, but went home in October.

Douglas took over Madden's brigade of Portuguese in the autumn.

Seventh Division. Dalhousie was absent after the Bidassoa (9th October). At the Nivelle (9th November), Le Cor was in command, but on 18th November Walker took over the division in Dalhousie's absence.

Le Cor was apparently transferred to the command of Hamilton's Portuguese division.

After the transfer of Barnes to the Second Division, Gardiner took over his brigade.

Light Division. Vandeleur took over a cavalry brigade (G. Anson's) on 20th July, and Skerrett then took over his infantry brigade, but went home in September, when John Colborne took command of the infantry brigade which had been Vandeleur's.

Portuguese Troops. Da Costa and Campbell commanded the brigades under Silveira till the end of the battles of the Pyrenees. By 9th November Hamilton was again in command of the Portuguese division, but at the fighting on the Nive (9th-11th December) Le Cor had the division and Da Costa and Buchan the brigades.

When Pack was moved to the Sixth Division (2nd July), Wilson took over his brigade until disabled by wounds on the 18th November, and was then replaced by A. Campbell.

(Abridged from Mr. C. T. Atkinson's Appendix to Professor Oman's *Wellington's Army*, pp. 365-371.)

APPENDIX III

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE FRENCH ARMY AT THE BATTLE OF VITORIA

ARMY OF THE SOUTH (GAZAN)

ADVANCED GUARD (FIFTH DIVISION).			Officers.	Men.
Maransin	12th, 45th Line		58	2869
FIRST LIGHT CAVALRY DIVISION (PIERRE SOULT).				
Vinot's Brigade	} 2nd, 21st Cavalry Leg. . . .	}	78	1588
? Brigade				
	5th, 10th Cavalry Leg. . . .			
FIRST DIVISION OF DRAGOONS (TILLY).				
Ismert's Brigade	} 2nd, 4th Dragoons	}	88	1841
Ormancey's Brigade				
	14th, 26th Dragoons			
FIRST INFANTRY DIVISION (LEVAL).				
Mocquéry's Brigade	} 9th, 24th Line	}	109	4735
? Brigade				
	88th, 96th Line			
THIRD INFANTRY DIVISION (VILLATTE).				
Rignoux's Brigade	} 27th, 63rd Line	}	93	5781
Lefol's (?) Brigade				
	94th, 95th Line			
FOURTH INFANTRY DIVISION (CONROUX).				
Rey's Brigade	} 32nd, 55th Line	}	129	6460
Schweiter's Brigade				
	43rd, 58th Line			

SIXTH INFANTRY DIVISION (DARRICAU).

		Officers.	Men.
St. Pol's Brigade	} 21st, 100th Line . . . }	101	4834
Rémond's Brigade			
Total		656	28,108

ARMY OF THE CENTRE (D'ERLON)

SPANISH INFANTRY BRIGADE (?)	?	?
LIGHT CAVALRY } 27th Cav. Leg., Nassau Light	?	?
BRIGADE (AVY) } Cavalry }		

DIVISION OF DRAGOONS (TREILHARD).

? Brigade	19th, 22nd Dragoons . . . }	?	?
? Brigade	13th, 18th Dragoons . . . }		

INFANTRY DIVISION (DARMAGNAC).

? Brigade	28th, 75th Line . . . }	?	?
German } ? ? . . . }			
Brigade			

INFANTRY DIVISION (CASSAGNE).

? Brigade	51st, 54th Line	.	.	?	?
Blondeau's	} 8th, 16th Line	.	.	}	?
Brigade					

ARMY OF PORTUGAL (REILLE)

SECOND DIVISION OF DRAGOONS (DIGEON).

? Brigade	16th, 21st Dragoons . . . }	83	1784
? Brigade	5th, 12th Dragoons . . . }		

DIVISION OF DRAGOONS (MERMET).

? Brigade	6th, 11th Dragoons . . . }	?	?
? Brigade	15th, 25th Dragoons . . . }		

LIGHT CAVALRY DIVISION (CURTO).

? Brigade	3rd, 22nd, 26th Light Cavalry }	?	?
? Brigade	13th, 14th Light Cavalry . }		

INFANTRY DIVISION (LAMARTINIÈRE).

? Brigade	118th, 119th Line . . . }	?	?
? Brigade	120th, 122nd Line . . . }		

INFANTRY DIVISION (SARRUT).

? Brigade	2nd, 36th Line . . . }	?	?
? Brigade	3rd, 4th, 65th Line . . . }		

(From *Archives de la Guerre*.)

APPENDIX IV

ORGANISATION OF THE FRENCH ARMY OF THE PYRENEES, 16TH JULY 1813

Commander-in-Chief.—Marshal Soult. 69,543 men (exclusive of artillery and engineers).

Chief of Staff.—Lieut.-General Gazan.

Chief of Artillery.—General of Division Tirlet.

RIGHT WING (REILLE)—15,484 INFANTRY

First Division (Foy).			Third Division (Maucune).		
<i>Brigade Commanders</i> —Berlier, Fririon.			<i>Brigade Commanders</i> —Pinoteau, Montfort.		
	Officers.	Men.		Officers.	Men.
6th Light . . .	18	603	17th Light . . .	20	755
36th Line . . .	39	985	15th Line . . .	40	886
39th Line . . .	23	676	66th Line . . .	24	556
65th Line . . .	35	941	82nd Line . . .	23	478
69th Line . . .	41	1356	36th Line . . .	17	473
76th Line . . .	23	667	84th Light . . .	16	737
	170	5228		140	3885
<i>Artillery.</i>			<i>Artillery.</i>		
6th Company 4th Regt. Foot Artillery.			19th Company 1st Regt. Foot Artillery.		
1st Company 2nd Batt. Train Artillery.			5th Company 12th Batt. Train Artillery.		

Ninth Division (Lamartinière).

Brigade Commanders—Gauthier, Menne.

	Officers.	Men.
2nd Light	17	418
118th Line	18	1212

	Officers.	Men.
119th Line	22	996
120th Line	41	1863
122nd Line	28	1443
	126	5926

Corps Cavalry—13th Chasseurs, 22 officers, 372 men.

Artillery—20th Company 3rd Regt. Foot Artillery.
6th Company 12th Batt. Train Artillery.

CENTRE (D'ERLON)—20,063 INFANTRY.

Second Division (Darmagnac).

Brigade Commanders—Chassé,
Guardet.

	Officers.	Men.
16th Light	22	1042
8th Line	20	1003
28th Line	47	1076
51st Line	17	1158
54th Line	19	1125
73rd Line	40	1198
	165	6602

Artillery.

13th Company 7th Regt. Foot
Artillery.

2nd Company 2nd Batt. Train
Artillery.

Third Division (Abbé).

Brigade Commanders—Rignoux,
Rémond.

	Officers.	Men.
27th Light	22	889
63rd Line	18	1120
94th Line	29	1470
95th Line	22	1133
64th Line	42	1461
5th Light	42	1275
	175	7348

Artillery.

?

Sixth Division (Maransin till September 1813, then Darricau).

Brigade Commanders—Baille de Saint Pol, Mocquéry.

	Officers.	Men.
21st Light	24	938
28th Light	17	602
24th Line	20	885
96th Line	23	996
100th Line	23	1211
103rd Line	25	1039
	132	5641

Corps Cavalry—22nd Chasseurs, 13 officers, 171 men.

Artillery—2nd Company 8th Regt. Foot Artillery.
4th Company 5th Batt. Train Artillery.

LEFT WING (CLAUSEL)—16,331 INFANTRY.

Fourth Division (Conroux).

Brigade Commanders—Rey,
Schweiter.

	Officers.	Men.
12th Light . . .	28	1121
22nd Line . . .	31	1561
43rd Line . . .	36	1149
45th Line . . .	8	887
55th Line . . .	13	931
58th Line . . .	12	996
	128	6645

Artillery.

19th Company 3rd Regt. Foot
Artillery.
5th Company 2nd Batt. Train
Artillery.

Fifth Division (Vandermaesen ;
after Sept. 1813, Maransin).

Brigade Commanders—Barbot,
Rouget.

	Officers.	Men.
25th Light . . .	19	503
27th Line . . .	19	564
50th Line . . .	21	832
59th Line . . .	24	865
130th Line . . .	36	1167
	119	3931

Artillery.

1 Company 1st Regt. Baden
Foot Artillery.
Baden Train Artillery.

Eighth Division (Taupin).

Brigade Commanders—Stormdegrave, Lecamus.

	Officers.	Men.
9th Light	36	1159
31st Light	10	610
26th Line	25	778
47th Line	39	1272
70th Line	35	860
88th Line	18	667
	163	5346

Corps Cavalry—15th Chasseurs, 13 officers, 217 men.

Artillery—3 Companies 1st Regt. Foot Artillery.
3 Companies 2nd Batt. Train Artillery.
1 Company 4th Batt. Train Artillery.

RESERVE (VILLATTE)—12,654 INFANTRY.

Brigade Commanders — Boivin, Thouvenot, Naustein, Verbigier
de St. Pol, Jamin, Guy.

Spanish Generals—Casapalacio, Soler.

	Men.		Men.
4 and 5/115th Line . . .	1411	Det. 114th Line . . .	300
3/118th Line	492	101st Line	661
2/119th Line	438	4th Light	637
3/31st Line	300	10th Light	263

	Men.
National Guard des Landes . . .	200
Mobile Guard, Basses Pyrénées . . .	450
2nd Regiment, Nassau .	1115
4th Regiment, Baden .	667

First Cavalry Division (P. Soult).

Brigade Commanders—Vinot,
Berton, Sparre.

	Officers.	Men.
2nd Hussars .	17	298
21st Chasseurs .	18	379
5th Chasseurs .	16	327
10th Chasseurs .	25	473
Nassau Mounted Chasseurs .	14	222
1st Spanish Chasseurs	25	169
2nd Spanish Chasseurs	27	188
Guadalaxara Hussars	12	139
5th Dragoons .	18	392
12th Dragoons .	15	399
	—	—
	235	3746

	Men.
1st Regiment, Frankfort	284
Italian Brigade . . .	1349
Spanish Brigade . . .	1168
Gendarmes . . .	900
Royal Guard . . .	2019

Second Cavalry Division
(Treilhard).

Brigade Commanders—Ismert,
Ormancey, Avy.

	Officers.	Men.
14th Dragoons .	17	409
16th Dragoons .	17	239
21st Dragoons .	20	349
26th Dragoons .	16	290
17th Dragoons .	14	295
4th Dragoons .	14	350
	98	1982

Engineers.

4 Companies Sappers.

Artillery.

(Over above Divisional Artillery)

4 Batts. Horse ; 3 Batts. Foot ;
5 Batts. Train.

APPENDIX V

TROOPS UNDER MARSHAL SUCHET,

1ST SEPTEMBER 1813

Total, 37,104 Men.

ARMY OF ARAGON.

			Men.
First Division Musnier	{ 1st Brigade, Millet	{ 1st Light .	1239
		{ 12 1st Line .	1362
	{ 2nd Brigade ?	{ 114th Line .	1278
Second Division Harispe	{ 1st Brigade, Mesclop	{ 7th Line .	850
		{ 44th Line .	734
	{ 2nd Brigade, Pannetier	{ 116th Line .	1540
Third Division Habert	{ 1st Brigade, Gudin	{ 14th Line .	1089
		{ 16th Line .	1204
	{ 2nd Brigade, Montmarie	{ 117th Line .	1096

10,397

ARMY OF CATALONIA.

First Division M. Mathieu	{ Brigade, Ordonneau	{ 18th Light .	1023
		{ 5th Line .	1719
	{ Brigade, ?	{ 20th Line .	1046
		{ 79th Line .	1452
Second Division	{ Brigade, Petit	{ 23rd Light .	1070
		{ 67th Line .	1104
	{ Brigade, Beurmann	{ 60th Line .	2038
		{ 115th Line .	1543

10,995

CAVALRY.

Brigade, Delort	{ 4th Hussars	588
		13th Cuirassiers 536
Brigade, Meyer	{ 24th Dragoons	540
		Westphalian Light Horse 155

1839

GARRISONS—479 Officers, 13,878 Men.

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